Reconstructing the caliphate or bringing liberal democracy to Turkey? Millî Görüş’s view on liberal democracy before reaching power

Abstract

This article explores the ideas of the Turkish-Islamist Millî Görüş movement on liberal democracy. From its formation in the 1970s to the 1990s, when it won the Turkish elections, the movement exhibited a substantial shift in their discourse. Millî Görüş started off as a movement with solid anti-Western rhetoric. It openly endorsed revolutionary-Jihadist movements and advocated for an Islamic state throughout the Muslim world (including, albeit subtly, in Turkey). It supported the 1979 Iranian revolution and argued democracy is a political system that is against Islamic revelation. However, by the mid-late 1990s, the Millî Görüş and its political party presented liberal ideas about the need for Turkey to democratize and respect people’s fundamental rights and freedoms. This rapid intellectual shift within two and a half decades is puzzling.

This article traces Millî Görüş’s changes in its discourse on liberal democracy. It offers an explanation on how external-geopolitical and internal-Turkish events during the 1980s and 1990s paved the way to Turkish-Islamist moderation on issues of how Turkey (and Muslim countries in general) ought to be governed.

This article explores the ideas of a prominent Turkish-Islamist movement, Millî Görüş Hareketi (Turkish for ‘The National Outlook Movement’), tracing the evolution of its views and rhetoric on the issue of liberal democracy. The years in focus are between 1973, when a Millî Görüş party first entered parliament, and 1995, when another Millî Görüş party (the Welfare Party – Refah Partisi) won the Turkish election. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the movement exhibited a substantial shift in its discourse on liberal democracy. During the 1970s, Millî Görüş texts showed contempt for both liberal and democratic values. Democracy was presented as a foreign un-Islamic idea, a conspiracy of the West to subjugate Turkey, or at least as a model of government that does not fit Muslim-majority countries. While not openly advocating for an Islamic state, especially not in Turkey, Millî Görüş hinted at its preference for an Islamic regime over democracy. Two decades later, however, during the 1990s, some Millî Görüş texts could be read as almost ‘textbook’ European or American liberal commentaries about the need for democratization and people’s fundamental rights and freedoms. Furthermore, during the 1990s, the movement backtracked from promoting a revolutionary or even a gradual transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state.¹

Why did the Millî Görüş transform its discourse so radically within two and a half decades, from a supporter of Islamist revolutionism and an Islamic state in the 1970s to a proponent of democracy (and even, to some extent – liberal democracy), during the 1990s? There is a scholarly consensus that Millî Görüş’s ideology started off as undemocratic. At the same time, the literature accepts that Millî Görüş’s rhetoric on democratic principles underwent some change over time, and the movement became more democratic towards the turn of the twenty-first century. The main explanations to the puzzle of Millî Görüş’s acceptance of democratic ideas are: (a) the movement’s electoral success, which inspired and required it to adopt the procedural rules of democracy,² (b) ideological changes amongst Turkish-Islamist intellectuals,³ or (c) a new, more moderate generation of politicians who rose in the Millî Görüş ranks.⁴ This article engages with the literature on Millî Görüş’s moderation towards democracy, and follows the intellectual path of the movement’s discourse on democracy from entering parliament until it won the Turkish elections. By examining how (rather than simply why) it moderated its position, this article wishes to contribute to the literature on Turkish Islamist thought as well as the broader literature on the puzzle of Islamist moderation. Its main contribution to the literature is by offering an explanation on how external-geopolitical and internal-Turkish events during the 1980s and 1990s paved the way to Turkish-Islamist moderation on the question of how Turkey (and Muslim countries in general) ought to be governed.

The Millî Görüş movement⁵ was formed by Necmettin Erbakan, an engineer who became a dominant politician in Turkey during the last quarter of the twentieth century. While the creation of the Millî Görüş was not the first attempt by Islamists to enter Turkish politics through the ballot box, to unwind Kemalism and make Turkey as Islamic a country as possible,⁶ the Millî Görüş is considered the most successful of these attempts. Through its political parties, the Millî Görüş movement ran in most of Turkey’s local and national elections, with varying degrees of success. The Millî Görüş leader, Necmettin Erbakan, even held the office of Prime Minister for one year (between 1996 and 1997).⁷ AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party), the party which has led Turkey since 2002, came out of Millî Görüş and shares much of its vision and goals. Turkey’s current president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was a prominent Millî Görüş member in the early years of his political career.

This research was conducted by examining official Millî Görüş publications from 1973 to 1995: its official party platforms, booklets, pamphlets and mainly its daily newspaper, the Milli Gazete. There are limitations to a study of a movement’s ideology based on texts which are mostly outward facing. They cannot be seen as ‘pure’ ideological texts but as texts that are produced, to some extent, for political purposes. Notwithstanding these caveats, the surveyed texts are instructive. They allow us to deepen our understanding of how the Millî Görüş movement theorized democracy, to examine the discourse they disseminated to their readership in Turkey, and to examine changes in their ideas and discourse over time. The 23-year-long researched period will be divided in this paper into five sub-periods, according to changes observed in the Millî Görüş movement’s discourse on the West: the 1970s, 1979–1980, 1981–1983, mid-late 1980s, and the early 1990s – until winning the 1995 elections.

An Islamist party (MSP) operating within a democratic framework: 1973–1979

The first timeframe to be discussed is the 1970s – from 1973, when a Millî Görüş party, MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation party), first entered the Turkish Parliament, to the Iranian revolution of 1979. The 1970s are considered a grim period in Turkish history and a period of political instability, much of it influenced by and paralleling the heightening Cold War. After a military intervention in 1971, followed by a technocratic government, Turkey returned to elected civilian rule in 1973, but internal social unrest, economic stagnation and geopolitical tensions in its surroundings continued. The 1973 oil crisis led to economic turmoil. Turkey was also embroiled in the Cyprus crisis, culminating in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, which Erbakan strongly supported. Internally, this period also witnessed growing ethnic tensions between Kurds and Turks, Alevis and Sunnis, as well as tensions along ideological lines.

The 1970s was, in most respects, a decade of anarchy in Turkey’s metropoles. Mirroring the situation in Europe and the US, Turkey saw clashes and violence by ideological groups from 1968 until the 1980 coup. Different student groups with inherently antagonistic ideological commitments of communism, ultranationalism, and Islamism organized as armed groups, both rivalling one another and opposing the political establishment.⁸ Millî Görüş, though suspected of having an Islamist agenda, was part of the coalition during most of the 1970s in order to block the appeal of radical politics in Turkey. Erbakan took advantage of this opportunity and served as Deputy Prime Minister under Prime Ministers from the center-left CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party) and the center-right AP (Adalet Partisi – Justice Party) during most of the period.

The Millî Görüş was very cautious during the 1970s when discussing sensitive political ideas. This caution was probably due to a lesson learned from the closure of the previous Millî Görüş party, the MNP (Milli Nizam Partisi – National Order Party), by the Constitutional Court in 1972 for violating the prohibition against the use of religion for political purposes. According to Binnaz Toprak, MSP leaders had decided to operate within the framework of the 1961 Constitution, which forbade the use of religion for political ends.⁹ However, Toprak argues that at least in the 1970s, the acceptance of Turkey’s democratic framework was a tactical, not an ideological, move.¹⁰

While not openly calling for an Islamic regime to replace Turkey’s democracy, Millî Görüş texts from the 1970s show little support for democracy and subtly support the idea of an Islamic state. Millî Görüş texts, as I will demonstrate in the next section: (a) constantly reminded its readers that Islam and democracy are two different systems, at odds with each other; (b) made a case against both Western and Turkish democracy and championed a regime based on Islam instead; (c) argued that since democracy is still ‘work in progress’, it can also be redefined to a model closer to an Islamic regime.

The case against democracy

Though not outwardly arguing that Turkey should not be democratic (that would have been illegal, according to the 1961 constitution), none of the MSP’s official documents (i.e. manifestos, party programs) mentioned democracy as one of the founding principles or goals of the party. Moreover, even the word ‘democracy’ (demokrasi) was not mentioned at all in most official MSP texts during the 1970s.¹¹ When official MSP documents contained the word ‘democracy’, it was usually not to promote democracy in Turkey. Rather, the term was used instrumentally: to argue that specific policies the MSP opposed (i.e. the limits on freedom of religion) were undemocratic.¹²

During the 1970s, the Millî Görüş not only did not say that they were a democratic movement but they actually openly expressed anti-democratic discourse and their texts had arguments against democracy. This means the movement was not only vague about its commitment to democracy (as it was later on) but actually wrote texts which challenged the notion of democracy during this period. In some texts, the concept of democracy itself was portrayed as a foreign idea, which is at odds with hak (the ‘truth’, meaning Islam).¹³ For example, a 1977 Milli Gazete editorial written by Turkish-Islamist intellectual Selahaddin Eş Çakırgil, claimed democracy is against the Muslim faith and a product of Western culture. Therefore, Çakırgil argues, it cannot be the right path:

Churchill said that democracy is the worst form of government… except for all the rest [but…] Democracy cannot claim it is the right path… as democracy opposes faith… It is a product of Western Culture.¹⁴

Apart from being a false system, Millî Görüş also argued during the 1970s that democracy was not needed in the Islamic world. It is unnecessary because Islam, as a socio-political system, exceeds democracy in its freedoms. Islamic governance, therefore, was not only the right path (hak) commanded by God, but it also has moral superiority over democracy.¹⁵

Other undemocratic arguments made by the Millî Görüş were on democracy’s inherent weakness. Such texts demonstrated how democracy could easily be abused by external forces (the US and USSR, which deliberately try to weaken Turkey, using its democracy)¹⁶ or by demagogue politicians within Turkey.¹⁷ Some texts from the 1970s argue that democracy is against human nature. According to this narrative, people’s choices should not always be trusted, as people can easily be deceived or make mistakes in their judgment. Similarly, Millî Görüş texts during the 1970s argued that Turkish people were not yet ready for democracy. Without a spiritual and moral awakening (meaning an Islamic one), the movement argued, people living in a democracy do not know what they are aiming for. A true societal awakening is needed for democracy to work.¹⁸

While frequently making a case against democracy, most surveyed texts from the 1970s did not offer a revolutionary Islamic alternative but rather a program of gradual Islamization of Turkey through its existing democratic system. A primary focus of texts from the 1970s was the need to change Turkey’s secular legal system. The Millî Görüş did not openly suggest Islamic (shariʿa) laws should be applied in Turkey; such a call could have caused the MSP to be closed down, according to the 1961 constitution. However, Millî Görüş texts from the 1970s hint that, theoretically at least, Islamic law would be the right path for Turkey.¹⁹ See, for example, a Milli Gazete editorial by Ahmet Tevfik Paksu, one of the founders of the Millî Görüş, who discusses what kind of legal system ‘a state’ (not explicitly mentioning Turkey) should have:

When Islam arrived, it arrived complete, unlike Christianity which arrived incomplete. In Islam, everything is perfect. No laws are missing, nor is there a lack of justice…

Which punishments should a state give?… The penalties commanded by the Quran…

Secularism puts a barrier between religion and the state. A religious state [Din Devleti] is the right thing.²⁰

While not calling openly to replace the current Turkish regime, some texts suggest that Islamic law could be implemented within the democratic system in Turkey. For example, in an editorial from 1977, Milli Gazete columnist Atilla Özdür argues that if Islamic law is a system, it must have a place within a democracy. Özdür suggests that within a democracy, those wishing to promote Islamic law should have a chance to express themselves: ‘We cannot build an Islamic state… That is the (Turkish) law, and we respect that… But it does not mean we should not work towards it.’²¹ A 1977 text written by Affan Gençosman, an Islamist intellectual and Milli Gazete columnist, argues that a shariʿa state can be built within the framework of Turkish democracy.²² In another article, Erbakan was asked if shariʿa law can be implemented in Turkey. He answered:

In theory, it is, of course, possible. Shariʿa law will make people in conservative countries happy. But the decision (on this issue) belongs to parliament.²³

The last few examples of how shariʿa law can be brought into the legal system through the democratic system exemplify another idea that the Millî Görüş often based its writing upon during the 1970s: that democracy is still an experiment. Since democracy is a new idea and its meaning is still being discussed, Millî Görüş argued, the notion of ‘democracy’ should not bind political parties and leaders from experimenting, developing it and infusing it with new ideas. See, for example, an excerpt from a 1978 article, which claims that ‘democracy’ does not have to mean what it currently represents, as it is still a work in process:

First of all, we need to clarify that we are not against democracy. But what is democracy? Is it what was passed to us from Western literature? Can we not make specific changes that have to do with who we are?…

Within the last 100 years, there have been experiments in democracy… It is not clear yet what democracy is and what it is not.²⁴

Another common discursive theme was a request to modify the democratic system to fit the ‘soul’ of a Muslim country like Turkey. Democracy should not be superimposed ‘as is’ from the West, it was argued, but rather, democracy should be fitted to ‘our Islamic values’.²⁵ For example, Professor Ahmet Fehmi Ulus, an Islamist intellectual, wrote in a Milli Gazete column that: ‘If we want to have democracy, we need to have one that has “Eastern” roots. Without this nuance, it will never work.’²⁶

A central theme in Millî Görüş political texts, not only in the 1970s but throughout the researched period, was a differentiation between democracy (demokrasi), secularism (laiklik), and the ‘extreme’ Turkish version of secularism, Kemalism.²⁷ According to Millî Görüş texts, the Turkish authorities are ‘obsessed’ with secularism and misunderstand the real meaning of the term.²⁸ Secularism, it was argued, is not democratic, especially in countries like Turkey, which have religious populations.

An Islamist opening: 1979–1980

The next short sub-period to be discussed falls between the Iranian revolution of February 1979 and the September 1980 military coup d’état. This year and a half was a period in which the Millî Görüş movement was more open about its Islamist aspirations, its contempt for democracy, and its advocacy for Iranian-style revolutions in other Muslim countries (including subtly supporting a similar revolution in Turkey). This section will demonstrate this change, focusing on a few themes observed in Millî Görüş texts in the sub-period: (a) the positive coverage of the Iranian revolution and the subsequent Islamic regime; (b) calls for exporting the revolution to other Muslim countries and (subtly) to Turkey; (c) the abundance of texts on the notion of an Islamic regime (in general and compared to a democracy); and (d) the scarcity of texts supporting democracy or calling for the democratization of Turkey and other Muslim nations.

The Iranian revolution was covered regularly and positively by the Millî Görüş during the sub-period. Official Millî Görüş publications hinted that the movement supported an Iran-like revolution in Turkey. See, for example, an excerpt from a 1979 interview with Erbakan:

Interviewer: … In Iran, there was an Islamic revolution… In the West, they say that after Iran, Turkey will also go through an Islamic revolution. What do you think?

Erbakan: Islam brings happiness and serenity to all humans. We, as Turkey, want to go on the right path. The best path Turkey can go to is following the orders of Allah… As the MSP, we want the voice of Islam to be strengthened, in Turkey and all over the Islamic world.²⁹

Another example of advocating an Islamic revolution in Turkey is in a 1980 article:

One day Islam will prevail again, even in the West… Just like in Iran, the way that the Ayatollah won after years of oppression, and just like in Pakistan… The US is in fear… The truth has been found in Iran… The truth (hak) has come; falsehood (batıl) has gone. I cannot stop myself from saying to you, Turkey: ‘I hope the same thing will happen to you.’³⁰

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, there seems to have been an increase in the volume of texts that compared democracy and Islamic rule, implying (usually in an indirect, hinted manner) Millî Görüş’s favoring of the latter.³¹ A series of articles on the Iranian constitution³² translated the Iranian constitution word by word, perhaps suggesting to readers that it was better than the Turkish constitution (which was only mentioned critically throughout the researched period). Another example is an interview with Osman Öztürk, a literature professor and Erbakan’s advisor, who argued that ‘just like at the beginning of Islam’, it is mosques that should be the ones who rule the states, rather than the state presiding over mosques.³³

In summary, while Millî Görüş did not openly state that democracy in Turkey should be dismantled and replaced with an Islamic regime, it provided its audience with many hints between 1979 and 1980 that this was its position. These ‘hints’ were immediately halted after the September 1980 coup and the following military regime.

Discussing political ideas under military law: 1981–1983

On 6 September 1980, a group of Millî Görüş sympathizers held a mass demonstration in Konya, carrying green (pan-Islamic) flags. Speakers in the protest called for a return to the shariʿa and refused to sing the Turkish national anthem. Demonstrators chanted slogans such as ‘The atheist state will surely be demolished’ and ‘Sharia will come, oppression will end’. The literature suggests that the demonstration in Konya was one of the reasons for the military coup six days later, on 12 September 1980.³⁴ The coup led to a three-year-long military regime in which Millî Görüş’s activities came to a near halt. Erbakan was arrested in April 1981 and charged with undermining the secularist principles enshrined in the 1961 Constitution. In February 1983, he was sentenced to four years imprisonment with subsequent confinement to the northwest of Turkey, only to be formally acquitted in 1985.

This context of the military regime and the court case against the Millî Görüş and its leader may shed light on the reason the movement, during martial law, was very careful with using Islamist terminology. During this period, Millî Görüş seemed to refrain from writing anything undemocratic or anti-secular that might have helped prove the prosecution’s arguments.

The first change observed in Millî Görüş discourse after the 1980 revolution (especially after the opening of the court case against them in 1981) is its careful distance from revolutionary Islamist movements, especially the Iranian regime. References to the Islamic Republic of Iran, its leaders and its political system were more formal, distant, and less enthusiastic. Unlike articles from the previous period that glorified the Iranian regime as a model of an Islamic state, Milli Gazete texts from 1981 to 1983 did not portray it as such.³⁵

The second change observed was in the movement’s discourse toward democracy itself. Unlike in the 1970s, undemocratic ideas were not found in texts from the military regime. While democracy was not praised, it was not critiqued but presented neutrally. Prominent Western countries such as the USA and England were critiqued not for being democracies but for not living up to their democratic credentials. Turkey, it was argued during the military regime, needed to be more democratic. For example, a 1980 article claimed that in Turkey ‘democracy is just a show’, since people choose a leader without knowing what he wants, and the leader simply uses his power to dictate policies.³⁶ In another article from 1980, democracy is described as another way to have authority. But some democracies, such as the Turkish one, are ‘ballot-box democracies’ – democracies without any substance, in which people elect the person who will govern them. After the election, the article argued, Turkey would be ruled as in any other authoritarian rule.³⁷

The last change observed in Millî Görüş’s texts throughout the military regime is in its de-politicized discourse on Islam. Texts on Islam published during the military regime period focused on non-political matters: individual, spiritual, or cultural aspects of Islam.³⁸ This, as opposed to the previous sub-period (1979–1980), in which texts about Islam focused mainly on political issues such as jihad, shariʿa law and the need for establishing an Islamic state.

The de-politicization of Islam and the re-interpretation of Islamic scripture in a less confrontational manner continued, to some extent, after the 1983 restoration of democracy. Political interpretations of Islam did not disappear from Millî Görüş discourse, but they were more concealed. During the mid-late 1980s and more so during the 1990s, Millî Görüş fine-tuned its message and suggested a less-radical political program, one that clashed less with the main pillars of democracy and tried to find a modus vivendi with the democratic system instead.

1983–1989

Even after the restoration of democracy, the Millî Görüş-affiliated party (Refah Partisi – RP) was not allowed to run in the 1983 parliamentary elections. Though the ban on the newly-formed RP was explained in procedural/technical terms, the literature claims it had to do with the coup leaders’ suspicion of Erbakan and the Millî Görüş.³⁹ Millî Görüş was, in the first years after the restoration of democracy, somewhat of a pariah movement: it was unrepresented in parliament, suspected by the authorities, and its charismatic leader, Erbakan, was forbidden to lead it.

Furthermore, Islamism, an ideology that constantly got the Millî Görüş in trouble with the authorities until the 1980 coup, could not be openly offered in the post-1983 era. Perhaps this is the reason that the new Millî Görüş party (RP), unlike its predecessor, the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP), did not ‘mark itself’ as an Islamist party. Instead, it presented itself as a party representing Turkey’s Anatolian Periphery,⁴⁰ which focuses on economic policies, with a nationalist (rather than Islamist) ‘flavor’.⁴¹

However, throughout the 1980s the Millî Görüş was freer to operate under Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP). Özal, himself affiliated with the İskenderpaşa community to which Erbakan belonged, and his brother Korkut, being a prominent Millî Görüş member, partnered with Millî Görüş supporters to pursue policies that were considered by previous regimes as Islamist. For example, under the ANAP government, the İmam Hatip school system was expanded, and mosque-building was encouraged. Özal’s most controversial move was, perhaps, his attempt to lift the ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves by female university students, only to be later nullified by the Constitutional Court in a 1989 decision. Apart from specific policies, the 1980s brought a new, more ‘relaxed’ interpretation of secularism and Kemalism. The institutionalization of a Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the state structure allowed, among other policies, an increasing role of religion within the Turkish educational system.⁴² Increased tolerance of Sufi orders became a prominent component of the national consensus project. In short, Turkey’s Islamists were empowered at a time when the traditional political forces of Turkey were disempowered and dislocated by the military. Furthermore, during the 1980s Islam gained more visibility in Turkish social and political life. It was no longer prominent only among the conservative Muslims in the Anatolian periphery or in urban slums; it was a significant part of urban life and had a role in leading educational institutions.⁴³

The mid- to late 1980s was a period in which the Millî Görüş showed more accommodation towards democratic principles than in the 1970s. Besides the Turkish political context elaborated above, this ‘democratic turn’ can also be attributed to events outside Turkey’s borders. The 1980s witnessed what scholars term ‘the third wave of democratization’, a period in which democracy swept across post-colonial African countries, Latin America and southern Europe.⁴⁴ Towards the end of the sub-period, Poland’s Solidarity movement began a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe.

Liberal democracy gained traction in the Arab world, too, with the collapse of communism, the failure of Pan-Arabism and the ‘third wave of democratization’. With the collapse of its ideological alternatives, democracy reemerged as a viable universal system in the eyes of prominent Arab intellectuals and activists in the late 1980s. These events also led to a rethinking of liberal democracy by Arab Islamists. For Egyptian Islamist thinkers such as al-Ghazali, al-Qaradawi and ʿImara, the democratization of Muslim societies seemed to be a viable option for gaining power. Casting votes at the ballot box seemed to be the most feasible way to peacefully transform Egypt into a shariʿa-based society. These three intellectuals wrote extensively in the 1980s about the democratic essence of Islam. They stressed, for example, the similarities between shura and liberal democracy.⁴⁵ Their ideas had implications outside the intellectual sphere, as the mid- to late 1980s saw the Egyptian and Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood lifting their boycott on local elections and participating in them.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, a more radical form of political Islam was gaining supporters during the 1980s, and required Islamists such as the Millî Görüş or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to differentiate between their interpretation of Islamist activism and the interpretation of the radical groups.⁴⁷

The internal Turkish context, as well as the Arab-Islamist and international contexts of the mid-late 1980s, could explain the changes in the Millî Görüş discourse during the sub-period, which show an increase in accommodation towards democracy. However, I will argue that these pro-democratic discursive changes were most likely more rhetorical than substantial. On the one hand, the Millî Görüş rebranded itself as a non-Islamist democratic movement: (a) it strengthened its calls for democratic reforms in Turkey; (b) it toned down its Islamist discourse. But on the other hand, I will also demonstrate that: (c) the movement’s so-called democratic reforms were de facto the same policies the movement demanded in previous decades, simply cloaked in democratic discourse; and (d) the Millî Görüş did not put a halt to its Islamist discourse but instead continued to hint it, perhaps insinuating to their audience that they were still committed to their previous ideas and goals.

During the mid- to late 1980s, Millî Görüş demonstrated a more substantial commitment to an electoral-democratic system of governance than in previous sub-periods. Unlike earlier periods, in which the movement positioned itself in opposition to democracy, the Refah Party portrayed itself as a democratic party. In some of its texts, the RP even argued that it was Turkey’s only democratic party.⁴⁸ During the mid-1980s, the RP focused its political discourse not on governing according to Islamic rules and values. Instead, it stressed the need for more democratization, freedom, and human rights. This constituted a significant shift from the 1970s, in which the movement and its party (MSP) hardly ever mentioned they were democratic at all.

The tilt towards democracy was evident in the movement’s texts, its leaders’ speeches and its party platforms. Moreover, official texts claimed democracy was not just a means to win power, as the movement’s critics suspected. Instead, according to Millî Görüş and RP's official discourse during the mid- to late 1980s, democracy was an intrinsic part of Millî Görüş’s philosophy. ‘Democracy and human rights’, RP chairman Ahmet Tekdal claimed in a 1987 press conference, are ‘part of our understanding of our national consciousness.’⁴⁹ In its 1987 election pamphlet, the first issue raised by the Refah Party was its demand for more democratization.⁵⁰

This ‘democratic turn’ might seem like a significant ideological change within Millî Görüş. On the surface, it was one: a movement that opposed democracy and wanted to transform Turkey into an Islamic state suddenly advocated for Turkey’s democratization. But the devil is, I argue, in the detail – the definition of ‘democracy’. What did the word ‘democracy’ mean in Millî Görüş’s discourse of the mid- to late 1980s? A close reading of texts from the period reveals a very narrow and limited approach to what democracy is. The movement focused on two aspects of democracy: (a) its procedure: voting and conducting policies according to the majority’s preferences; and (b) its freedoms: mainly religious freedom and freedom of speech.

An editorial from 1984 called ‘What is Democracy?’ exemplifies how Millî Görüş narrowed down democracy to these two aspects.⁵¹ The author, senior Milli Gazete columnist Abdulkadir Özkan, first claims that, ‘Democracy is that everyone is free in their thoughts and beliefs.’ Özkan then presents Western democracy as a platform for different ideas, not as an ideology by itself: ‘Regardless of the ideology of the winning party in the West, the system does not change. In Europe – it does not matter who wins. If the Christian Democrats or Socialists or Communists win the elections, there can be a government.’ In Turkey, on the other hand, democracy is flawed, Özkan writes: ‘… nobody believes in Democracy in Turkey, unlike Europe… Because in Turkey, people may go to prison for their thoughts.’ Democracy, texts from the 1980s argue, is a system in which every party and every idea can win the popular vote and, if elected, rule according to their beliefs. For democracy to be implemented in Turkey, therefore, an Islamist party like the RP should be allowed to be elected and (perhaps) to rule according to Islamic law.

One procedural aspect of democracy promoted in texts of the mid- to late 1980s was elections. Millî Görüş stressed throughout the sub-period the importance of holding and participating in elections, the importance of elections being fair, and the importance of political parties being free to represent their voters in parliament.⁵² Elections were portrayed as more than a mere procedure or a means to win power, but also a form of justice comparable to Islamic justice. For example, RP parliament member Cevat Ayhan compared voting in elections to the right to participate in the management of a society, as practiced by the Rashidun.⁵³

This embrace of democratic elections constitutes a puzzle: why would a movement which was sour towards democracy one decade earlier promote democratic elections as ‘justice’? I believe this rhetorical change signals Millî Görüş’s coming to grips with the potential benefits of democracy and the ability to leverage it for its own benefit. Texts from the 1980s suggest that Millî Görüş saw the Iranian or the jihadi-revolutionary path as unrealistic. Instead, reaching power through the ballot box was seen as a more viable path to power.

However, as with other Islamist movements of the period, essential parts of Millî Görüş’s view on democracy were ignored. For example, they did not address the question of who could be allowed to run in an election in the political order the Millî Görüş was aiming to establish. Similarly, Millî Görüş did not commit to keeping the democratic system in Turkey if it won the election or stepping down if it lost an election after it had gained power.⁵⁴ These omissions are not insignificant: since the Millî Görüş was not committed to democracy until 1983, their focus since 1983 on their right of democratically ‘winning’ elections while ignoring how they would rule Turkey could be a sign of the movement not being fully committed to democracy.

Along with elections, another aspect of democracy amplified in Millî Görüş texts of the mid- to late 1980s was the need to adhere to the preferences of the majority. Rather than making a religious case, Millî Görüş’s arguments were often presented from a majoritarian point of view. According to texts from the period, policies that stem from Islamic scripture should be implemented not because the Quran and its laws command it but because they are the policies most Turks desire.⁵⁵ As explained in the opening of a 1986 editorial: ‘Democracy is the will of the people; action must be taken according to the will of the people.’⁵⁶

Some majoritarian arguments were also assisted by liberal-progressive discourse, such as human rights and individual and collective freedoms. This can be seen, for example, in the case Millî Görüş made for allowing women to wear the hijab in public spaces. The struggle for the rights of women to cover, which Millî Görüş was very engaged in during the 1980s, was framed both as one of human rights but also a majoritarian one.⁵⁷ Since the hijab represents most of Turkey’s women’s values, it was argued that it was undemocratic to interfere with the preference of the majority.⁵⁸

However, majoritarianism was also used to promote anti-liberal views during the 1980s. For example, Millî Görüş’s support for the mayor of Konya’s decision to run segregated buses for men and women, a decision which was contested in court. In a long 1989 interview with Erbakan, he does not mention the Quran or the Islamic faith even once. Instead, he claims it is ‘the people’s choice’ to have separate buses in Konya and asks his political opponents, rhetorically: ‘Where is the democracy? Where are the human rights?’⁵⁹ Perhaps the most striking example of illiberal majoritarianism was the movement’s coverage of the Salman Rushdie affair and Khomeini’s fatwa ordering his killing. Millî Görüş supported capital punishment against Rushdie, but interestingly, their case was not based solely on Islamic law but also on democracy. Most Muslims, Millî Görüş claimed, believe that blasphemy deserves capital punishment, and therefore it is not ‘democratic’ for the West to dismiss Muslims’ values.⁶⁰

The coverage of Rushdie’s case is an example of how Millî Görüş positioned itself as a champion of some cherry-picked liberal values (mostly freedom of religion) while being proudly anti-liberal in their views. The movement consistently positioned itself against progressive ideas of the era, such as feminism, abortion rights and LGBT rights.⁶¹ The democracy that Millî Görüş advocated for was an illiberal one, based on what they claim were the ‘values’ of Turkey’s conservative (and silenced) majority.

Sensitive political ideas toned down or hinted at

Millî Görüş’s political discourse in the mid- to late 1980s was, as demonstrated above, more democratic than it was during the 1970s. However, non-democratic ‘Islamist’ ideas of governance (such as re-establishing an Islamic Caliphate or applying Islamic law in Turkey) did not completely disappear from Millî Görüş’s publications. They appeared less often, and when they did, the ideas were more hinted at and concealed. The following section demonstrates how Millî Görüş continued to spread non-democratic discourse during the 1980s.

The dominance of religious law over man-made law, which was openly stated until the 1980 coup, was a subject that Millî Görüş continued insinuating throughout the 1980s. While unlike during the 1970s, the movement did not say that Turkish legislation should be bound to the shariʿa, it did hint that democratic legislation ought to be supervised by religious authorities. The 1987 election manifesto, while showing commitment to democracy, suggested that one of the ‘cures’ for Turkey’s problem was ‘the rule of religion and religious cadres’.⁶² Similarly, the RP’s chairman, Ahmet Tekdal, hinted in his speech at the party’s first Congress (1985) that religious ‘truths’ or law (hak) need to have priority over politicians. ‘… as long as it is not accepted that the hak has priority over power’, Tekdal said, ‘humanity will face greater disasters’.⁶³ Erbakan, too, suggested in some of his speeches that legislation should be limited by religion. For example, in a conference in Frankfurt, Erbakan argued that the problem with Western democracy is that legislation can be against ‘the truth’. He suggested that supervision (meaning religious supervision) of legislation is the solution.⁶⁴

While official Millî Görüş speeches and texts usually remain within the boundaries of democracy, some texts from the 1980s suggest that the movement continued to disperse Islamist hints to its audience, including ideas that fall outside the boundaries of democracy. Examples of such Islamist ‘hints’ were found in the ‘back pages’ of the Milli Gazete throughout the 1980s. While the Milli Gazete editorial page toned down its Islamist discourse and advocated for democracy, other sections of the newspaper, such as the religion, culture and foreign affairs sections, hinted otherwise.

The religion section of the Milli Gazete was one channel for discussing sensitive political ideas cloaked in religious discourse. See, for example, articles focusing on texts from the Quran or the Hadith that call for an Islamic regime,⁶⁵ and a series of articles discussing ‘the place of politics in Islam’.⁶⁶ Islamist political ideas were also delivered in the cultural section of the Milli Gazete. The daily page on culture (Kültür ve Sanat) recommended newly-published books which contain openly Islamist content and support the creation of an Islamic state.⁶⁷ Advertisements of Islamist books which promoted non-democratic ideas appeared on a daily or weekly basis.⁶⁸ The cultural page often held articles about authors and poets who were either Islamists themselves or were ‘rebranded’ as such.⁶⁹ Similarly, the Milli Gazete continued its praise (and perhaps, its subtle advocacy) for an Islamic state in its history section. Columnists often wrote about the morality, justice and equality of Islamic states in the past, referring to them as the ‘golden age’ of human civilization. Articles about the Ottoman Empire tended to glorify the religious opponents of nineteenth century Tanzimat reforms and the Young Turks, some subtly signaling their discomfort with the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic.⁷⁰ Some texts on Islamic history were dotted with undemocratic hints. For example, one article from 1984 claims that if democratic elections had been held in Mecca before Prophet Mohammad migrated to Medina, people would not have chosen Islam.⁷¹

Another avenue of Millî Görüş’s continuity in advocating an Islamic regime rather than democracy was in discussing foreign policy. While the mid- to late 1980s was a period in which the Islamic Republic of Iran was less praised, other Islamist movements that openly called for an Islamic state were endorsed. For example, Millî Görüş openly supported the Islamist forces fighting the USSR in Afghanistan, as well as other Islamist leaders and movements, regardless of their commitment to democracy. Millî Görüş endorsed revolutionary militants who aimed to overthrow their regime and establish an Islamic state.⁷² They also supported non-democratic leaders who introduced shariʿa law within their country’s legal system (Sudan’s Omar Bashir and Pakistan’s Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq).⁷³

As a final observation on the movement’s coverage of foreign policy and how it can imply its views on democracy, it is also important to note what was not mentioned during the 1980s: advocacy for democracy in other Muslim countries. Though the political landscape of the Muslim world was discussed daily in Millî Görüş publications, I have not found even one text demanding the democratization of any Muslim country in the surveyed texts from the 1980s.⁷⁴ The fact that Millî Görüş did not endorse the democratization of any Muslim country apart from Turkey could be a mere coincidence, but it could cast a shadow on the movement’s claim to be committed to democratization, at least during the 1980s.

1990–1995

During the last sub-period, the early 1990s, Millî Görüş continued and intensified its commitment to democracy. Millî Görüş discourse was, as a rule of thumb, more democratic and less (if at all) focused on creating an Islamic state during this sub-period. This section will focus on the following changes in the movement’s ideas, as reflected in their texts from the early 1990s: (a) a rise in pro-democracy texts and a halt in texts promoting an Islamic state, (b) democracy presented as a strategy for the rise of Islam, and (c) their vision for Turkey was no longer illiberal: some liberal ideas were advanced.

The context for these changes is complex. It spanned inner-Turkish electoral strategies, inner-Islamist debates among intellectuals and politicians in the Middle East and worldwide, and geopolitical factors. The inner-Turkish context of Millî Görüş’s pro-democracy ‘tilt’ has to do with the movement’s success in the early 1990s. Starting with the 1991 national elections, Erbakan and the Millî Görüş party (Refah Partisi) gradually gained more parliamentary and municipal power. At the end of the researched period, the RP received 21.4 per cent of the votes in the 1995 national elections, allowing Erbakan to establish and lead a coalition government in 1996.

Part of RP’s electoral success in the 1990s is attributed to adopting a more secular platform to expand its political support base. This new approach resulted from a strategic decision the party took in its Fourth Grand Congress in October 1993, to open up the party to new groups in the electorate, including non-practicing Muslims.⁷⁵ One prominent electorate targeted by the RP was nonreligious voters, and therefore RP’s election advertisements avoided religious language. They presented themselves as a forward-looking party with a vision encompassing all strata of society, not only those who sided with political Islam.⁷⁶ Political advertisements referred to issues like pensions, affordable housing, health care, and the environment. Religious themes and images were, for the most part, avoided.⁷⁷ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who became mayor of Istanbul in 1994, represented the party’s new strategy during the 1990s, focusing on electoral success rather than Islamic purity. Erdoğan was quoted saying, during a 1994 campaign rally, ‘A person can be drunk or [a woman] may not wear a headscarf; [but] if they accept the RP’s tenets, they are welcome.’⁷⁸ The RP’s electoral strategy to appeal to ‘everyone’ could explain, partially, why its discourse became more democratic, more liberal, and less Islamist.

Turkish internal politics also played a role in the movement’s moderation. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey’s Islamists and the Turkish state no longer shared a common cause in the struggle against the radical left. Therefore, Millî Görüş returned to be perceived as a threat to secular Turkey rather than a partner against communism.⁷⁹ The period was also dotted with Islamist-inspired violence, which was not directly related to the Millî Görüş but nonetheless increased suspicion towards Erbakan and his party. The most significant instances of violence were the murder of the Kemalist investigative journalist Uğur Mumcu and the murder of 35 people, mainly of Alevi origin, in an arson attack on a hotel in Sivas.⁸⁰

Millî Görüş’s moderation also has a geopolitical context. After the collapse of the USSR, when it was clear that America was becoming the world’s sole superpower, prominent Millî Görüş intellectuals and politicians argued that it was wiser not to fight against the evolving unipolar liberal-democratic world order.⁸¹

The RP’s democratic discourse can be vividly observed in their publications and speeches before local and national elections. The party’s campaign posters and slogans used a much more democratic and less Islamist vocabulary during the 1990s. The 1995 election campaign, for example, claimed the RP would work for the ‘human rights and democratization’ of Turkey.⁸² Similarly, in a speech to the Turkish parliament, Erbakan proclaimed the main principles of RP’s governance program if it were to be elected: a liberal, participatory and fully democratic regime in all fields would be established; the rule of law would be essential; basic principles of human rights would be indispensable; there would be freedom of belief and thought; and freedom of religion and belief would be an indispensable principle of social life.⁸³ Though some of the principles have been articulated throughout the researched period, the first two principles (democracy being liberal, participatory, and abiding by the rule of law) were new. Their introduction as part of the RP’s guiding principles constitutes a (tactical or ideological) change within the movement.

The RP not only claimed it was a democratic party, but, unlike Turkey’s other (Kemalist) parties, that they were the only real democratic party in Turkey.⁸⁴ Unlike previous decades, Millî Görüş did not refer to the democratic system as a superimposed ‘Western’ system but rather as one very close to an Islamic system of governance.⁸⁵ Political Islam, it was argued in Millî Görüş texts from the 1990s, is not an alternative to democracy, but rather constitutes the very fulfillment of democracy in the Muslim world. Islamist movements and parties were the Muslim world’s peaceful democrats, while secular parties and regimes were its violent, non-democratic oppressors.⁸⁶

In addition to Millî Görüş referring to itself and its policies in democratic discourse, it also refrained from some of its previous Islamist rhetoric. The 1995 RP program is an excellent example of this change, as it avoids any Islamist discourse and does not mention the Islamic faith or Muslims even once.⁸⁷ Similarly, none of the 1994 local election pamphlets mention Islam.⁸⁸ I believe this is not a coincidence, but rather a conscious decision to gather support from secular or less-religious voters and avoid giving the Turkish military any excuse to close the RP down and halt its rise to power.

Millî Görüş did not completely halt its Islamist rhetoric in the early 1990s. It did not stop calling for an Islamic political order (İslam düzeni), for jihad, for shariʿa law, or the creation of Islamic states. But these calls were rarer and tended to be general ones or referred to other Muslim countries rather than Turkey. However, unlike the previous decade, Millî Görüş’s commitment to democracy was not only reserved for Turkey but included, to some extent, calls for the democratization of Muslim countries too. These calls focused on Arab countries with strong Islamist parties, such as Egypt and Jordan.⁸⁹ The main Muslim country for which Millî Görüş endorsed its democratization during the 1990s was Algeria, in which the Islamic party FIS (Front Islamique du Salut – Islamic Salvation Front) and its 1992 victory in the Algerian elections were in the headlines nearly daily. Rüşen Çakır points to the rise of the FIS in the 1992 elections as a tipping point that made Millî Görüş realize the benefits of a democratic system for Islamist parties.⁹⁰ Other researchers demonstrate Algeria was a turning point for other Islamist movements too.⁹¹

Did Millî Görüş ‘fall in love’ with democracy during the 1990s? I suspect not. However, texts from the 1990s show a growing understanding within the movement that demography in Turkey was on their side and playing the democratic game could be a tool to reach power. The idea of using democracy as a tool to gain power is rarely openly stated but rather implied. However, some texts openly treated democracy as a mere tool to get into power. For example, a text by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called democracy a ‘vehicle’ (araç) for implementing Millî Görüş’s goals.⁹² Another example is a 1992 article that argues that just as America uses democracy as a ‘vehicle, a technical way to get towards their target’, the same should be done by Muslims: they should use democracy to advance their (Islamist) goals.⁹³ Similarly, in a 1993 speech, Erbakan told his audience that democracy is a valuable tool to reveal ‘the truth’ (hak).⁹⁴ Whether the instrumental use of democracy to reach power disqualifies Millî Görüş’s democratic credentials is a matter of philosophical-political inquiry beyond the scope of this article. However, Millî Görüş was not unique among Islamist movements in doing so. The instrumental use of democracy as a means of winning power has been observed within other Centrist Islamist movements during the 1990s, as demonstrated by scholars such as Shadi Hamid and Uriya Shavit.⁹⁵

But what did the Millî Görüş mean when championing democracy in the early 1990s? As in the 1980s, the movement continued to ‘cherry-pick’ notions of democracy while leaving out other concepts as ambiguous, or even ignored them. The aspects of democracy that were in focus in the 1990s were, as in previous decades, freedom of speech, political expression, and freedom of religion.⁹⁶ A new aspect of democracy discussed in the 1990s was the supremacy of the parliament over the army. Turkey, some texts carefully argued, should be free of military interventions.⁹⁷

However, Millî Görüş remained relatively silent on other aspects of democracy, leaving some questions unanswered. For example, does democracy also mean full political equality for Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities (i.e. Alevis, Christians and Jews)? Do they believe in granting freedom and equal rights to those who do not live ‘Islamic’ lives, like atheists or homosexuals? Are man-made laws allowed to clash with the divine law of the shariʿa? Does freedom of speech allow blasphemy or teaching non-Islamic ideas (such as Charles Darwin’s evolution theory)? Does Millî Görüş’s vision of democracy enable the future replacement of a democratically elected Islamist party (rather than ‘one man, one vote, one time’, as Millî Görüş’s political rivals argued)?⁹⁸ Such questions were ignored in texts from the early 1990s.

What does this silence mean? One can argue that as an opposition movement, it is natural that Millî Görüş focused their attention on issues they wished to promote. However, their silence on how they would govern if they were to win the Turkish elections is puzzling. Especially since before Millî Görüş ‘rebranded’ themselves as democrats, they were vocally opposed to some of the issues mentioned above. Perhaps Millî Görüş’s democratic turn was more tactical than ideological. They may have been more committed to democracy while seeking to be elected rather than to rule as democrats once reaching power.

Having said that, not all texts from the early 1990s promoted an illiberal political agenda. Compared to the previous sub-period (the mid- to late 1980s), in which Millî Görüş’s version of democracy was procedural, majoritarian, and mainly illiberal, during the early 1990s some (selective) liberal ideas were added to the movement’s discourse.⁹⁹ Millî Görüş discourse on women’s rights, for example, was more liberal than before. Unlike previous periods, in which women were advised to stay at home and be housewives, texts from the early 1990s protected women’s rights to be educated, employed, and even politically active.¹⁰⁰ Also, ‘feminism’ was not a derogatory term during the 1990s but was presented as an Islamic value.¹⁰¹ Minor discursive changes were also noted in Millî Görüş’s texts on religious minorities, which were previously portrayed as ‘enemies of Islam’. For example, Turkey’s Jewish community, which was depicted in previous decades as a fifth column, was described during the 1990s as part of Turkish society.¹⁰² Similarly, the non-Sunni Alevi sect, previously denounced as heretic, was written about more favorably, as a part of the Turkish-Muslim community.¹⁰³ One can also observe a change in Millî Görüş’s discourse on nonbelievers. Fewer texts, compared to previous decades, dealt with the need to fight the spread of atheism or use derogatory words like ‘kafir’ (infidel). One example of this moderation is the movement’s view on Salman Rushdie during the 1990s. Though the support for Imam Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, given by Millî Görüş in the late 1980s, was not retracted, it was toned down or even ignored.¹⁰⁴

Conclusion

This article demonstrated changes in Millî Görüş’s thinking on questions of how Turkey (and other Muslim countries) should be governed. These changes, it was shown, were neither linear nor clear-cut. In the 1970s, while serving in a coalition government, Millî Görüş discussed building the foundations of an Islamic state within the framework of Turkish democracy. The movement portrayed democracy as a foreign construct and argued that it is not the best nor the right (religiously speaking) path for Muslim societies. The movement escalated its undemocratic rhetoric after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Millî Görüş clearly hinted that it not only supported the Islamic revolution but wished Turkey to follow a similar path of abandoning democracy and becoming an Islamic state. While the 1980 coup caused the movement to refrain from discussing sensitive political issues, revolutionary ideas continued to be hinted at (though much more subtly) after the restoration of democracy in 1983. The 1980s also saw a rise in democratic/human rights-based discourse, rather than an Islamist revelation-based one, to champion the movement’s goals. However, this democratic rhetoric focused on procedures rather than substance, and the movement was somewhat blurry on questions such as how it would run Turkey if it were to be elected. The last surveyed sub-period, the early 1990s, was a period in which the Millî Görüş continued to promote democratic and even liberal ideas but also seemed to have backtracked from promoting a revolutionary or even a gradual transformation of Turkey into an Islamic state.

The changes in Millî Görüş’s discourse on liberal democracy, whether ideological or tactical-rhetorical, were in line with other movements and parties from its Islamist network. These parties, which previously rejected democracy and wished to build an Islamic state, gravitated during the 1990s toward the democratic electoral process. To some extent, some also adopted liberal-democratic values.¹⁰⁵ Case studies of Islamist movements in other countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Indonesia and India show a similar trend of previously undemocratic Islamist movements gradually accepting the democratic system during the parallel period.¹⁰⁶

Millî Görüş continued its moderation towards liberal-democratic values after being ousted from power in 1997 by the Turkish military,¹⁰⁷ after which RP was dissolved and replaced by a more ‘moderate’ Millî Görüş party, Fazilet Partisi. Another, perhaps more significant moderation point was after prominent Millî Görüş members broke off from the movement and established the AKP. These later ‘moderations’ are outside the scope of this article but are well-documented and explained in the existing literature. This article’s main contribution is following the gradual evolution of democratic discourse within Turkish Islamists, until a Millî Görüş party reached power.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Millî Görüş continued to change its positions and rhetoric also after winning the Turkish elections, after being ousted from power in what is considered a ‘silent coup’ in 1997, and moreover in the next decades, when the AKP was formed. However, this research project purposely ends in 1995, before the Millî Görüş parties of Refah Partisi, and later AKP, became Turkey’s ruling parties and were perhaps forced to moderate in order to rule.

2 For example, J. Salt, ‘Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, no. 1 (1995), pp.13–27.

3 For example, M. Guida, ‘The New Islamists’ Understanding of Democracy in Turkey: The Examples of Ali Bulaç and Hayreddin Karaman’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 11, no. 3 (2010), pp.347–70; S. Karasipahi, Muslims in Modern Turkey: Kemalism, Modernism and the Revolt of the Islamic Intellectuals (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).

4 See, for example, B. Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); H. Yavuz, ‘Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey’, Comparative Politics (1997), pp.63–82; F. Atacan, ‘Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, no. 2 (2005), pp.187–99.

5 This article will refer to the ‘Millî Görüş’ both as a religious, social and political movement which operated several interlinked civil society organizations, and also as a series of Islamist parties inspired by Necmettin Erbakan, one succeeding the other as they were banned for violating Turkey’s secularist legislation.

6 On the earliest attempts of Turkish Islamists to enter politics after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, see scholarly works on the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party) and Serbest Fırka (Liberal Republican Party), two parties which operated between 1925 and 1930 and were both closed down for ‘encouraging religious reactionaries’. A later attempt to introduce Islamist ideas into the Turkish political system was initiated after the end of Turkey’s one-party system, with the Millet Partisi (Nation Party), which split off from the ruling Demokrat Parti in 1948, and closed down in 1953. On these three parties, see E. J. Zürcher, ‘Fundamentalism as an exclusionary device in Kemalist Turkish nationalism’, in W. Schendel and E. J. Zürcher (eds), Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the 20th Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp.209–22; U. Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), pp.23–25, 65; B. Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.52–56.

7 For more on the Millî Görüş as part of Turkish-Islamist political history, see Z. Öniş, ‘Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence’, Contemporary Politics, Vol. 7, no. 4 (2001), pp.281–98; H. Yavuz, ‘Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey’, Comparative Politics (1997), pp.63–82; B. Turam, Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); Z. Öniş, ‘The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, no. 4 (1997), pp.743–66; E. Özbudun, ‘Islam and Politics in Modern Turkey: The Case of the National Salvation Party’, in B. Stowasser (ed.), The Islamic Impulse (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Ü. C. Sakallioğlu, ‘Parameters and Strategies of Islam–State Interaction in Republican Turkey’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, no. 2 (1996), pp.231–51; H. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Q. Mecham, ‘From the Ashes of Virtue, a Promise of Light: The Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, no. 2 (2004), pp.339–58; C. Tuğal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); J. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011); Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey.

8 J.M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1974); Ş. Mardin, ‘Youth and Violence in Turkey’, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 19, no. 2 (1987), pp.229–54; E.J. Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 266–79.

9 B. Toprak, ‘Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State: The National Salvation Party in Turkey’, in S. A. Arjomand (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (Berlin: Springer, 1984).

10 B. Toprak, ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, no. 2 (2005), pp.167–86.

11 None of the following documents, for example, mention the word ‘democracy’: Milli Selamet Partisi, 1973 Seçim Beyannamesi [MSP, 1973 Election Manifesto] (Istanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1973); Millî Selâmet Partisi, 5 Haziran 1977 Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi [MSP, 5 June 1977 Election Manifesto] (Istanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1977); Milli Selamet Partisi, 5 Haziran 1977 İnanç ve Hamle [Faith and Movement] (Ankara: Gaye Matbaası, 1977).

12 For example, Milli Selamet Partisi, Program ve Tüzük [Program and Statute] (Ankara: Elif Matbaacılık, 1976).

13 ‘Demokrasinin ve İslamin dayandiği esaslar’ [Fundamentals of Democracy and Islam], Milli Gazete, 16 July 1976.

14 ‘Demokrasi nasıl bir nesne?’ [What Kind of Thing is a Democracy?], Milli Gazete, Mar. 1977.

15 For example, ‘İslamiyetin Getirdikleri’ [The Things that the Islamiyyet Brought], Milli Gazete, 5 June 1975; ‘İnanç Hürriyeti’ [Freedom of Belief], Milli Gazete, 14 Apr. 1976.

16 For example, ‘Türkiye’de demokrasinin temelleri’ [The foundations of democracy in Turkey], Milli Gazete, 23 June 1974; ‘İslam ve Demokrasi’ [Islam and Democracy], Milli Gazete, 15 Mar. 1976.

17 For example, ‘Türkiye ‘İkinci Lübnan’ Olmaktan Kurtarılmalı’ [Let’s Save Turkey from Becoming a Second Lebanon], Vesika, 24, 15 Nov. 1976.

18 For example, Milli Selamet Partisi, 3. Büyük Kongresi 24 Ekim 1976 [3^rd Grand Convention, 24 Oct. 1976], Ankara, 1976; ‘MSP asla pişman etmez’ [The MSP (Millî Görüş party) will never be regretful], Milli Gazete, 21 Mar. 1977.

19 For example, ‘İslamiyet ve Şeriat Terimleri’ [Terms of the Islamic movement and the Sharia], Milli Gazete, 23 Feb. 1976; ‘Şeriat ve Din Düşmanlığı’ [Shari’a and the hate of religion], Sebil, Vol. 1, no. 10, 5 Mar. 1976.

20 ‘Laiklik ve İnanç Hurriyeti’ [Secularism and Freedom of Religion], Milli Gazete, Oct. 1974.

21 ‘Şeriat-Demokrasi ve Yalan’ [Shari’a, Democracy and Lies], Milli Gazete, 30 Oct. 1974.

22 ‘Şeriat devletine doğru…’ [Towards a Shari’a state], Milli Gazete, 27 July 1977.

23 ‘Alman Emperyalizmi ve Erbakan’ [German Imperialism and Erbakan], Milli Gazete, 8 Oct. 1974.

24 ‘Demokrasi Dilberi’ [The Beautiful Democracy], Milli Gazete, Jan. 1978.

25 ‘MSP ve Gerçekler’ [MSP and the truths], 28 Apr. 1974; ‘Fetih Nesli Doğu Ruhçu toplum demokrasisi’ [The Generation of Conquest’s Eastern Spirited Social Democracy], Milli Gazete, 3 May 1975.

26 ‘Demokrasi Dilberi’ [The Beautiful Democracy], Milli Gazete, 17 Jan. 1978.

27 It is important to stress that the claim that Kemalism is an extreme and illiberal form of secularism was not only put forth by Turkish Islamists. This critique was, and still is expressed also by Turkish liberals, as well as scholars of Turkish history. See, for example, Y. Navaro-Yashin, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); H. Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); A. Kuru and A. Stepan, ‘Laïcité as an “ideal type” and a continuum: comparing Turkey, France, and Senegal’, in A. Kuru and A. Stepan (eds), Democracy, Islam, and secularism in Turkey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), pp.95–121. For scholarly works less critical of Kemalism, see B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961); B. Toprak, ‘Secularism and Islam: The building of modern Turkey’, Macalester International, Vol. 15, no. 1 (2005), p.9.

28 See, for example, ‘Sordular, Erbakan Cevaplandı’ [Erbakan Answers Questions], Milli Gazete, Jan. 1978; ‘Fikir Hürriyeti ve Sonrası’ [Freedom of Thought and Afterwards], Milli Gazete, 1 June 1974.

29 ‘İran’da hakk’ın ve İslamin gemesinden sevinçliyiz. Şah: İslam düsmanı bir batı usağıdır’ [We are happy that justice and Islam came to Iran. The Iranian Shah – the enemy of Islam, who serves the West], Milli Gazete, May 1979.

30 ‘Korkunun ecele faydası yok’ [There’s no point in fearing], Milli Gazete, May 1980.

31 See, for example, ‘İslam ve Demokrasi’ [Islam and Democracy], Milli Gazete, July 1979; ‘Demokrasi Çıkmazı’ [Democracy’s dead end], Milli Gazete, Aug. 1979.

32 ‘İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Anlayalım ve Kavrayalım’ [Let’s understand and grasp the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran], Milli Gazete, (series) May 1980; ‘İran İslam Cumhuriyeti Anayasası’ [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran], Milli Gazete, December 1979.

33 ‘İslam’in ilk devirlerinde devlet camiden idare edilirdi camilere tekrar bu fonksyon iade edilmelidir’ [At the first years of Islam, the state was ruled from the mosques. And that function must return to mosques again], Milli Gazete, December 1979.

34 Cumhuriyet - Ansiklopedisi 1961-1980. ‘MSP’nin tartışmalı Konya mitingi.’ [MSP’s controversial demonstration in Konya], Vol. 3 (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2002).

35 ‘Kül olup gitmek’ [Becoming like Ash], Milli Gazete, 12 Aug. 1981; ‘Nazik Dengeler ve İran’ [Gentle Balances and Iran], Milli Gazete, 10 July 1981.

36 ‘Demokrasi recetesi’ [Recipe for Democracy], Milli Gazete, 10 Oct. 1980.

37 ‘Demokrasi Tartışması’ [The Democracy Debate], Milli Gazete, 10 Oct. 1980; ‘Demokrasya’ [Democracy], Milli Gazete, 27 Aug. 1982.

38 For example, ‘Kur’an’da Mü’min’ [The Believer in the Qur’an], Milli Gazete, 23 Mar. 1982; ‘İslâm’da tebliğ’ [Preaching in Islam], Milli Gazete, 21 July 1982; ‘ZİKİR’ [Zikr], Milli Gazete, 22 Mar. 1982.

39 W. Hale, and E. Özbudun. Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (London: Routledge, 2009), p.4.

40 Yavuz, Political Islam and the Welfare Party.

41 B. Toprak, ‘The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey’, in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds), State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin and New York: Walter De Gruyter, 1988), pp.128–29.

42 Ü. Kurt, ‘The Doctrine of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” as Official Ideology of the September 12 and the “Intellectuals’ Hearth–Aydinlar Ocagi” as the Ideological Apparatus of the State’, European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 3, no. 2 (2010), pp.111–44.

43 C. Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp.166–206; N, Göle, ‘Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, no. 1 (1997), pp.46–58.

44 S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

45 U. Shavit, Scientific and Political Freedom in Islam: A Critical Reading of the Modernist-Apologetic School. (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2017), p.128.

46 On Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to run in the 1984 parliamentary elections, see, M. El-Ghobashy, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, no. 3 (2005), pp.373–95; C. Harnisch and Q. Mecham, ‘Democratic Ideology in Islamist Opposition? The Muslim Brotherhood’s “Civil State”’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, no. 2 (2009). On Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood between the 1985 ousting of the Nimeiry regime and the 1989 coup, see R. El-Solh, ‘Islamist Attitudes towards Democracy: A Review of the Ideas of Al-Ghazali, Al-Turabi and ‘Amara’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, no. 1 (1993), pp.57–63.

47 See, for example, E. Sivan, ‘The Clash Within Islam’, Survival, Vol. 45, no. 1 (2003), pp.25–44; B. Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Oakland: University of California Press, 2002).

48 For example, ‘Demokrasi korkusu!’ [The fear of democracy!], Milli Gazete, 18 Nov. 1989; ‘Demokrasiye Îman Edenler!’ [Those who idolize democracy], Milli Gazete, 21 June 1989.

49 Refah Partisi, Refah Partisi İkinci Büyük Kongresi 11 Ekim 1987 [RP, Second Grand Convention] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1987), p.4.

50 Refah Partisi, Tek Çözüm: Refah Partisi [The Only Solution: The Refah Party] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1987); Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam, p.147.

51 ‘Demokrasi nedir ki?’ [What is democracy?], Milli Gazete, 3 May 1984.

52 ‘Dinini Ta’n eyleyen…’ [Those who make the religion of God], Milli Gazete, 24 Jan. 1986; ‘Seçmek ve Seçilmek’ [To Elect and to be Elected], Milli Gazete, 2 Mar. 1985.

53 ‘Seçim hayatımızın bir parçasıdır’ [Elections are part of our lives], Milli Gazete, 11 Jan. 1988.

54 These issues were ones that other non-Turkish Islamist thinkers were also blurry on. See, for example, T. Masoud, ‘Islamist Parties: Are they Democrats? Does it Matter?’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, no. 3 (2008), pp.19–24; U. Shavit, ‘Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy? Roots and Systemization of a Polemic’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, no. 3 (2010), pp.349–74.

55 For example, in a 1987 conference in Elazığ, Erbakan said that democracy means ‘being content with what the nation wants’, rather than forcing external ideas on the nation: Necmettin Erbakan, Ortak Pazar ve Türkiye - Elazığ Konferansı [The Common Market and Turkey – Elazığ Conference] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1987).

56 ‘Kültürel çözülme’ [Cultural dissolution], Milli Gazete, 8 Jan. 1986.

57 F. M. Göçek, ‘To Veil or not to Veil: The Contested Location of Gender in Contemporary Turkey’, Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 1, no. 4 (1999), pp.521–35.

58 See, for example, ‘Atatürk kadınların başörtüsüne karışmadı’ [Ataturk didn’t interfere with the women’s headscarves], Milli Gazete, 3 Apr. 1989; ‘Başörtü’ [The head cover], Milli Gazete, 28 Jan. 1986.

59 ‘Erbakan: Laiklik adı altında din düşmanlığı yapılıyor’ [Erbakan: Under the name of Secularism, animosity to religion is being done], Milli Gazete, 16 Apr. 1989.

60 For example, ‘Gerçekten Rüşdi savunuyorlar mı?’ [They’re really protecting Rushdie?], Milli Gazete, 4 Mar. 1989.

61 See, for example, ‘Kadın ve bitmeyen sömürüsü’ [Women and their endless exploitation], Milli Gazete, 1 July 1988; ‘Feminizm üzerine’ [About Feminism], Milli Gazete, 22 May 1989; ‘Gençliğim eyvah’ [Oh, my youth!], Milli Gazete, 21 July 1987.

62 Refah Partisi, Tek Çözüm: Refah Partisi.

63 Refah Partisi, Refah Partisi Birinci Büyük Kongresi, Genel Başkan Ahmet Tekdal’ın Açış Konuşması (30 Haziran 1985) [The Welfare Party First Great Convention, Chair Ahmet Tekdal’s Opening Speech (30 June 1985)] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1985).

64 N. Erbakan, Yeni Problemler, Yeni Düşünce, Yeni Çözümler [New Problems, New Thinking, New Solutions], speech at AMGT conference, Stuttgart 1989.

65 See, for example, ‘Hicret’e adım adım…’ [Step by step to the Hijra], Milli Gazete, 16 Aug. 1988.

66 ‘İslâm’da siyasetin yeri’ [The place of politics in Islam], Milli Gazete, (series) 8–14 Apr. 1987.

67 See, for example, ‘İslâm’da cihad ve şehidlik’ [Jihad and Martyrdom in Islam], Milli Gazete, 3 Jan. 1988; ‘İbn Teymiye Külliyatı’ [Ibn Taymiyyah’s ‘Kulliyat’], Milli Gazete, 14 Apr. 1987.

68 For example, ‘Seyyid Kutub Düşüncesi Tamamlandı’ [All of Sayyed Qutb’s Philosophy], Milli Gazete, advertised throughout spring 1988; ‘TÜRKİYE’DE İSLAMCILIK DÜŞÜNCESİ’ [Islamist thinking in Turkey], Milli Gazete, advertised throughout 1987.

69 See, for example, ‘Çağdaş İslâmi Şiirler’ [Contemporary Islamic Poets], Milli Gazete, 29 July 1988; ‘Necip Fazıl’ın sanat eserleri’ [The artistic bases of Necip Fazil], Milli Gazete, 12 June 1988; ‘Mevlana’yi anlamak’ [Understanding Mevlana], Milli Gazete, Aug. 1984.

70 For example, ‘Tanzimât’a muhalefet’ [The opposition to the Tanzimat], Milli Gazete, 5 Dec. 1985; ‘Türkiye İslam ülkesi değildir’ [Turkey is not an Islamic Country], Milli Gazete, 3 Oct. 1983.

71 ‘Siyasi Hurriyet ve Kayyum merakı’ [Political freedom and curiosity of the administrator], Milli Gazete, 9 Apr. 1984.

72 See, for example, ‘Rohingali, Müslümnalar kendi topraklarında yurtsuz kaldılar’ [The Rohinga remain homeless in their own lands], Milli Gazete, Nov. 1984; ‘Moro Cihadı Sürüyor’ [Moro continues its Jihad], İslam, no. 39 (Nov. 1986).

73 See, for example, ‘Sudan’da İslam’ın Geleceği’ [The Future of Islam in Sudan], Milli Gazete, May 1988; ‘Ziya: Şeriat varlığımızın esası olduğu kadar hayatta kalmamızın da teminatı!’ [Ziya: shariʿa is the guarantor of our survival as much as the basis of our existence], Milli Gazete, 20 Aug. 1988.

74 This tendency changed in the 1990s, starting with the Algerian elections of 1992, in which an Islamist party (FIS) was posed to win. See R. Çakır, Ne Seriat, Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak [Neither the Sharia nor Democracy: Understanding the Welfare Party] (Istanbul: Metis, 1994), pp.110–18.

75 M. Heper, ‘Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation?’ The Middle East Journal (1997), pp.32–45.

76 A. Çarkoğlu, and B. Toprak, Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset [Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı, 2000); M. Kamrava, ‘Pseudo-democratic politics and populist possibilities: the rise and demise of Turkey’s Refah party’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, no. 2 (1998), pp.275–301.

77 J. White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p.41.

78 Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi, pp.82–83.

79 B. Özkan, ‘Turkey’s Islamists: From Powersharing to Political Incumbency’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 14, no. 1 (2015), pp.72–83.

80 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, pp.294–95.

81 U. Rosenberg, ‘“If you can’t beat them – join them”: explaining Milli Görüş movement’s views towards the West’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies (2023), pp.1–21.

82 ‘25 Aralık Sabah: Türkiye Yeniden Doğacak’ [On 25 Dec. morning: Turkey will be Reborn], Milli Gazete, 8 Dec. 1995.

83 N. Erbakan, 28.11.92 Tarihli Meclis Konuşması [Parliamentary Speech 28 Nov. 92] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1992).

84 See, for example, ‘Gerçek Demokrasi ve Refah Partisi’ [Real Democracy and the RP], Milli Gazete, (series) 21–22 Aug. 1995; ‘En Demokrat Refah’ [RP - the most democratic], Yörünge 253, 19–25 Nov. 1995.

85 See, for example, a 1992 Milli Gazete article on the victory of the Islamists in Algeria’s election: ‘While the basic human rights and freedoms and democracy principles which dominate our era like a religion are not 100 per cent compatible with Islam, there are more than a few parallels between the two systems’: ‘Şeriatçıların zaferi̇’ [The victory of the Shari’a people], Milli Gazete, 1 Jan. 1992.

86 See, for example, ‘Yobaz Ateistler Barışçı Müslümanlar’ [Bigoted Atheists, Peaceful Muslims], Milli Gazete, 21 Apr. 1994.

87 Refah Partisi, 24 Aralik 1995 Refah Partisi Secim Beyannamesi [The RP’s Election Program for the 24.12.1995 Elections] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1995).

88 Refah Partisi, Refah Partisi Türkiye’nin Teminatı: Yeni Bir Dünya [RP’s Guarantees for Turkey: A New World] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1994).

89 See, for example, ‘Mısır ABD’nin ileri karakolu mu?’ [Is Egypt the US outpost?], Milli Gazete, 28 Aug. 1993; ‘İslam gelir, emperyalizm gider’ [Islam comes, imperialism goes], Milli Gazete, 1 Jan. 1992.

90 Çakır called it ‘The Algerian Syndrome’: Çakır, Ne Seriat, Ne Demokrasi, pp.110–18.

91 See, for example, M. Makram-Ebeid, ‘Democratization in Egypt: the “Algeria Complex”‘, Middle East Policy, Vol. 3, no. 3 (1994), pp.119–124; M. Boulby, The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945–1993 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999).

92 R. T. Erdoğan, ‘Araç Demokrasi, Amaç Adil Düzen…’ [The Vehicle is Democracy. The Aim is a Just Order], İzlenim, no. 2 (Feb. 1993).

93 ‘Fukoyama’, Milli Gazete, 19 Mar. 1992.

94 Refah Partisi, Refah Partisi Genel Başkanı Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan’ın Konuşmaları Haziran 1993 [RP General Secretary Prof. Necmettin Erbakan’s Speeches – June 1993] (Ankara: ESAM Yayınları, 1993).

95 S. Hamid, Temptations of Power: Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Shavit, Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy?.

96 See, for example, ‘Yeni model’ [A new model], Milli Gazete, 7 Apr. 1995.

97 For example, ‘Genelkurmay hükümeti’ [A government of generals], Milli Gazete, 3 May 1994; ‘Askeri Demokrasi’ [Military Democracy], Yörünge, 9–15 July 1995.

98 M. Heper and A. Guney, ‘The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience’, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 26, no. 4 (2000), pp.635–57.

99 G. D. Belcher, Journey from Islamism to Conservative Democracy: The Politics of Religious Party Moderation in Turkey (PhD Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2012), p.113.

100 See, for example, ‘Herkes Kabiliyeti Nispetinde Çalışmalı’ [Everyone Should be Allowed to Work in their Capacity], Yörünge, 112, 31 Jan. 1993; ‘Kadınlar Yerel Yönetici de Olmalı’ [Women can be also Local Governors], Yörünge, 152, 21 Oct. 1993.

101 See, for example, ‘Osmanli feministleri yada Osmanli’da feminizm’ [Ottoman Feminists or Feminism in the Ottoman Empire], Milli Gazete, (series) Oct. 1994; ‘Feminizm ve Kadın Bakanlığı’ [Feminism and the Ministry of Women], Yörünge, 129, 13 June 1993.

102 See, for example, ‘AMGT Genel Sekreteri Ali Yüksel: İslam’ı bilmiyoruz’ [AMGT’s General Secretary Ali Yüksel: We don’t know Islam], Milli Gazete, 18 June 1993; ‘İsrail, Siyonist Devlettir’ [Israel is a Zionist State], Yörünge, 233, 2–8 July 1995.

103 See, for example, ‘Alevîler ve Sünnîler kardeştir diyen Şevki Yılmaz: Dış güçlerin oyununu bozalım’ [Şevki Yılmaz says that the Alevis and Sunnis are brothers: Let’s break the conspiracies of foreign powers], Milli Gazete, 18 July 1993; ‘Alevi Müslümanlığı!’ [The Muslimness of Alevis], Yörünge, 196, 2–8 Oct. 1994.

104 See, for example, the response of Ali Yüksel, a Millî Görüş leader based in Germany, when asked about the fatwa: ‘I do not argue its (the fatwa’s) truth or wrongness, but if it was up to me, I would not have given such a fatwa’: ‘AMGT Genel Sekreteri ve Almanya Şeyhülislamı Ali Yüksel: Ayrımcılığa karşıyız’ [AMGT General Secretary and German Sheikh ul-Salam, Ali Yüksel: ‘We are Against Discrimination’], Milli Gazete, 19 June 1993.

105 C. Kurzman and I. Naqvi, ‘Do Muslims Vote Islamic?’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, no. 2 (2010), pp.50–63; J.A. Clark, ‘The conditions of Islamist moderation: Unpacking cross-ideological cooperation in Jordan’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 38, no. 4 (2006), pp.539–60; J. Schwedler, Faith in moderation: Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); M. Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

106 J.M. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); M. El-Ghobashy, ‘The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, no. 3 (2005), pp.373–95; D. Brumberg, ‘Islam, Elections, and Reform in Algeria’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, no. 1 (1991), pp.58–71; I. Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

107 The memorandum handed out by the Turkish military did not focus on RP’s commitment to democracy, but rather on suspicion of creeping religious fundamentalism and the eroding of Turkish secularism. Issues such as Erbakan’s visits to Libya and Nigeria, an anti-Israel rally joined by RP members in the Ankara suburb of Sincan, in which the Iranian ambassador to Turkey was a speaker, and employment of graduates of Turkey’s religious schools (İmam Hatip okulları) in branches of the ‘secular’ state apparatus were some of the examples of religious reactionary fundamentalism (irtica) presented by the military.