Moral progress and grand narrative genealogy

ABSTRACT

In this article, I explore the method of genealogy in moral philosophy, with a focus on evaluating the credibility of moral progress judgments. Despite genealogy becoming a new trend in this field, I critique three types of defective grand narrative genealogies represented by the works of Peter Railton, Michael Huemer, and Nicholas Smyth. I argue that their genealogies fail to be adequate for evaluating moral progress judgments’ credibility. Railton’s genealogy lacks specificity regarding the relatum of the causal story he presents, Huemer’s fails to withstand the scrutiny of historical evidence, and Smyth’s gives no clear verdict on the credibility of the moral progress judgments it explains. These failures, I argue, stem from grand narratives’ neglect of the particularities in each case of moral belief emergence. The disregard for details renders grand narratives generally inadequate for credibility evaluation. Instead, I propose a case study approach that takes into account four types of particulars in each case. I argue that this approach is more methodologically adequate in evaluating the credibility of moral progress judgments since these case-specific details are essential in determining the credibility of a moral belief.

KEYWORDS:

• Genealogy
• moral progress
• moral epistemology
• Peter Railton
• Michael Huemer
• emancipatory values

Acknowledgement

I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou. Our discussions were the spark that ignited the initial idea for this work. I also wish to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Dan Lowe and Prof. Monika Betzler for their invaluable feedback and insightful comments on this work. Their expertise and guidance have been instrumental in shaping this manuscript. I would also like to thank my peers at various conferences and anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful critique and constructive discussions, which significantly improved the quality of this work. The time and effort invested by all have been greatly appreciated and have contributed immeasurably to this work. This work has been supported by several funding sources, including The National Postdoctoral Fellowship Program [grant number: GZC20230549].

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Authors’ contribution statements

The sole author of this paper, Jinglin Zhou, conceptualised and developed the philosophical arguments, conducted the relevant literature review, wrote the manuscript, and prepared the manuscript for submission.

Data availability statement

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by the author, and no new data were created or analysed in this study.

Ethics approval

Not applicable. This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by the author.

Notes

1 See (Anderson 1991, 2014b, 2014a, 2015, 2016; Baker 2019; Buchanan and Powell 2016; Gibbard 1990; Hauser 2006; Huemer 2016; Joyce 2000; Kitcher 2011; Kumar and Campbell 2022; Lowe 2019; Singer 2011; Smyth 2020; Street 2006; Wright 2010). Some philosophers, however, consider how certain moral attitudes or dispositions might have developed in idealised and game-theoretical scenarios rather than in actual history. See (Pettit 2018; Williams 2004).

2 Nietzsche and Freud are among the most prominent figures who developed grand narratives. See (Freud 2010; Nietzsche 2008).

3 Many authors think that modernisation in a broad sense is an important factor contributing to the change of our moral beliefs and moral characters. e.g., see (Anomaly 2017; Heath 2004; J. K. G. Hopster et al. 2022; Pinker 2011; Sauer 2019).

4 In this paper, ‘genealogy’ refers to what Matthieu Queloz describes as ‘historiographical genealogies’ rather than ‘pragmatic genealogies’. The former explains the origins and evolution of ideas in terms of causal-historical processes, while the latter does so in terms of practical origins in basic human needs, interests, concerns. See (Queloz 2021, 14).

5 Some philosophers believe that the evolutionary origin of morality justifies specific moral norms. See (Casebeer 2005; Richards 1989; 2010; Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990). But others use the evolution of morality as a premise for moral scepticism. See (Joyce 2000; 2007; Ruse 1998; Street 2006; Woolcock 2000). And see (Copp 2008; Sober 1994) for critical reviews on moral scepticism based on evolutionary ethics.

6 Joshua Cohen gives a similar but more detailed explanation of the demise of slavery by the injustice of the institution. See (Cohen 1997).

7 See (Huemer 2016, 1987). Whether the moral attitudes (i)–(iii) constitute a coherent ethical orientation, I think, depends much on the way in which these vague attitudes are elaborated. I cannot see, e.g., why and how (i) and (iii) are closely related.

8 ibid., 1999. Whether the three values of what Huemer calls liberalism really fit with one another, and whether the cases of moral progress Huemer cites are in line with these values, I think, are a matter of interpretation. However, for now I will just take as granted Huemer’s view that they are coherent for the sake of argument.

9 See (Cofnas 2020; Hopster 2020) for other alternative but empirically rigorous alternatives to Huemer’s explanatory model.

10 ibid., 22. I add the content within the parenthesis.

11 ibid., 23. Action resources, according to Smyth, include knowledge. The claim that no objective knowledge can flourish when there is a lack of knowledge is a tautology.

12 It is unclear to me why the awareness of inner experience matters for mathematics and other knowledge. Nonetheless, as this point is less relevant to my argument, I refrain from stressing this point.

13 To more accurately describe it, nativism can be considered a form of quasi-natural-order-values. This is because it justifies indifference to the domination or vulnerability experienced by immigrants, often based not on perceived natural inferiority but on cultural or religious grounds.

14 An anonymous reviewer astutely notes that Huemer's approach constitutes an intuitionist-rationalist model rather than a causal account in the traditional sense. However, since Huemer’s model incorporates certain causal mechanisms in addition to the human capacity for a priori knowledge, I have chosen to treat it as a causal explanation for the sake of brevity.

15 See also (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013).

16 This important objection has been pointed out by an anonymous reviewer.

17 This objection could be plausibly directed at (Lowe 2019), where they attempt to derive positive epistemic conditions from the American abolition movement.

18 I extend my sincere thanks to the reviewer for raising this insightful objection.

19 This insightful objection is provided by an anonymous reviewer.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by The National Postdoctoral Fellowship Program [grand number: GZC20230549], National Social Science Fund of China [grand number: 20&ZD0451], and National Natural Science Foundation of China [grand number: LL2224015].