The more the merrier? Examining the effects of inter-municipal cooperation on costs and service quality in upper secondary education

Figures & data

Figure 1. Swedish municipalities in a local federation for upper secondary education, 1998–2021.

Table 1. Aggregated and dynamic treatment effect estimates of being part of a local federation on costs and grades.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Costs	Costs	Grades	Grades
Aggregated effect	−0.0286	−0.0351*	−0.244*	−0.369*
year 0–7	(0.0162)	(0.0139)	(0.100)	(0.154)
Local federation t-5	0.0294	0.0377	−0.0512	0.0797
	(0.0171)	(0.0226)	(0.130)	(0.191)
Local federation t-4	0.0144	0.0424	−0.187	−0.137
	(0.0260)	(0.0377)	(0.135)	(0.167)
Local federation t-3	−0.0198	−0.0282	−0.105	−0.112
	(0.0154)	(0.0194)	(0.0883)	(0.107)
Local federation t-2	−0.00826	0.00831	−0.132	−0.0301
	(0.0102)	(0.0117)	(0.0831)	(0.0930)
Local federation	0.00431	0.0108	−0.193*	−0.343**
	(0.0148)	(0.0181)	(0.0926)	(0.123)
Local federation t +1	−0.00741	−0.0251	−0.150	−0.245
	(0.0218)	(0.0275)	(0.126)	(0.166)
Local federation t +2	−0.0357	−0.0607**	−0.234*	−0.361*
	(0.0239)	(0.0235)	(0.107)	(0.152)
Local federation t +3	−0.0652*	−0.0781**	−0.249*	−0.250
	(0.0292)	(0.0242)	(0.118)	(0.148)
Local federation t +4	−0.0142	−0.0194	−0.242*	−0.444*
	(0.0393)	(0.0522)	(0.123)	(0.176)
Local federation t +5	−0.0337	−0.0446**	−0.229	−0.381
	(0.0213)	(0.0148)	(0.135)	(0.253)
Municipal controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

N = 6,378.

Figure 2. Impact of local federations on school expenditure by relative time to treatment, model with covariates.

Figure 3. Impact of local federations on grades by relative time to treatment, model with covariates.

Table A1. Municipalities in local federations in upper secondary education 1998–2021.^14.

Year	Local federations	Municipalities in federation	Municipalities in federation (%)	Number of municipalities	Number of leaving municipalities
1998	7	20	7%	288	0
1999	8	24	8%	289	0
2000	9	26	9%	289	0
2001	9	26	9%	289	0
2002	9	26	9%	289	0
2003	9	26	9%	290	2
2004	8	24	8%	290	0
2005	9	28	10%	290	0
2006	9	28	10%	290	0
2007	9	28	10%	290	1
2008	10	29	10%	290	1
2009	10	28	10%	290	0
2010	11	32	11%	290	2
2011	10	30	10%	290	5
2012	8	25	9%	290	0
2013	9	27	9%	290	0
2014	9	27	9%	290	0
2015	10	30	10%	290	3
2016	10	29	10%	290	0
2017	10	30	10%	290	0
2018	10	30	10%	290	0
2019	10	30	10%	290	2
2020	9	28	10%	290	0
2021	9	28	10%	290	0

Table A2. Descriptive statistics of municipalities in main analysis (csdid model).

	Municipalities in local federation			Municipalities outside local federation
	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.
Local federation	1	1	1	0	0	0
Cost upper secondary education	114 748	60 661	225 835	104 308	42 011	237 663
Average grade	13.75	12.27	15.21	13.85	10.31	16.49
Income	278 904	179 221	424 971	256 233	160 099	494 242
Employed, age 20–64%)	79.49	71.13	87.24	78.23	53.22	89.10
Population, age 16–19%)	4.79	3.40	6.49	5.05	3.06	7.67
Population	17 918	4780	64 324	34 512	2387	978 770
Population density	29.74	0.20	144.60	119.98	0.20	5228.20
Foreign born (%)	10.32	4.30	22.27	11.29	1.90	43.36
Highly educated (%)	27	14	48	29	11	78
Students in private schools (%)	12.26	0.37	39.89	14.39	0.00	70.49
Observations	282			6096

Table A3. List of variables, definitions, and sources.

Variable	Definition and measure	Source
Local federation	Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if municipality belongs to a local federation and 0 otherwise.	Statistics Sweden and National Agency for Education
School costs (log)	Log expenditures of upper secondary education of a municipality, per student in Swedish krona (SEK). This is measured as costs (including for school transportation) minus internal revenues and revenues from other municipalities regarding upper secondary education. The costs are divided by the number of students who reside in the municipality and participate in upper secondary education.	Statistics Sweden and National Agency for Education
Average grade	The average grade represents the mean grade across all subjects for graduating students residing in a municipality. The grades can take values between 0 and 20.	Statistics Sweden and National Agency for Education
Population (log)	Log population of the municipality.	Statistics Sweden
Population density	Density of population in each municipality, measured as number of inhabitants per square kilometers.	Statistics Sweden
Population age 16–19%)	Number of inhabitants aged between 16 and 19, divided by total number of inhabitants.	Statistics Sweden
Median income	Median earned yearly income for people between 20–64, measured in SEK.	Statistics Sweden
Employed (%)	Number of working inhabitants in the age group 20–64, divided by total number of inhabitants.	Statistics Sweden
Foreign born (%)	Number of inhabitants born outside of Sweden, divided by total number of inhabitants.	Statistics Sweden
Highly educated (%)	Number of inhabitants with any post upper secondary education aged 35–64, divided by total number of inhabitants.	Statistics Sweden
Students in private schools (%)	Number of students in private schools within or outside the municipality, divided by total number of students residing in the municipality.	Statistics Sweden and National Agency for Education

Table B1. The effect of being part of a local federation on expenditure on education (log) per student and grades.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Costs	Costs	Grades	Grades
Local federation	−0.0534*	−0.0742***	−0.0368	−0.0451
	(0.0235)	(0.0202)	(0.0554)	(0.0570)
Year and municipal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
fixed effects
Municipal controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6378	6378	6378	6378
Adjusted R^2	0.901	0.907	0.663	0.666

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table B2. The effect of being part of a local federation on expenditure on education (log) per student and grades, full dataset.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Costs	Costs	Grades	Grades
Local federation	−0.0512**	−0.0741***	−0.0460	−0.0356
	(0.0181)	(0.0155)	(0.0372)	(0.0361)
Year and municipal	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
fixed effects
Municipal controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6954	6954	6954	6954
Adjusted R^2	0.897	0.902	0.659	0.663

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table B3. The effect of being part of a local federation on expenditure on education (log) per student and grades, model including leads and lags.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Costs	Costs	Grades	Grades
Local federationt-5	0.0260	0.0347	0.102	0.0869
	(0.0219)	(0.0210)	(0.101)	(0.0922)
Local federationt-4	0.0100	0.0171	−0.0321	−0.0492
	(0.0369)	(0.0370)	(0.0636)	(0.0629)
Local federationt-3	−0.0231	−0.0205	0.0442	0.0307
	(0.0279)	(0.0285)	(0.0831)	(0.0830)
Local federationt-2	−0.0209	−0.0166	0.0284	0.00346
	(0.0237)	(0.0247)	(0.0704)	(0.0709)
Local federation	−0.00870	−0.00717	0.0522	0.0201
	(0.0221)	(0.0239)	(0.0601)	(0.0616)
Local federation t +1	−0.0197	−0.0196	0.102	0.0758
	(0.0260)	(0.0277)	(0.0644)	(0.0670)
Local federation t +2	−0.0469	−0.0462	0.0127	−0.0189
	(0.0249)	(0.0255)	(0.0758)	(0.0800)
Local federation t +3	−0.0770**	−0.0789**	0.00200	−0.0249
	(0.0286)	(0.0286)	(0.0822)	(0.0839)
Local federation t +4	−0.0258	−0.0288	0.00414	−0.0233
	(0.0392)	(0.0401)	(0.0827)	(0.0820)
Local federation t +5	−0.0491	−0.0510*	0.0143	−0.00831
	(0.0205)	(0.0202)	(0.0740)	(0.0745)
Municipal and year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
fixed effects
Municipal controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

N = 6,378.

Table C1. Group-specific effects of joining a local federation on school costs and grades.

	Costs	Grades
Aggregated effect	−0.0286** (0.00900)	−0.358*** (0.0866)
Group 1999	0.0832** (0.0297)	−0.764*** (0.153)
Group 2000	0.0418** (0.0157)	−0.0462 (0.106)
Group 2005	−0.0915*** (0.0111)	−0.0373 (0.318)
Group 2010	−0.0152 (0.0185)	−1.602*** (0.118)
Group 2013	−0.0863*** (0.0128)	0.173*** (0.0482)
Group 2015	−0.0366 (0.0213)	−0.309** (0.108)
Group 2017	−0.239*** (0.0113)	−0.607*** (0.0505)

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

N = 6,378.

Table C2. Calendar time effects of joining a local federation on school costs and grades.

	Costs	Grades
Aggregated effect	0.00325 (0.0199)	−0.424** (0.148)
t = 1999	0.0625 (0.0383)	−0.500** (0.172)
t = 2000	−0.0273 (0.0649)	−0.823*** (0.239)
t = 2001	−0.0625 (0.0335)	−0.601** (0.228)
t = 2002	−0.0920 (0.0499)	−0.596** (0.191)
t = 2003	0.121 (0.116)	−0.679** (0.257)
t = 2004	−0.00343 (0.0245)	−0.705** (0.261)
t = 2005	0.00344 (0.0122)	−0.428 (0.216)
t = 2006	0.0131 (0.0207)	−0.377 (0.239)
t = 2007	0.00162 (0.0197)	−0.428* (0.206)
t = 2008	0.00956 (0.0293)	−0.368 (0.221)
t = 2009	0.00800 (0.0247)	−0.370 (0.246)
t = 2010	0.0242 (0.0294)	−0.183 (0.227)
t = 2011	0.139 (0.0750)	−0.357* (0.166)
t = 2012	0.0228 (0.0443)	−0.297 (0.162)
t = 2013	0.0495 (0.0449)	−0.191 (0.160)
t = 2014	0.0183 (0.0353)	−0.286 (0.187)
t = 2015	−0.00528 (0.0299)	−0.366 (0.228)
t = 2016	−0.0420 (0.0459)	−0.333 (0.207)
t = 2017	−0.0277 (0.0373)	−0.282 (0.170)
t = 2018	0.00232 (0.0438)	−0.344* (0.174)
t = 2019	−0.0647 (0.0388)	−0.369* (0.167)
t = 2020	−0.0388 (0.0432)	−0.427* (0.176)
t = 2021	−0.0374 (0.0410)	−0.450** (0.170)

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

N = 6,378.

Table D1. Impact of joining a local federation on costs for emergency service, model with covariates.

	Costs
Aggregated effect	−17.48
year 0–7	(23.94)
Local federationt-5	18.97
	(38.58)
Local federationt-4	26.86
	(37.57)
Local federationt-3	52.53
	(37.03)
Local federationt-2	13.58
	(24.81)
Local federation	−8.577
	(12.75)
Local federation t +1	−51.13
	(39.37)
Local federation t +2	−66.48
	(59.60)
Local federation t +3	−57.47
	(64.78)
Local federation t +4	18.11
	(30.54)
Local federation t +5	15.31
	(31.73)
Municipal controls	Yes

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

N = 6,378.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author KS, upon reasonable request.