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Abstract
This paper examines the Russian migration and citizenship regime as encountered by forced migrants from Ukraine who fled to Russia during the period of 2014–2016. Based on legal and other official documents, media articles, and interviews, it gives an account of these migrants’ reception in Russia in theory and practice. Russia made great efforts to accommodate them, and in Russian media they were often spoken of as an easily integrated labor resource and as potential citizens. In 2015–2016, around 165,000 Ukrainians acquired Russian citizenship. While ethno-cultural similarity does privilege Ukrainian migrants in Russia, full asylum has been granted sparingly, and citizenship is not unconditionally granted. As this paper shows, Russian authorities have rather tried to control and distribute these forced migrants for the benefit of the state, according to principles of selectivity and economic interests – giving privileged access to permanent residency and citizenship to working-age people willing to settle in regions where population growth and more workers are deemed necessary. However, permanent residency and citizenship are also available to those able to circumvent or pay their way through the obstacles encountered – taking advantage of the flexibility inherent in a system that is not totally consistent.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank all who have read and contributed with comments and suggestions at various stages of this manuscript’s progress. She is especially indebted to Pål Kolstø, Sverre Rustad, Egle Kesylyte-Alliks, Oxana Shevel, Caress Schenk, and Christine Lukash. The field work for this study was made possible thanks to a travel grant from the Faculty of Humanities, University of Oslo.
Notes
1. By the end of 2016 the FMS was liquidated and its responsibilities transferred to the Ministry of the Interior (MVD).
2. Citizenship acquisition in Crimea after the Russian annexation is beyond the scope of this paper. As the majority of the population of Crimea got Russian citizenship already in 2014, figures on Ukrainian citizens acquiring Russian citizenship in 2015 and 2016 are not affected by the annexation.
3. This is the term used by Bridget Anderson (Citation2012), elaborated on below.
4. Names of the VK groups: “Pomosh’ bezhentsam s Ukrainy v Tule,” “Pomosh’ bezhentam iz Ukrainy v Lipetske,” “Pomosh’ bezhentsam iz Ukrainy v Voronezhe,” “Donbas v Moskve. Pereselentsy, bezhentsy,” “Pomoshch bezhentsam s Ukrainy. Novosibirsk”. Personal requests were sent to group members with open profiles. Four informants were recruited at two state run centers for temporary residence in Voronezh and Lipetsk.
5. For MVD statistics on the migration situation in 2016 see https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/upload/site1/document_news/009/359/228/stat_2016.pdf.
6. This document was referred to already in June/July 2014. Some regions included this leaflet into a larger information brochure. The information is also posted on the web page of the MVD migration department under the headline: “Citizens of Ukraine and persons without citizenship, permanently living in Ukraine, staying in Russia according to emergency mass procedure,” available at https://xn--b1ab2a0a.xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/upload/site1/document_file/3o5gIOPDD8.pdf.
7. Since 18 February 2017 people from Donetsk and Luhansk may use documents issued by the self-proclaimed republics for travels in Russia. See http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53895.
8. Special arrangements were made for Ukrainian citizens who wanted to start or continue their studies in Russia. The Ministry of Education and Science assured Ukrainian citizens that they would be admitted to Russian universities on equal terms with Russian citizens, and capacity was increased at several universities, primarily in the border regions.
9. The law “On refugees” promises employment assistance; this amendment to the law on the legal status of foreign citizens was therefore said to make the legislation more coherent.
10. In both 2011 and 2012 only around 650 TA permits were issued, an approval rate of approximately 60%.
11. Such an agreement existed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan between 1996 and 2012, and since 1999 between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (See Chudinovskikh Citation2014, 33–37).
12. According to Olga Chudinovskikh, although there are complaints that it is difficult and time-consuming to get Russian citizenship, 99.9% of those acquiring it get it through simplified (faster) procedures.
13. For details on the cumbersome procedures to renounce Ukrainian citizenship see Shevel Citation2013b.
14. Program participants previously got temporary residence permits (TRP) outside the quotas and could apply for citizenship when the TRP was granted. In 2016 the TRP step was replaced by permanent residence permits (PRP) on the route to citizenship. A stated reason was to “optimize the expenses from the Federal budget on the social and housing situation (sotsial’no-bytovoe obustroistvo) of people residing in temporary places of accommodation.” It is unclear exactly how, but the PRP allows people to rent housing, register at the place of residency, and to take up loans to buy housing. In general, PRP is a more generous status when it comes to rights, allowing one to accumulate pension rights. Perhaps most importantly, while with a TRP one is tied to a particular region for work, a PRP allows free movement around the country.
15. While not very popular in its first years of existence, changes introduced in 2012/ 2013 made the state program more attractive. See Myhre Citation2017.
16. The CAC is a human rights organization working extensively on issues related to migrants and refugees in Russia; it is headed by Svetlana Gannuskhina.
17. For details on the legislation in Russian see: http://www.consultant.ru/law/hotdocs/30316.html.