The link between firm risk-taking and CEO power of listed firms on the Vietnamese stock market: the role of state ownership

Figures & data

Table 1. CEOP indicators.

Aspects	Variables	Definition
Structure power	Independence of board (CEO_INDE)	The proportion is assigned by independent members in the total members of the director board.
	Duality (CEO_DUAL)	The dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 when the CEO acts as the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise.
Ownership power	Ownership (CEO_OWN)	The proportion of common shares being held by the CEO.
Expert power	Tenure (CEO_TENURE)	The duration of the CEO’s tenure in years.

Source: Tang et al. (2011) and Finkelstein (1992).

Table 2. Variable descriptions.

Variable	Definition	Measurement
RISK1	Firm risk-taking	As indicated in Section 3.2.1.
RISK2	Firm risk-taking	As indicated in Section 3.2.1.
CEOP	Power of CEO	As indicated in Section 3.2.2.
SO	State ownership	The proportion is assigned by number of shares held by the state/state agents/state ownership enterprises in total shares.
SIZE	Firm size	Total assets’ natural logarithm at the year-end.
DEBT	Firm debt	The proportion of total debt in total assets at the year-end.
CE	Firm capex expenditure	The proportion of capital cost in total assets at the year-end.
TBQ	Firm market value	The ratio of market value to book value of assets.
SALEGR	Firm development	The annual rate of change in firm sale
HHI	Herfindahl-Hirschman Index	Squaring the market share of each competing firm in a given market and summing up these squared values
INF	Inflation	The changes in the yearly consumer price index

Source: Author.

Table 3. Variable statistics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std	Min	Max
RISK1	3,121	0.026	0.035	0.000	0.533
RISK2	3,121	0.046	0.024	0.000	0.278
SO	3,112	23.452	24.534	0.000	96.720
CEOP	3,121	0.195	0.248	0.000	0.980
SIZE	3,121	27.273	1.451	23.441	32.510
DEBT	3,121	0.227	0.185	0.000	0.798
CE	3,121	−0.043	0.073	−0.822	0.639
TBQ	3,121	1.062	0.540	0.192	8.902
SALEGR	3,121	0.166	1.162	−1.049	29.556
HHI	3,121	0.112	0.114	0.019	0.574
INF	3,121	5.504	4.668	0.631	18.678

Source: Authors.

Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the characteristics of CEOP.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Sd	Min	Max
CEO_TENURE	3,121	15.997	9.158	1.000	50.000
CEO_DUAL	3,121	0.270	0.444	0.000	1.000
CEO_OWN	3,121	0.136	0.224	0.000	0.995
CEO_INDE	3,121	0.372	0.183	0.000	1.000

Source: Authors.

Table 5. Pearson correlation matrix.

	RISK1	RISK2	CEOP	SIZE	DEBT	CE	TBQ	SALEGR	HHI	INFL
RISK1	1.000
RISK2	0.081	1.000
CEOP	0.020	0.074	1.000
SIZE	−0.047	−0.170	−0.028	1.000
DEBT	−0.097	0.060	0.046	0.358	1.000
CE	0.023	0.028	0.028	−0.079	−0.160	1.000
TBQ	0.090	−0.097	−0.088	0.094	−0.184	−0.094	1.000
SALEGR	−0.006	0.016	0.023	0.064	−0.017	−0.004	−0.006	1.000
HHI	0.072	−0.156	−0.025	0.063	−0.057	0.005	0.180	−0.017	1.000
INFL	0.060	0.187	0.047	−0.082	0.039	−0.036	−0.178	0.007	−0.103	1.000

Source: Authors.

Table 6. The relationships among FRT, CEOP, and SO.

Equation	Eq. (3)(3) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{30}+{\gamma }_3{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{31}{\text{*CEOP}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{32}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{33}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{34}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{35}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{36}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{37}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{38}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(3)	Eq. (4)(4) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{50}+{\gamma }_5{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{51}{\text{*CEOP}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{52}{\text{*CEOP}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{53}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{54}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{55}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{56}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{57}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{58}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{59}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(4)	Eq. (3)(3) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{30}+{\gamma }_3{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{31}{\text{*CEOP}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{32}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{33}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{34}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{35}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{36}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{37}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{38}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(3)	Eq. (4)(4) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{50}+{\gamma }_5{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{51}{\text{*CEOP}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{52}{\text{*CEOP}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{53}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{54}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{55}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{56}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{57}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{58}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{59}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(4)
RISK(-1) (by RISK1)	0.6317***	0.6270***	–	–
	(-246.77)	(-247.43)
RISK(-1) (by RISK2)	–	–	0.0728***	0.0666***
			(-29.79)	(-28.32)
CEOP	0.0034***	0.0050***	0.0017***	0.0068***
	(-7.94)	(-11.01)	(-6.41)	(-15.89)
SO*CEOP	–	−0.0003***	–	−0.0006***
		(-9.08)		(-19.60)
SIZE	−0.0008***	−0.0010***	−0.0044***	−0.0049***
	(-6.47)	(-7.93)	(-38.31)	(-44.41)
DEBT	0.0024***	0.0021***	0.0318***	0.0309***
	(-4.27)	(-3.82)	(-27.26)	(-24.59)
CE	0.0423***	0.0402***	0.0342***	0.0287***
	(-18.86)	(-18.48)	(-15.99)	(-18.67)
TBQ	0.0045***	0.0046***	0.0055***	0.0057***
	(-25.07)	(-23.51)	(-24.74)	(-22.58)
SALEGR	−0.0001***	−0.0001***	−0.0011***	−0.0013***
	(-3.68)	(-5.32)	(-26.69)	(-25.60)
HHI	−0.0042***	−0.0041***	−0.0980***	−0.0940***
	(-4.49)	(-3.96)	(-45.63)	(-40.16)
INF	0.0001***	0.0001***	0.0005***	0.0006***
	(-3.39)	(-6.12)	(-38.90)	(-31.88)
Constant	0.0257***	0.0321***	0.1591***	0.1725***
	(-7.80)	(-9.32)	(-48.58)	(-57.63)
Number of Groups	303	303	303	303
Number of IV	261	261	295	295
AR(1) test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AR(2) test	0.370	0.377	0.202	0.182
Hansen test	0.282	0.357	0.275	0.263

***, **, and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

() shows the t-statistic of the coefficient.

Source: Authors.

Table 7. The relationships among FRT (RISK1), characteristics of CEOP and SO.

Equation	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)
Characteristics of CEOP	CEO_ DUAL	CEO_ DUAL	CEO_ INDE	CEO_ INDE	CEO_ OWN	CEO_ OWN	CEO_ TENURE	CEO_ TENURE
RISK(-1)	0.6339***	0.6329***	0.7627***	0.7596***	0.6277***	0.6288***	0.6249***	0.6214***
	(260.20)	(249.76)	(256.66)	(265.10)	(265.06)	(262.63)	(322.49)	(293.59)
CEOC	0.0031***	0.0043***	0.0034**	0.0107***	−0.0016***	−0.0027***	−0.0002***	−0.0001***
	(9.08)	(9.97)	(2.22)	(5.62)	(-5.58)	(-6.15)	(-11.70)	(-4.27)
SO*CEOC	–	−0.0001***	–	−0.0003***	–	0.0000***	–	0.0000***
		(-5.37)		(-7.85)		(2.03)		(-6.52)
SIZE	−0.0007***	−0.0008***	−0.0005***	−0.0011***	−0.0012***	−0.0012***	−0.0013***	−0.0014***
	(-5.86)	(-6.40)	(-3.20)	(-5.89)	(-13.26)	(-13.29)	(-15.58)	(-15.84)
DEBT	0.0023***	0.0020***	0.0049***	0.0058***	0.0047***	0.0049***	0.0038***	0.0040***
	(3.94)	(3.60)	(4.67)	(5.05)	(8.02)	(8.04)	(8.08)	(8.00)
CE	0.0438***	0.0422***	0.0574***	0.0538***	0.0560***	0.0565***	0.0471***	0.0457***
	(22.00)	(21.36)	(12.78)	(12.46)	(31.84)	(32.04)	(26.41)	(24.13)
TBQ	0.0046***	0.0046***	0.0047***	0.0045***	0.0048***	0.0048***	0.0050***	0.0048***
	(22.94)	(22.65)	(11.62)	(12.33)	(28.36)	(27.44)	(26.15)	(26.15)
SALEGR	−0.0001***	−0.0001***	−0.0007***	−0.0010***	−0.0001***	−0.0001***	0.0000*	0.0000**
	(-6.11)	(-6.60)	(-3.22)	(-4.79)	(-3.16)	(-2.85)	(-1.72)	(-2.27)
HHI	−0.0051***	−0.0047***	−0.0061	−0.0012	−0.0076***	−0.0078***	−0.0048***	−0.0036***
	(-5.38)	(-4.84)	(-3.47)	(-0.58)	(-6.54)	(-6.71)	(-4.98)	(-3.78)
INF	0.0000***	0.0001***	0.0001***	0.0001***	0.0000***	0.0000***	0.0001***	0.0001***
	(1.61)	(3.69)	(1.53)	(2.59)	(2.70)	(2.50)	(3.75)	(3.85)
Constant	0.0248***	0.0268***	0.0148***	0.0296***	0.0374***	0.0376***	0.0424***	0.0442***
	(7.21)	(7.69)	(3.17)	(5.71)	(15.50)	(15.52)	(19.60)	(19.14)
Number of groups	303	303	303	303	303	303	303	303
Number of IV	261	261	209	209	267	267	279	279
AR(1) test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AR(2) test	0.368	0.371	0.338	0.341	0.379	0.379	0.374	0.375
Hansen test	0.269	0.272	0.157	0.148	0.289	0.275	0.485	0.518

***, **, and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

() shows the t-statistic of the coefficient.

Source: Authors.

Table 8. The relationships among FRT (RISK2), characteristics of CEOP and SO.

Equation	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)	Eq. (5)(5) $$\begin{array}{c}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_{40}+{\gamma }_4{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{41}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{42}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{43}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{44}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{45}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{46}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{47}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{48}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(5)	Eq. (6)(6) $$\begin{array}{l}{\text{FRISK}}_{\text{it}}={\beta }_0+{\gamma }_6{\text{*FRISK}}_{\text{it}-1}+{\beta }_{61}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{62}{\text{*CEOC}}_{\text{it}}{\text{*SO}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{63}{\text{*SIZE}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{64}{\text{*DEBT}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{65}{\text{*CE}}_{\text{it}}\\ +{\beta }_{66}{\text{*TBQ}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{67}{\text{*SALEGR}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{68}{\text{*HHI}}_{\text{it}}+{\beta }_{69}{\text{*INF}}_{\text{it}}+{\epsilon }_{\text{it}}\end{array}$$(6)
Characteristics of CEOP	CEO_ DUAL	CEO_ DUAL	CEO_ INDE	CEO_ INDE	CEO_ OWN	CEO_ OWN	CEO_ TENURE	CEO_ TENURE
RISK(-1)	0.0599***	0.0533***	0.0542***	0.0396***	0.1172***	0.1149***	0.0668***	0.0611***
	(29.66)	(29.19)	(16.40)	(11.11)	(63.42)	(76.06)	(27.01)	(23.92)
CEOC	0.0045***	0.0102***	0.0242***	0.0364***	−0.0333***	−0.0531***	−0.0003***	−0.0002***
	(25.99)	(41.95)	(32.87)	(32.77)	(-233.79)	(-118.49)	(-13.78)	(-9.14)
SO*CEOC		−0.0004***	–	−0.0005***	–	0.0007***		0.0000***
		(-27.15)		(-18.70)		(57.96)		(-13.85)
SIZE	−0.0046***	−0.0050***	−0.0042***	−0.0048***	−0.0019***	−0.0012***	−0.0047***	−0.0050***
	(-46.62)	(-39.48)	(-29.64)	(-36.39)	(-29.88)	(-15.28)	(-34.86)	(-36.10)
DEBT	0.0319***	0.0307***	0.0347***	0.0318***	0.0227***	0.0271***	0.0318***	0.0312***
	(31.64)	(39.37)	(19.41)	(17.74)	(33.69)	(38.15)	(33.36)	(28.05)
CE	0.0329***	0.0298***	0.0469***	0.0368***	0.0461***	0.0489***	0.0250***	0.0241***
	(14.7)	(24.12)	(20.83)	(17.64)	(52.51)	(51.63)	(17.69)	(15.11)
TBQ	0.0053***	0.0054***	0.0066***	0.0063***	0.0007***	0.0004***	0.0061***	0.0061***
	(32.75)	(24.45)	(21.47)	(21.04)	(4.17)	(3.91)	(27.80)	(32.32)
SALEGR	−0.0010***	−0.0012***	−0.0009***	−0.0013***	−0.0002***	−0.0001***	−0.0012***	−0.0013***
	(-24.12)	(-29.11)	(-13.80)	(-11.39)	(-3.98)	(-2.74)	(-20.94)	(-25.18)
HHI	−0.0925***	−0.0893***	−0.0913***	−0.0838***	−0.0365***	−0.0423***	−0.0945***	−0.0929***
	(-53.45)	(-45.39)	(-32.64)	(-29.31)	(-30.15)	(-35.24)	(-59.81)	(-59.83)
INF	0.0005***	0.0006***	0.0005***	0.0005***	0.0002***	0.0002***	0.0005***	0.0005***
	(38.33)	(37.40)	(19.42)	(25.65)	(15.99)	(15.34)	(38.32)	(38.08)
Constant	0.1635***	0.1729***	0.1426***	0.1588***	0.0958***	0.0768***	0.1723***	0.1778***
	(63.21)	(51.35)	(38.33)	(45.96)	(60.32)	(33.32)	(43.59)	(45.71)
Number of Groups	303	303	303	303	303	303	303	303
Number of IV	298	298	282	282	300	300	290	290
AR(1) test	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
AR(2) test	0.131	0.114	0.161	0.114	0.994	0.963	0.134	0.125
Hansen test	0.303	0.294	0.142	0.146	0.386	0.410	0.222	0.207

***, **, and * denote significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

() shows the t-statistic of the coefficient.

Source: Authors.

Tang, J., Crossan, M., & Rowe, W. G. (2011). Dominant CEO, deviant strategy, and extreme performance: The moderating role of a powerful board. Journal of Management Studies, 48(7), 1479–1503. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00985.x

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Data availability statement

The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author.