Berkeley on whether human sensible ideas are identical to certain divine ideas

ABSTRACT

Berkeley seems to be committed to the view that human sensible ideas are identical to certain divine ideas. However, this interpretation is subject to three objections. I argue that Berkeley holds that human sensible ideas are qualitatively identical to certain divine ideas, and I argue that objections to this view can be satisfactorily answered.

KEYWORDS:

• Berkeley
• ideas
• identity

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank participants at the International Berkeley Conference in Jerusalem for their comments on a previous draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Adam Arico, Tim Jankowiak, Holly Kantin, and Guy Schuh for their comments on previous drafts of this paper either in writing or in conversation.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 1949, 2: 212. I refer to Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous by the page numbers in this volume preceded by ‘DHP.’

2 I say why I attribute this view to Berkeley in section 2 below.

3 George Dicker finds textual evidence for and against the identity view and speculates that ‘perhaps [Berkeley] was just undecided’ on the subject (2011, 282–283, 291–294).

4 Emphasis added. See also Winkler 1998, 196–201, 231; 303–305.

5 Berkeley 1948-1957, vol. 1. I refer to Philosophical Commentaries by the entry numbers preceded by ‘NB’ (for “notebooks”). Frankel 2016; 57.

6 Berkeley 1948-1957, vol. 2. I refer to A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge by the section numbers preceded by ‘PHK.’

7 Cf. Pappas 2000; 109–112.

8 Winkler 1998, 157–159.

9 It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and attempt to refute these alternative interpretations.

10 Emphasis added. Cf. DHP 239-240.

11 Flage cites PHK 29, DHP 212, 230-231, 235 (1994, 134); Dancy cites DHP 212, 230–231 (1987, 50–51); Raynor cites DHP 214, 239, 240 (1987, 613–614); Luce cites DHP 215 (1942, 15); Hight cites DHP 230–231, 235, 240 (2008, 181, 183); Berman cites DHP 240 (1986, 44); Pappas cites DHP 251–252 (2000, 109, 186).

12 According to Pappas, there is no convincing textual evidence for the claim that Berkeley’s view is that ideas are private. So Pappas concludes that Berkeley’s view is that ideas are publicly perceivable (1982, 9). Since Pappas also holds that God perceives the same ideas that we do, his view must be that human sensible ideas are numerically identical to certain divine ideas (1982, 8-9; 2000, 108-112, 186, 201).

13 Underlining added. Luce 1940, 103.

14 Underlining added. Luce 1940, 103.

15 Underlining added.

16 Winkler 1998, 304; Dicker 2011, 283, 291; C. D. Broad 1954, 162; McKim 1992, 227–229; Tipton 1974; 86.

17 Cf. Berkeley 1948-1957, vol. 1, An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, §109; PHK 12.

18 Berkeley 1948-1957, 2: 285-286. I refer to ‘Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, 1729-30’ by page numbers from this volume preceded by ‘C.’

19 Locke used ‘archetype’ to refer to matter which has the power of causing ideas in us. Locke 1979, 2.31.1, 3-6, 8, 14 (I refer here to the book, chapter, and paragraph numbers of Locke’s Essay).

20 Cf. Ablondi 2005, 500; Pitcher 1977; 167.

21 Winkler 1998, 235–236.

22 Emphasis added.

23 Underlining added.

24 Thus, I take Berkeley to be using ‘sensation’ to refer to the object of sensing and not the act of sensing.

25 2010; 224-225.

26 Berkeley 1948-1957, vol. 5. I refer to Siris by the section number preceded by ‘S.’ Roberts 2010, 225.

27 The same response can be made to the objection that Philonous’s claim that intense heat is great pain (DHP 176) means that passivity is part of the content of a sensible idea (McCracken 1979; 282). Cf. McKim 1992, 228–229.

28 Cf. NB 590, 647.

29 DHP 253, 254; C 293. Cf. DHP 231.

30 A proponent of the numerical identity view could hold that ideas are only fleeting in relation to us or even that our ideas are eternal though not perceived eternally (Dancy 1987, 54; Hight 2008, 210; Dicker 2011, 285).

31 Emphasis added.

32 Emphasis added.