The effect of the sex diversity of the board of commissioners on firm performance and the role of the ethnic background of president commissioners

Figures & data

Figure 1. Research model. Note: FP denotes firm performance; SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; ETC denotes the ethnic background of the president commissioner; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity.

Table 1. Operational definitions of variables.

No	Criterion	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
1.	Manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange	223	225	235	245	255	1,183
2.	Companies that did not provide the data needed in the study	(66)	(67)	(75)	(99)	(93)	(400)
Total sample		157	158	160	146	162	783

Table 2. Operational definitions of variables.

Variables	Code	Measurement	Reference
Panel A: Dependent variable
Tobin’s Q	TQ	(Market value equity + Total debt)/Total assets	(Hosny & Elgharbawy, 2022; Zarefar & Narsa, 2023)
Market to book value	MBV	Total market capitalization/Total equity	(Yıldız et al., 2019; Zarefar & Narsa, 2023)
Panel B: Independent variables
Sex diversity of the board of commissioners	SDBOC	BI = 1 − ${\sum }_{i=1}^k{\mathit{\text{Pi}}}^2$ Information : BI = Blau index k = Number of members of the board of commissioners in each category i = Category P = Proportion of members of the board of commissioners to each member	(Leyva-Townsend et al., 2021; Limbasiya & Shukla, 2019; Hosny & Elgharbawy, 2022)
Number of women on board of commissioners	NWBOC	Total number of women on the board of commissioners	(Yıldız et al., 2019)
Proportion of women on board of commissioners	PRONWBOC	Total number of women on the board of commissioners divided by the total number of members of the board of commissioners	(Yıldız et al., 2019)
Presence of women on board of commissioners	WBOCDUM	1 If it has one or more women on the board of commissioners; 0 if otherwise	(Yıldız et al., 2019; Zarefar & Narsa, 2023)
Panel C: moderating variable
Ethnic background of president commissioner	ETC	1 = President commissioner with matrilineal tradition backgrounds (Minangkabau, Dayak, Nias, Sumba, and Toraja) 2 = President commissioner with patrilineal tradition backgrounds (Javanese, Sundanese, Balinese, Batak, and Madurese)	(Riani et al., 2021)
Panel D: Control variables (governance mechanisms)
Age of president commissioner	AGE	Age of president commissioner	(Osei Bonsu et al., 2023)
Education level of president commissioner	GRADE	1 = Senior high school 2 = Bachelor’s 3 = Master’s 4 = Doctorate 5 = Professor	(Osei Bonsu et al., 2023)
Educational background of president commissioner	MAJORITY	1 = Economics 2 = Technical 3 = Other	(Molinero-Díez et al., 2022)
Size of the board of commissioners	NBOC	Total number of members of the board of commissioners	(Kusumastati et al., 2022)
Size of the board of directors	NBOD	Total number of members of the board of directors	(Kusumastati et al., 2022)
Size of the independent board of directors	NBODI	Total number of members of the independent board of directors	(Maji & Saha, 2021)
Proportion of independent directors	PRONBOID	Total number of members of the independent board of directors/total number of members of the board of directors	(Maji & Saha, 2021)
Size of women board of directors	NWBOD	Total number of women on the board of directors	(Pidani et al., 2020)
Size of the audit committee	NAC	Total number of members of the audit committee	(Meah et al., 2021; Zarefar & Narsa, 2023)
Proportion of women audit committee	PRONWAC	Total number of women on the audit committees/total number of members of the audit committees	(Omotoye et al., 2021)
Panel E: Control variables (firm characteristics)
Firm age	FIRMAGE	Number of years since the company was founded	(Sahoo et al., 2023; Yıldız et al., 2019; Zarefar & Narsa, 2023)
Company size	FIRMSIZE	Ln total assets	(Maji & Saha, 2021; Sahoo et al., 2023; Yıldız et al., 2019)
Leverage	LEV	Total debt divided by total assets	(Maji & Saha, 2021; Sahoo et al., 2023; Zarefar & Narsa, 2023)
Liquidity	CR	Current assets divided by current liabilities	(Boshnak et al., 2023)

Table 3. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
TQ	783	1.43	1.11	0.12	7.76
MBV	783	2.17	5.73	−8.26	70.57
SDBOC	783	0.15	0.20	0.00	0.50
ETC	783	1.93	0.26	1.00	2.00
AGE	783	61.41	11.18	36.00	89.00
MAJORITY	783	1.72	0.86	1.00	3.00
GRADE	783	2.24	0.78	1.00	5.00
NBOC	783	3.96	1.77	2.00	10.00
PRONBOID	783	0.18	0.16	0.00	0.67
NBOD	783	4.61	2.06	2.00	12.00
NWBOD	783	0.58	0.88	0.00	6.00
NBODI	783	0.69	0.52	0.00	3.00
NAC	783	3.00	0.35	1.00	5.00
PRONWAC	783	0.20	0.25	0.00	1.00
FIRMAGE	783	39.91	17.69	4.00	104.00
FIRMSIZE	783	21.58	1.65	17.72	25.92
LEV	783	0.49	0.27	−0.91	0.94
CR	783	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.10

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value, SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; ETC denotes the ethnic background of the president commissioner; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity.

Table 4. Frequency of NWBOC.

Number of women	Number of observations	Frequency (%)
0	502	64.11
1	226	28.86
2	46	5.87
3	9	1.16
Total	783	100

Table 5. Frequency of ETC.

Code	Ethnic background of president commissioner
	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	59	7.54
2	724	92.46
Total	783	100

Table 6. Frequency of native and non-native Indonesian ethnicities.

Code	Ethnic background of president commissioner
	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	556	71.01
2	227	28.99
Total	783	100

Table 7. Pairwise correlations.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) TQ	1.000
(2) MBV	0.257*	1.000
(3) BI	0.027	−0.008	1.000
(4) ETC	0.027	0.028	0.062	1.000
(5) AGE	−0.078	−0.040	0.075	−0.123*	1.000
(6) MAJORITY	0.017	0.039	0.014	−0.032	0.340*	1.000
(7) GRADE	0.057	0.063	−0.129*	0.056	−0.281*	−0.487*	1.000
(8) NBOC	−0.030	0.006	−0.078	−0.023	0.268*	0.060	0.103*	1.000
(9) NBOD	−0.014	0.101*	−0.104*	0.010	0.201*	0.056	0.045	0.586*	1.000
(10) NWBOD	0.025	0.114*	0.091	0.005	0.046	−0.014	0.039	0.080	0.328*
(11) NBODI	0.035	0.011	−0.051	−0.040	−0.100*	−0.016	0.012	0.013	0.102*
(12) PRONBOID	0.037	−0.016	0.032	−0.017	−0.196*	−0.047	−0.012	−0.247*	−0.357*
(13) NAC	0.063	−0.018	−0.115*	−0.011	−0.031	0.025	−0.037	0.130*	0.151*
(14) PRONWAC	−0.087	−0.026	0.246*	−0.023	0.037	0.010	−0.015	−0.081	−0.065
(15) FIRMAGE	0.030	0.094*	0.047	−0.006	0.140*	0.036	0.096*	0.196*	0.173*
(16) FIRMSIZE	−0.063	0.019	−0.143*	−0.030	0.218*	0.099*	0.045	0.578*	0.628*
(17) LEV	−0.011	0.003	−0.015	0.017	−0.067	−0.063	0.122*	−0.009	−0.009
(18) CR	0.029	−0.039	−0.077	0.016	−0.046	−0.108*	0.106*	−0.046	−0.036

Table

Variable	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
(10) NWBOD	1.000
(11) NBODI	0.044	1.000
(12) PRONBOID	−0.089	0.794*	1.000
(13) NAC	0.018	0.035	−0.042	1.000
(14) PRONWAC	0.052	−0.068	−0.009	−0.031	1.000
(15) FIRMAGE	0.113*	−0.037	−0.099*	0.038	0.032	1.000
(16) FIRMSIZE	0.139*	0.020	−0.251*	0.179*	−0.126*	0.250*	1.000
(17) LEV	0.044	0.037	0.047	−0.023	0.090	−0.051	−0.054	1.000
(18) CR	0.044	0.004	0.009	0.002	0.018	−0.007	−0.075	0.497*	1.000

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; ETC denotes the ethnic background of the president commissioner; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. *p < 0.1

Table 8. Effect of SDBOC on FP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TQ	TQ	TQ	MBV	MBV	MBV
Intercept	1.451***	1.924***	1.694***	2.197***	7.913***	6.241***
	(39.49)	(7.95)	(10.16)	(8.68)	(2.01)	(1.58)
SDBOC	0.499**	0.766*	0.757*	2.208	3.097	3.276
	(1.95)	(1.74)	(1.74)	(0.80)	(1.10)	(1.17)
AGE		−0.005	−0.004		−0.033	−0.025
		(−1.29)	(−1.47)		(−1.62)	(−1.23)
MAJORITY		0.129***	0.114***		0.668 **	0.560**
		(2.71)	(2.68)		(2.40)	(2.01)
GRADE		0.132**	0.137***		0.669**	0.694**
		(2.40)	(2.37)		(2.16)	(2.25)
NBOC		−0.031	−0.033		0.679***	0.671***
		(−0.91)	(−1.02)		(3.48)	(3.46)
PRONBOID		0.407	0.251		2.561	1.554
		(1.17)	(0.58)		(0.82)	(0.50)
NBOD		0.077	0.076		0.409**	0.402**
		(1.54)	(1.44)		(2.12)	(2.09)
NWBOD		0.347***	0.367***		1.178**	1.074**
		(5.14)	(5.22)		(2.11)	(1.93)
NBODI		−0.069	−0.035		−0.792	−0.580
		(−1.07)	(−0.49)		(−0.91)	(−0.67)
NAC		0.221**	0.225***		−0.422	−0.386
		(2.99)	(3.35)		(−0.71)	(−0.65)
PRONWAC		0.423***	0.421***		−0.916	−0.884
		(4.37)	(−2.210)		(−1.09)	(−1.06)
FIRMAGE		0.003**	0.003**		0.023**	0.020*
		(2.35)	(2.37)		(1.93)	(1.69)
FIRMSIZE		0.083**	0.084***		0.341**	0.345**
		(2.83)	(3.09)		(1.99)	(2.02)
LEV		−0.172**	−0.217**		0.768	0.453
		(−2.44)	(−2.21)		(0.87)	(0.51)
CR		2.541	2.573		−18.144	−17.451
		(1.19)	(1.08)		(−1.24)	(−1.20)
Year effect			Yes			Yes
Industry effect			Yes			Yes
Adj. R^2	0.19	0.22	0.37	0.00	0.05	0.12
N	783	783	783	783	783	783
F-stat	0.887***	0.936***	0.909***	0.447***	0.304***	0.339***

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women members of the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. t-Statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 9. Moderating role of ETC.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	TQ	TQ	MBV	MBV
Intercept	1.798***	1.560***	8.105**	6.531**
	(7.12)	(5.30)	(2.27)	(2.10)
SDBOC	1.648**	1.604*	3.412	3.125
	(1.94)	(1.73)	(1.24)	(1.20)
ETC	0.087*	0.089	0.008	0.021
	(1.67)	(1.42)	(0.04)	(0.09)
SDBOC*ETC	0.750**	0.760**	1.600*	1.666**
	(2.22)	(2.08)	(1.82)	(2.05)
AGE	0.005*	−0.004	−0.035	−0.028
	(1.76)	(−1.35)	(−1.43)	(−1.49)
MAJORITY	0.128***	0.112**	0.614*	0.507*
	(2.68)	(2.46)	(1.77)	(1.72)
GRADE	0.133***	0.136**	0.667*	0.687**
	(2.60)	(2.43)	(1.83)	(1.90)
NBOC	−0.031	−0.029	0.666***	0.655***
	(−0.97)	(−0.85)	(7.12)	(−6.28)
PRONBOID	0.328	0.162	2.214	1.119
	(0.84)	(0.36)	(0.77)	(0.35)
NBOD	0.074	0.072	0.381	0.369
	(1.60)	(1.47)	(1.47)	(1.36)
NWBOD	0.341***	0.356***	1.228**	1.130**
	(5.08)	(4.68)	(2.18)	(2.03)
NBODI	−0.081	−0.052	−0.734	−0.540
	(−1.28)	(−0.72)	(−1.08)	(−0.81)
NAC	0.226***	0.232***	−0.415	−0.377
	(3.48)	(3.86)	(−0.99)	(−0.93)
PRONWAC	0.420***	0.415***	−0.952	−0.919**
	(4.73)	(4.07)	(−1.44)	(−1.44)
FIRMAGE	0.003**	0.003**	0.024	0.021
	(2.47)	(2.59)	(1.27)	(1.12)
FIRMSIZE	0.084***	0.085***	0.341*	0.345*
	(3.21)	(3.23)	(1.73)	(1.81)
LEV	−0.173**	−0.220**	0.800	0.491
	(−2.31)	(−2.15)	(1.26)	(1.03)
CR	2.466	2.535	20.171*	19.716**
	(1.21)	(1.13)	(1.79)	(2.10)
Year effect		Yes		Yes
Industry effect		Yes		Yes
Adj.R^2	0.060	0.067	0.069	0.080
N	783	783	783	783
F-stat	0.928***	0.902***	0.581***	0.574***

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; ETC denotes the ethnic background of the president commissioner; SDBOC*ETC denotes the interaction variable between the sex diversity of the board of commissioners and the ethnic background of the president commissioner; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; PRONWBOD denotes the proportion of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. t-Statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 10. Moderating role of indigenous and non-native Indonesian ethnicities.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TQ	TQ	TQ	MBV	MBV	MBV
Intercept	0.663	3.725	0.672	4.135	8.014**	3.725
	(0.73)	(0.55)	(0.736)	(0.594)	(2.026)	(0.557)
SDBOC	−0.235	−0.571	1.351**	2.742	−0.051	−0.571
	(−1.12)	(−0.70)	(2.325)	(1.246)	(−0.048)	(−0.707)
ETC			0.058	−0.194
			(0.517)	(−0.335)
SDBOC*ETC			1.310***	2.808*
			(3.065)	(1.875)
AGE	0.005	0.024	0.004	0.022	−0.034	0.024
	(1.22)	(1.32)	(1.053)	(1.211)	(−1.646)	(1.326)
MAJORITY	0.121**	0.621*	0.105*	0.558*	0.627**	0.621*
	(2.04)	(1.81)	(1.796)	(1.683)	(2.257)	(1.814)
GRADE	0.122**	0.741	0.120**	0.737	0.631**	0.741
	(2.19)	(1.54)	(2.131)	(1.531)	(2.036)	(1.542)
NBOC	−0.006	−0.284*	−0.006	−0.286*	−0.656***	−0.284*
	(−0.16)	(−1.70)	(−0.161)	(−1.732)	(−3.373)	(−1.703)
PRONBOID	−0.028	−0.882	0.028	−0.663	2.212	−0.882
	(−0.04)	(−0.32)	(0.047)	(−0.245)	(0.716)	(−0.323)
NBOD	0.009	0.320	0.016	0.340	0.390**	0.320
	(0.29)	(1.18)	(0.508)	(1.252)	(2.028)	(1.180)
NWBOD	−0.426***	−1.336**	−0.424***	−1.315**	1.158**	−1.336**
	(−3.41)	(−2.03)	(−3.488)	(−1.975)	(2.078)	(−2.032)
NBODI	−0.041	−0.554	−0.047	−0.588	−0.752	−0.554
	(−0.26)	(−0.75)	(−0.314)	(−0.800)	(−0.864)	(−0.755)
NAC	0.114	−0.246	0.098	−0.310	−0.428	−0.246
	(0.93)	(−0.58)	(0.790)	(−0.712)	(−0.715)	(−0.580)
PRONWAC	−0.263	−1.279**	−0.247	−1.281**	−0.909	−1.279**
	(−1.56)	(−2.11)	(−1.462)	(−2.124)	(−1.080)	(−2.114)
FIRMAGE	0.002	0.010	0.002	0.010	0.024*	0.010
	(0.70)	(0.40)	(0.731)	(0.434)	(1.955)	(0.401)
FIRMSIZE	−0.024	−0.222	−0.025	−0.224	−0.337*	−0.222
	(−0.56)	(−0.65)	(−0.600)	(−0.664)	(−1.954)	(−0.655)
LEV	−0.070	1.887	−0.036	2.072	0.603	1.887
	(−0.36)	(1.25)	(−0.187)	(1.346)	(0.682)	(1.259)
CR	0.597	−21.939*	0.600	−23.368*	−14.571	−21.939*
	(0.23)	(−1.83)	(0.231)	(−1.822)	(−0.966)	(−1.835)
Year effect	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes
Industry effect	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes
Adj.R^2	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.04	0.02	0.03
N	783	783	783	783	783	783
F-stat	0.909***	0.935***	0.890***	0.371***	0.304***	0.339***

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; ETC denotes the ethnic background of the president commissioner; SDBOC*ETC denotes the interaction variable between the sex diversity of the board of commissioners and the ethnic background of the president commissioner; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. t-Statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 11. Effects of PRONWBOC, NWBOC, and WBOCDUM on FP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	TQ	TQ	TQ	MBV	MBV	MBV
Intercept	2.280***	2.291***	2.267***	−39.291	−42.164	−42.043
	(10.78)	(12.58)	(9.27)	(−0.84)	(−0.90)	(−0.83)
WBOCDUM	1.154***			12.199
	(4.41)			(1.20)
WBOCDUM*ETC	0.430***			2.559
	(2.92)			(0.70)
PRONWBOC		4.859***			6.314
		(4.73)			(0.21)
PRONWBOC*ETC		2.030***			9.037
		(3.92)			(0.73)
NWBOC			0.885***			11.954
			(3.09)			(1.27)
NWBOC*ETC			0.384***			2.537
			(3.86)			(0.79)
AGE	0.005*	0.006*	−0.005	−0.015	0.003	0.005
	(1.72)	(1.83)	(−1.497)	(−0.19)	(0.04)	(0.05)
MAJORITY	0.129***	0.131***	0.126***	0.725	0.685	0.671
	(3.24)	(3.09)	(3.12)	(1.09)	(0.93)	(0.82)
GRADE	0.128**	0.133**	0.129**	−0.839	−0.845	−0.860
	(2.52)	(2.34)	(2.31)	(−0.63)	(−0.65)	(−0.64)
NBOC	−0.015	−0.030	−0.020	3.843*	−3.578	−3.584*
	(−0.44)	(−0.93)	(−0.60)	(1.65)	(−1.92)	(−1.79)
PRONBOID	0.242	0.385	0.265	20.606	21.635	21.457
	(0.80)	(1.33)	(0.80)	(0.72)	(1.13)	(0.98)
NBOD	0.068	0.077	0.072	5.277	5.312	5.309
	(1.49)	(1.55)	(1.55)	(1.14)	(1.24)	(1.17)
NWBOD	0.337***	0.342***	0.331***	−10.961	−10.324	−10.357
	(5.12)	(4.93)	(4.57)	(−0.89)	(−0.97)	(−0.92)
NBODI	−0.055	−0.071	−0.056	0.126	−0.212	−0.146
	(−1.09)	(−1.22)	(−0.92)	(0.02)	(−0.04)	(−0.03)
NAC	0.210***	0.198***	0.205***	−4.134	−4.136	−4.123
	(3.75)	(3.55)	(3.38)	(−1.18)	(−1.28)	(−1.21)
PRONWAC	0.404***	0.394***	0.391***	−6.599	−6.127	−6.112
	(5.01)	(4.41)	(4.20)	(−1.31)	(−1.53)	(−1.43)
FIRMAGE	0.004***	0.004**	0.004***	−0.027	−0.025	−0.024
	(2.71)	(2.89)	(2.72)	(−0.50)	(−0.50)	(−0.49)
FIRMSIZE	0.098***	0.097***	0.099***	1.751	1.765	1.754
	(4.19)	(3.73)	(3.78)	(0.91)	(0.97)	(0.91)
LEV	−0.083	−0.065	−0.073	2.948	3.033	3.035
	(−1.33)	(−0.90)	(−1.00)	(0.79)	(0.90)	(0.89)
CR	0.242	0.221	0.170	−3.473	−18.144	−1.800
	(0.33)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(−0.03)	(−1.24)	(−0.02)
Year effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj.R^2	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.01	0.01	0.01
N	783	783	783	783	783	783
F-stat	0.934***	0.935***	0.9341***	0.305***	0.304***	0.306***

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; WBOCDUM*ETC denotes the interaction variable between the presence of women on the board of commissioners and the ethnic background of the president commissioner; PRONWBOC denotes the proportion of women on the board of commissioners; PRONWBOC*ETC denotes the interaction variable between the proportion of women on the board of commissioners and the ethnic background of the president commissioner; NWBOC denotes the number of women on the board of commissioners; NWBOC*ETC denotes the interaction variable between the number of women on the board of commissioners and the ethnic background of the president commissioner; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. t-statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 12. Effects of NWBOC1, NWBOC2, and NWBOC3 on FP.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	TQ	TQ	TQ
Intercept	1.012	0.728	0.954
	(1.108)	(0.803)	(1.042)
NWBOC1	−0.136
	(−0.949)
NWBOC2		0.279*
		(1.669)
NWBOC3			−0.236
			(−0.466)
AGE	0.003	0.005	0.004
	(0.881)	(1.298)	(0.933)
MAJORITY	0.118*	0.115*	0.119*
	(1.926)	(1.937)	(1.958)
GRADE	0.115**	0.114**	0.117**
	(2.041)	(2.046)	(2.079)
NBOC	−0.006	−0.009	−0.009
	(−0.203)	(−0.228)	(−0.294)
PRONBOID	0.165	0.292	0.185
	(0.255)	(0.471)	(0.285)
NBOD	−0.032	0.027	−0.028
	(−0.954)	(0.815)	(−0.833)
NWBOD	−0.016	−0.490***	−0.013
	(−0.301)	(−3.769)	(−0.250)
NBODI	−0.025	−0.095	−0.033
	(−0.158)	(−0.617)	(−0.211)
NAC	0.143	0.145	0.136
	(1.185)	(1.177)	(1.129)
PRONWAC	−0.233	−0.235	−0.212
	(−1.310)	(−1.403)	(−1.196)
FIRMAGE	0.001	0.002	0.001
	(0.405)	(0.648)	(0.364)
FIRMSIZE	−0.032	−0.032	−0.029
	(−0.739)	(−0.772)	(−0.674)
LEV	−0.072	−0.059	−0.063
	(−0.368)	(−0.309)	(−0.325)
CR	1.437	0.655	1.258
	(0.561)	(0.258)	(0.489)
Year effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj.R^2	0.23	0.25	0.23
N	783	783	783
F-stat	0.940***	0.928***	0.936***

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; NWBOC1 has a value of 1 if it has one female member on the board of commissioners and 0 otherwise; NWBOC2 has a value of 1 if it has two women members on the board of commissioners and 0 otherwise; NWBOC3 has a value of 1 if it has three women members on the board of commissioners and 0 otherwise; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. t-Statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 13. Heckman two-stage regression and fixed effects.

	Heckman two-stage regression			Fixed effects
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	SDBOCDUM	TQ	MBV	TQ	MBV
Intercept	0.710	0.741	−89.858	1.965***	51.293
	(0.44)	(0.789)	(−0.988)	(9.57)	(−0.92)
SDBOC		0.682**	−2.436	2.225***	17.392
		(2.375)	(−0.301)	(2.72)	(0.68)
SDBOC*ETC		0.346***	0.586	0.606**	1.519
		(3.217)	(0.187)	(2.56)	(0.43)
LAGPRONWBOC	5.975***	–	–	–	–
	(13.27)	–	–	–	–
IMR1		0.067**	−0.361	–	–
		(0.599)	(−0.276)	–	–
AGE	0.016**	0.004	0.141	−0.004	0.039
	(1.97)	(0.979)	(1.098)	(−1.63)	(0.35)
MAJORITY	−0.267**	0.121*	−0.338	0.119***	0.020
	(−2.55)	(1.903)	(−0.267)	(3.30)	(0.02)
GRADE	−0.434***	0.129**	−0.930	0.139***	−0.667
	(−3.48)	(2.143)	(−0.472)	(2.64)	(−0.54)
NBOC	0.242***	0.001	−4.791	−0.007	3.596*
	(3.38)	(0.024)	(−1.011)	(−0.20)	(1.66)
PRONBOID	−1.445	0.113	21.126	0.121	13.805
	(−1.40)	(0.195)	(0.774)	(0.33)	(0.66)
NBOD	−0.010	0.025	5.781	0.069	5.219
	(−0.15)	(0.756)	(0.964)	(1.58)	(1.11)
NWBOD	−0.495**	−0.446***	−15.612	0.351***	−11.678
	(−2.18)	(−3.613)	(−1.049)	(5.18)	(-0.88)
NBODI	−0.188	−0.081	−1.013	−0.044	1.178
	(−0.67)	(−0.566)	(−0.314)	(−0.81)	(0.20)
NAC	0.018	0.149	−1.909	0.227***	−3.788
	(0.08)	(1.196)	(-0.691)	(3.70)	(−1.10)
PRONWAC	0.62*	−0.278*	−9.006	0.417***	−6.549
	(1.90)	(−1.675)	(−1.250)	(4.76)	(−1.34)
FIRMAGE	0.001	0.003	0.070	0.003***	−0.047
	(0.19)	(0.731)	(0.872)	(2.67)	(−0.74)
FIRMSIZE	−0.151**	−0.036	3.302	0.098***	1.722
	(−2.25)	(−0.848)	(0.957)	(4.12)	(0.88)
LEV	−0.144	−0.006	2.808	−0.137	0.658
	(−0.41)	(−0.036)	(0.425)	(−1.42)	(0.16)
CR	−13.753***	−0.162	−19.136	0.349	1.272
	(−2.81)	(−0.249)	(−1.098)	(0.51)	(0.01)
Year effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry effect	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj.R^2	0.11	0.24	0.07	0.12	0.02
N	684	783	783	783	783
F-stat	0.233***	0.118***	0.211***	0.871***	0.351***

Note: TQ denotes Tobin’s Q; MBV denotes the market to book value; SDBOC denotes the sex diversity of the board of commissioners; ETC denotes the ethnic background of the president commissioner; SDBOC*ETC denotes the interaction variable between the sex diversity of the board of commissioners and the ethnic background of the president commissioner; LAGPRONWBOC denotes the lagged value of the percentage of women on the board of commissioners; IMR1 denotes the effect of self-selection bias; AGE denotes the age of the president commissioner; MAJORITY denotes the educational background of the president commissioner; GRADE denotes the education level of the president commissioner; NBOC denotes the size of the board of commissioners; PRONBOID denotes the proportion of independent directors; NBOD denotes the size of the board of directors; NWBOD denotes the number of women on the board of directors; NBODI denotes the size of the independent board of directors; NAC denotes the size of the audit committee; PRONWAC denotes the proportion of women on the audit committee; FIRMAGE denotes the firm’s age; FIRMSIZE denotes the company’s size; LEV denotes leverage; CR denotes liquidity. t-Statistics in parentheses; *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

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Data availability statement

Data used in the present study will be available on request, from the corresponding author.