Reversal of nuclear-conventional entanglement in outer space

ABSTRACT

In recent years, scholars have grappled with the risks and conditions of nuclear-conventional entanglement. One of the examples of entanglement discussed in the academic literature is U.S. nuclear command and control satellites, which have historically served both nuclear and conventional missions. From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. Air Force made a series of programmatic decisions that would, at least in part, reverse this entanglement, separating nuclear from non-nuclear spacecraft. This reversal of nuclear-conventional entanglement in outer space poses strategic consequences, but it was less a strategic choice made by U.S. leadership than the result of acquisition reforms and bureaucratic dynamics.

KEYWORDS:

• Entanglement
• nuclear
• escalation
• command and control
• space

Introduction

The relationship between spacecraft and nuclear war dates to the early days of the Space Age. Beginning in the 1960s, the United States started launching satellites for operating and defending itself in the event of a nuclear exchange.¹ These capabilities generally fall into two categories: spacecraft capable of detecting missile launches, known as missile warning satellites, and spacecraft that can transmit communications during a nuclear conflict, known as strategic communications satellites. These assets comprise U.S. space-based nuclear command and control.²

U.S. nuclear command and control satellites serve not just nuclear but also non-nuclear missions. Missile warning satellites detect launches of both missiles armed with nuclear weapons and missiles armed with conventional weapons; strategic communication satellites transmit messages from national leadership to nuclear forces as well as between conventional forces.³ Scholars have characterized this military-technical condition as an example of ‘nuclear-conventional entanglement’, which broadly refers to the commingling of nuclear and non-nuclear systems and how that commingling affects the likelihood of a conventional conflict escalating to nuclear use.⁴

Analysts have wrestled with the consequences of entanglement. During the Eisenhower administration, NATO positioned tactical nuclear arms along the Central Front to ensure that if Soviet forces were to invade NATO territory, those forces would encounter nuclear weapons. Tom Nichols calls this NATO strategy ‘terrifying but effective’.⁵ Other scholars warn that entanglement could run the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to nuclear use. After detailing how China has interspersed some of its nuclear and conventionally armed forces, Caitlin Talmadge concludes that in a hypothetical war between the United States and China, plausible U.S. conventional military operations would almost certainly erode ‘significant components of China’s nuclear or nuclear-relevant capabilities’.⁶ As suggested by these analyses, entanglement could deter a conventional attack or push an otherwise conventional conflict to the nuclear threshold.

From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. Air Force made a series of decisions that would reverse nuclear-conventional entanglement – what this paper is characterizing as ‘disaggregation’ – for the next generation of communications satellites.⁷ One set of spacecraft, referred to as strategic communications satellites, would be designed to ensure nuclear-survivable communications for U.S. leadership and for U.S. nuclear forces. A separate set of spacecraft, referred to as tactical communications satellites, would be designed to transmit messages to and from non-nuclear forces.⁸ Although this would not completely disaggregate space-based nuclear command and control, it would represent a near complete disaggregation of strategic satellite communications.⁹ This change remains in effect; an initial capability for the strategic program is expected in 2031 and for the tactical program as soon as 2024.¹⁰

The thesis of this article is the U.S. decision to disaggregate its nuclear-conventional satellite communications capabilities poses strategic consequences, but it may not have been a strategic decision. Disaggregating nuclear command and control satellites has serious implications for the most pressing debates in national security space circles, including the conditions that could bring about a war that extends to space and whether such a space war, once initiated, might escalate to nuclear war. From 2010 to 2016, the disaggregation of U.S. strategic communications satellites was proposed within the Department of Defense (DOD) but failed to persuade DOD leadership. The next year ushered in acquisition reforms that delegated some authority away from central DOD leadership. In this new acquisition environment, disaggregation came about in gradual programmatic moves imperceptible to many observers. In short, disaggregation was less a strategic choice made by U.S. leadership than the result of acquisition reforms and bureaucratic dynamics.

This article makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the scholarship of escalation dynamics and nuclear-conventional entanglement. Theoretically, it ties the theory of entanglement to the U.S. decision to disaggregate its communications satellites. Although there is robust scholarship on the strategic implications of entanglement, the strategic implications of reversing it has received far less attention and study. Further, the U.S. decision to disaggregate its communications satellites has not previously been discussed in the academic literature. Empirically, using policy and budgetary documents, this article offers a case-study that builds on prior work suggesting that a state’s decision to entangle or, in this case, disaggregate nuclear and conventional capabilities is not always made for strategic reasons. In the case of the U.S. decision to disaggregate its strategic communications satellites, the policy and budgetary documents reveal that disaggregation only came to pass when policy changes allowed it to circumvent central defense leadership. ¹¹

This article explains the U.S. reversal of some of its nuclear-conventional entanglement in space in three parts. Through an examination of the existing academic literature, the first part applies the theory of entanglement to the current entanglement and planned disaggregation of U.S. strategic communication satellites. In addition to the academic literature, we leverage public U.S. government materials on U.S. communications satellites and analysis on the physics of space operations from think-tank reports.

The second part of the article reviews the two main arguments used for disaggregating U.S. space systems. The first argument aligns closely with the entanglement literature: disaggregating would prevent space conflict from escalating to nuclear war. The second argument, in contrast, is non-strategic. It argues for disaggregation on the grounds that it would generate cost savings and technological advances in the acquisition of space systems. We identify and analyze these arguments through a review of publications and public reporting from 2010 through 2021, to include editorials, think-tank and U.S. government reports, and congressional testimony.

The third part of the article examines how the decision to disaggregate unfolded. It describes how the decision to disaggregate – an issue that could affect the likelihood of space conflict and nuclear attack – may not have been a departmental strategic policy choice but the result of delegated decision-making enabled by acquisition reforms. We trace the decision to disaggregate through U.S. government and think-tank reports and U.S. Department of Defense budget justification materials.

Applying the theory of entanglement to the disaggregation of nuclear command and control spacecraft

Scholars have proposed different definitions and frameworks for entanglement, but the core ideas are largely the same.¹² Entanglement describes the overlap of nuclear and conventional forces or nuclear- and conventional-enabling capabilities, such as command and control assets, and how that overlap can risk inadvertent nuclear escalation. In a conventional war, a nation may logically seek to use its conventional weapons to target and strike an enemy combatant’s weapons or support systems that are important for conventional warfighting. If these capabilities are entangled with nuclear assets or serve both conventional and nuclear missions, strikes on them may destroy or undermine the entangled nuclear systems even if that was not the intent of the attack. In such a scenario, after suffering damage to its nuclear capabilities, the attacked state may retaliate by launching a nuclear attack, perhaps out of fear that its nuclear systems will continue to be targeted and weakened. In short, entanglement of conventional and nuclear capabilities could increase the risk of a conventional conflict escalating to nuclear use, even if, at the outset, both countries desire otherwise.

A common theme in the literature is analyzing the military-technical characteristics of entanglement.¹³ Principally, this includes the extent to which a target state has commingled its nuclear and conventional assets and to which its conventional and nuclear systems are readily distinguishable to an adversary. David Logan’s analysis, for example, addresses geographic and technological dimensions of entanglement.¹⁴ For geographic entanglement, he analyzes the extent to which Chinese missile systems are co-located. For technological entanglement, he analyzes, among other things, China’s deployment of conventional and nuclear variants of the same missiles, which may be difficult to differentiate. These two dimensions capture different ways a deliberate conventional attack could escalate. An attacking state may be unable to destroy some of the target state’s conventional forces without also destroying commingled nuclear forces or it may destroy some of the target state’s nuclear forces because it cannot tell the difference. Collectively, these characteristics amount to the risk that potential attacks in a conventional war could damage a target state’s nuclear capability.

Although important, the military-technical elements are not the only driver of nuclear escalation. The second category of risks discussed in the literature are perceptual.¹⁵ It is not only the damage from an attack that matters but also the perception of the attack. Affecting a state’s decision over whether an attack and degradation to its nuclear systems meets its threshold for nuclear use are potential perceptual errors that could heighten the risk for escalation. A targeted state could misjudge the damage suffered or misinterpret the intent of the attack, particularly in the fog of war, about which Talmadge writes, ‘missing or ambiguous information may be interpreted as highly threatening’.¹⁶ As an example, if a state loses communication with some of its nuclear forces, the state may assume the forces are under attack even if the actual circumstances are less grave. It may also not be clear whether an attacker’s motivations are to strike conventional warfighting targets or to undermine and weaken its opponent’s nuclear deterrent. An attacked state may worry that strikes on its entangled assets may presage strikes on its other nuclear capabilities. Perceptual errors could exacerbate escalatory pressures.

The academic literature on entanglement provides a lens for understanding the strategic implications of the U.S. decision to disaggregate its communications satellites. The rest of this section will apply concepts from the academic literature to the current entanglement and planned disaggregation of U.S. communications spacecraft. First, it reverses the logic of entanglement to lay out the general strategic implications of disaggregation, which can be applied to spacecraft or other systems. Second, it examines the military-technical conditions of entanglement and disaggregation for U.S. communications satellites. Third, it examines the perceptual risk factors for U.S. communications satellites. Military-technical conditions and perceptual factors make up the two general categories of risk identified in the entanglement literature.

Logic of reversing entanglement

Concepts from the academic literature on entanglement help clarify the strategic implications of disaggregation. A clear takeaway from the literature is that entanglement, at least for a particular target, can increase the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation.¹⁷ Disaggregating, therefore, would logically decrease the risk of inadvertent nuclear escalation: striking conventional-armed missiles that are co-located with nuclear-armed missiles would logically create more escalatory pressure than striking conventional-armed missiles that are well separated from their nuclear counterparts. Accordingly, a country separating or disaggregating its conventional missiles from its nuclear systems – if that disaggregation was clearly conveyed to the adversary – could lower the risk of escalation that could result from strikes on those missiles.

Although it might reduce the escalatory pressure associated with a particular strike, the act of disaggregating could make the conventional target, now separated from the nuclear system, more tempting. This strategic advantage of entanglement is discussed in the academic literature. For example, Logan writes that ‘entanglement may be a tool for deterring a risk-adverse adversary’.¹⁸ The risk of escalation could deter a country from attacking the entangled assets.

NATO nuclear strategy in the 1950s offers an example of entanglement as a form of deterrence. Fearing a Soviet invasion, the United States positioned nuclear ground artillery, including Davy Crockett and Honest John battlefield missiles, in infantry battalions in the Seventh Army in Europe.¹⁹ The U.S. Army deployed the first Davy Crockett systems at the Fulda Gap in West Germany, which was the expected invasion route of a Soviet army.²⁰ The entangling of the nuclear and ground forces would prevent the Soviet Union from achieving conventional military gains without confronting nuclear weapons, where those weapons would, as put by Nichols, ‘be overrun or employed’.²¹ Some analysts suggest this entanglement may have helped prevent a war.²²

In short, the academic literature reveals two core hypotheses about entanglement. First, it may increase the likelihood of a strike escalating to nuclear use; second, it may decrease the likelihood of the strike. These two ideas derive from the same premise: entanglement generates risk – that risk may push a conflict to nuclear use, or it may dissuade a would-be-attacker for fear that an attack would push the conflict to nuclear use. Using this logic, we can sort through the strategic implications of disaggregation. As summarized in Figure 1, disaggregation may reduce the likelihood of a strike escalating to nuclear use, but it may increase the likelihood of a strike. Policymakers should weigh this fundamental trade-off when considering entangling or disaggregating their conventional and nuclear systems.

Figure 1. Strategic implications of entanglement and disaggregation.

Military-technical conditions of U.S. communications satellites

The current military-technical entanglement of U.S. strategic communications satellites is unambiguous. The United States currently deploys two sets of strategic communications satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO): Milstar and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF).²³ The U.S. Department of Defense launched five Milstar satellites from 1994 to 2003 and launched six AEHF satellites, the follow-on capability to Milstar, from 2010 to 2020.²⁴ These spacecraft serve both nuclear and conventional missions. The satellites can use strategic waveforms to ensure nuclear-survivable communications among U.S. leadership and nuclear forces, such as intercontinental ballistic missile launch control centers and ballistic missile submarines. Or the satellites can use tactical waveforms with much higher data rates to enable communications for deployed conventional forces, such as conventionally armed ships and reconnaissance aircraft.²⁵ Given this coupling of strategic and tactical missions, a kinetic strike on the spacecraft would likely degrade U.S. communications capabilities not just for conventional operations but also for nuclear operations.

DOD’s planned replacement to AEHF includes different programs for strategic and tactical satellite communications. Evolved Strategic Satcom (ESS) is the strategic program, and Protected Tactical Satcom (PTS) is the tactical program.²⁶ Among the differences between the systems, the waveforms and satellites for ESS will be designed to operate in nuclear environments, similar to Milstar and AEHF, whereas the waveforms and spacecraft for PTS will not be. The terminals for the two sets of spacecraft will have different cryptology and waveform requirements, and PTS will have a data rate nearly 20 times greater than ESS.²⁷ The bandwidth for ESS will be sufficient for transmitting emergency action messages and voice conferencing in a nuclear environment – communications necessary in a nuclear crisis – but the greater bandwidth for PTS will enable the transmission of more complex messages and Internet connectivity for deployed conventional forces.²⁸ Such bandwidth would be vital in a conventional military operation, in which deployed forces may need situational awareness and intelligence information in a dynamic environment. Given these different requirements and capabilities, the strategic terminals that communicate with ESS satellites would not be designed to receive messages from PTS, nor would the tactical terminals that communicate with PTS be designed to receive messages from ESS. The systems intended to support nuclear operations would be sharply split from the systems intended to support conventional operations.

Although the disaggregation of U.S. communications satellites would make it possible for an adversary to strike a tactical asset without also striking a strategic asset, it does not guarantee that an adversary would be able to differentiate them. If combatants cannot delineate the strategic from tactical capabilities, they could attack strategic spacecraft under the false impression they were attacking tactical spacecraft. Such a scenario could produce consequences ‘more severe than the consequences of attacking dual-use assets’.²⁹ To prevent this outcome, U.S. leadership may need to disclose and persuade adversaries of the distinction. Elbridge Colby, for example, argues for the explicit identification of disaggregated strategic systems, ‘effectively “painting red” some elements of the U.S. space force structure’.³⁰ DOD’s deployment of ESS and PTS would represent a lower level of entanglement for U.S. communications satellites, but they would need to be readily distinguishable to an adversary to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent escalation.

Perceptual risk factors for U.S. communications satellites

Scholars in the entanglement literature have observed that perceptual risk factors are just as important as military-technical risks.³¹ This seems particularly true if a war extended to space, where virtually anything could be used as a weapon and where gleaning the intentions of an adversary could be more challenging than in terrestrial operations. As outlined by Rebecca Reesman and James R. Wilson, states can carry out a kinetic strike on a satellite in two ways: launch a ground-based anti-satellite missile or use an orbital weapon.³² Although the launch of an anti-satellite missile would be detectable to a country with mature missile warning capabilities, such as the United States, an orbital weapon could be harder to identify. Because of the speeds with which objects travel in space, simply colliding with another satellite can destroy it. Proximity operations in space – which can support concepts like on-orbit repair, refueling, repositioning, and active debris removal – can offer a pretense for a kinetic strike. Given the dual use nature of orbital systems, states could develop, test, and deploy orbital anti-satellite weapons while masquerading them as benign capabilities.³³

Orbital weapons could pose a threat to satellites in GEO, the orbit for U.S. strategic communications satellites. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that China launched a debris removal satellite in GEO in October 2021 and that – according to Russian press reporting – Russia is developing an orbital servicing capability for GEO as well.³⁴ As Reesman and Wilson describe, one of the ways an orbital weapon could strike a target satellite is a ‘tail-on collision’, in which the attacker in the same orbital plane could use on-board propellants to increase its velocity to engage the satellite kinetically or attack it with on-board weapons.³⁵ They note that GEO is an optimal location for such an attack because all satellites in GEO are already in the same orbital plane and are moving in the same direction, ‘making it easy to pass off an attacking satellite as a nonaggressive satellite’.³⁶ For the owner of the satellite being approached, ascertaining the intentions of the approaching satellite could be extremely difficult.

As scholars have observed, judicious decision-making in war can often devolve into decision-making based on worst-case scenario planning. As suggested by James Acton and Thomas MacDonald, worst-case planning in a space conflict could mean that even non-malicious activity could lead to escalation. They suggest a repositioning operation that leads to one satellite approaching a nuclear command and control satellite might be interpreted as the beginning of an attack on the approached country’s nuclear command and control capabilities.³⁷ A satellite maneuvering to an alarming position could reflect an adversary’s intention to attack or could reflect nothing at all. Misperceptions could be grave.

These perceptual factors have implications for both entanglement and disaggregation. An attack on an entangled satellite would produce daunting perceptual challenges. The attacked state would have to interpret the motive of the attack: was the strike meant to weaken its conventional warfighting capability or its ability to prosecute a nuclear war? In a conflict that extends to space, entanglement adds perceptual complications that disaggregation could limit.

These perceptual factors, however, also show the inherent complexity and escalatory risk that could accompany any war in space, regardless of whether the United States has an entangled or disaggregated architecture. By increasing the risk of strike on a conventional satellite – per the theory of entanglement discussed – disaggregation could also increase the likelihood of a kinetic war in space, a war that might be difficult to control and that could be rife with misperception.

Arguments for disaggregating U.S. communications satellites

In the years leading up to the decision to disaggregate U.S. communications satellites, advocates of disaggregation used one or a combination of two main arguments. The first of these arguments aligns closely with the theory of entanglement as laid out in the prior section. This argument sought to limit the perceptual risk that an attack on a U.S. communications satellite could be construed as either a conventional attack or as a nuclear attack and lessen the military-technical risk that strategic communications spacecraft could be degraded in a conventional war. Further, it accepted the strategic trade-off of disaggregation, favoring a lower likelihood of a strike that would weaken nuclear command and control even if it might mean a higher likelihood of a strike on disaggregated conventional spacecraft.

Unlike the first argument, the second argument rests on non-strategic grounds. This argument asserts that disaggregation would lead to fewer requirements for conventional spacecraft, less expensive satellite systems, and faster lifecycles, which, collectively, would reduce costs and allow more opportunities to use new technology. The use of this argument is consistent with the observation made by some scholars and analysts that entanglement is not always a decision made for strategic reasons.

Argument 1: Disaggregation lessens the likelihood of nuclear war

The primary rationale for splitting apart nuclear and non-nuclear spacecraft, consistent with entanglement theory, focuses on escalation dynamics. The argument is that disaggregating nuclear and conventional space systems creates a sharp break between conventional attacks and nuclear war, preventing escalation not intended at the opening of conflict. In 2016 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, Doug Loverro – then the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy – said the ‘ultimate benefit’ of disaggregation is ‘strategic clarity and avoidance of unintended escalation that current aggregated architectures pose’.³⁸ Disaggregation, according to this argument, would make escalation to nuclear war less likely.

A main tenet of this argument is that disaggregation clarifies whether an adversary intends to threaten nuclear war. This clarification would lessen the perceptual risk that misinterpreting an adversary’s actions could increase the likelihood of escalation. U.S. Air Force General John Hyten made this argument in congressional testimony in 2016.³⁹ He argued that entanglement or, as he put it, ‘aggregation’ may increase crisis instability because U.S. policymakers will not be able to discern an adversary’s intent if an aggregated space asset was attacked.⁴⁰ In the event of such an attack, Hyten noted the intent could be ‘limited to degrading U.S. non-nuclear forces’ or the intent could be to ‘purposefully degrade strategic missile warning and nuclear command and control as a prelude to attacking the United States of America with nuclear weapons’.⁴¹ The United States could mistake a deliberate conventional attack as an overture to nuclear strikes or misconstrue an intentional nuclear attack as one limited to conventional war.

Under a disaggregated satellite architecture, the United States, according to this argument, would have clarity on an opponent’s objectives if the opponent struck a U.S. satellite. A strike on a purely tactical system would mean the adversary was deliberately confining the attack below the nuclear threshold; a strike on a purely strategic system would mean the adversary was deliberately hitting that nuclear threshold.

The clarity of disaggregation, would not just offer insight into the adversary’s intentions but also attenuate the prospect of U.S. nuclear command and control coming under attack. In other words, it would reduce the military-technical risk that U.S. nuclear command and control systems were degraded. Removing the ambiguity of aggregation prevents an adversary from being able to compromise U.S. command and control while plausibly claiming its objectives are confined to conventional war. In a disaggregated architecture, attacks on nuclear systems would, according to this argument, constitute the first step in nuclear war.⁴²

Advocates for disaggregation stress this logic. A 2013 Air Force Space Command white paper in support of disaggregation says that disaggregation would lead to the recognition among potential adversaries that some missions would be ‘clearly “off limits”, or the aggressor would risk nuclear escalation’.⁴³ In 2016, then Representative Jim Bridenstine said that it is important to differentiate tactical and strategic satellites because, while attacking a tactical satellite ‘should elicit a conventional response’, attacking a strategic capability ‘would be more escalatory’.⁴⁴ A 2017 Air War Journal article says disaggregation ‘makes one asset class operationally vulnerable, in policy and in fact, while making strategic satellites the policy equivalent of sovereign territory – attacks on which trigger overwhelming and devastating responses’.⁴⁵

Consistent with the theory of entanglement, the logic of disaggregation in space reveals its strategic trade-off. If the fear of nuclear war would deter a combatant from striking U.S. spacecraft that serves purely nuclear purposes, that same fear of nuclear war might deter a combatant from striking U.S. spacecraft that serves both conventional and nuclear purposes. And if so, aggregating conventional and nuclear assets would not only protect the assets serving nuclear forces but also the assets serving conventional forces.⁴⁶ In an aggregated architecture, the fear of nuclear escalation might prevent the space conflict altogether.

Despite how easily the logic can flip against disaggregation, advocates of disaggregation are willing to accept some additional risk of a space strike in exchange for some lower risk that a space strike turns nuclear. Testimony from Hyten, a supporter of disaggregation, from 2016 addresses these two claims directly. ‘While it’s possible that disaggregation could lower the threshold for adversaries to attack systems that only support non-nuclear forces’, he says, ‘we also have to weigh the possible advantages that disaggregation lowers the risk of adversary attack to space systems dedicated to nuclear warning, and command and control’.⁴⁷

Enthusiasts for disaggregation also often refer to an increasing likelihood of space war. This makes sense. If a space war is considered unavoidable, it seems logical to focus on containing a conflict rather than preventing one. Two influential papers that argue on behalf of disaggregation use just this logic, contrasting today with the Cold War, when a space war never broke out. A 2012 essay written by senior space official General Ellen Pawlikowski, Doug Loverro, and Tom Cristler and the 2013 Air Force Space Command white paper both draw a sharp contrast between the Cold War space threat environment – when they claim space strikes were conflated with nuclear conflict – and the current space threat environment, in which space conflict should be, in their view, considered more common and disassociated from nuclear war. The 2013 paper says: ‘Threats to space were deemed a tolerable risk, since an attack in space would be provocative and escalatory and might be interpreted as a prelude to nuclear war’. The 2012 journal issues a similar call: ‘Space warfare was viewed as unlikely – just another element of the strategic détente between the Soviet Union and the United States’. The 2012 essay then implies space war is now more likely: ‘The days of space chivalry are clearly numbered’.⁴⁸ The 2013 white paper explicitly invokes this logic: ‘If, as many experts assert, an attack in space is inevitable … ’ A belief in the inevitability of space war often accompanies support for disaggregation.

Argument 2: Disaggregation would offer acquisition benefits

Unlike the first argument, the other often-made argument for disaggregation does not address strategic issues. Rather, it says that disaggregation would offer important acquisition advantages, particularly saving money or leveraging new technology. This general argument breaks up into three different claims: First, nuclear hardening is expensive and demanding on other aspects of satellite design so freeing some satellites from those requirements would net savings. Second, buying more but cheaper satellites will, in total, be a cheaper and faster acquisition approach. Third, buying more satellites at more frequent intervals will allow new technology to be inserted more often, which in turn will increase the performance of satellites.

Fewer requirements

The simplest claim for why disaggregation would generate financial savings is that tactical communications do not need to meet the same stringent requirements as strategic systems.⁴⁹ By disaggregating, the non-nuclear capabilities would not be forced to undergo the same level of testing and meet the same standards for cryptography and nuclear hardening.⁵⁰ Several studies from the 1990s estimate the physical nuclear hardening makes up one to 8% of satellite costs.⁵¹ However, these studies do not account for all the added costs of nuclear hardening systems, such as protecting electronics from radiation and building in additional redundancies.

More but cheaper satellites

Another acquisition claim for disaggregation says that buying a larger number of simpler satellites is less expensive than buying a smaller number of more complex systems. The claim that is often made is that disaggregation could allow for acquirers to buy simpler capabilities, which might save money in total, beyond just saving money from forgoing nuclear hardening. As stated in the 2013 Air Force Space Command white paper on disaggregation: ‘Combined, these characteristics of disaggregated space architectures may lead to cost savings’.⁵²

Other more detailed arguments suggest disaggregation would generate savings in development and in production. In development, each disaggregated satellite would be less complex and thus cheaper to design; in production, the greater numbers of satellites would allow manufacturers to improve and simplify their processes.⁵³ Additionally, using simpler systems could produce savings in launch costs in two other ways: (1) some disaggregated satellites could use launch options other than traditional national security launch and (2) disaggregated satellites could mean lighter satellites, which, all else equal, cost less to launch than heavier satellites.⁵⁴ At its simplest, this claim says that disaggregated satellites are cheaper because they are smaller, using mass as a proxy for cost, which research finds is correlated.⁵⁵

Faster cycle

Another related acquisition claim for disaggregation says that using cheaper and simpler systems will create more opportunity for leveraging new technologies. Part of the rationale for relying on cheaper and simpler space assets is that those assets will not need to stay in orbit as long because they are more expendable. Replacing those satellites more frequently creates more opportunities for inserting the newest technology.⁵⁶Advocates of disaggregation made this claim regularly, including in the Pawlikowski, Loverro, and Cristler essay.⁵⁷

Because decisions about future architectures are usually made in requirements and acquisition forums, not strategic ones, the argument that disaggregation would generate cost savings and acquisition advantages featured heavily throughout the debate. The prominence of this argument is consistent with the observation made by scholars, including by Acton, Tong Zhao, and Li Bin that entanglement or, in this case, disaggregation, may happen for reasons of cost or convenience.⁵⁸

How disaggregation came to be

From 2010 to 2016, the primary arguments for disaggregation did not convince central DOD leadership. Instead, disaggregation came to fruition only after a series of reforms starting with the Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which gave the military services more autonomy of their acquisition. These reforms allowed disaggregation to occur gradually without receiving approval from central DOD leaders.

The rest of this section discusses how disaggregation came to be. First, it describes how, from 2010 to 2016, disaggregation was repeatedly proposed within DOD but failed to persuade enough of DOD’s leadership. Second, it discusses the DOD acquisition reforms made in the Fiscal Year 2016 NDAA. These reforms created an alternative acquisition pathway that removed responsibility from central DOD leadership, such as from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and delegated it to the military services. Third, it describes how these new reforms were leveraged for disaggregation. Fourth, it assesses whether disaggregation was a strategic choice, concluding that the way in which disaggregation unfolded suggests it was less a strategic choice than the result of acquisition reforms and bureaucratic maneuvering.

Failing to convince leadership

From 2010 to 2016, disaggregation failed because it did not generate enough support among defense leadership. The argument for disaggregation kicked off when the cancellation of Transformational Satellite in 2009 prompted planning for the next generation of protected satellite communications. Although DOD’s studies consistently proposed disaggregation, central DOD leadership just as consistently rejected disaggregated architectures.

The first study reflected this rhythm of proposal and rejection. The Joint Space Communications Layer Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), which came out in 2010, formally validated unmet future needs.⁵⁹ In developing this document, the Air Force’s Space and Missile System Center (SMC) proposed an architecture of disaggregated satellite communications, splitting the strategic and tactical protected communications systems.⁶⁰ The final document did not approve the suggested architecture, thereby rejecting disaggregation, demonstrating that no consensus existed among DOD senior leaders that disaggregation was the right path. However, the final document did leave open the possibility of disaggregation, which allowed for funding technology that might enable disaggregation in the future.

Subsequent studies explored but also ultimately rejected disaggregation. Launched at the start of 2011, the ‘Resilient Basis for Satellite Communications in Joint Operations Study’ examined a disaggregated architecture. However, after it was briefed to the Defense Space Council – the DOD-wide body responsible for space oversight, co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition – the final study concluded the disaggregated architecture did not meet all of the ICD requirements and ‘would result in a significantly higher life cycle cost’.⁶¹ The Defense Space Council in turn directed another study, the ‘Protected Satellite Communications Services Analysis of Alternatives,’ which formally started in the fall of 2013. This study initially presumed a disaggregated architecture but, in its final findings in July 2015, concluded an aggregated architecture ‘provides the greatest demand satisfaction for the cost’.⁶²

This frustration about disaggregation broke out in public as well. Doug Loverro-one of the authors of an early important argument for disaggregation – was quoted in a news report in 2014, when he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, downplaying disaggregation: ‘Loverro cast doubts on the ‘disaggregation’ idea as a trendy concept that is potentially too simplistic. “I don’t like the term disaggregated’, he said. “It’s too narrow’”.⁶³

Yet the studies on disaggregation persisted. In 2015, the Air Force Space Command initiated a study to reopen the possibility of disaggregation.⁶⁴ This study’s results recommended a disaggregated architecture – repudiating the earlier choice of an aggregated architecture – weighing the advantage of what it considered as added resiliency over a projected 18% higher life cycle cost.⁶⁵ In 2016, central DOD leadership again rejected this recommendation: the Defense Management Advisory Group chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead directed an aggregated architecture augmented with a polar-orbiting communication satellite and a tactical communications payload with a protected waveform that could be hosted on other satellites.⁶⁶

For seven years, attempts to convince DOD leadership to adopt disaggregation were unsuccessful. The next try, however, would take place in a new environment marked by the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 NDAA acquisition reforms.

Fiscal year 2016 acquisition reforms

The FY 2016 NDAA initiated a series of reforms to the acquisition process, with two reforms playing an important role in the eventual decision on disaggregation. The first reform, included in section 804 of the FY 2016 bill, created an alternate pathway for ‘middle-tier acquisition programs’ to rapidly field or prototype systems, with ‘rapid’ defined as within five years. The second reform, directed by section 825, delegated final acquisition decisions to the military services. These reforms created new ways to pursue acquisition programs, creating auspicious circumstances for disaggregation.

An alternate acquisition pathway

A provision in the FY 2016 NDAA exempted certain programs, called middle-tier acquisition programs, from the oversight typical of the traditional acquisition and requirements processes. Middle-tier acquisition programs were programs in which the capability could be rapidly prototyped, rapidly fielded, or both. These changes were characterized as offering a ‘more flexible acquisition path’ that ‘begins with a blank slate’ that would ‘forgo the multiple checklists, signatures, and annexes,’ required under the traditional acquisition process.⁶⁷

The military services quickly leveraged the new middle-tier program authorities. By March 2019, GAO found that the services had initiated 35 middle tier programs with six others initiated by other DOD components.⁶⁸ Eighteen months later, the DOD Inspector General identified 69 middle-tier programs with an estimated total value of $31.1 billion.⁶⁹ Of those, GAO found 17 met the cost thresholds that would have previously automatically made them major defense acquisition programs.⁷⁰ The new middle tier authorities freed the military services and DOD components from following a standard process, giving them much more flexibility for acquisition than they had previously.

Devolution to the military services

The FY 2016 NDAA also included a provision that devolved responsibility for acquisition decisions to the military services. Section 825 made the service acquisition executive the default milestone decision authority – the official who has the power to approve or disapprove programs at key moments in their development – rather than the senior acquisition official of DOD. Moreover, the original Senate bill and its accompanying report emphasized that the services were supposed to be central to the acquisition process in other ways as well, a message reinforced in the following years’ NDAAs. As summarized by the DOD Inspector General, these reforms ‘gave the Military Services significantly more authority for managing acquisition programs’, and ‘reduced Office of the Secretary of Defense level oversight of and accountability for acquisition programs’.⁷¹

The Defense Department implemented this direction thoroughly. In December 2017, the senior DOD acquisition official testified that she would ‘shift the “bulk” of major defense programs’ to the military services.⁷² GAO reported that by March 2019 DOD had devolved 80 of 89 major defense acquisition programs down to the service-level; the remaining nine were some of the largest weapons programs and had been designated as requiring Office of the Secretary of Defense-level oversight prior to the reform taking effect.⁷³

The FY 2017 NDAA gave additional acquisition responsibility to the military services. Passed in December 2016, it created a requirement for which services would not need validation from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as had been the case with requirements since the early 1980s. As a result of these reforms, the military services could initiate an acquisition program based on a requirement that they set completely themselves.

Leveraging acquisition reforms to push disaggregation

Disaggregation was the realization of a series of programmatic decisions between 2017 and 2019, which were enabled by the new acquisition and requirements environment. The changing budget justifications from FY 2018 to FY 2020 capture this gradual process, shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Changing budget justifications for evolved strategic system.

Fiscal Year	Language from President’s Budget Submission
FY 2018 (May 2017)	‘The space vehicles will be designed to accommodate a hosted [tactical] payload’.
FY 2019 (Feb 2018)	‘The space vehicles will be designed to accommodate hosted payloads as required’.
FY 2020 (Feb 2019)	‘ … the ESS Program Office is developing an acquisition strategy that leverages Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding to the greatest extent practical, while maintaining the continuity of the AEHF strategic mission’.

The first change came in the FY 2018 president’s budget submission, which went to Congress in May 2017, about 6 months after DOD leadership had last rejected disaggregation for protected satellite communications. The request initiated two new programs: (1) an evolved replacement for AEHF, listed as ‘Protected SATCOM Services – Aggregated’ with a project called Evolved Strategic SATCOM (ESS), and (2) a payload that would leverage a new waveform intended solely for tactical missions, called Protected Tactical Service (PTS).⁷⁴ That proposal comported with the direction to keep protected communications aggregated because the ESS satellites would carry the payload, PTS. The programs, however, were named and funded separately.

In 2018, the Air Force accelerated the ESS program and formally split it from PTS. The FY 2019 budget submission reflects this change. Although the FY 2018 budget submission says that the ESS space vehicles will carry the PTS payload, the FY 2019 budget submission simply says that the ESS space vehicles will be ‘designed to accommodate hosted payloads as required,’ omitting any direction that it will carry PTS.⁷⁵

In 2019, the change became even sharper. The FY 2020 budget submission no longer characterized ESS as an aggregated system and ESS became the entire program, not just a project within the program. The submission also included no reference to ESS hosting a tactical payload. Similarly, although PTS was still described as ‘a payload-centric focus’, that payload could be ‘integrated onto a commodity satellite bus.’⁷⁶ In other words, PTS would be its own satellite and nuclear and non-nuclear spacecraft would be disaggregated.

These changes were possible because, in 2019, both programs officially became middle-tier acquisition programs, leveraging the new pathway that had less oversight. The decision not only bypassed the strategic and acquisition debates but was reached only when reforms had devolved responsibility to the military services, taking away responsibility from senior leadership. The budget documents trace how an aggregated system became a disaggregated system in 3 years, all without receiving formal approval from central DOD leadership.⁷⁷

A strategic choice?

The history of disaggregation in DOD suggests that its eventual adoption was not a strategic choice made at the senior-most levels. From 2010 to 2016, central DOD leadership, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, among others, were part of forums that considered and rejected a disaggregated architecture. Only when acquisition reforms allowed disaggregation to bypass this central leadership did it come pass. Although it is possible that DOD leaders changed their opinion on disaggregation from 2017 to 2019, it seems more likely that they were simply not part of the decision-making process. Moreover, even if central DOD leadership had been persuaded to support disaggregation, it may not have been for strategic reasons. As discussed, one of the main arguments used for disaggregation was based on cost and acquisition considerations.

This would not be the first time a major power made force structure changes that could affect nuclear escalation for reasons that were not strategic. In his examination of China’s entanglement of its nuclear and conventional missiles, David C. Logan assessed that ‘Chinese entanglement has not emerged as a strategic policy choice but, rather, as the by-product of more parochial organizational dynamics’.⁷⁸ In this case, Logan posits the entanglement may have arisen to take advantage of economies of scale in China because ‘conventional and nuclear variants of the same missile system are likely to have similar transportation, maintenance, logistics, and personnel requirements’.⁷⁹ He also hypothesized that the entanglement could have stemmed from political factors, noting that ‘Rocket Force commanders may have viewed entanglement as a political advantage in their organizational battles with other elements of the [People’s Liberation Army]’.⁸⁰ Entangling the conventional- and nuclear-armed missiles may have helped ensure the Chinese Rocket Force would retain control of all the country’s missile units. As suggested by Logan and other scholars, the escalatory risks may be greater in circumstances in which entanglement was not a strategic choice because the state may not fully consider the strategic implications and risks that accompany entanglement.⁸¹

Unlike the nuclear-conventional entanglement of Chinese missiles, which has received serious investigation and inquiry, the split of ESS and PTS has not generated much coverage or analysis. This seems likely due, in part, to the way in which the split occurred. If there had been a pivotal moment in which DOD clearly reversed its position, the decision to disaggregate may have attracted more attention. Instead, it happened incrementally, revealed in subtle changes to budget justification documents.

As ESS and PTS mature, they will likely grow more conspicuous. The FY 2023 president’s budget request includes projected future years spending through FY 2027, and – based on those projections – for FY 2027, ESS would be the third biggest budget line in the U.S. Space Force budget and PTS would be the 11^th biggest budget line.⁸²

Conclusions

The disaggregation of U.S. nuclear and conventional communications satellites does not appear to have been a strategic decision. One of the core arguments for disaggregation is based on cost and acquisition considerations rather than on strategic factors. Further, central DOD leadership rejected disaggregation from 2010 to 2016, and it eventually came about through an alternative acquisition pathway that required less oversight and authority from central DOD leadership. Collectively, this suggests this decision was largely the result of acquisition reforms and bureaucratic dynamics.

Moreover, framing disaggregation as a ‘decision’ in this case is a misnomer. It is hard to pinpoint the exact decisive moment when senior civilian DOD leadership approved disaggregation because there was none. In reality, disaggregation, as traced in the budget documents, came about gradually, albeit quickly, in programmatic moves seemingly too subtle for many observers to notice. The truly decisive moment, seemingly unrelated to disaggregation, came with the passage of the 2016 NDAA, which gave military services more control over what they wanted to acquire and how they wanted to acquire it.

Although the decision to separate nuclear and non-nuclear satellite communications may not have been a strategic choice, it clearly poses strategic consequences. Based on the theory of entanglement, disaggregation could increase the likelihood of a strike on a conventional disaggregated space asset but could decrease the likelihood of strike escalating to nuclear use. Scholars have argued that the escalatory risks stemming from entanglement may be less acute for a state that pursues entanglement as a strategic choice because the state would presumably be more aware of the risks and potential for misperception. The same may be true for disaggregation. If policymakers consider disaggregating other space missions, they should carefully consider the strategic implications and trade-offs of disaggregation and entanglement and plan for the risks that such a decision brings with it.

Author contribution

Robert Samuel Wilson is a Systems Directors at Aerospace’s Center for Space Policy & Strategy, and Russell Rumbaugh is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Frederic Agardy, Aaron Bateman, Robin Dickey, Timothy McDonnell, Jamie Morin, and John Orem for reviewing and offering insights on the draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Robert Samuel Wilson

Robert Samuel Wilson is a Systems Director for the Center for Space Policy and Strategy at The Aerospace Corporation. In this role, he leads work on the convergence of nuclear weapons and outer space. Wilson has authored papers covering the technical characteristics of the broader missile environment, the effect of space technologies on nuclear proliferation, and the U.S. hypersonic missile debate, among other issues. His work has appeared or been covered in The Washington Post, The Financial Times, Politico, and The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, among other outlets. Prior to joining Aerospace, Wilson served as a senior defense analyst at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. There, he led reports on strategic force structure; arms control; and nuclear command, control, and communications.

Russell Rumbaugh

Russell Rumbaugh is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller. Prior to taking this role and while writing this article, he served as Systems Director for the Center for Space Policy and Strategy at The Aerospace Corporation, where he was responsible for conducting projects and research on how institutional defense policy affects U.S. operations in space. Rumbaugh has had multiple stints in the Pentagon and Congress. He was also the director of the Stimson Center’s budgeting for foreign affairs and defense program. In his time at Stimson, he published work in Foreign Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, and The New York Times. He has also served as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and the University of Maryland School of Public Policy, teaching graduate seminars on U.S. defense budgets and planning.

Notes

¹ Paul Stares, ‘Space and US national security’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 6/2 (1983), 40–42.

² U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review’, Feb. 2018, pp. 56–57.

³ James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43/1 (Aug. 2018), 63–65.

⁴ For scholarship on nuclear-conventional entanglement, see: See: Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1991); David C. Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing? The dimensions, drivers, and risks of nuclear-conventional entanglement in China’, The Journal of Strategic Studies (2020), 1–52; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 56–99; Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security 41/4 (Spring 2017), 50–92; Joshua Rovner, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe: nuclear escalation and protracted war in Asia’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 40/5 (2017), 696–730; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence: Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 44/2 (Fall 2019), 61–109; Wu Riqiang, ‘Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation’, International Security 46/3 (Winter 2021/2022), 128–162; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and U.S.-China Security Relations’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (August 2012), 453–471; Nina Tannenwald and James M. Acton, Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Emerging Risks and Declining Norms in the Age of Technological Innovation and Changing Nuclear Doctrines, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2018), 32–52; and Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control’, Foreign Affairs, (Nov/Dec. 2018); and Tong Zhao and Li Bin, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement: A Chinese Perspective’, in James M. Acton, (ed.), Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2017), 47–75.

⁵ Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, (Strategic Studies Institute 2012), ix.

⁶ Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ p. 51.

⁷ This article adopts a narrow definition of disaggregation. Besides separating nuclear and non-nuclear spacecraft, the term disaggregation is also often used to describe adding more spacecraft to conduct the same mission, regardless of whether nuclear or non-nuclear. Instead of relying on fewer large and complex systems, this approach emphasizes higher numbers of small and modular systems. See, for example, GAO-14-328T, ‘Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges persist for Current and Future Programs’, Government Accountability Office (Mar. 2014). This use of disaggregation has receded as proliferated architectures have changed the scale from dozens of additional spacecraft to thousands. For the purposes of this article, disaggregation refers strictly to the separation of nuclear and non-nuclear spacecraft.

⁸ This article adopts the language used by the U.S. Department of Defense for military satellite communications systems. Strategic satellite communications are designed to provide nuclear-survivable communications capabilities for U.S. leadership and U.S. nuclear forces, such as ballistic missile submarines. Tactical satellites are designed to provide higher-bandwidth communications to and from deployed conventional forces, such as Army brigade combat teams and conventionally armed attack submarines.

⁹ This paper discusses the disaggregation of strategic communications spacecraft; it does not discuss missile warning space assets, the other core element of space-based nuclear command and control.

More abstractly, a weapon or effect could be construed as ‘strategic’ even if it is not ‘nuclear’. Theoretically, the mission of strategic communications satellites could expand to non-nuclear forces and for environments degraded by non-nuclear effects. Nevertheless, the next generation of strategic communications satellites will be dramatically more disaggregated than its predecessors, even if it does occasionally support non-nuclear forces. For more on the strategic-non-nuclear debate, see Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age’, European Journal of International Security, 6/3 (Aug 2021), 257–277; and James Acton, ‘Silver Bullet? Asking the Right Questions About Conventional Prompt Global Strike’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013, pp. 1–149.

¹⁰ GAO-21-520T, ‘Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges and Opportunities with Acquiring Space Systems in a Changing Environment’, Government Accountability Office, (May 2021), p. 10. See also, U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, ‘The Future of DoD SATCOM: Delivering Fighting SATCOM’, Milsat Magazine, (Apr. 2019); and Sandra Erwin, ‘U.S. to ramp up spending on classified communications satellites’, SpaceNews (1 May 2022).

¹¹ David C. Logan wrote an article on China’s entanglement of its nuclear- and conventional-armed missiles that, among other things, examines the implications of such entanglement and assesses how it came about. This article seeks to address similar issues for the U.S. decision to disaggregate military satellite communications systems. Logan suggests entanglement of its missiles may not have been a strategic choice for China; this article suggests the disaggregation of U.S. space systems may not have been a strategic choice for U.S. leadership either. See: Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 1–52.

¹² See, for example: Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 57–58; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 2; Acton, Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, 1.

¹³ See, for example: Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ pp. 57–64; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 6–12; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 61–66, 82–92; and Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, pp. 51–55.

¹⁴ Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 4–22.

¹⁵ See, for example: Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ pp. 57–64; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 13–15; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 67–82; Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, pp. 460–461; and Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, pp. 55–58.

¹⁶ Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ p. 63.

¹⁷ See, for example: Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 58–60; Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, pp, 453–467; Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, pp. 47–51; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 5; Rovner, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe’, pp. 702–706.

¹⁸ Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 13.

¹⁹ See Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History 2015), 213–280, 442–449; A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, DC: National Defense UP 1986), 71–127; David S. Yost, ‘The history of NATO theater nuclear force policy: Key findings from the Sandia conference’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 15/2 (June 1992), 231.

²⁰ Carter, Forging the Shield, 40–287.

²¹ Nichols, Stuart, and McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, viii.

²² Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A Response to an American Proposal for Renouncing the First Use of Nuclear Weapons’, Foreign Affairs(Summer 1982), pp. 159–160; Nichols, Stuart, and McCausland, Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, xv. For debate on this issue, see James M. Garrett, ‘Nuclear weapons for the battlefield: Deterrent or fantasy?’ The Journal of Strategic Studies 10/2 (1987), 168–188.

²³ U.S. Space Force Space Operations Command, ‘Fact Sheet – Milstar Satellite Communications Systems (Milstar)’, Aug. 2021; U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite (AEHF), As of FY 2021 President’s Budget’, Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval, pp. 7–44.

²⁴ Space Force, ‘Fact Sheet – Milstar Satellite Communications Systems’; Department of Defense, ‘Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite’, pp. 7–44.

²⁵ John R. Hoehn, ‘Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Modernization’, Congressional Research Service (8 Dec 2020); GAO/NSIAD-99-2, ‘Military Satellite Communications: Concerns With Milstar’s Support for Strategic and Tactical Forces’, Government Accountability Office (Nov 1998).

²⁶ For example, see Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, ‘The Future of DoD SATCOM’; Erwin, ‘U.S. to ramp up spending on classified communications satellites’.

²⁷ Interview with Frederic Agardy, who for 17 years has served as the Chief Architect for U.S. military satellite communications at The Aerospace Corporation, a portfolio that includes ESS and PTS (May 2023).

²⁸ U.S. Department of the Air Force, ‘Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 23 Budget Estimates – Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation, Space Force’, (Apr. 2022), pp. 215–237, 499.

²⁹ Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, p. 95. As another example, a CSIS 2021 report says: ‘An adversary may not be able to distinguish between satellites that are intended for different missions, and even if such differences are disclosed, an adversary may not trust this distinction and attack both anyway’. See: Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, and Makena Young, ‘Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space: Protecting Space Systems from Counterspace Weapons’, Center for Strategic and International Studies. (Feb. 2021), p. 11.

³⁰ Elbridge Colby, ‘From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space’, Center for a New American Security, (Jan. 2016), pp. 21–22.

³¹ See, for example: Rovner, ‘Two kinds of catastrophe’, pp. 700–714; Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 13–15; Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear?’ pp. 50–52; and Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution’, pp. 460–461.

³² Rebecca Reesman and James R. Wilson, ‘The Physics of Space War: How Orbital Dynamics Constrain Space-to-Space Engagements’, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation (Oct. 2020), pp. 14–15.

³³ James A. Vedda and Peter L. Hays, ‘Major Policy Issues in Evolving Global Space Operations’, The Aerospace Corporation and Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, (Feb. 2018), pp. 44–45. For other examples of proximity operations and capabilities in space, see Brian Weeden and Victoria Samson (ed.) ‘Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment’, Secure World Foundation, (Apr. 2023), and Kaitlyn Johnson, Thomas G. Roberts, and Brian Weedon, ‘Mitigating Noncooperative RPOs in Geosynchonous Orbit’, Aether: A Journal of Strategic Airpower and Spacepower, 1/4 (Winter 2022).

³⁴ U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Challenges to Security in Space’, (Mar. 2022), pp. 18–29.

³⁵ Reesman and Wilson, ‘The Physics of Space War’, pp. 14–15.

³⁶ Reesman and Wilson, ‘The Physics of Space War’, p. 15.

³⁷ James Acton and Thomas MacDonald, ‘Nuclear Command-and-Control Satellites Should Be Off Limits’, Defense One, 10 Dec. 2021.

³⁸ HASC No. 114–110, ‘House Armed Services Committee Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services; Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for National Security Space’, (15 Mar. 2016).

³⁹ HASC No. 114–110.

⁴⁰ HASC No. 114–110.

⁴¹ HASC No. 114–110.

⁴² There is no universal definition of an attack in space; however, it could include physical strikes, electronic warfare, and cyber-attacks. A noted by Aaron Bateman, during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union had not even defined ‘interference’ with respect to space systems. See: Aaron Bateman, ‘Mutually assured surveillance at risk: Anti-satellite weapons and cold war arms control’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 45/1 (Jan. 2022), 7–11.

⁴³ AFD-130821-034, ‘Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures’, U.S. Air Force Space Command, (2013).

⁴⁴ Tom Risen, ‘Disaggregation’, Aerospace America, Apr. 2017.

⁴⁵ ‘Fast Space: Leveraging Ultra Low-Cost Space Access For 21^st Century Challenges’, Air University, (13 Jan. 2017), p. 8. For another example of this argument, see Harrison, ‘The Future of Milsatcom’, p. 38.

⁴⁶ For example, a 2021 CSIS report notes the debate without supporting a specific argument. Against disaggregation, it says, ‘disaggregation of strategic and tactical missions may make attacking the tactical system in a conventional conflict more attractive if the risk of strategic escalation is reduced’. In support of disaggregation, it says: ‘If the strategic and tactical payloads are disaggregated into separate space systems, an adversary could target the tactical system only and leave the strategic system unharmed if it does not want to risk nuclear escalation’. See: Harrison, Johnson, and Young, ‘Defense Against the Dark Arts in Space’, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁷ HASC No. 114–110.

⁴⁸ Documentary evidence shows that space was never considered outside of the fray of competing states, including attacks on space assets, despite the assertions of these pieces. See: Robin Dickey, ‘The Rise and Fall of Space Sanctuary in U.S. Policy’, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, (1 Sept. 2020).

⁴⁹ In 2017, Todd Harrison estimated and compared the costs of three different military satellite communications systems: AEHF, Wideband Global Satcom, and the Mobile User Objective System. See Todd Harrison, ‘The Future of Milsatcom’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, (2013), p.17.

⁵⁰ Ron Burch, ‘The Case for Disaggregation of U.S. MILSATCOM’, IEEE MILCOM 2011 Military Communications Conference, (Nov. 2011).

⁵¹ See: Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-2857, ‘Estimating the Costs of Nuclear-Radiation-Hardened Military Satellites’, (Nov. 1994); Testimony of Mr. Gordon K. Soper, Group Vice President, Defense Group, Inc. in Hearing, House Small Business Committee, Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, (1 June 1999); Paul Nordin, ‘Other Hostile Environments’, in Wiley J. Larson and James R. Wertz (ed.), Space Mission Design and Analysis 2nd ed., (Microcosm Inc. and Kluwer Academic Publishers: 1992), 226.

⁵² Air Force Space Command, ‘Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures’.

⁵³ Dax Linville and Robert A. Bettinger, ‘An Argument against Satellite Resiliency: Simplicity in the Face of Modern Satellite Design’, Air and Space Power Journal (Spring 2020).

⁵⁴ Burch, ‘The Case for Disaggregation of U.S. MILSATCOM’.

⁵⁵ Katherine Wagner, ‘Optimization of Disaggregated Space Systems Using the Disaggregated Integral Systems Concept Optimization Technology Methodology’, unpublished dissertation, (June 2020).

⁵⁶ Thomas D. Taverney, ‘Resilient, disaggregated, and mixed constellations’, The Space Review, (29 Aug. 2011).

⁵⁷ Even when these arguments were being made, there were skeptics these advantages would be achieved, equating disaggregation with other past claims that doing things differently would be both better and cheaper simultaneously. See: Loren Thompson, ‘Satellite Disaggregation: The Space Community’s Newest Way of Wasting Money’, Lexington Institute, (8 Feb. 2013).

⁵⁸ Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, p. 92; Zhao and Li, ‘The Underappreciated Risks of Entanglement’, p. 68.

⁵⁹ Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 24.

⁶⁰ Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 8.

⁶¹ Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 30.

⁶² Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 35.

⁶³ Sandra I. Erwin, ‘Pentagon Undecided on Future Path for Space Systems’, National Defense Magazine, 22 Apr. 2014.

⁶⁴ This study was officially called the ‘Protected Satellite Communications Services Analysis of Alternatives Follow-on for Resilience (PAFR) Study’.

⁶⁵ Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, p. 38.

⁶⁶ Tran and Hillebrandt, ‘Time to Get to Milestone B’, pp. 39–41 (citing November 2016 draft Programmatic Decision Memorandum).

⁶⁷ Douglas W. Burbey, Mindy Gabbert and Kathryn Bailey, ‘Middle-tier acquisition authority features flexible prototype and fielding options’, Army AL&T Magazine, (12 Sept. 2019).

⁶⁸ GAO-19-439, ‘Leadership Attention Needed to Effectively Implement Changes to Acquisition Oversight’, Government Accountability Office, (June 2019), p. 26.

⁶⁹ DOD Inspector General Report No. DODIG-202 1–131, ‘Audit of Department of Defense Middle Tier of Acquisition Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding Programs’, (28 Sept. 20210), p. 4.

⁷⁰ GAO-21-222, ‘Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Updated Program Oversight Approach Needed’, Government Accountability Office’, (June 2021), p. 29.

⁷¹ DOD Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2020-109, ‘Special Report: Lessons Learned for Department of Defense Acquisition Officials During Acquisition Reform’, (31 July 2020), p. 10.

⁷² Aaron Mehta, ‘Policy shift: DoD is pushing major program management back to the military’, Defense News, (11 Dec. 2017).

⁷³ GAO-19-439, p. 13.

⁷⁴ The FY 2018 president’s budget also initiated the Midterm Polar MILSATCOM System (MPS) and the Protected Tactical Enterprise System (PTES) in line with DOD direction. MPS would ensure XDR payloads over the polar regions when the existing systems aged out. PTES would be a ground system to process the protected tactical waveform transmitted over Wideband Global Satellites.

⁷⁵ Air Force FY18 RDT&E Budget Justification, Vol II, (2017) p. 323; and Air Force FY19 RDT&E Budget Justification, Vol II, (2018) p. 37.

⁷⁶ Air Force FY20 RDT&E Budget Justification, Vol II, (2019), p. 471.

⁷⁷ A standard argument in the bureaucratic politics literature is organizations seek autonomy to favor approaches that advance their own interests, not their political masters even when those approaches may not be the most effective way to achieve the organization’s stated mission. See: Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928, (Princeton University Press: 2002) and James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, (Basic Books, 1989), pp. 179–194. Given that that the power to use strategic capabilities, such as nuclear weapons, rests with the heads of state, disaggregating strategic communications satellites would imply a broader sphere of autonomy for organizations operating space forces. The disaggregated strategic system would remain the purview of the highest levels of leadership, but the disaggregated tactical system would reasonably be delegated to military agents. It is notable that the most vocal advocates for disaggregation were also advocates for greater autonomy for space forces. For the correlation between disaggregation advocates and advocacy for greater autonomy for space forces, see Doug Loverro, ‘Why the United States needs a Space Force’, Space News, (June 26, 2018); John Hyten, ‘Thoughts on National Security Space Organization’, Letter to House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, (11 Jan. 2017); and Alison Snyder and Andrew Freedman, ‘NASA administrator throws support behind Trump’s “Space Force”’, Axios, (27 June 2018).

⁷⁸ Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p. 1. As another example, Edward Hampshire argues that the controversial UK 1981 Defence Review, which dramatically cut the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet, was as much based on assumptions and perceptions of key decision-makers as it was based on strategic and budgetary factors. See Edward Hampshire, ‘Strategic and Budgetary Necessity, or Decision-making “Along the Grain”? The Royal Navy and the 1981 Defence Review’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 39/7 (2016), 956–978.

⁷⁹ Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p.35.

⁸⁰ Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ p.36.

⁸¹ See, for example: Logan, ‘Are they reading Schelling in Beijing?’ pp. 14–15; Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement’, pp. 93–94.

⁸² ‘Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 23 Budget Estimates’, pp. 215–237.