Messaging and the bomb: public attitudes toward nuclear proliferation

Figures & data

Table 1. Hypotheses

H0	Elite messaging does not impact US public attitudes toward nuclear-proliferation issues.
H1	Elite messaging impacts US public attitudes toward nuclear-proliferation issues.
H2	Different types of messaging will have distinct effects on US public attitudes toward nuclear-proliferation issues.
H3	The effect of messaging on US public attitudes varies across different proliferation issues.

Table 2. Attitudes toward the Iran nuclear deal

	Pre-messaging (%)	Post-messaging (%)	Change (percentage points)
T1: Nature of the agreement**
Support	44	36	–8
Oppose	21	23	2
Don’t know	35	41	6
T2: Alliance considerations**
Support	44	40	–4
Oppose	20	25	5
Don’t know	37	36	–1
T3: Security implications**
Support	47	38	–9
Oppose	26	31	5
Don’t know	27	31	4
T4: Trust**
Support	41	34	–7
Oppose	31	32	1
Don’t know	29	34	5

Note: Some collective pre- or post-messaging responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Figure 1. Pre-messaging and post-messaging attitudes toward the Iran deal—T1: nature of the agreement.

Note: Responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding.

Figure 2. Pre-messaging and post-messaging attitudes toward the Iran deal—T2: alliance considerations.

Note: Responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding.

Figure 3. Pre-messaging and post-messaging attitudes toward the Iran deal—T3: security implications.

Note: Responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding.

Figure 4. Pre-messaging and post-messaging attitudes toward the Iran deal—T4: trust.

Note: Responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding.

Table 3. Attitudes toward the AUKUS nuclear-powered-submarine initiative

	Pre-messaging (%)	Post-messaging (%)	Change (percentage points)
T1: Nature of the agreement
Support	39	39	0
Oppose	19	17	–2
Don’t know	42	43	1
T2: Alliance considerations*
Support	41	37	–4
Oppose	17	17	0
Don’t know	42	46	4
T3: Security implications
Support	42	39	–3
Oppose	22	21	–1
Don’t know	36	40	4
T4: Trust
Support	49	47	–2
Oppose	18	16	–2
Don’t know	33	36	3

Note: Responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Figure 5. Pre-messaging and post-messaging attitudes toward the AUKUS initiative—T2: alliance considerations.

Note: Responses may not add to 100 percent, owing to rounding.

Table 4. Changed attitudes by age, education, gender, party, and political interest

	Changed attitude toward Iran nuclear deal (%)	Changed attitude toward AUKUS nuclear-powered-submarine initiative (%)
Age
Gen Z (1997–)	27	19
Millennials (1981–96)	24	39
Gen X (1965–80)	24	16
Boomers (1946–64)	24	20
Silent Gen (1928–45)	19	29
Education
Less than high school	27	62
High school	27	24
Some college	27	22
College	18	22
Postgraduate	15	18
Gender
Female	26	27
Male	19	21
Party (three-point ID)
Democrat	23	25
Republican	20	36
Independent	28	16
Other/not sure	26	25
Political interest
Most of the time	17	17
Some of the time	32	33
Only now and then	28	34
Hardly at all	27	12
Don’t know	22	31

Table A1. Iran nuclear deal: responses by age, education, gender, party, and political interest

	N	Pre-messaging			Post-messaging
	(weighted)	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Don’t know (%)	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Don’t know (%)
Age
Gen Z (1997–)	103	39	25	36	35	26	39
Millennials (1981–96)	287	47	17	36	38	16	46
Gen X (1965–80)	233	42	25	33	37	29	34
Boomers (1946–64)	310	42	30	28	35	36	29
Silent Gen (1928–45)	66	51	25	24	44	33	23
Education
Less than high school	65	27	14	58	30	21	49
High school	325	35	28	37	27	31	42
Some college	304	46	25	29	34	29	36
College	193	52	22	26	49	26	25
Postgraduate	114	58	20	22	55	19	26
Gender
Female	518	42	15	44	35	19	46
Male	482	46	35	19	39	37	24
Party (three-point ID)
Democrat	356	64	6	30	57	11	32
Republican	266	27	48	25	19	48	32
Independent	276	41	29	31	34	33	33
Other/not sure	102	24	13	63	22	17	61
Political interest
Most of the time	418	56	35	9	49	37	14
Some of the time	285	48	20	32	40	24	37
Only now and then	142	26	13	61	19	24	57
Hardly at all	100	24	14	63	20	17	64
Don’t know	55	9	14	76	9	7	84
Total	1,000	44	24	32	37	28	36

Table A2. AUKUS nuclear-powered-submarine initiative: responses by age, education, gender, party, and political interest

	N	Pre-messaging			Post-messaging
	(weighted)	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Don’t know (%)	Support (%)	Oppose (%)	Don’t know (%)
Age
Gen Z (1997–)	103	47	23	30	33	27	40
Millennials (1981–96)	287	31	19	50	29	21	51
Gen X (1965–80)	233	42	18	40	41	16	44
Boomers (1946–64)	310	49	19	32	48	15	36
Silent Gen (1928–45)	66	60	15	25	68	10	22
Education
Less than high school	65	39	17	44	32	11	56
High school	325	36	21	42	34	21	46
Some college	304	46	18	36	42	16	42
College	193	46	17	37	47	17	35
Postgraduate	114	50	19	31	51	19	30
Gender
Female	518	28	21	51	28	18	54
Male	482	59	16	25	54	18	28
Party (three-point ID)
Democrat	356	41	20	40	39	18	43
Republican	266	53	16	31	49	18	33
Independent	276	44	19	37	42	17	42
Other/not sure	102	21	23	57	22	20	58
Political interest
Most of the time	418	60	14	26	58	16	26
Some of the time	285	42	23	35	38	20	42
Only now and then	142	25	23	52	24	18	58
Hardly at all	100	19	26	55	20	23	57
Don’t know	55	6	9	85	2	12	86
Total	1,000	43	19	38	41	18	42

Table A3. Iran nuclear deal: convincingness findings

	Argument	Pre-messaging attitude	Very convincing (%)	Somewhat convincing (%)	Somewhat unconvincing (%)	Very unconvincing (%)
T1	For	Support	32	49	18	1
		Oppose	3	14	33	50
		Don’t know	3	38	40	18
	Against	Support	13	42	32	13
		Oppose	34	25	13	28
		Don’t know	5	42	33	19
T2	For	Support	39	49	11	1
		Oppose	6	15	26	53
		Don’t know	5	49	32	14
	Against	Support	17	30	29	23
		Oppose	58	20	15	7
		Don’t know	12	47	29	12
T3	For	Support	44	43	11	2
		Oppose	6	19	25	50
		Don’t know	7	45	32	17
	Against	Support	23	40	28	8
		Oppose	56	24	8	12
		Don’t know	17	43	25	16
T4	For	Support	26	53	16	5
		Oppose	8	12	37	43
		Don’t know	5	39	40	16
	Against	Support	28	35	29	8
		Oppose	59	24	16	1
		Don’t know	13	40	35	13

Table A4. AUKUS nuclear-powered-submarine initiative: convincingness findings

	Argument	Pre-messaging attitude	Very convincing (%)	Somewhat convincing (%)	Somewhat unconvincing (%)	Very unconvincing (%)
T1	For	Support	49	44	6	0
		Oppose	4	33	35	28
		Don’t know	8	38	33	20
	Against	Support	7	41	38	15
		Oppose	16	24	47	13
		Don’t know	11	32	40	18
T2	For	Support	39	44	17	1
		Oppose	6	14	49	32
		Don’t know	3	37	47	13
	Against	Support	8	26	40	27
		Oppose	16	32	28	24
		Don’t know	8	28	47	16
T3	For	Support	53	40	3	4
		Oppose	6	36	37	22
		Don’t know	9	48	31	11
	Against	Support	17	42	22	20
		Oppose	15	42	26	16
		Don’t know	9	51	32	9
T4	For	Support	45	46	8	1
		Oppose	7	27	43	22
		Don’t know	8	34	40	18
	Against	Support	11	54	24	10
		Oppose	19	36	31	13
		Don’t know	6	40	36	17