Investigation of ‘μέτρον’ in the Philebus – a critique of pleasure in Plato's later years

ABSTRACT

In the Philebus, Plato considers pleasure to be part of the good life. Always despises pleasure, Plato, however, no longer insists on extreme rationalism, instead, he reconciles reason and pleasure with the fundamental principle of ‘measure’ In the Philebus, Plato considers ‘measure (μέτρον)’ to be of the highest value. He not only argues for the concrete application of ‘measure’ in the sensual world, but also confirms the metaphysical ground of ‘measure’. Many scholars have discussed the application of ‘measure’ from different perspectives, but the deep logical principle of ‘measure’ has not been clarified clearly yet. Actually, the thought of ‘measure’ involves the relationship between ideas and sensual things. On the basis of the redefinition of this relationship, Plato proposes that a life that mixes reason and pleasure is a good one. On the one hand, ‘measure’ gives a certain rationalistic color to pleasure, and on the other hand, ‘measure’ protects pleasure from being replaced by reason. In this way, Plato turns to moderate rationalism, pioneers the principle of ‘measure’ in dealing with ethical issues, and draws a line between the gods and man.

KEYWORDS:

• Philebus
• measure
• reason
• pleasure

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The editions of Plato’s writings on which this paper is based are in ancient Greek: Plato, Ed. by Burnet J. 1900–1907. Platonis Opera, 5 Volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Plato, Ed. by Cooper J. M. 1997. Plato Complete Works, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing; Chinese version: Plato, translated by Wang Xiaochao. 2017. The Complete Works of Plato. Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Plato, annotated by Zhang Bobo, 2003. Annotation of Philebus. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House. The version of Aristotle’s works: Aristotle, annotated by Liao Shenbai. Ethika Nikomachea, Beijing: Commercial Press.

2 The Greek text of the Philebus uses the words τὸ χαίρϵιν (rejoice), τὴν ἡδονὴν (pleasure), and τὴν τέρψιν (enjoyment, delight) to mean ‘pleasure’ and τὸ φρονϵῖν (wise), τὸ νοϵῖν (thoughtful), τὸ μϵμνῆσθαι (remind), and other words mean ‘reason’. (see Phileb., 11b) Philebus spoke of pleasure as bound up with animal desires. Later, Epicurus also said that ‘pleasure is the highest good’, but he believed that pleasure combines with virtues. See Diogenes (2018, 536) (D. 132). Epicurus’s view of pleasure is not what Plato criticises in the Philebus.

3 Early works such as Phaedo generally regard pleasure and desire as the source of disaster; later works such as the Philebus and Laws advocate for therestriction and guidance of pleasure. The goal of virtue must be consistent with the pleasure of good. There are also scholars who believe that Plato’s attitude towards pleasure is moderated in the Philebus, from completely denying it to accepting some harmless pleasure. See Zhang (2018).

4 Dorothea Frede believed that Socrates in the Philebus converted the hedonist Protarchus to rationalism. See Frede, (1996, 213–248). Justin C. Gosling thought that Plato’s pleasure in the Philebus is the quenching of desire, which is a rationalist view. See Gosling (2003, 24–25).

5 Terence Irwin believed that Plato’s pursuit of overall happiness assumed that a full life requires both reason and pleasure, both of which are components of the good. See Irwin (1995, 335). Russell. C. Daniel argued that Plato’s relationship between pleasure and reason is divided into a ‘control model’ and ‘agreement model’. See Russel (2005, 12–13). Zhang Bobo argued that Plato pursued a ‘measure’-based happiness in ‘Pleasure’. See Zhang (2018). However, he discussed ‘measure’ from the perspective of Plato’s division of being (Phileb., 23c-d), and considered ‘measure’ as a restriction of the limit on unlimitedness. This is the result of the presentation of ‘measure’ rather than the logical source of ‘measure’ which has not been elucidated yet. In order to fill this lack, this paper will explain the logical principle of ‘measure’ and its application in specific cases from the perspective of ‘one and many’.

6 In terms of crafts, counting, measuring, and weighing are the most important of all crafts (Phileb., 55e); without proper measure, there would be no craft (Stm., 284d) Any craft that loses its measure becomes highly unreliable; measure means precision, and precision makes good work; in terms of epistemology, measurable means knowable, and knowable means good; from a moral point of view, measure means temperate, and temperate means good; and from a political point of view, measure means just – to make things just right.

7 For a definition, see the Ancient Greek English Dictionary: Perseus Digital Library and Greek-English Lexicon compiled by Henry George Liddell D.D. (1811–1898) and Robert Scott D.D. (1811–1887).

8 Socrates proposes ‘one and many’ as an important principle in problem solving (14c), but he soon leaves this method behind (20b). In terms of the dialogue, the relationship between the ‘one and many’ and pleasure criticism is ambiguous. Frede, (1996) and Meinwald (1996) have argued for the coherence of ‘one and many’ with critical pleasure. This paper follows this path using ‘measure’ as a clue to the argument.

9 Meinwald (1996) proposed that ‘one and many’ involves questions such as: 1. Whether we should posit forms?; 2. Assuming that we agree to do so, the next concern arises within the world of forms: the unity of each despite its pluralization by species; 3. The last question is in regards with the relation between forms and our world: the unity of each form despite its pluralization by sensibles. Frede, (1993, 22 xxii) wrote the following questions: Can one be understood as a form? and whether forms are always the same in themselves or are they more scattered in empirical things? Cooper (1968, 339) wrote that the problem of ‘one and many’ is the method of division of various genera.

10 The method of division is also discussed in Parmenides and Sophist., but the method of delineation in Philebus is more complete.

11 Here, ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ refer to the ‘limit’ and ‘unlimited’, respectively, in the Philebus

12 Silverman (2002, 226) regard ‘one and many’ and ‘limit and unlimitedness’ as two different ways to express the same content. In China, Deng (2021) also believe that ‘one and many’ or ‘limit and unlimitedness’ are the formal and material causes of being, respectively. This approach either understands both the one and the limit as generated things, ignoring the particularity of the one as a true being, or it understands them as true being, slipping into the trap that Socrates had warned – jumping from one end to the other, ignoring the process in between. Sayre (1983, 123) did not completely accept the clear statement that ‘one’ is not ‘limited’ and ‘many’ is not ‘unlimited’, because the view ignores the limited nature of ‘one’ and the unlimited nature of ‘many’.

13 Certainly there are some exceptions. Crombie proposed two ways of understanding ‘unlimitedness’, the traditional understanding (i.e., unlimitedly many particulars) and a different understanding (unlimitedly many insignificantly different subkinds) (Crombie 1963. II, 364). The only difference is that Crombie thought species (classes) may also be unlimited. If this is how Crombie understood it, then there is only the ‘unlimited many’ – both species (classes) and individuals. Classes and individuals are numerically unlimited, and there is no such thing as the ‘unlimited many’.

14 Frede also used this example. See D. Frede (1992, chap. 14, 440).

15 In Gorgias (500d), Plato pointed out that goodness is the highest purpose of life and the city-state; in Meno (77b–78b), he pointed out that theoretically all people seek goodness, and those who do evil only misunderstand evil as good; and in the Republic (504e–505a), he pointed out that the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of the idea of the good, from which all just things derive their utility and value.

16 Plato’s reasons for saying that no one would choose a life of reason alone are not very justified. His attitude towards the rational life here is different from that in his earlier works, and it involves a basic human starting point, which is relevant to the later discussion of whether the mixed life is better than the divine life.

17 Whether the mixed life is better than the divine life is debatable. Frede believed that the mixed life is just a remedy for Socrates and is actually inferior to the pain-free reasonable life. See Frede (1992, chap. 14, 440). Carone believed that the mixed life is the best life, not the second best option. See Carone (2000). Fletcher also wrote that the mixed life of man is better than the divine life of God. See Fletcher (2014).

18 See Irwin (1995, 345). If we look at it from the point of view of good and bad, God’s life must be better than man’s, but if we consider the applicability, the divine life is excluded.

19 Frede believed that pleasure is the means to achieve the good. Socrates said that true pleasure is the pleasure caused by the restoration from the lack of knowledge as we learn, although the lack of knowledge does not cause us perception or pain. (51b) Thus, Frede concluded that the definition of pleasure is the restoration of lack of knowledge, and he considered pleasure as a means of achieving good. But the means that make restoration possible is learning, not pleasure, and pleasure is only the emotion that accompanies the learning – what he called restoration. Therefore, I think this argument of Frede can only show that learning is a means to achieve good, but not enough to show that pleasure is a means to achieve good (Frede 1992).