Nietzsche's intuitions

ABSTRACT

This essay examines a particular rhetorical strategy Nietzsche uses to supply prima facie epistemic justification: appeals to intuition. I first investigate what Nietzsche thinks intuitions are, given that he never uses the term ‘intuition’ as we do in contemporary philosophy. I then examine how Nietzsche can simultaneously endorse naturalism and intuitive appeals. I finish by looking at why and how Nietzsche uses appeals to intuition to further his philosophical agenda. Answering these questions should provide a new and deeper understanding of how Nietzsche does philosophy.

KEYWORDS:

• Nietzsche
• epistemology
• methodology
• intuition
• justification
• naturalism

Acknowledgements

My thanks to R. Kevin Hill, Mark Migotti, Paul Katsafanas, Andrew Kissel, Carl Sachs, Joseph Swensen, Luis Cheng-Guajardo, and an anonymous reviewer for discussion of these ideas and comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 With respect to moral philosophy, for example, see Katsafanas (2016, 26–28, 35); Owen (2007, 5, 146).

2 For various accounts of Nietzsche's naturalism, see Leiter (2002, 2013); Schacht (2012); Acampora (2006, 2013); Clark and Dudrick (2006, 2012).

3 For instance, Leiter writes, ‘Any method that reliably produces knowledge of what is true is a Wissenschaft [viz, a science, broadly construed to include the humanities]’ (Leiter 2019a, 93, my brackets). A different view is offered by Clark and Dudrick (2006, 2012). They hold that for Nietzsche justification occurs with the realm of human behavior, or the ‘space of reasons’, rather than the realm of merely empirical phenomena, or the ‘space of causes’, which is studied by the sciences. My account differs from Clark and Dudrick's in that they do not discuss how Nietzsche's rhetorical strategies might supply justification in the space of reasons.

4 Janaway (2009) and Gemes (2006) offer influential accounts of this approach.

5 It might be desirable if the two approaches could be shown to be globally compatible, despite first appearances, since this demarcation strategy raises many obvious problems. For instance, we might wonder how to draw the boundaries, how to explain why justification is or is not pertinent, and why the non-justificatory domain is still philosophically important.

6 In what follows, I use ‘justification’, ‘warrant’, and ‘reason to believe’ interchangeably, and I count ‘S has reason to believe X’ and ‘S has reason not to believe X’ both as instances of providing genuine justification.

7 This paper concerns philosophical appeals to intuition in general, rather than Nietzsche's technical use of the term ‘intuition’ [Anschauung], which he contrasts with ‘intellect’ [Intellekt] in ‘On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense’. For discussion of Nietzsche's specific use term ‘intuition’, see Church (2015, 88). Appeals to intuition have been around in philosophy for a long time, though of course not in name, and my aim here is to understand why and how Nietzsche appeals to what we now understand as appeals to intuition.

8 For Nietzsche, affective states can be conscious or unconscious, but in what follows I only discuss conscious affective states. Although appeals to intuition could certainly affect us unconsciously, having an intuition – for example, the intuition that God's death is frighteningly disorienting – is often a conscious experience. I also focus on intuitions that actually manifest in affective reactions, despite the fact that Nietzsche does not seem to believe that intuitions necessarily manifest affectively. This will help us understand the relation between drives and intuitions.

9 What follows is indebted to Bengson (2015). One major difference between Nietzsche and Bengson's accounts is that Bengson, but not Nietzsche, believes presentational states can provide sufficient justification, specifically justification that does not require justification in turn – akin to something ‘given’. Nietzsche would reject this rationalist view.

10 See, e.g. Lewis (1983, x); Gopnik and Schwitzgebel (1998); Devitt (2006, 491); Kornblith (1998).

11 For further explanation, see Bengson (2015, section 4). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to be clear about these ideas.

12 This appears unique to Nietzsche. Intuitions are often thought to be beliefs, dispositions to believe, or sui generis propositional attitudes, none of which typically involve affective states. For a helpful discussion of these competing ways to understand intuitions, see Pust (2017, section 1).

13 For discussion, see BonJour (2011).

14 I use BGE 186, which concerns moral philosophy, as just one example of the way in which Nietzsche rejects theory-independent justification, but there is good reason to think that rejecting views on these grounds extends to other domains of philosophy. For defense of this view, see Katsafanas (forthcoming).

15 Indeed, in the preface to the Groundwork Kant famously claims that his moral theory will be supported by ‘common cognition’, or our ordinary, intuitive judgments concerning morality.

16 Owen is right to say that, on Nietzsche's account, our ‘moral intuitions’ are ‘the product of the particular contingent course of European history’ (Owen 2007, 5; see also Katsafanas 2016, 26–28). Owen later claims that this contingency ‘encourages a degree of scepticism towards forms of argument based on any straightforward appeal to our intuitions’ (Owen 2007, 146). But, as I argue below, Nietzsche repeatedly appeals to intuition in GM, though of course nothing ‘straightforwardly’ turns such appeals. Owen dedicates a section of his book on GM to understanding Nietzsche's rhetoric and, unfortunately, does not mention Nietzsche's strategy of appealing to intuition.

17 Nietzsche's understanding of the scientific method, and his preference for the scientific method over conviction, is very similar to Peirce's position in his influential essay ‘The Fixation of Belief’. See Peirce (1982, 61–78).

18 This terminology comes from Reginster (2006, 26–27).

19 One might argue that for Nietzsche the propositional content of our intuitions must be explicit rather than implicit, since conscious content is necessarily conceptualized, and conceptualized content is fully articulated. But, as we see here in GS 125, Nietzsche does not necessarily link conceptual content with fully articulated content. Conceptual content can be implicit.

20 For a detailed discussion of this point, see Leiter (2019b).

21 One might argue that Nietzsche's account fails to distinguish practical from theoretical reason, such that what we have reason to do should be separated from what we should believe. It might be further argued that practical reason does not provide genuine justification. More specifically, what we should believe, all things considered, could be considered more important that our reasons for being pushed merely to act in some way or another. In response, Nietzsche does not follow those who like Aristotle who separate practical from theoretical reason and prefer the latter, and, on my account, he believes practical reason can provide prima facie justification to seek out the best theoretical reasons for embracing some position or another.

22 There might be another way to push back. Nietzsche seems to respect the intelligence of the slaves and dismiss the nobles as unintelligent. This is a standard reading. For just a few clear examples, see Ridley (1998, 127–134); Welshon (2014, 20–22); Hatab (2011, 207–213). Nietzsche writes, ‘A race of such men of ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree: namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance’ (GM I: 10). I am not convinced that this undermines the intuitive appeal of nobility. First, the passage continues by describing nobility in strongly positive terms. Second, Nietzsche holds that the slave's cleverness develops from dishonesty, and he praises the honesty of nobility. Third, Nietzsche thinks the cleverness of the slaves plunges humanity into nihilism (see GM I: 12). As I see things, then, cleverness does not render the slave class appealing.

23 For a similar reading – and one that provides much more depth than my description here – see Migotti (unpublished manuscript).

24 I therefore disagree with White's claim that ‘Nietzsche deliberately destroys the possibility of identification with [the noble master], by stressing his most horrible aspects as a murderous “beast of prey”’ (White 1994, 66), and Janaway's claim that ‘Readers will be indignant about the nobles as Nietzsche describes them’ (Janaway 2009, 100). Hatab (2008, 48–49) suggests that the negative remarks directed at nobility in GM I: 11 come from the perspective of the slave, rather than Nietzsche's own perspective. If so, this supports my reading of Nietzsche's positive depiction of the nobles, since the positive descriptions are clear in other passages. But it is hard to reconcile Hatab's reading with the wealth of positive descriptions used for nobility in GM I: 11, since these are descriptions that the slaves would clearly not bother making. One might also argue that contemporary readers cannot genuinely grasp the appeal of nobility because we are far removed from those cultures in which nobility flourished – we cannot ‘go back’, and of course Nietzsche never advocates for a return to the noble way of life. But, as Migotti writes, Nietzsche never suggests that the perspective of nobility is ‘epistemically unavailable’ (Migotti 2006, 111). Migotti continues: ‘Noble values are not so bizarre as to render it doubtful that we can understand what it might have been like to live in accordance with them’ (Migotti 2006, 111). This understanding certainly informs the appeal of nobility for current readers.

25 Commentators tend to significantly underestimate the intuitive appeal of the nobles. Here are just a few examples. Ridley writes, ‘Nietzsche is much nicer about the nobles in the first essay than he is about the slaves’ (Ridley 1998, 128; cf. Ridley 2011, 315; see also Conway 2008, 42–43). Swanton claims that Nietzsche ‘appears’ to ‘valorize’ nobility, but ‘he valorizes it by comparison with slave morality which for him is clearly much more dangerous in its tendencies to undermine the development of “higher man”’ (Swanton 2011, 292). Janaway says, ‘So someone who winces at the description of the nobles in GM I might also be someone whose reaction is tinged with a kind of admiration or awe’ (Janaway 2009, 101, emphasis added). Janaway is on much better ground when he claims that Nietzsche wants to elicit ‘an affective inclination in favor of the nobles, to show that one has also inherited from earlier value systems an excitement and attraction for heroism, prowess, and the exercise of power with aristocratic disdain’ (Janaway 2009, 105; cf. Owen 2007, 86). For an informative discussion about some of the key positive features of nobility, see Migotti (2006, 110–113).

26 These features, along with others, are explored in greater detail in Bengson (2015).

27 The methodological strategy of appealing to intuition also helps makes sense of Nietzsche's aim described in the seemingly enigmatic first section of the Preface of GM. Nietzsche says, ‘We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves – how could it happen that we should ever find ourselves?’ (GM P: 1). Atheists must be pushed to know themselves – they must be pressed into understanding what it means fully to embrace atheism – and Nietzsche's appeals to intuition ground this project of discovery. Nietzsche writes, ‘we sometimes rub our ears afterward and ask, utterly surprised and disconcerted, “what really was that which we have just experienced?” and moreover: “who are we really”’ (GM P: 1). Given that the noble mode of valuation runs against our modern mode, it is obviously disconcerting to have the impression that nobility is attractive. Nietzsche suggests that atheists should reflect on their affective impressions and seek out who they really are – they are, in fact, still theist in many crucial ways. This seeking is grounded in the presentational states Nietzsche stirs up.

28 See Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001); Knobe and Nichols (2008); Weinberg (2017).

29 Gemes (2006, 199–201) gives a nice example of Nietzsche's use of this strategy in GM. Nietzsche's presentation of the triumph of slave morality suggests that nineteenth-century Germans are actually quite Jewish, which, given the cultural climate in Germany at the time, is certainly aimed to unsettle them.

30 Kornblith (2017, 157) also makes this point, and, importantly, he does so when arguing for a naturalistic philosophical methodology.