Unearthing the mediating role of political affiliation in tax compliance determinants: new evidence from Ghana

Figures & data

Table 1. Variables measurement.

Variable	Sources
Dependent variable:
Tax compliance (TC)	(Ayuba et al., 2018; Lozza et al., 2013; Musimenta, 2020)
Independent variables:
Tax knowledge (TK)	(Fauziati et al., 2020; Hunt et al., 2019)
Service quality (SQ)	(Abasili & Akinboye, 2019; Alm & Gomez, 2008)
Mediating variable:
Political party affiliation	(Bodea & LeBas, 2016; Hunt et al., 2019)
Control variables:
Gender	(Khozen & Setyowati, 2023)
Age	(Alm & Gomez, 2008)
education	(Gugushvili, 2022)
salary	(Ernest et al., 2022)

Table 2. Reliability of the instrument.

		Reliability Coefficient (α)
Sub-Scale	No. of Items	Pilot Tests	Actual Study
Tax Knowledge (TK)	7	0.801	0.886
Tax Service Quality (SQ)	7	0.862	0.934
Political Affiliation (PA)	3	0.822	0.825
Tax Compliance (TC)	3	0.839	0.887
Total	20	0.831	0.883

Figure 1. Structural equation model.

Table 3. Respondents’ demographics.

Variable	Description	Sample	%	T-test
Gender	Female	333	74	t (450) = 2.12, p= .002)
	Male	117	26
Age (Years)	25–35	187	42	t (450) = 3.03, p= .001)
	36–45	128	28
	46–60	69	15
	Above 60	66	15
Educational Level	Illiterate	123	27	t (450) = 2.016, p= .002)
	High School	259	58
	Tertiary	68	15
Estimated Monthly Income (GH cedis)	200–600	86	19	t (450) = 2.462 p= .003
	601–1200	84	19
	1201–1800	178	40
	Above 1801	102	23

Table 4. Descriptive statistics.

Constructs	N	Max	Min	Mean	SD	Excess Kurtosis	Skewness
Tax Knowledge (TK)	450	5	1	4.23	0.701	4.783	−1.382
Service Quality (SQ)	450	5	1	4.08	0.381	4.041	−1.384
Political Affiliation (PA)	450	5	1	4.17	0.525	5.029	−1.301
Tax Compliance (TC)	450	5	1	4.28	0.481	3.194	−1.041

Table 5. Correlation matrix.

Constructs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1.Age	1.000
2.Education	.394**	1.000
3.Gender	−.058	−.058	1.000
4.Income	−.020	−.212**	−.092	1.000
5.PA	−.049	−.026	.102*	.080	1.000
6.SQ	−.012	−.003	.035	.045	.402**	1.000
7.TC	.017	.063	.066	.024	.662**	.288**	1.000
8.TK	−.055	−.049	.072	.052	.385**	.640**	.253**	1.000

Note. **^,*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 and o.05 levels (2-tailed).

Table 6. Results of validity and reliability of items constructs.

Constructs	Code	FL ≥ 0.6	CA ≥0.7	CR ≥0.8	Rho_ACP ≥0.5	AVE ≥0.5	VIF
Tax Knowledge (TK)	TK1	0.86	0.870	0.886	0.900	0.566	1.397
	TK2	0.75					2.181
	TK3	0.89					1.977
	TK4	0.87					2.456
	TK5	0.77					1.934
	TK6	0.79					2.33
	TK7	0.85					1.545
Service Quality (SQ)	SQ8	0.89	0.803	0.829	0.850	0.664	1.364
	TSQ9	0.75					1.332
	SQ10	0.83					2.097
	SQ11	0.83					1.872
	SQ12	0.73					1.741
	SQ13	0.82					2.563
	SQ14	0.83					1.173
Political Affiliation (PA)	PA15	0.824	0.784	0.793	0.826	0.614	1.536
	PA16	0.741					1.202
	PA17	0.784					1.457
Tax Compliance (TC)	TC24	0.83	0.720	0.750	0.843	0.642	1.699
	TC 25	0.87					1.479
	TC26	0.84					1.312

Table 7. Discriminant validity.

Constructs	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT) Criteria
1.Age
2.Education	0.394
3.Gender	0.058	0.058
4.Income	0.02	0.212	0.092
5.PA	0.07	0.042	0.122	0.096
6.SQ	0.043	0.055	0.051	0.087	0.594
7.TC	0.047	0.075	0.078	0.029	0.232	0.448
8.TK	0.059	0.051	0.078	0.055	0.51	0.762	0.325
Fornell-Larcker Criteria)
1.Age
2.Education	0.394
3.Gender	−0.058	−0.058
4.Income	−0.02	−0.212	−0.092
5.PA	−0.047	−0.026	0.101	0.079
6.SQ	−0.02	−0.013	0.043	0.048	0.458
7.TC	0.015	0.066	0.07	0.023	0.66	0.353
8.TK	−0.057	−0.046	0.073	0.047	0.404	0.637	0.254

Table 8. Model goodness and significance.

Hypothesis	R^2	Q^2 > 0	F^2 >0.35	Goodness of Fit	Decision
H1a:TK→ TC	0.228	0.203	0.037	0.325 0.308	Supported
H2a: SQ→ TC	0.202	0.309	0.018		Supported
H1b: TK→ PA→ TC	0.192	0.298	0.384	0.320	Supported
H2b: SQ→ PA→ TC	0.877	0.324	0.332		Supported
Model Fitness
	Saturated Model		Estimated Model
Chi-square	1547.481		4662.399
ChiSqr/df	9.379		24.539
RMSEA	0.130		0.223
AGFI	0.694		0.630
PGFI	0.597		0.438
SRMR	0.058		0.051
NFI	0.908		0.920
TLI	0.954		0.958
CFI	0.971		0.961
AIC	1637.481		2383.29
BIC	1822.397		1749.492

Table 9. Hypothesis testing.

Hypothesis	β	Mean	T-Statistics	p Values	Decision
Model 1-Contol Variables
Age→TC	0.016	0.066	1.105	0.000
Education→TC	0.073	0.130	1.255	0.210
Gender→TC	0.022	0.028	0.220	0.826
Income Level→TC	−0.013	−0.022	0.638	0.000
Model 2 -Direct Effect
H1a:TK→ TC	0.067	0.331	1.836	0.004	Supported
H2a: SQ→ TC	0.103	0.092	5.512	0.000	Supported
PA→ TC	0.642	1.366	6.972	0.001
TK→ PA	0.188	0.426	3.289	0.001
SQ→ PA	0.338	0.304	2.713	0.007
Model 3-Mediation (Indirect Effect)
H1b: TK→ PA→ TC	0.610	0.576	3.199	0.001	Supported
H2b: SQ→ PA→ TC	0.420	0.414	2.579	0.010	Supported

Sig at p < .05, two-tailed.

Table 10. Robust check based upon respondents’ demographic classification.

Hypothesis	Young-Tax compliant	Old-Tax compliant	High-income tax compliant	Low-income tax compliant	Educated Tax-complaint	Non-Educated Tax-complaint
Age→TC	0.189*	0.069*
Education→TC					1.255*	0.210**
Income Level→TC			0.102	0.203*
H1a:TK→ TC	0.381	0.331**	0.066*	0.058*	0.219	0.516**
H2a: SQ→ TC	0.087*	0.092*	0.435**	0.221*	0.050*	0.176
H1b: TK→ PA→ TC	0.025**	0.309*	0.289*	0.015	0.289**	0.058
H2b: SQ→ PA→ TC	1.303*	0.118*	0.799**	0.069	0.092*	0.179
R^2	0.287	0.559	0.475	0.584	0.773	0.373
Obs.	187	273	102	348	327	123

Table A1. Questionnaire.

Codes	Items	Likert Scale
Tax knowledge (TK)		1	2	3	4	5
TK1	I know it is a civic right to pay taxes to the government authority in charge of tax.
TK2	I know that I must register my business with the tax authorities.
TK3	I am aware that every business owner must have a taxpayer identification number.
TK4	I am aware that only government employees must pay taxes.
TK5	I know how to file my tax returns.
TK6	Tax return submission is vital even if I do not meet the deadline.
TK7	I always listen to publicity and education on tax issues.
Service Quality (SQ)		1	2	3	4	5
SQ1	Revenue officials undertake their duties within hours that are convenient to taxpayers.
SQ2	Tax officials provide taxpayers with timely updates on tax law and services.
SQ3	Most tax officials sometimes take bribes to assist taxpayers in avoiding taxes.
SQ4	There is no transparency as far as government spending of tax revenue is concerned.
SQ5	Benefits derived from the government cannot be compared with the tax paid.
SQ6	Payment of tax does not come with stress.
SQ7	In tax assessment, the rate of tax is fair.
Tax Compliance (TC)		1	2	3	4	5
TC1	I have an induced attitude toward compliance.
TC2	My compliance attitude is subjective to service delivery.
TC3	I have been paying my tax obligations on time.
Political Affiliation (PA)		1	2	3	4	5
PA1	I have a strong affect balance to my party of affiliation.
PA2	I owe a duty of trust to my political party.
PA3	I believe partisanship plays major role in resource distribution

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Data availability statement

Data for this original research work will be available by the corresponding author upon request.