![Sample our Social Sciences journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/110822/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Social-Sciences.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
The main aim of this paper is to illustrate the distinctive features of the Finnish school of critical theory, focusing especially on its reception of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and his ideas regarding the concept of social pathology. In this respect, the article will provide a concise description of the philosophical work of some of its members: Onni Hirvonen, Heikki Ikäheimo, Arto Laitinen and Arvi Särkelä. The paper consists of seven parts. First, the paper will sketch a very general account of Honneth’s theory of recognition and social life, and, secondly, it will describe the ways the Finnish scholars have reinterpreted Honneth's paradigm of recognition. The third part will discuss two conceptions of social pathology that Honneth has explicitly endorsed in his intellectual career: Christopher Zurn’s idea of pathology as a second-order disorder, and the organicist conception of social pathology, which Honneth himself has put forward in his essay The Diseases of Society: Approaching a Nearly Impossible Concept. Part four and five will then look at how the Finnish theoreticians have discussed and criticized these two conceptions of social pathology that are central in Honneth's work. In part six, the paper will briefly introduce some of the more fundamental criticisms that scholars have aimed at Honneth and, more or less directly, at the Finnish scholars. Finally, the article will explain why the new perspectives of Laitinen, Ikäheimo, Hirvonen, and Särkelä are, in any case, consistent with Honneth's philosophical perspective.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The following account does not represent an historical reconstruction of Honneth’s theory. It only aims to clarify the concepts that constitute the invariant elements of Honneth’s work, and to better understand the nature of the work of the Finnish scholars that will be presented in the following pages.
2 See Honneth (Citation2014b), pp. 125-129.
3 The Finnish scholars that, through the second part of the 20th century and the beginning of the new millennium, have shown interest and have participated actively in critical theory’s debate are undoubtedly many more. Thomas Wallgren has underlined how a “gradual rise of interest, first in Frankfurt School critical theory and to a smaller extent French and Italian Marxism and poststructuralism, and later in feminist philosophy and postmodernism, can be noted at Finnish universities from the late 1960s onwards, becoming relevant especially at the University of Jyväskylä and involving a noticeable number of scholars and theorists” (Wallgren Citation2003, 560–572). In line with this tendency, Wallgren, Rauno Huttunen, and Arto Laitinen have highlighted, for instance, how Habermas’ thought has been influenced by Georg Henrik von Wright and Finnish legal theorist, becoming in turn rather meaningful for the development of Finnish social research in many sides (Huttunen, Laitinen, Wallgren Citation2019).
4 There are other Finnish recognition-theorists, like Risto Saarinen and Heikki Koskinen, whose studies are less critical and more oriented to addressing the problem of religious recognition. See, for instance, Saarinen (Citation2016) and Koskinen (Citation2019).
5 For a complete overview of this conceptual clarification see Ikäheimo and Laitinen (Citation2007, 34–37) and Laitinen (Citation2003, 77–79).
6 To deepen the theme of recognition in terms of attitudes of recognition cf. Ikäheimo (Citation2002, 447–462) and Ikäheimo and Laitinen (Citation2007, 42–51).
7 Cfr. Ikäheimo and Laitinen (Citation2007, 37–39).
8 Cfr. Honneth (Citation2007, 329–330).
9 On this topic see especially Honneth (Citation2002, 171–199).
10 For a deeper understanding of this conception of social life, see in particular Särkelä (Citation2014, 87–105). Here the issue of the struggle for recognition, a central topic for Honneth at least until the publication of Freedom’s Right, is precisely reinterpreted by drawing a parallel between the competitive image of recognition elaborated by Dewey and the process of recognitive reconciliation described by Hegel when he deals with the dialectic of consciousness in the Phenomenology.
11 Ultimately, Särkelä clarifies how the idea of democratic ethics introduced by Dewey and taken up by Honneth is compatible with the dynamics of social conflict and with the substantial and progressive transformation of a given normative framework.
12 In line with the purposes of the first section, this part of the article intends to present a conceptual clarification and map of Honneth’s ideas regarding the issue of social pathologies, not an historical reconstruction of the evolution of Honneth’s thoughts about the topic. For a precise historical account of Honneth’s ideas concerning this topic see, for instance, Laitinen and Särkelä (Citation2019a & Citation2019b). Nevertheless, it is worthy to clarify why the present section does not take into account the distinction between “social pathology” and “social misdevelopment”, which has been introduced by Honneth in Freedom’s Right (Honneth Citation2014b, 128–129). Simply, Honneth himself states that the social misdevelopments should not be subsumed under the concept of “social pathology”, but under the broader category of “social wrong”. In this regard, a discussion of the idea of “social misdevelopment” is beyond the scope of this paper. For an acute and precise analysis and critique of Honneth’s distinction between “social pathology” and “misdevelopment” see Freyenhagen (Citation2015).
13 Cfr. Honneth (Citation2014a, pp. 698-699).
14 As an anonymous reviewer has pointed out, Zurn’s conceptualization of social pathologies would have been problematic for Honneth even before 2011. In fact, in an interview about racism in 2007, Honneth states that the solution to social pathologies cannot be just an act of reflection, which aims to correct a second-order belief. See https://www.eurozine.com/rassismus-als-sozialisationsdefekt/?pdf
15 Similarly, following Ikäheimo, even in the deontological and contributory spheres there can be conditional and unconditional forms of recognition. A person can be respected only for prudential, calculative reasons. A staunch racist could engage in public tolerant behavior towards ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities just to not be sanctioned by the laws of his country. In the labor market, it is possible to assume unconditional recognitive attitudes when gratitude is manifested for someone's efforts regardless of the results of their work performance. In this case, we appreciate not only the material results achieved by those who are recognized and their usefulness for our personal purposes, but also their intention and efforts aimed at contributing to general well-being and cooperation within the community to which they belong.
16 For an alternative and interesting account of Honneth’s (and Durkheim’s) organicism, more inclined to underline the positive features of such a paradigm, see Thijssen (Citation2012) in which “organic solidarity is conceived of as a synthesis of both instrumental and empathic considerations. Instrumental solidarity results from a universalistic identification of others as useful exchange partners. Emphatic solidarity results from a particularistic identification with the singularity of another individual and the perceived misrecognition of his qualities and needs” (pp. 467-468).
17 For a broader description of these types of pathology and an analysis of the contribution of John Dewey's reflection in this regard, see in particular Särkelä (Citation2017, 107–126). In this essay, Särkelä analyzes in particular the reflections that the American philosopher elaborated in a cycle of lectures in China held between 1919 and 1920.
18 “Ideology culminates thus in an unintended learning process; it is unintended since the ideological consciousness intends not to change the world, but only itself; yet it is a learning process, because, in changing itself, the ideological consciousness also appears to change the world. Ideology denotes, then, a learning process that goes beyond itself: the participants learn to acknowledge the practical consequences of their ideological conceptions as the truth of those conceptions by assuming the standpoint of a generalized other – the great institutional achievement of the ideological experience itself” (Särkelä Citation2015, 77).
19 See Fraser and Honneth (Citation2003).
20 See McNay (Citation2008).
21 See Thompson (Citation2016, 63–88).
22 See Harris (Citation2019).
23 It is worth noting that there are other scholars that, following similar theoretical assumptions concerning Honneth’s theory of recognition, have contributed to the analysis of such specific topics. Hans Arentshorst has mainly discussed the limits and contributions of Honneth’s perspective regarding the problem of degenerations of democratic politics, and social and political freedom (Arentshorst Citation2016), and of Honneth’s normative conception of the market and economics (Arentshorst Citation2015). Heidi Elmgren instead has deepened the study and the critique of the idea of meritocracy and its relation to recognition (Elmgren Citation2015, Citation2018). Further contributions on the topic of social pathology developed by Finnish scholars can be found in the volume “Special Issue-Pathologies of Recognition”, Studies in Social and Political Thought, vol. 25, 2/2015.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Corrado Piroddi
Corrado Piroddi is a PhD candidate at Tampere University. His primary research interests include ethics, critical theory, social ontology, political philosophy. He has also published in Italian journals such as Consecutio rerum, Philosophical Readings, and La società degli individui.