Local delivery of bus transportation services: a model of interdependency of provision and production choices

Figures & data

Figure 1. Theoretical Model of provision and production decisions.

Figure 2. Public transportation service delivery in Portugal.

Table 1. Independent variables (descriptions, sources and expected signals).

Independent variables	Description	Years	Source	Expected sign		Expected sign Y2^5
				Y0	Y1	(1) (2)	(3)	(4)
Dimension
Population (log)	Number of inhabitants in the municipality	Census 2011	INE	+	-	-	+	+
Population density (log)	Inhabitants per km^2.	Census 2011	INE	+		-	+	+
Financial Status
Debt per capita (log)	Total debt divided by the number of inhabitants in 2015.	2015	PORDATA	-	+	-	+	+
Financial autonomy (%)	Proportion of own revenues	Average 2015, 2016 and 2017	DGAL		-	+	-	-
Ideology and Interest Groups
Political party	Political party winning the previous local election (2017) Left-leaning = 1; Others = 0.	2017	MAI			-	-	-
Public employees per 1,000 inhabitants	Number of employees working for the city hall divided by the municipal population, multiplied by 1000	Average 2015, 2016 and 2017	DGAL		+	+	-	-

https://www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt/autarquicas2017/

Table 2. Summary statistics (dependent and independent variables).

Variáveis	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Provision decision (Y0)	278	.8705036	.336354	0	1
Cooperation decision (Y1)	242	.6404959	.4808496	0	1
Production decision (Y2)	242	2.966942	0.834265	1	4
Population (log)	278	9.767122	1.11766	7.49	13.21
Population density (log)	278	4.367626	1.494102	1.63	8.9
Debt per capita (log)	242	6.141736	.9650715	−.28	8.73
Financial autonomy	242	42.82645	17.46113	11	91
Left-leaning party	242	.5991736	.4910816	0	1
Public employees per 1,000 (log)	242	2.68343	.4931399	1.57	4.26

Table 3. Baseline estimations - separate logit models.

VARIABLES	Provision Decision	Cooperation Decision	Production
	Provision = 1	Cooperation = 1	Municipal Corporation	Inter-municipal Contracting out	Municipal Contracting out
Estimation	Logit	Logit	Multinomial logit
Population, log	0.402*	0.198**	−0.101	0.598***	0.553**
	(0.225)	(0.096)	(0.354)	(0.224)	(0.239)
Pop. density, log	0.433		0.170	−0.263	−0.455*
	(0.266)		(0.489)	(0.256)	(0.272)
Mun employees, log		0.031*
		(0.019)
Debt p.c., log	−0.547**	−0.156	−0.763***	−0.229	−0.289
	(0.223)	(0.128)	(0.268)	(0.193)	(0.212)
Financial autonomy		−0.022**	0.079***	−0.024	−0.001
		(0.010)	(0.031)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Left-leaning mayor			−1.916**	−0.731	−1.362**
			(0.852)	(0.506)	(0.553)
Wald chi2	88.93	22.92	120.12
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000
Observations	278	242	242

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

Figure 3. Marginal effects of the determinants of the provision decision.

Figure 4. Marginal effects of the determinants of the cooperation decision.

Figure 5. Marginal effects of the determinants of the choice of production alternatives.

Table 4. Nested logit estimations.

Variables	Alternative specific	Cooperate	Model
			EM	Intermun. Contracting	Mun. Contracting
Complex	20.787***
	(7.419)
Complex* Pop. dens, log	−0.831
	(0.696)
Population, log		−0.566**
		(0.264)
Population density, log		0.747*
		(0.441)
Public employees		0.013
		(0.022)
Debt per capita, log			−2.613**	−1.454***	−1.390**
			(1.089)	(0.499)	(0.558)
Financial Independency			0.200**	0.012	0.025
			(0.085)	(0.033)	(0.046)
Left-leaning mayor			−6.145	−3.091	−4.455
			(3.901)	(2.101)	(2.796)
Id Municipality	242	242	242	242	242
Observations	968	968	968	968	968

Standard errors in parentheses.

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.