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ABSTRACT
Call generalism about children’s and adults’ wellbeing the thesis that the same theory of wellbeing applies to both children and adults. Our goal is to examine whether generalism is true. While this question has not received much attention in the past, it has recently been suggested that generalism is likely to be false and that we need to elaborate different theories of children’s and adults’ wellbeing. In this paper, we defend generalism against the main objections it faces and make a positive case for it.
Acknowledgments
This paper was written at Pompeu Fabra University, in Barcelona, where the authors were, respectively, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Family Justice Research Project and Visiting Research Scholar in the Law Department. We would like to thank Serena Olsaretti and all the members of the Family Justice group for providing us with a fantastic research environment. We are very grateful to Serena Olsaretti, Anca Gheaus, Andrew Williams, Colin Macleod, Paul Boswell, Willem van der Deijl, and four anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous drafts of the paper. We would also like to thank Paul Bou-Habib, Dale Dorsey, Luara Ferraccioli, Antti Kauppinnen, Arto Laitinen, Erik Magnusson, Andres Moles, Viki Møller Lyngby Pedersen, Jason Raibley, and Isabella Trifan for their useful comments on various presentations of the paper. Finally, we wish to thank Olivia Schuman for the liguistic revision of the manuscript. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme [Grant Agreement Number: 648610].
Notes
1. This label is inspired by Wayne Sumner’s remarks that a theory of wellbeing must be ‘general’ in two distinct senses. First, it must help us make sense of ‘all of the different sorts of welfare assessments we make’ (Sumner Citation1996, 13), most notably, of our assessments of wellbeing levels and wellbeing gains and losses. Second, it must equally apply to all (paradigmatic) wellbeing subjects, including infants, children and many non-human animals, in addition to adults (Sumner Citation1996, 14). We derive the term ‘generalism’ from the second sense in which a theory of wellbeing must be general, according to Sumner. Note, however, that in this paper we focus only on generalism about children’s and adults’ wellbeing.
2. Anthony Skelton (Citation2015) and Eden Lin (Citation2018) are two notable exceptions. Lin, in particular, considers the question of whether the same theory of wellbeing applies to all paradigmatic wellbeing subjects, including children, but also severely cognitively disabled individuals and non-human animals. (He calls this thesis ‘welfare invariabilism’). While in this paper we defend a view similar to Lin’s, we do so by offering new arguments and by engaging directly with some recent works in the philosophy of childhood. That said, the arguments against generalism that we discuss in section 2 and 3, as well as the argument in favour of generalism that we present in section 5, could be reformulated so as to apply, mutatis mutandis, to the issue of whether humans’ and non-human animals’ wellbeing are fundamentally different. Although we think that generalism is true also of humans’ and non-human animals’ wellbeing, for reasons of space we will not defend this position here.
3. Thus, for instance, Tomlin writes: ‘I am inclined toward [the view that what makes a child’s life go well is not co-extensive with what makes an adult’s life go well]. This is in part because I place a very high value on personal freedom and nondomination in thinking about what makes an adult life go well. These kinds of values matter so much, I think, because of certain capacities that adults have. Paternalism, whilst sometimes justifiable toward adults, is always pro tanto bad for those who have certain kinds of capacities. It is not bad for children, who lack these capacities, or do not possess them to the same degree’ See Tomlin (Citation2018a,40).
4. On this point, see also Lin (Citation2017a).
5. Such a view has potentially crucial implications for the issue of what is morally owed to children. Indeed, if childhood is bad for children – particularly, if it is worse than adulthood – then it is plausible to think that children are owed more than adults. See Hannan (Citation2018), on the potential moral and political implications of the predicament view of childhood.
6. We will have more to say about how to interpret this claim in section 2.
7. For a helpful overview of the various questions that the alleged existence of special goods of childhood raises, see Tomlin (Citation2018a).
8. For simplicity, in what follows we will generally omit the qualifications ‘as children’ and ‘as adults’.
9. Brighouse and Swift appear to endorse this position when they write: ‘[W]e think that innocence about sexuality, for example, is good in childhood, even though for most people it would not be valuable for their adulthood. A certain steady sense of being carefree is also valuable in childhood but is a flaw in most adults.’ (Brighouse and Swift Citation2014, 65).
10. Notice that the argument could have equally well been formulated in terms of ‘special goods of adulthood’, where the latter are conceived as items that are good only for adults, but not for children. We discuss the argument in the current form to explore the full implications of the recent debate about the special goods of childhood.
11. In a similar vein, Gheaus claims that a ‘sense of being care-free’ may be either good or bad, not depending on whether one is a child or an adult, but depending on whether being care-free is, for any individual, ‘enjoyable, attractive, and morally unobjectionable’ (Gheaus Citation2015a, 45).
12. This shows that the desire fulfilment theory is primarily an explanatory theory of wellbeing.
13. One may ask how the enumerative/explanatory distinction, as well as our overall argument, applies to perfectionist theories of humans’ and animals’ wellbeing. Suppose that the exercise of some capacities, e.g. the capacity for autonomy, is finally good for humans but not for dogs. This shows that humans’ and dogs’ wellbeing differs at the enumerative level. Does it also differ at the explanatory level? There seem to be two possibilities. On the one hand, if we say that human wellbeing consists in the perfection of human nature, while dogs’ wellbeing consists in the perfection of canine nature, then we have two different explanatory theories. On the other hand, if we say that, for any individual to which the theory applies (either human or canine), wellbeing consists in the perfection of the individual’s nature, e.g. in being a good specimen of one’s kind, then we have a single explanatory theory. We think that the second characterisation should be preferred, since it provides the ultimate explanation of what wellbeing consists in. Notice, however, that this does not entail that perfectionism is necessarily a generalist theory about humans’ and non-human animals’ wellbeing. Indeed, one may hold that perfectionism is true of humans, but not of non-human animals (or vice-versa). In this case, the explanation of why certain items are finally good will differ across humans and non-human animals. We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
14. Eden Lin (Citation2017b) has recently challenged the distinction between enumerative and explanatory theories of wellbeing. Lin claims that we should distinguish between the particularthings that are finally good for an individual and the kindsof things that are finally good for her. In light of this distinction, Lin argues that, insofar as the goal of enumerative theories is to offer a list of thekindsof things that are (non-derivatively) finally good for the individual, then allwellbeing theories can be considered both enumerative and explanatory. Indeed, all of them list different kinds of (non-derivatively) finally good itemsand explain the (derivative) final goodness for the individual of the particulars by reference to those kinds. If this is true, it follows that, if two theories differ at the explanatory level, then they are also different at the enumerative level – contrary to what we presuppose in our discussion. While we do not have the space to discuss Lin’s position in detail here, we want to notice that, if Lin is right, then we simply need to reformulate our point as follows. In order to show that children’s and adults’ wellbeing is fundamentally different, it is not enough to show that their wellbeing differs at the level of the particular things that are (derivatively) finally good for them; rather, one has to show that they differ at the level of the kinds of things that are (non-derivatively) finally good for them.
15. On the distinction between derivative and non-derivative final value, see Zimmerman (Citation2001).
16. For instance, an item may stand either in a determinate/determinable relation, or in a species/genus relation, with another item that is non-derivatively finally good.
17. See Hannan (Citation2018) on different ways of interpreting the idea of children’s sexual innocence.
18. Hannan (Citation2018, 14–16) argues that sexual innocence and the ability to love and trust without apprehension are actually bad for individuals, both in themselves and instrumentally.
19. In fact, it might even be argued that this is the level of analysis at which future discussions about children’s wellbeing should be framed. See Alexandrova (Citation2017, chapter 3), for an argument advocating the need for ‘mid-level’ theories of (children’s) wellbeing.
20. In fact, Alison Gopnik claims not only that young children possess some of the same ‘higher-level’ capacities that adults possess, but also that they exercise them better than adults. As she writes it: ‘young children are actually smarter, more imaginative, more caring, and even more conscious than adults are’ (Gopnik Citation2009, 5; see also Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl Citation1999). For a detailed discussion of Gopnik’s work, see Gheaus (Citation2015a, Citation2015b).
21. Though see Annas (Citation1993); Russell (Citation2012).
22. Tomlin (Citation2018a) uses the metaphor of a caterpillar turning into a butterfly to express the idea that children and adults are different kinds of beings. Tomlin thinks, however, that if children and adults are different kinds of beings, it is because different accounts of wellbeing apply to them, rather than vice-versa. Still, this leaves open the question of why different accounts of wellbeing are supposed to apply to them.
23. For a similar point, see Lin (Citation2017a, 358–360).
24. An alternative way to reject this move, which we will not explore here, consists in appealing to considerations from section 3 and arguing that, to the extent that all the main accounts according to which wellbeing involves the exercise of higher-level capacities that children do not yet possess are problematic, then there is reason to think that, if there is a higher-level capacity that determines adults’ wellbeing, it is likely to be one that children too possess to a minimal extent, so that such a capacity determines also children’s wellbeing. Thanks to Paul Boswell for this suggestion.
25. Being intrinsically good for an individual is a way of being finally good for her. It is not the only way, though. It is indeed possible for an item to be extrinsically finally good. As many authors have argued (see, e.g. Korsgaard Citation1983; Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen Citation1999), an item may be finally good for an individual in virtue of some of its relational (hence, not intrinsic) properties. It is important to keep the ‘intrinsic’ qualification in sight, for the principle becomes false otherwise. To see why, suppose we drop the qualification. The principle is now subject to counter-examples: the exercise of a fully developed capacity for skiing may be good for an individual, in virtue of (e.g.) the enjoyment that it procures, but the exercise of a partially developed capacity for skiing may not, because of (e.g.) the undesirable consequences that it may provoke, such as the displeasure of falling down a hill. Counter-examples of this sort may be avoided if we reinstate the ‘intrinsic’ qualification. If the exercise of a capacity is intrinsically good for an individual, that is, good for her independently of its extrinsic properties (such as its consequences), then the exercise of the same capacity is intrinsically good for that individual when such a capacity is only partially developed.
26. Here, and in what follows, we use the expression ‘fully developed capacity’ as synonym of ‘capacity developed to a sufficient degree’ (according to some non-prudential standard), rather than as synonym of ‘maximally developed capacity’.
27. Lin (Citation2018) reaches essentially the same conclusion, though by means of a different strategy.
28. Policy-makers and educators also routinely appeal to considerations of this sort in the design of educational policies or practices.
29. In other words, children’s and adults’ wellbeing comparisons are impossible if it is determinately false that children’s wellbeing is either higher, equal to, on a par, or lower than adults’ wellbeing.
30. On this point, see also Tomlin (Citation2018b).
31. One may prefer S1 to S2 on the ground that a society that occupies a higher position in its justice scale than another does in its own justice scale is likely to be a happier society. However, this preference is based on an intersocietal comparison of happiness, not of justice.
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Andrée-Anne Cormier
Andrée-Anne Cormier is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at York University, Glendon College. Her current work is on issues of justice concerning the family and children’s education, the nature and value of childhood, and the ethics of intimate relationships.
Mauro Rossi
Mauro Rossi is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Université du Québec à Montréal. His research interests are in value theory and philosophy of economics. His current scholarship focuses particularly on wellbeing, psychological happiness, and the fitting-attitude analysis of value.