ABSTRACT
A nuclear test often is as political as it is technical. The intricacies of domestic and external politics play into Pyongyang’s decisions on nuclear testing, going far beyond the technical aspects of such tests. This article explores the repercussions of the second North Korea-US summit in Hanoi in 2019 across all policy realms in North Korea and how domestic and external factors could inform and shape Kim Jong-un’s decision on a seventh nuclear test. In order to delve into what to look out for in 2024 and beyond, this article focuses on Pyongyang’s approach to the civilian economy as opposed to national defense and the reorientation of its foreign and South Korea policies as potential key indicators of Kim’s thinking on nuclear testing.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
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Rachel Minyoung Lee
Rachel Minyoung Lee is a senior fellow with the 38 North Program at the Stimson Center. From 2000 to 2019, Lee was a North Korea collection expert and analyst with the US Government, where she covered North Korean domestic and foreign policy and a broad range of Korean Peninsula issues with implications for Pyongyang’s regime stability and regional security.