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ABSTRACT
Reflection on free agency has largely been motivated by perceived threats to its very existence, which, in turn, has driven the philosophical conversation to focus on the question of whether we have the freedom required for moral responsibility. The Stoics were early participants in this conversation, but they were also concerned about an ideal of inner moral freedom, a freedom over and above that required for responsibility, and one to which we might aspire over the course of our lives. Though some details of the Stoic ideal would be difficult for many of us to accept, I argue that it merits our attention for the way it focuses on the removal of inner obstacles to virtue, leading to improved moral vision and the willingness to follow that vision. I then show how we can harness resources from contemporary theorizing on responsible agency to capture the structure and scalar nature of such an ideal, thereby helpfully situating ideal moral freedom in relation to the freedom relevant to moral responsibility. I outline three possible contemporary versions of such an ideal, noting how each will be sensitive to related commitments in metaphysics, moral psychology, and normative theory.
Acknowledgements
This project – a descendent of a larger one – has evolved over a long period of time and has benefitted from the input of many others. I am especially grateful to the following readers: James Baillie, Joseph Campbell, Justin D. Coates, Isabel Cortens, Martha Eshleman, John Martin Fischer, Michael McKenna, Paddy McShane, Garrett Pendergraft, Neal Tognazzini, and two anonymous referees for this journal. I’d also like to thank colloquium audiences at: University of Hawaii, Manoa; University of Arkansas at Little Rock; and Western Washington University. Finally, I’m grateful to fellow participants in two on-line workshops devoted to work on free agency and responsibility: FLAW and ZOWAR.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 All quotations from and references to the Discourses and Handbook (Enchiridion) are from Epictetus (Citation2014).
2 Related ideals of freedom have originated within the Hindu, Buddhist, and Daoist traditions.
3 I earlier (Eshleman Citation2014) hinted at this possibility. Here, I seek to develop it further.
4 For example, we might think that the virtue of justice entails that we remain angry about a historical injustice.
5 In the text, I am emphasizing the widely acknowledged fact that these forms of injustice are embedded in societal structures, not simply in individual biases. It also might be the case that we are limited in the extent to which we can entirely eliminate such obstacles to full virtue within ourselves. Finally, difficult normative issues are raised by the phenomenon of internalized forms of oppression. Though members of oppressed groups may internalize forms of oppression, one need not assume that virtue demands the same of them as it does of others. I’m grateful to Paddy McShane for highlighting this last point for me.
6 The actively resistant nature of moral ignorance is now also much discussed in diagnosing obstacles to racial justice (see e.g., Moody-Adams Citation1994; Sullivan and Tuana Citation2007).
7 Murdoch’s emphasis on the role of moral imagination highlights the fact that when aspiring to be morally better, we often may have only a tenuous grasp of that for which we are reaching. Similarly, Anges Callard has recently characterized the aspiration to value something new as a form of agency wherein an agent ‘strives to see what she cannot yet get fully into view’ (Citation2018, 4). Unfortunately, space does not permit engaging Callard’s provocative argument that this entails the existence of a distinctive kind of ‘proleptic’ reason, though it may bear on the ‘reasons-responsiveness’ aspect of models discussed later.
8 I’m grateful also to learn from an anonymous referee of work in contemporary philosophy of religion which overlaps to some degree with the present topic. Many theistic thinkers have maintained that (a) those in heaven continue to possess free will; and (b) those in heaven have become wholly virtuous and are thus incapable of wrongdoing. This seems close to the Stoic ideal, especially if free will is conceived to increase by degree, alongside virtue. The ‘Problem of Heavenly Freedom’ arises if free will entails access to alternatives in the libertarian sense, for then it might seem that the second claim rules out the first. However, some (e.g., Pawl and Timpe Citation2009) argue that when properly construed, free will—including access to some alternative possibilities in the libertarian sense—is consistent with perfect virtue. As we’ve seen, the ancient Stoics were not similarly concerned with access to such alternative possibilities.
9 One notable caveat that cannot be pursued here is the question of what constraints there might need be on how one arrived at the values that generate one’s identifications.
10 I am grateful to Isabel Cortens for reminding me of this passage in relation to the present point.
11 In envisaging the combination of mesh and reasons-responsive views, I have been aided by Wolf (Citation1987; Citation1990), along with McKenna and Van Schoelandt (Citation2015), though again, their aim was to assess the combination for characterizing the freedom relevant for responsibility, rather than ideal moral freedom.
12 A few qualifying notes. Fischer and Ravizza offer their view as an account of ‘guidance control’, rather than freedom, but regard guidance control as the freedom-relevant condition for moral responsibility (Citation1998, 38). They have held that the relevant responsiveness is best attributed to action-generating mechanisms, or processes, in the agent giving rise to the action. However, I here follow others in attributing the responsiveness to agents (see e.g., Wolf Citation1990; Nelkin Citation2011; Mckenna Citation2013; and Sartorio Citation2018).
13 Though Fischer and Ravizza aim to characterize a threshold conception of control necessary for moral responsibility, they acknowledge, for contrast, the possibility of a form of responsiveness that is not just strong, but ‘super’ (Citation1998, 44).
14 Kongzi’s (Confucius’) self-characterization at 70, after a lifetime of conscientiously cultivating his virtue, suggests considerable success in approximating such an ideal: ‘ … I could follow my heart’s desires without overstepping the bounds of propriety’ (Analects II.4 in Slingerland Citation2003, 9).
15 In his ‘ecumenical’ account of the attributability necessary for responsibility, Shoemaker (Citation2015) likewise combines these two possible sources of identification. The present model adds idealized moral responsiveness to such an account.
16 This possibility is hinted at in Shoemaker’s discussion (Citation2015, 127–128), though as an aside as he pursues a different point.
17 As Gushee (Citation2020, 35:24) points out, the LGB individuals in these circumstances have often faced similar turmoil within themselves before coming out—that is, a struggle between self-love/care and a set of values they may have reflectively adopted, given their acculturation.
18 As Bennett highlights, Huck also seeks to rid himself of ambivalence and regain wholeheartedness, but by altogether abandoning appeals to principled morality (Citation1974, 131).
19 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for prompting me to highlight this issue and comment on it, if only provisionally.
20 Here, I’ve drawn from Frankfurt’s initial stage-setting characterization of freedom of the will: ‘ … the question about the freedom of his will has to do with whether he has the will he wants to have’ (Citation1988, 20) and his on-going subsequent emphasis on the ways in which one can be alienated from one’s will. Notably, in characterizing the sense in which an agent may be responsible for her character, Russel too remarks that the question is ‘ … whether or not she is alienated from the values and attitudes she has developed’ (Citation2009, 400).
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Andrew Eshleman
Andrew Eshleman is Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Portland, United States. He has written on freedom, moral responsibility, the problem of evil, and religious fictionalism.