‘Tell him that he is different’: how U.S. intelligence tried to recruit the Soviets in Iran

ABSTRACT

This article first describes the intelligence landscape in Iran in the mid-and late 1970s where intelligence services from three countries, the USA, the Soviet Union, and Iran, were involved in a standoff. It offers an in-depth overview of these organizations and explores their history, emergence, and expansion. Then, the article dwells on approaches and methods that the U.S. intelligence agencies employed for the recruitment and co-option of would-be renegades. In particular, the article focuses on the concepts of psychological vulnerabilities and ‘MICE’ and how they were applied to find people who are already mentally defected and manipulate them toward betrayal. Two cases of the Soviet officials in Iran who became targets of recruitment approaches are analyzed in depth. Besides, ethical considerations in recruitment operations are examined briefly.

KEYWORDS:

• Intelligence
• KGB
• CIA
• Iran
• SAVAK
• MICE
• betrayal
• psychological vulnerability

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Andreeva Elena, Russia and Iran in the Great Game: Travelogues and Orientalism (Abingdon and New York: Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern History, 2007); Atkin Muriel, Russia and Iran 1780–1828 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); Fiorani Piacentini, Valeria, ‘Aspetti Originali Della Politica Napoleonica nel Persia nel Quadro Duello Anglo Francese,’ Storia e Politica, 7, no. 4 (1968): 637–647; Kazemzadeh Firuz, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914. A Study in Imperialism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968); Kelly Laurence, Diplomacy and Murder in Tehran: Alexander Griboyedov and the Tsar’s Mission to the Shah of Persia (London: IB Tauris, 2001); Mikhail Volodarsky, „Persia and the Great Powers, 1856–1869,” Middle Eastern Studies, 19, no. 1 (1983): 75–92.

² Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK) – Intelligence and Security Organization.

³ Muslim Students Following the Line of the Imam, Documents of the U.S. Espionage Den (DUSED) (Tehran: Center for the Publication of the US Espionage Den’s Documents, 2010); Ayatollah Khomeini called a U.S. Embassy ‘a den of espionage (asnad-e laneh-e jasusi)’ day after it was stormed by the ‘students’. s. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran and the United States. An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace (New York and London: Bloomsbury, 2014. Electronic book), 58.

⁴ Ian Mather, ‘CIA hostages: the tell-tale documents. Evidence emerges that four were CIA operatives,’ Maclean’s. Canada’s Weekly Magazine, 8 February 1981. https://archive.macleans.ca/article/1981/2/9/cia-hostages-the-telltale-documents

⁵ David Ignatius, ‘Bungles, Bobbles and Spies,’ The Washington Post, 5 May 1991 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/05/05/bungles-bobbles-and-spies/c0887d2f-3be5-48ae-929b-99e72acf8e0b/

⁶ Documents of the U.S. Espionage Den (DUSED) (Tehran: Center for the Publication of the US Espionage Den’s Documents, 2010). Access the following link while referring to different volumes of DUSED throughout this paper: https://archive.org/details/DocumentsFromTheUSEspionageDen/Documents%20from%20the%20U.S.%20Espionage%20Den%20v01/

⁷ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World (London: Penguin Books, 2018. Electronic book), 205–231; Vladimir Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB, My life in Soviet Espionage (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990); Lev Kostromin, Moya zhizn‘ – razvedka. Iz vospominanii professional’nogo razvedchika [My life is intelligence. The memoirs of the intelligence officer] (Moscow: Detektiv Press, 2011); Leonid Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy. Zapiski nachal’nika sovetskoi razvedki [The Moscow’s hand. Notes of the head of the Soviet intelligence] (Moscow: Terra, 1996); Manouchehr Hashemi, Davari: Sohani dar Karnameh-ye SAVAK [judgment – some remarks about SAVAK] (Los Angeles: Ketab Corp., 2004); Fard Erfan, Dar damgah-e hadese. Goftegui ba Parviz Sabati [In the net of Events. Interviews with Parviz Sabeti] (Los Angeles: Ketab Corp., 2012); Hussein Fardust, Zohur va soqut-esaltanati-ya Pahlavi [The rise and fall of the Pahlavi dynasty], volume 1 (Tehran: Ettela’at, 2004).

⁸ Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The 1953 Coup in Iran,’ Science & Society, 65, no. 2 (2001): 182–215; Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia. Muhammad Mossadegh and a very British Coup (London: Vintage Books, 2013); William Daugherty, ‘Truman’s Iranian Policy, 1945–1953: The Soviet Calculus,’ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 15, no. 4, (2002): 580–593; Andreas Etges, ‘All that Glitters is Not Gold: The 1953 Coup against Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran,’ Intelligence and National Security, 26, no. 4 (2011): 495–508; Koch Scott, ‘Zendebad Shah!’: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq, August 1953, History Office of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1998. Declassified in 2017, published online in February, 2018 by the National Security Archive: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/iran/2018-02-12/cia-declassifies-more-zendebad-shah-internal-study-1953-iran-coup; Fariborz Nokhtari, ‘Iran’s 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue,’ The Middle East Journal, 62, no. 3 (2008): 457–490.

⁹ Harold Saunders, ‘The Crisis Begins,’ in American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, ed. Warren Christopher et al. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 46.

¹⁰ Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure. The Fall of the Shah (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 267.

¹¹ Ronen Bergman, The Secret War with Iran (Oneworld Publications, 2008), 4. Furthermore, a note of caution should be added here on what constitutes the term ‘informant’ and how the Iranians defined it. An informant can be a formally authorized and managed agent as well as a more informal ad hoc contact.

¹² Pollack, Kenneth, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004), 95. Also on this assumption s. Penelope Kinch, ‘The Iranian Crisis and the Dynamics of Advice and Intelligence in the Carter Administration,’ Journal of Intelligence History, 6, no. 2 (2006): 75–87, 75.

¹³ Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails. Lessons From the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2012), 17–18.

¹⁴ Ibid, 60–108.

¹⁵ Fard Erfan, 287–288; A. A. Gorokhov and G. V. Pipiya, ‘Podryvnaya deyatel’nost’ Iranskoy razvedki protiv Sovetskogo Soyuza,’ [Subversion activities of Iranian intelligence against the Soviet Union] Trudy Vysshei Shkoly KGB, 9 (1975): 232–244, 236 https://www.kgbdocuments.eu/assets/books/journals/tvs/09.pdf; Philip Cherry, ‘U.S. Intelligence and the Shah, 1957–1979: A case of asymmetric intelligence liaison’ (Master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2010), 19 https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/553466

¹⁶ Abbas Milani, The Shah (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Electronic book), 393.

¹⁷ DCI Richard Helms to Henry A. Kissinger, 8 September 1970, Office of the Director, Iran, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-4, Washington, DC. Cited in Philip Cherry, 19.

¹⁸ Philip Cherry, 44.

¹⁹ Mark Gasiorowski, ‘US Intelligence Assistance to Iran, May–October 1979,’ Middle East Journal, 66, no. 4 (2012); 613–627, 621.

²⁰ US Embassy Tehran. Memorandum for Edward J. Ganin by Donald C. Paquin. 29 October 1979. DUSED vol. 55, 22.

²¹ Ibid, 22; All his hopes were crushed in less than a week later as the U.S. embassy was stormed and Ahern and other employees were taken hostages

²² Meir Doron and Joseph Gelman, Confidential. The Life of Secret Agent Turned Hollywood Tycoon Arnon Milchan (Jerusalem: Gefen Books, 2011), 80.

²³ Lev Kostromin, 277–278.

²⁴ Manouchehr Hashemi, 421.

²⁵ A. A. Gorokhov and G. V. Pipiya, 236. Among such officers were, e.g., Peter ‘Petya’ Ringland and his Ukrainian wife Valentina stationed in Iran in 1971–1973.

²⁶ Lev Kostromin, 151–152. According to some anecdotal evidence, the person in question may have been Peter ‘Petya’ Ringland who, during his Temporary Duty Travel (TDY) in Kabul, tried to recruit a KGB-controlled asset when he was ‘suddenly’ detained by the Afghan police. s. Yuriy Totrov, „Deyatel’nost‘ sovetskoy razvedki v Azii v 1960-e – 1980-e gg.“ [Soviet intelligence activities in Asia in the 1960s through the 1980s] in Trudy Obshhetstva izucheniya istorii otechestvennykh spetssluzhb, ed. V.K. Bylinin (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2007), vol. 3, 293–305, 301.

²⁷ A. A. Gorokhov and G. V. Pipiya, 236.

²⁸ Yuriy Totrov, 296. Other fancy names for such groups worldwide were (and in many instances still are) ‘Survey Unit’, ‘Field Research Unit Joint Technical Advisory Group’, ‘Composite Analysis Group’, ‘Area Liaison Coordination Detachment’, ‘Research Management Branch’ and many others. These entities were staffed by the CIA employees disguised as ‘civilians’ who worked for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.

²⁹ Frank J. Johnson died in a terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983. s. Kai Bird, The Good Spy. The Life and Death of Robert Ames (New York: Broadway Books, 2014), 297–298.

³⁰ In March 1978, Hart was stopped at the checkpoint in Tehran and brutally beaten by two Revolutionary Guards. Hart claimed after his retirement that he killed them in an act of self-defense. s. Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes. The history of the CIA (New York & London: Doubleday, 2007), 370; Greg Miller, ‘Howard Hart, legendary figure in CIA clandestine service, dies at 76,’ The Washington Post, 18 May 2017 https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/howard-hart-legendary-figure-in-cia-clandestine-service-dies-at-76/2017/05/18/56b4144e-3731-11e7-b4ee-434b6d506b37_story.html

³¹ DUSED. On George Cave s. vol. 10 (pp. 4, 6, 26, 28, 48), 17 (p. 63), and 56 (p. 5); on James Higham – vol. 52 (pp. 90–92); on Frank J. Johnson – vol. 52 (pp. 72, 87, 92); on William Warnell – vol. 52 (p. 78); on Howard Hart and Waldimir Skotzko s. ‘Political and Political-Military Sections”, vol. 7 (pp. 85–86).

³² Abdul Rahman Ahmadi, SAVAK va dastgah-e ettela’ati Esrail [The SAVAK and the Israeli intelligence service] (Tehran: Institute for political studies and research, 2008), 75.

³³ The 2^nd, 3^rd, 7^th, and 8^th directorates dealt with intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. Other directorates had administrative functions.

³⁴ Christian Delannoy, SAVAK (Paris: Stock, 1990), 63, 67-68, 202; Yves Bonnet,VEVAK. Au service des ayatollahs(Timée-Edition, 2009), 65; Uri Bar-Joseph, “Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution,”Journal of Strategic Studies, 36, no. 5 (2013): 719–742, 721–727.

³⁵ Christian Delannoy, 15.

³⁶ Manouchehr Hashemi, 350–353, 445–477.

³⁷ Christian Delannoy, 93–194; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), 96; Manouchehr Hashemi, 411, 414–415.

³⁸ William Sullivan, 22.

³⁹ Manouchehr Hashemi, 419.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 365.

⁴¹ Fard Erfan, 293–294.

⁴² Abraham Ribicoff ‘Lessons and Conclusions,’ in American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, ed. Warren Christopher et al. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 392.

⁴³ Uri Bar-Joseph, 723–724.

⁴⁴ Essa Molavi Vardanjani and Davood Feyzafra ‘Barrasi monasebat-e sazeman-e ettela’at va amniyat-e keshvar (SAVAK) dar dovran-e pahlyavi ba sazeman-e ettela’at-e esrail-e mossad’ [Investigating the relations between the Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) and the Israeli intelligence service (Mossad) during the Pahlavi era] Quarterly Journal of Research in History, Politics and Media, 1, no. 4 (2019): 513–528, 516 http://ensani.ir/file/download/article/1591777696-10273-1399-21.pdf

⁴⁵ James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian Relation (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), 403, 430.

⁴⁶ Essa Molavi Vardanjani and Davood Feyzafra, 518; Abdul Rahman Ahmadi, 147–156. On interrogation and torture s. Trita Parsi, Treacherous alliance: the secret dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007. Electronic book), 26, f.n. 29, 288; Christian Delannoy, 203–204; James Bill, 403.

⁴⁷ Christian Delannoy, 202.

⁴⁸ Revealing in this context is the AFOSI’s list of the KGB and the GRU officers compiled in February 1978 with the remark that their Iranian source complained that the list was not current due to extensive problems in obtaining data from the SAVAK about arrivals and departures s. DUSED, vol. 48, 113.

⁴⁹ Manouchehr Hashemi, 419, 450.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 364–365.

⁵¹ Hussein Fardust, 457.

⁵² Abbas Milani, 394.

⁵³ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 151.

⁵⁴ Lev Kostromin, 148–149.

⁵⁵ It ran through 1,750 km on land and 750 km through the Caspian Sea.

⁵⁶ Manouchehr Hashemi, 463–472.

⁵⁷ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 151.

⁵⁸ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 206.

⁵⁹ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 205; DUSED, ‘The Soviet intelligence presence in Iran’, 2 June 1974, vol. 47, 62; This estimate is in line with that of General Fardust who mentioned around 50 Soviet intelligence officers in his book. s. Hussein Fardust, 456.

⁶⁰ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky (ed.) More ‘instructions from the centre’: top secret files on KGB global operations, 1975–1985 (Abingdon, The UK: Frank Cass, 1992), 86.

⁶¹ On mastering Farsi by the heads of the residency s. Vladimir Kuzichkin, 114 (Kostromin), 149 (Kazankin), 283 (Shebarshin).

⁶² Leonid Shebarshin, 116.

⁶³ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 210.

⁶⁴ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 333–337

⁶⁵ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 217.

⁶⁶ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 361–365; Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2007), 191–192.

⁶⁷ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 343–346.

⁶⁸ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 144–145.

⁶⁹ DUSED, vol. 48, 115.

⁷⁰ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 148, 196–200; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 214–216.

⁷¹ Abbas Milani, 391.

⁷² Christian Delannoy, 145.

⁷³ Abbas Milani, 395.

⁷⁴ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 196–197.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 200.

⁷⁶ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 215.

⁷⁷ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, f.n. 41, 622.

⁷⁸ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 147–148; Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‘Space-age spies,’ Newsweek, 6 March 1978, 37; Amnesty International Report (1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978) (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1979), 257.

⁷⁹ On a psychological profile of the Shah s. Marvin Zonis, Magestic Failure. The Fall of the Shah (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

⁸⁰ Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, 215–216, 218; Abbas Milani, 397.

⁸¹ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 104–105, 146–147.

⁸² Anatoliy Zhitnukhin, Leonid Shebarshin (Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2014), 98.

⁸³ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 222–223.

⁸⁴ DUSED. ‘Guidance regarding personal relationships with nationals of the Soviet Union and certain other communist countries,’ Department of State, 20 April 1979. vol. 52, 28.

⁸⁵ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, 87.

⁸⁶ ‘Tolik’ is a diminutive name of ‘Anatoliy’ and is usually used among relatives and friends.:

⁸⁷ DUSED, vol. 52, 72.

⁸⁸ DUSED, vol. 52, 47–65 (Sazanov), 72–93 (Ramkov).

⁸⁹ John Marks, The Search for the ‘Manchurian Candidate’: The CIA and Mind Control. The Secret History of the Behavioral Sciences (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 164, 172.

⁹⁰ Eleni Braat and Ben de Jong ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Precarious State of a Double Agent during the Cold War,’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, (2022): 1–30, 16–17.

⁹¹ John Marks, 173.

⁹² Andrew Twiddy, ‘The Recruitment of Soviet Officials,’ Studies in Intelligence, 8, no. 1 (1964): 1–15 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78T03194A000200020001-1.pdf; Martin Brabourne, ‘More on the Recruitment of Soviets,’ Studies in Intelligence, 9, no. 1 (1965): 39–60 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000609084.pdf

⁹³ Martin Brabourne, 40.

⁹⁴ Martin Brabourne, 41.

⁹⁵ Wilhelm Marbes, ‘Psychology of Treason,’ Studies in Intelligence, 30, no. 2 (1986): 1–11 https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006183135.pdf

⁹⁶ Ibid, 2.

⁹⁷ Ayelett Shani, ‘Why People Betray Their Countries, According to an Israeli Expert. Interview with Ilan Diamant,’ Haaretz, 20 September 2020 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-why-whistleblowers-betray-their-countries-according-to-an-israeli-expert-1.9167750

⁹⁸ Wilhelm Marbes, 3.

⁹⁹ Sun Tzu, Art of War. Translated by Lionel Giles (London: Luzak & Co., 1910). Updated by Bob Sutton. Chapter 13, paragraph 10 https://suntzusaid.com/book/13 In this context, in 2021, a Chinese rocket technician who had been overlooked for promotion, defected to the UK. Marco Giannangeli, ‘Global tensions grow as Chinese rocket scientist defects to the West;’

Express, 23 January 2022https://www-express-co-uk.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.express.co.uk/news/world/1554695/China-rocket-scientist-defects-West-MI6-global-tensions/amp

¹⁰⁰ Ayelett Shani, online.

¹⁰¹ Adjudicative Desk Reference. Assisting Security Clearance Adjudicators, Investigators, and Security Managers in Implementing the U.S. Government Personnel Security Program (Defense Personnel and Security Research Center, 2014), 268 https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=831537

¹⁰² Martin Brabourne, 41.

¹⁰³ Wilhelm Marbes, 9.

¹⁰⁴ Martin Brabourne, 41.

¹⁰⁵ Adjudicative Desk Reference, 264; Wilhelm Marbes, 9.

¹⁰⁶ David Charney, NOIR: A White Paper. True Psychology of the Insider Spy (Part I), (NOIR for USA, Inc., 2014), 2 https://noir4usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/NOIR-White-Paper-17JUL14.pdf

¹⁰⁷ Lydia Wilson, ‘Reversal Theory: Understanding the Motivational Style of Espionage,’ International Journal of Intelligence Ethics, 3, no. 1 (2012): 76–100, 92.

¹⁰⁸ DUSED, vol. 52, 47–48.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 47–48.

¹¹⁰ ibid, 47–48.

¹¹¹ Vladimir Kuzichkin, 140, 149, 215, 266–267.

¹¹² DUSED, vol. 47, 66; vol. 48, 80.

¹¹³ Victor Cherkashin, Spy handler: memoir of a KGB officer: the true story of the man who recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 152.

¹¹⁴ Dmitriy Prokhorov and Oleg Lemekhov, Perebezhchiki. Zaochno rasstrelyany [The Defectors. Shot in absentia] (Moscow: Veche, 2001), 391. Cherpinsky revealed the identities of the KGB officers who worked under diplomatic cover. Soon after his defection, the Belgian authorities declared three Soviet diplomats persona non grata – among them Sergey Naryshkin, who in 2016 was appointed the head of the Russian foreign intelligence, the SVR. s. Evgeny Krutikov ‘Kto i kak predal budushhego glavu rossiskoi razvedki,’ [Who and how betrayed the future head of Russian intelligence] Vzglyad, 3 August 2021 https://m.vz.ru/society/2021/8/3/1112099.html

¹¹⁵ DUSED, vol. 47, 90–91.

¹¹⁶ Leo Carl, The CIA Insider’s Dictionary of US and Foreign Intelligence, Counterintelligence & Tradecraft (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1996). Carl calls it a ‘former Soviet KGB acronym’, 366.

¹¹⁷ Stanislav Levchenko, On the Wrong Side: My Life in the KGB (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 106.

¹¹⁸ Randy Burkett, ‘An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS,’ Studies in Intelligence, 57, no. 1 (2013): 7–17, 9 https://cyberwar.nl/d/fromCIA.gov/Burkett-MICE%20to%20RASCALS.pdf

¹¹⁹ Terence Thomson, ‘Toward an Updated Understanding of Espionage Motivation,’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 27, no. 1 (2014): 58–72, 61.

¹²⁰ Randy Burkett, 11.

¹²¹ Christopher Smith, ‘John Cairncross, RASCLS and a reassessment of his motives,’ Intelligence and National Security, (2022):1–15, 1–2.

¹²² Randy Burkett, 7.

¹²³ Randy Burkett, 7–17; Ian Stanier and Jordan Nunan, ‘Identifying informant motivation: The FIREPLACES Framework,’ Crest Security Review, Summer (2021): 24–27 https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/fireplaces-and-informant-motivation/

¹²⁴ Randy Burkett, 13.:

¹²⁵ Stephen Grey, The new spymasters. Inside espionage from the Cold War to global terror (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 67.

¹²⁶ DUSED, Certificate of understanding and agreement, 29 September 1976. vol. 52, 52–53. The obituary of Dr. (Colonel) Seymour Levine mentions his stint in Tehran. s. ‘Dr. (Colonel) Seymour Levine’, Washington Jewish Week, 23 December 2014 https://www.washingtonjewishweek.com/dr-colonel-seymour-levine/https://archive.org/details/DocumentsFromTheUSEspionageDen/Documents from the U.S. Espionage Den v52/page/n27/mode/2up?view = theater

¹²⁷ DUSED, vol. 52, 45.

¹²⁸ ibid, 59.

¹²⁹ DUSED, vol. 52, 51, 54.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 54.

¹³¹ Ibid, 65.

¹³² Ibid, 71.

¹³³ Ibid, 87.

¹³⁴ ibid, 84.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 87–88, 92.

¹³⁶ Ibid, 78, 80.

¹³⁷ ibid, 87,90–91.

¹³⁸ DUSED, vol. 52, 139.

¹³⁹ ibid, 78, 91.

¹⁴⁰ Similarly, in 1972, the Soviet counterintelligence managed to apprehend an intelligence officer of Central Asian origin who, shortly before, had been recruited by the CIA in Tehran. The information provided by the Czech illegal Karel Köcher who worked at the CIA as a contractor in Washington, allowed the Soviets to narrow the search and identify the traitor as well as the CIA case officer who recruited him. s. Pavel Žáček, “Případ „Rino‘: náš člověk v CIA. Řízení čs. špičkové agentury sovětskou rozvědkou, 1973–1976’ (The ‘Rino’ case: our man in CIA. Management of the top Czechoslovak agency by the Soviet intelligence, 1973–1976), Securitas Imperii, 29, (2016):190–242; 204–205, 209, 222–223.

¹⁴¹ David Ignatius, online. On the break-in; ‘In the CIA cable dated 040023Z JUL 79 (4 July 1979), the CIA HQ provided the combination for an Air Force safe in Tehran’. This cable is not currently available among the DUSED online.

¹⁴² On using a doctor in the operations s. DUSED, vol. 52, 61; on using the wife of ‘Larry Giel’ s. DUSED, vol. 52, 59.

¹⁴³ David Crist, The twilight war: the secret history of America’s thirty-year conflict with Iran (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012. Electronic book), 97.

¹⁴⁴ Glenn Curtis and Eric Hooglund (ed.), Iran: a country study (Library of Congress, 2008), 277 https://web.archive.org/web/20171010060505/http:/www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Iran.pdf

¹⁴⁵ David Crist, 97; Vezarat-e ettela’at jomhuri-ye eslami-ye (VEVAK).

¹⁴⁶ Matthew Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New York & Berlin: Bloomsbury Press, 2012. Electronic book), 269–272.

¹⁴⁷ David Crist, 97.

¹⁴⁸ The Soviet intelligence suffered a devastating blow when the KGB officer Vladimir Kuzichkin stationed in Tehran, defected to the UK in 1982 and revealed the names of dozens of Soviet agents and informants, especially among the Iranian Communist Party. Their identities were later leaked to the Iranian security service which rounded up and executed dozens of people. s. David Crist, 83.

¹⁴⁹ Carl Wege, ‘Iranian Counterintelligence,’ International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 32, no. 2, (2019): 272–294, 273.

¹⁵⁰ For example, Ursula Wilder, in her 2017 study, underlines the importance of such factors as dysfunctions in personality, a state of crisis, and ease of opportunity – all traits from the ‘PAS’ framework. s. Ursula Wilder, ‘The Psychology of Espionage,’ Studies in Intelligence, 61, no. 2 (2017): 19–36 https://www.cia.gov/static/30b273c621d0896f13104ff48840b68f/psychology-of-espionage.pdf

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Notes on contributors

Grigorij Serscikov

Grigorij Serscikov is an independent researcher and consultant. As a management consultant with more than 15 years of experience, he provides strategic advice and analysis for companies of the energy sector. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Dundee. In his Ph.D. thesis, Dr. Serscikov examined how political risk and surprise – often neglected in the entry choice analysis – could become the crucial elements that make or break the entire undertaking. He also gained a Master’s Degree in Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University with a focus on intelligence failure, strategic surprise, and extremism. His recent article titled ‘The spies who came to the East: Soviet illegals in the post-World War II Japan’ was published in this journal in February 2022.