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This article refers to:
Willing and not being able: Nietzsche on akratic action

Article title: Willing and not being able: Nietzsche on akratic action

Authors: Thomas, L.

Journal: Inquiry

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2164053

  • On page 6, author has deleted the unnecessary return between long quotation and citation of (Anderson 2012, 230).

  • On page 8, author has changed (Hume 1993 [1748]) to (Hume 5.1.5).

  • On page 8, author has corrected the footnote 18 to read: “For more on the nature of Nietzschean drives, see Anderson (2012), Clark and Dudrick (2012), Katsafanas (2016), Riccardi (2018, 2021), and Richardson (2020).”

  • On page 10, author has corrected the footnote 19 to read: “Richardson cites NF 1885, 40[37] as another example of this tendency. He also points out that at NF 1881, 11[73], Nietzsche ‘passes back and forth between Trieb and Affekt in making [his] points’ (Richardson 2020, 117n5).”

  • On page 10, on footnote 20, author has corrected the reference Riccardi 2020 to Richardson 2020.

  • On page 11, author has corrected the footnote 22 to read: “See, for example, Davidson (1980).”

  • On page 11, author has corrected the footnote 23 to read: “There are competing accounts of the nature of the ‘order of rank’ of drives. Clark and Dudrick (2012) advance a normative interpretation, according to which the order is a function of subordinate drives recognizing the normative authority of commanding drives. Katsafanas (2016) and Riccardi (2018) argue that this reading commits Nietzsche to the homunculus fallacy. A second interpretation, defended by Riccardi (2018, 2021) reads the order of the drives as a function of drives’ causal strength.”

  • On page 12-13, author has requested to format the footnote 24 as formatted in the received manuscript as follows:

24 While Nietzsche offers a list of factors that shape evaluative belief, his claim boils down to the same point made in BGE 6. After all, Nietzsche also takes our “likes” and “dislikes” to be a product of our drives (NF 1881 11[164]). And a passage from Daybreak neatly expresses his position regarding the relationship between drives and experience:

This nutriment [of the drives] is therefore a work of chance: our daily experiences throw some prey in the way of now this, now that drive, and the drive seizes it eagerly; but the coming and going of these events as a whole stands in no rational relationship to the nutritional requirements of the totality of the drives: so that the outcome will always be twofold—the starvation and stunting of some and the overfeeding of others. Every moment of our lives sees some of the polyp-arms of our being grow and others of them wither, all according to the nutriment which the moment does or does not bear with it. Our experiences are, as already said, all in this sense means of nourishment, but the nourishment is scattered indiscriminately without distinguishing between the hungry and those already possessing a superfluity. And as a consequence of this chance nourishment of the parts, the whole, fully grown polyp will be something just as accidental as its growth has been. (D 119)

Our experiences “nourish” our drives in the sense that they provide opportunities for expression (and strengthening) of individual drives. The strength of each drive—and thus, the “order of rank” determining a person’s “morality”—is therefore, at least in part, a product of environmental factors. Of course, this picture is perfectly compatible with Nietzsche’s claim in BGE 6 that the “order of rank” of the drives determines one’s “morality.” While the causal history of the “rank ordering” involves environmental influence, Nietzsche’s view is that one’s evaluative convictions at a given point in time are a function of their drives at that same time.
  • On page 21, author has deleted the unnecessary return between long quotation and citation of (NF 1881, 11[131]).

  • On page 22, author has formatted the references as follows: on a line below “Works Cited,” there should be, in italics, “Works by Nietzsche”. Then the entries for the following works should be moved from their present locations to this section, in the following order:

  • The Wanderer and His Shadow (1880), translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. [WS]

  • Daybreak (1881), translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. [D]

  • The Gay Science (1882), translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1977. [GS]

  • Beyond Good and Evil (1886), translated by Walter Kaufmann, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. New York: Random House, 1967. [BGE]

  • On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), translated by Walter Kaufmann, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. New York: Random House, 1967. [GM]

  • Twilight of the Idols (1888), translated by Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Viking, 1954. [TI]

  • The Antichrist (1888), translated by Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche. New York: Viking, 1954. [A]

  • Nachgelassene Fragmente. Retrieved at www.nietzschesource.org. Translations my own. [NF]

  • On page 22, author has informed to provide correct spacing for the reference: Anderson, R. Lanier. 2006.

  • On page 22, author has deleted the reference “Hoffmann, Tobias. 2008”.

  • On page 22-23 author has substituted few references:

Anderson, R. Lanier. 2012. “What is a Nietzschean Self?” In Janaway and Robertson, edited by Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, 203–235. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To

Anderson, R. Lanier. 2012. “What is a Nietzschean Self?” In Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Normativity, edited by Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson, 203–235. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bennett, Jonathan. 1974. “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” Philosophy (london, England) 49: 123–134. doi:10.1017/S0031819100048014.

To

Bennett, Jonathan. 1974. “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” Philosophy 49: 123–134.

Davidson, Donald. 1970. How Is Weakness of the Will Possible? Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 21–42.

To

Davidson, Donald. 1980 [1970]. “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?,” in Essays on Actions and Events, edited by Donald Davidson, 21–42. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fowles, Christopher. 2020. “Conviction, Priority, and Rationalism in Aristotle’s Epistemology.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (1): 27–139. doi:10.1353/hph.2020.0001.

To

Fowles, Christopher. 2020. “The Heart of Flesh: Nietzsche on Affects and the Interpretation of the Body.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 58(1): 113–139.

Janaway, Christopher. 2009.

To

Janaway, Christopher. 2009. “Autonomy, Affect, and the Self in Nietzsche’s Project of Genealogy.” In Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, edited by Ken Gemes and Simon May, 51-68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leiter, Brian. 2009. “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will”, in Gemes and May (2009), 107–126.

To

Leiter, Brian. 2009. “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will.” In Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy, edited by Ken Gemes and Simon May, 107-126. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leiter, Brian. 2011. “Who is the ‘Sovereign Individual’? Nietzsche on Freedom”, in May, 101–119.

To

Leiter, Brian. 2011. “Who is the ’Sovereign Individual’?” In Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 101-119. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leiter, Brian, and Joshua Knobe. 2007. “The Case for Nietzschean Moral Psychology, edited by Nietzsche and Morality, edited by Leiter Brian and Neil Sinhababu. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To

Leiter, Brian and Joshua Knobe. 2007. “The Case for Nietzschean Moral Psychology.” In Nietzsche and Morality, edited by Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu, 83–109. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Plato. 1997. Protagoras, in Cooper, 746–790.

To

Plato. Protagoras. 1997. In Plato: Complete Works, edited by John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Risse, Matthias (2007). “Nietzschean ‘Animal Psychology’ versus Kantian Ethics”, in Leiter and Sinhababu, 53–82.

To

Risse, Matthias. 2007. “Nietzschean ‘Animal Psychology’ versus Kantian Ethics.” In Nietzsche and Morality, edited by Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu, 53–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Strong, Tracy. 2008. “Nietzsche, the Will to Power, and the Weak Will”, in Hoffmann, 231-251.

To

Strong, Tracy. 2008. “Nietzsche, the Will to Power, and the Weak Will.” In Weakness of Will from Plato to the Present, edited by Tobias Hoffmann, 231–251. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.

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