Designing around NATO’s deterrence: Russia’s Nordic information confrontation strategy

ABSTRACT

This article examines Russia’s evolving information confrontation strategy in the Nordic region between 2022–2023. It assesses Russia’s approaches toward NATO members Norway, new member Finland, and prospective member Sweden. Despite decreased regional influence, the article finds that Russia persists with sub-threshold information confrontation tactics to bypass NATO deterrence. The strategy aims to shape NATO’s presence, undermine Western cohesion, and reduce support for Ukraine. These sub-threshold activities underscore the coercive utility of Russia’s information confrontation strategy in Russian strategic thinking. As tensions escalate due to the Ukraine conflict, Moscow will continue seeking to influence domestic debates in Nordic and European countries.

KEYWORDS:

• Northern Europe
• cybersecurity
• security policy
• NATO
• influence operations

Introduction

Russia’s brutal upscaling of its war in Ukraine in 2022 upended European security and prompted Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership.¹ Russia’s military intervention in one neighbouring region impedes Russia’s strategic objectives in another, the Nordic region. Russia’s influence in the region is drastically diminished compared to the partial reset after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.² Regardless, Russia continues to pursue information confrontation measures below the threshold of war towards its Nordic neighbours and Europe to undermine NATO position and Western cohesion. The following explores why this is the case and what Russia’s information confrontation strategy in the Nordic region is. Furthermore, what are the implications of Russia’s strategy for security policy making in the region?

NATO’s deterrence posture mitigates the worst brunt of Russia’s aggression.³ Consequently, Russia seeks to influence and intimidate in other ways, thereby circumventing and undermining NATO’s deterrence without triggering conflict escalation. After 2014, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine made the West aware of grey zone activities below the threshold of armed conflict.⁴ Researchers have pointed to a broader coercive approach in Russian strategic thinking, including non-military (political, diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, scientific-technical and various other) measures.⁵ Non-military means are central to Russian theorising on modern warfare. They offer a means of creatively countering emerging threats and challenges by blurring the line between war and peace. Russia’s concept of information confrontation, informatsionnoe protivoborstvo (IPb), plays an important role in this regard. IPb and its subsequent information operations are understood as incorporating non-military, military, and nuclear tools. The latter categories include military signalling and, notably, the psychological effect that posturing and threatening its use can provide. Consequently, the empirical section is structured according to these categories to showcase their individual and combined relevance to IPb. This structure builds on Dmitry Adamsky’s work on cross-domain coercion and is a more effective categorisation to showcase the ‘coordinating’ role of IPb compared to a tactical, operational, and strategic categorisation.⁶

Concerning strategic concepts such as coercion or subversion, Western literature has largely focused on the cyber aspect of Russia’s IPb concept.⁷ Russian thinking incorporates a broader understanding of the tools and intended influence effects of information-technical measures. Recognition of the psychological measures in Russian thinking is crucial to both understanding IPb as a part of Russian coercive strategy and as a concept that encompasses mere disinformation campaigns. This article contributes to the existing literature by providing an empirical study to showcase these complexities. Russia’s attempts to bypass NATO’s deterrence are examined through the lens of IPb, using the unique geographic and new geopolitical environment of the Nordic region as a reference point. The time frame is 2022–2023, as Russia changes its categorisation of the region as ‘relatively peaceful’ to consisting of ‘unfriendly states’. Geographically, the Nordic region includes Finland, Sweden, Norway Denmark and Iceland. In the following, the focus is on Finland, Sweden and Norway, and Russia’s varying and comparable approaches towards three different categories of NATO membership: one newly acquitted member (Finland), one pending (Sweden) and one founding member (Norway).⁸

Theoretically, the article ties itself – and adds – to the literature, advocating a need to expand our understanding of coercion by encompassing non-military means. Simultaneously, the importance of the interconnected role of military and non-military means in Russian strategic thinking is highlighted.⁹ This insight is not new but needs rethinking in a more complex and interconnected world facing increasingly hostile great power competition. This is especially imperative as nuclear parity and relative conventional strength, but also temporary conventional weakness, encourage the use and advancement of asymmetric grey zone advances by powers such as Russia.

The Nordic countries have historically chosen different ways of calibrating their security postures (deterrence and reassurance) in response to Russia’s nuclear and conventional deterrence posture. These differences in calibration are reflected in Russian influence attempts and policy towards the various countries. Russian competitive narratives regarding the need to restrain deterrence measures and bolster regional and bilateral ties have proven remarkably stable since the end of the Second World War.¹⁰ Russia has emphasised that increased NATO and U.S. (United States) presence is detrimental in general to Nordic security and in particular to non-aligned Sweden and Finland.

Although this is still stressed after 2022, Russia faces a more coherent Nordic security constellation and bolstered Nordic deterrence postures. Despite this apparent strategic failure, Russia has increased its sub-threshold aggression, seeking to exploit the grey zone to create a hostile image of its Nordic neighbours, prepare for escalation, and further encourage insecurity and division. Russia increasingly views the Nordic region as part of a larger confrontation with the West, resulting in qualitatively more aggressive non-military and military IPb advances across all three Nordic NATO categories. After 2022, Finland appears to have been targeted most aggressively. Russia is displeased with the considerable border extension with NATO and consequently seeks to shape the content of Finland’s NATO membership and create a hostile domestic image of Finland. Russia has actively attempted to keep Sweden out of NATO by bolstering conflict lines with key NATO members such as Turkey. As for Norway, its northern regions and the Svalbard archipelago are emerging as key areas of contention, reflected in Russian strategic documents and its bolstering of various IPb advances since 2022.

In the following, this article discusses with key aspects of Russia’s information confrontation strategy; Russia’s broader and specific IPb approaches towards Finland, Sweden and Norway; and drawing upon these observations, this research addresses the coercive utility of Russian IPb.

Designing around NATO’s deterrence

A Nordic NATO increases Russia’s perceived strategic vulnerabilities on its northwestern flank. This relates to Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities on the Kola peninsula (near the Norwegian and Finnish borders), a doubling of Russia’s border with NATO (Finland), and more challenging naval operations and protection of its Kaliningrad exclave in the Baltic Sea (Finland and Sweden). Russia’s conventional forces in the region are reduced, its diplomatic presence diminished, and access to traditional venues for wielding influence and information gathering are lost. Nonetheless, several indicators point to continued Russian activity in the grey zone, an operational space between peace and war where coercive approaches are used to seek strategic advantage. The line between military and non-military activity is often blurred, and most activity retains a degree of plausible deniability.¹¹ Nordic intelligence services warn of a more risk-prone Russia and expect increased digital pressure, intelligence activity, covert action and increased rhetorical and military assertiveness.¹²

According to Andrés Gannon et al., Russia amends its use of force in accordance with the existing NATO deterrence posture. Consequently, Russia opts to ‘design around’ NATO’s deterrence by employing tools, including ‘unambiguous information operations’, to enhance its interests without risking escalation.¹³ Russia’s nuclear and conventional forces form the bedrock of Russian military thinking and deterrence. However, military inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S. and NATO, economic incentives, and a historical preoccupation with asymmetric approaches incentivise advances at lower conflict.¹⁴ In Russian zero-sum thinking this is ultimately a competition ‘in which one side achieves predominance over the other’ and information confrontation is an asymmetric answer to the ‘external influence of stronger subjects’.¹⁵

Russia’s information confrontation strategy

After the Cold War, most European countries saw themselves as part of a world characterised mostly by cooperation and peaceful competition. Russia, on the other hand, never truly relinquished the idea that it was in a constant confrontation with the West.¹⁶ This shapes state-to-state relations and how countries pursue their national interests.¹⁷ Although a relatively new term, IPb has grown out of Soviet and Russian theoretical thinking on how the information space can both harm and serve Russia’s strategic interests.¹⁸ Soviet terms such as ‘active measures’ and ‘reflexive control theory’ are still relevant today but have evolved as part of Russian thinking on modern warfare, the introduction of new technology, and a changing information ecosystem.¹⁹ Active measures denote information attempts to influence political life, mislead an adversary and undermine and weaken its position.²⁰ Reflexive control theory examines how to gain advantages by causing an adversary to unknowingly make unfavourable decisions.²¹

A product of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) and the geopolitical changes in the early 1990s, President Vladimir Putin’s regime has always been very aware of uncontrollable information flows.²² A prevailing idea is that the U.S. toppled the Soviet Union by informational means and has since tried to topple regimes through ‘colour revolutions’ with the help of information technology and networks.²³ Russia sees the information space as an operating environment where information is created, used, stored, modified and transmitted. The operating environment consists of information activities that impact the information infrastructure as well as individual and societal consciousness to regulate social relations.²⁴ Consequently, the idea of information security has permeated official security and defence strategies and doctrines since the 2000s. Russian strategic thinking has to varying degrees adhered to the description of a more volatile world with growing competition and foreign powers seeking to undermine Russia.²⁵

In the Russian vernacular, IPb is a defining feature of state relations, characterised by a constant struggle between sides. Each side strives to defeat (or damage) the other through their actions in the information space while protecting their own space. IPb is conducted every day, not just during conflict or war.²⁶ Although information superiority (e.g., what Russia enjoys domestically) is the ultimate goal, IPb is also carried out when this is hard to achieve.²⁷ In line with this definition, IPb can be both offensive and defensive and is holistic in that it can use a variety of special (political, economic, diplomatic, military, technical and other) methods and means to influence the information environment of the opposing side.²⁸ IPb targets the control systems of other states and their armed forces, the political and military leadership, society as a whole, the media, and the information infrastructure and technical systems to achieve beneficial goals.²⁹ Accordingly, information operations (IO) are multifaceted and can focus on different targets and activities, be coordinated, and may even be opportunistic, but they are all nonetheless united by the same purpose and strategic objectives.³⁰ Information measures are usually divided into two interconnected subtypes: psychological (aimed to affect the mind) or technological (aimed at systems, devices and the information stored within).³¹ Regarding strategic thinking in the West, information operations tend to be viewed as a part of cyberspace, focusing on the physical infrastructure and devices that enable it. However, Russian strategic thinking about information encompasses the domain of human cognition and emotion, with the main emphasis on psychological effects.³² Externally, the IPb strategy seeks to aggravate existing divisions to degrade cohesion, create confusion (and fear), assert a Russian worldview, sow doubt regarding what is true, and inflict considerable psychological effects to intimidate and frustrate decision-making processes.³³

It should be noted that both Russian and non-Russian scholars often use the terms information confrontation (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), information struggle (information borba’) and information warfare (informatsionnaya voyna) interchangeably.³⁴ A direct translation of the term would be information ‘countermeasures’.³⁵ The term information confrontation is chosen because it better encapsulates Russian activities across the peace-war spectrum, where most of the activity takes place below the threshold of armed conflict (war) and includes offensive Russian measures. Information warfare (IW) represents the most destructive part of IPb.³⁶ In war, IPb enhances the use of military force, whereas in peacetime demonstration of military power enhances the effectiveness of non-military measures.³⁷

IPb as a coordinator of cross-domain coercion

Russian strategic thinking emphasises the integration of military and non-military means to achieve strategic goals.³⁸ The 2014 military doctrine’s focus on enhancing the capacity and means of information confrontation was seen as a way to ‘integrate non-military ways for strategic deterrence, of which cyber operations and influence operations play a part’.³⁹ Arguably, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a turning point in Russia’s assessment of the effectiveness of IPb. Drawing on experience from earlier conflicts, including Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008), Russia effectively managed to shape the information environment to isolate Ukrainian grievances, regionally and internationally.⁴⁰ Russia sees coercion as a ‘merging of military and non-military forms of influence across nuclear, conventional and informational (cyber) domains’⁴¹ Some Russian scholars believe that technological progress is potentially producing a new deterrent trend – offensive IPb – that can violate state sovereignty or interfere in a state’s internal affairs.⁴² Others see information-psychological confrontation as so effective that it can alter the consciousness of a country.⁴³ This is not a dismissal of traditional coercion theory, in line with Thomas Schelling’s idea of coercion.⁴⁴ Russia’s nuclear and conventional means form the backbone of Russian coercion credibility. However, scholars find that despite limited utility as an independent coercive tool, cyber operations form part of a change in how states ‘employ coercion to achieve a position of advantage relative to their rivals’.⁴⁵ In Russian thinking, what makes ‘someone yield or comply’ may take the form of non-military actions across domains as part of the Russian IPb strategy. IPb coordinates non-military, military, and nuclear components to create an information-psychological effect in the grey zone.

In the following, Russia’s IPb towards the Nordic region is understood as offensive information operations that are implemented, sponsored, or tied to the Russian state. IOs refer to the methods of deliberate informational influence on an adversary, aiming to assert reflexive control to alter strategic or tactical conduct in a desired direction.⁴⁶ Russia’s holistic approach to IPb means it has a vast toolkit at its disposal across all domains. While Russia’s physical access to the Nordic countries may be limited, their information ecosystem remains highly active.⁴⁷ This includes Russia’s foreign ministry, local diplomats, media outlets, organisations, senior political and military leaders, and online Russian-affiliated (or intelligence-steered) groups and proxy actors.

Russia and the Nordic region after 2022: A new era of intimidation?

After 2014, Russia blamed the Nordic countries for worsening relations. Russia criticised their participation in the EU sanctions and for catering to an increased U.S. and NATO presence in the Nordic region. Still, dialogue and cooperation at levels deemed possible continued. Relations with Finland were, up until 2021, still considered to ‘develop in a good neighbourly manner’. Russia also emphasised high points in Russo-Norwegian and even Russo-Swedish relations.⁴⁸ Consequently, 2022 marked a significant worsening in Russo-Nordic relations. Reflecting the broader Russian outlook on Europe, all the Nordic countries are now categorised as ‘unfriendly states’ willing to go to any length to serve the hegemonic plans of the United States and their other senior allies’.⁴⁹

The following highlights identified as well as covert Russian approaches.⁵⁰ The observations are first categorised according to non-military, military, and nuclear categories, then according to three country-specific observations. Whereas the broader categories show a convergence in Russian aggression, the country-specific sections show that geography and Russian country knowledge also inform Russian approaches as it targets three NATO categories: Established member (Norway), new member (Finland), and pending member (Sweden).

Non-military measures

Diplomacy, media, and social media

After 2022, Russia blames its Nordic neighbours for destroying important regional structures and aggravating the security situation in a previously stable area of the world to serve ‘the hegemonic plans’ of the U.S. To avoid culpability, Russia persistently presents its actions as reactions to Western ‘aggression’ and dismisses accusations of Russian aggression as biased or fabricated. Negative coverage of Russia in Nordic media is dismissed as either lies, ‘spy mania’, or ‘provocations’, and Russia reiterates variations of claims that the Nordic media is controlled by their governments, the intelligence services, and foreign puppet masters.⁵¹ Russia accuses the Nordic states of reproducing myths about the Russian threat to the European security order, and of anti-Russian, Russophobic, and even racist and neo-Nazi attitudes towards Russia in response to sanctions on Russian car entries to Finland and Norway. Such accusations fit into the broader story that the West wants to destroy Russia.⁵²

Russia uses the new security situation to push various messages to sow division. One venue is between the smaller Nordic states and the U.S., NATO, and EU. The common denominator is that they are under full control and unable to make independent decisions. For example, using its foreign ministry, social media, Finnish right-wing politicians, Russian TV and Swedish media, Russia paints an image of external, globalist forces steering Swedish and Finnish security policy decisions, including through large-scale military exercises to prepare their territories for membership.⁵³ Another venue is between the Nordic governments and their people, emphasising that policy decisions related to, among others, NATO membership and support to Ukraine, go against citizen’s wishes and the countries’ security and economic interests.⁵⁴ Lastly, Russia targets the Nordic countries’ international reputations and identities as part of a broader divisive campaign to undermine the liberal rules-based order.⁵⁵ One example is the active dissemination of Sweden as Islamophobic (as detailed below). Another example is an information campaign using the Russian foreign ministry, social media, Russian international media and other sources to portray Finnish foreign policy as colonial.⁵⁶ Similarly, the Russian Embassy in Norway has blamed Norway for showing arrogance towards the sovereignty of developing countries and their ability to determine their foreign policy approaches.⁵⁷

Another Russian angle uses heightened tension to create fear with the aim of dissuading decision-making. For example, all three Nordic countries are now ‘front line territories’ of a hostile U.S.-led military alliance. This weakens their national security and destabilises the military-political situation in the region.⁵⁸ Russia warns that it will take all necessary measures to ensure its national interests, including strengthening defence capabilities and employing political, economic, and military-technical measures.⁵⁹ Prior to Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids, Russia also threatened to bolster its nuclear presence in the Baltic region.⁶⁰ As Finland and Sweden applied for NATO memberships, Russian messaging shifted its full focus to shaping the conditions of Finland and Sweden’s memberships. Russia also warns that there will be consequences for what is called Finland, Sweden and Norway’s confrontational stance towards Russia as part of their military aid to Ukraine.⁶¹ Russian debate channels have discussed, among others, bombing Sweden and Norway in retaliation.⁶² Russia’s disinformation, understood as distorted messages intended to mislead, sow division and cause disunity. This can slow down decision-making and intimidate both the public and decision-makers, making them question if the situation is becoming too dangerous and costly to continue.

Energy and critical infrastructure

Russia’s war with Ukraine led many European countries to recognise their vulnerability to Russian energy dependence and influence. Consequently, many looked to new providers, including Norway.⁶³ Since 2022, the Nordic region has been the victim of two sabotage attacks on gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea. The Russian Nord Stream 2 pipeline in the economic zones of Sweden and Denmark in September 2022 and the Baltic-Connector pipeline in the economic zones between Finland and Estonia in October 2023. The latter also included damage to Estonian and Swedish subsea communications cables. The unattributed Nord Stream sabotage created great anxiety in Europe and turned Norway into Europe’s key gas provider overnight. The sabotage also caused wild speculations, including a Russian-fuelled narrative that the UK, Norway, and the U.S. were behind the sabotage.⁶⁴ In addition to several other unattributed attacks on below-sea critical infrastructure, European countries scrambled to heighten security.⁶⁵ In Norway, 9000 km of sub-sea cables were inspected, the readiness level was increased, and NATO countries helped patrol the seas around the oil and gas platforms.⁶⁶ After the Nord Stream explosions, great concern and fear were caused as Norway experienced a rapid rise in drone sightings near critical infrastructure. The incidents resulted in several arrests (and later the release) of Russian citizens.⁶⁷

The Baltic Connector sabotage took place as Finland experienced increased pressure from Russia. Although also unattributed, Russia possesses significant sub-sea warfare capability.⁶⁸ Sabotaging critical infrastructure can be seen as a strategy of intimidation below the threshold of war to instil fear among decision-makers and the public regarding security policy decisions. The Baltic-connector sabotage may have sought to dissuade increased Allied presence in Finland and deeper NATO integration. Both Nord Stream and Baltic-connector fit into a broader pattern of Russian intimidation, signalling, and preparation. In 2021, a Norwegian exposé warned of large-scale Russian mapping of critical infrastructure on the bottom of the Norwegian Sea. In April 2021, 4.2 kilometres of cables that send sensitive information disappeared from the bottom of the Sea off the coast of northern Norway. Two months later, one of two cables connecting the Svalbard archipelago to the Norwegian mainland was cut. In both cases, the same Russian fishing vessels crossed the cables several times before they disappeared. Both cables have high communication and information value for Norway.⁶⁹ Regardless of who are behind these various subsea sabotages, the aftermath caused distress regarding energy security, rising prices, and the possibility of future attacks on critical infrastructure.

Cyber-attacks

Russia has been linked to various disruptive cyberattacks, from stealing sensitive information and timing the release to gain maximum effect to attacking energy grids and critical infrastructure.⁷⁰ Russia also uses online ‘troll farms’ to disseminate various pro-Russian messages and disinformation. In May 2022, the Russian MFA spokesperson used the messaging app Telegram to call on the troll farm ‘Cyber Front Z’ to target Western social media platforms, including Finnish accounts.⁷¹ Parallel to Russia’s war in Ukraine, Russian-linked hacker groups have used low-level attacks to disrupt websites in several European countries. ‘NoName057(16)’ is known for defacement and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against Ukraine and its supporters (including Norway, Finland and Sweden) in response to Western ‘Russophobia’ and actions against Russia’.⁷² For example, the group attacked the Norwegian Parliament’s website in response to a decision to provide Ukraine with military material. In a Telegram message, the group echoed statements made by Russian officials, questioning the Norwegian government’s decision to spend money on Ukraine amidst record-rising consumer prices and blamed Norway for seeking to ‘please their hegemon’.⁷³ As Finland joined NATO in April 2023, NoName057(16) claimed to be behind a retaliatory DDoS attack that disrupted the websites of the Finnish Parliament and Prime Minister Sanna Marin.⁷⁴ NoName057(16) was also behind attacks on several Swedish official webpages in June 2023 in retaliation for the Swedish police ‘allowing’ the Quran to be burned in Stockholm. Other hacker groups, including ‘Anonymous Sudan’, which has been tied to the Russian GRU-affiliated hacker group ‘Killnet’ have also joined in attacking Swedish targets.⁷⁵ These types of attacks aim to create fear and uncertainty rather than cause actual harm. For example, by sowing doubts about government control and giving the impression that infrastructure and services are vulnerable.

Refugees

In November 2023, Finland experienced a significant influx of third-country nationals crossing the border from Russia. Finland has accused Russia of orchestrating this surge as a retaliatory measure for Finland’s NATO membership and alignment with U.S. defence policies. Several media reports point to Russian government involvement and in particular to Russia using migrants as a tool of coercion.⁷⁶ These statements are reinforced by similar refugee influxes from Russia occurring on the Storskog border with Norway in 2015 and northern Finland in 2016. Sending refugees across the border may serve several Russian objectives, including forcing Finland to close its border with Russia. This is used by Russia to portray Finland as hostile but also to divert attention and resources and create uncertainty and disagreements. The refugee tool can also serve a reflexive control function as Russia might need to close its borders before a new unpopular mobilisation after the March 2024 presidential election.

Military measures

Russia’s relatively quiet initial response to Finland and Sweden’s membership decisions was likely caused by Russia’s preoccupation and heavy losses in Ukraine. Russia’s war has significantly reduced Russia’s land forces and equipment, decreasing Russia’s conventional deterrence in its Northwestern territory.⁷⁷ In August 2023, Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that ‘threats to the military security of the Russian Federation have multiplied in the western and northwestern strategic areas’. Shoigu called Finnish and eventually Swedish NATO memberships a ‘serious destabilising factor’ that necessitated new military bases in the western Russian region, including an army corps in Karelia.⁷⁸

Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine have forced Russia to cancel most of its land force exercises, including its prestigious annual large-scale rotational strategic command exercise scheduled to be held in the Western military district (Zapad). Despite the strain on land forces, Russia’s air and naval forces are less affected. These are key capabilities in a Russian escalation scenario with NATO. For example, Ocean Shield 2023 signals to the West that Russia intends to prevent the Baltic Sea from becoming a free space for NATO and ensure Russian operations in case of an escalation.⁷⁹ Since 2014, Russia has actively used NOTAMs to disrupt NATO exercises, distress the opponent, and signal military strength.⁸⁰ Russia’s air force has been used to signal Russia’s dissatisfaction with Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish policy by conducting simulated attacks towards Nordic installations and vessels. Sweden and Finland have also been victims of air and maritime territorial violations.⁸¹ This has continued after 2022. Four Russian fighter jets violated Swedish airspace in the Baltic Sea, three days after Sweden’s historic decision to send military aid to Ukraine.⁸² Two Russian Mig-31 fighter jets violated Finnish airspace in August 2022, two days after Russia condemned Finnish visa policy towards Russia as a ‘Russophobic crusade’ and promised a ‘proper reaction’.⁸³ Such violations are strong signalling of Russian discontent and served to intimidate and scare their opponents. Russia also regularly exposes Northern Norway and Finland to its electronic warfare capabilities by disrupting GPS signals. This causes both civil and military air traffic disruption, hampers crisis response preparedness, and can ‘degrade the effectiveness of high-tech precision-guided munitions’.⁸⁴ Jamming can be offensive and defensive. Because the signal disruption often occurs during NATO exercises, Russia is accused of using jamming strategically as part of a more extensive toolkit designed to keep NATO off balance.⁸⁵ After 2022, the GPS jamming increased five-fold. This likely reflects a perceived vulnerability in areas previously considered safe and signals disruptive capabilities to Norway and Finland. Building on a growing trend since 2014, Russia’s behaviour after 2022 is described as increasingly aggressive in its military demonstrations.

Nuclear measures

As a result of temporarily reduced conventional power, Russia’s nuclear forces have gained renewed importance.⁸⁶ Russia seeks to create uncertainty and fear regarding its willingness to use nuclear weapons through symbolic escalations of preparedness, strategic nuclear exercises, such as Grom 2022, withdrawing Moscow’s ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and conveying nuclear threats.⁸⁷ Despite nuclear threats aimed at dissuading Finnish and Swedish NATO applications, Russia’s strategic signalling is first and foremost aimed at the U.S. and NATO.⁸⁸ As a deterrent, it effectively serves to scare people. When Russia’s nuclear forces were put on high alert in March 2022, Norwegian pharmacies immediately ran out of iodine tablets.⁸⁹ The Northern Fleet is responsible for defending military bases in the Kola Peninsula, the Northern Bastion, and the Barents Sea. With the increasing importance of Russia’s nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence forces, the Northern Fleet’s role has become more crucial.⁹⁰

IPb as a tailored cross-domain coordinator: Finland, Sweden and Norway

The evolving geopolitical landscape in the Nordic region, particularly with NATO’s enlargement, has elicited a diverse range of strategic responses from Russia. The cases of Finland, Sweden, and Norway, each at different stages of their relationship with NATO, showcase Russia’s multifaceted approach to employing various tools of influence and confrontation. This section briefly delves into Russia’s tailored tactics towards these countries.

Russia’s response to NATO’s latest enlargement, which effectively doubles its NATO border, focuses on influencing the content of Finland’s membership. As Finland finalised the bilateral defence agreement with the U.S. and sought to join NATO’s command structure, Russia intensified its information confrontation tactics. In addition to military warnings by Defence Minister Shoigu, prominent Russian figures like the Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, Medvedev, have used social media to mock Finland’s NATO accession in Finnish and have called for relations with Finland to be severed. Adding a nuclear threat, he also promised an ‘apocalyptic end’ to the world if the West did not meet Russian security demands in Ukraine.⁹¹ Russian Security Council General Secretary Nikolai Patrushev painted Finland as aggressively anti-Russian, alleging attempts to establish militias in Russian Karelia and echoing far-right Finnish demands for territorial reclamation. Russian media has insinuated that Finland was involved in drone attacks on Russian targets and warned of potential threats from Finnish territory.⁹² In response to the EU’s ban on car imports from Russia, one of Russia’s most popular talk shows aired a warning to Finland that Russia might instead send tanks.⁹³ Finland is also reminded that it is ‘Ludacris’ to fear Russia, considering that Finland would not be sovereign today if not for Vladimir Lenin’s ‘thoughtlessness’ in granting Finland its independence in 1917.⁹⁴

Russia aims to recast Finland as militarily aggressive, historically antagonistic, and Russophobic. This includes accusations of Finnish recruitment of Russians in Finland to spy on Russian diplomats and attempts to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs.⁹⁵ This narrative revisionism serves both to galvanise Russian support internally and to challenge Finland’s international position, potentially influencing the terms and nature of its NATO membership. The aim is to rewrite their bilateral history, creating a hostile image of Finland and shaping the information domain for potential escalation.

During 2022, and after Finland’s membership accession in 2023, Sweden’s pending NATO membership status was a focal point for Russian information campaigns. These efforts aim to delay or derail Sweden’s entry into NATO by exploiting and inflaming domestic and international tensions.⁹⁶ Russia’s disinformation campaigns portray Sweden as Islamophobic, exacerbating tensions with Turkey and other Muslim-majority nations. Russia amplifies domestic controversies in Sweden, such as Quran burnings, to worsen Sweden-Turkey relations and hamper Sweden’s NATO bid.⁹⁷ Russian-backed media and online platforms are used to disseminate narratives that paint Sweden in a negative light on the international stage.⁹⁸ In connection with Quran burnings in Sweden, text messages were sent out to Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish mobile numbers, urging Muslims to take revenge. The messages seemingly came from Hezbollah, but Norwegian and Swedish security services quickly revealed that the messages were sent from a group called the Anzu Team. This is a platform previously used by Russian hackers.⁹⁹ Building on tensions already surrounding the Quran burnings, the messages were seen as an attempt to create further unrest and division. This strategic disinformation aims to damage Sweden’s international reputation and create internal divisions, aligning with Russia’s objective of keeping Sweden non-aligned and limiting NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea.

Norway’s established status as a NATO member presents a different set of strategic considerations for Russia, particularly in the Arctic region, due to Norway’s proximity to Russia’s strategic nuclear capabilities. Since the war in Ukraine escalated, securing its northern assets is an even higher priority for Russia. Russia updated its maritime doctrine in 2022 to reflect its ambition to protect its Arctic waters using all available means.¹⁰⁰ This approach not only underscores the strategic importance Russia places on the Arctic but also demonstrates its readiness to blur civilian and military operations in pursuit of its geopolitical objectives. Furthermore, Russia’s 2023 Foreign Policy Review replaced the usual section on Russia’s ties with various European countries with a section highlighting Russia’s ambition to prevent ‘the negative impact of illegal restrictive measures imposed by unfriendly states on Russia’s presence on the Spitsbergen archipelago’.¹⁰¹ This suggests that the Svalbard archipelago and Northern Norway are key areas of contention in Russian thinking. In this regard, Russia utilises a mix of cyber, legislative, historical, religious, and paramilitary approaches to intimidate, assert influence, and challenge Norwegian authority.¹⁰²

Discussing the utility of Russian IPb: A failure of Russian strategy?

In 2022, a new era of security policy began in the Nordic region, which resulted in a significant shift in the Russo-Nordic relations. Norway, Finland, and Sweden are now categorised as ‘unfriendly countries’ under U.S. control. Analysing Russia’s activities across non-military, military, and nuclear measures, it is evident that Russia’s primary security objectives still concern the U.S., NATO’s presence, and countering Western sanctions. Despite the evident strategic failures of Russia’s foreign and security policy in the region, Russia continues its sub-threshold approaches.

Russia’s regional conventional deterrence is temporarily weakened as Russia’s military has suffered heavy casualties in Ukraine. Despite an aggressive Russian information offensive, including nuclear threats, Russia failed to stop Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid. Russia’s aggression has also increased NATO and U.S. presence in Norway and the Arctic. Combined, Russia has lost its strategic buffers in the Nordic region. Furthermore, regional and cross-border cooperation, bilateral relations, and diplomatic presence are severely hampered, removing important arenas for Russian influence activity.

In response to this Russia’s IPb offensive has turned qualitatively more aggressive, building on amplified or modified pre-existing Russian stances, threats, and grievances. Russian IPb is opportunistic, focusing on spreading distorted and disruptive narratives to deceive, mislead, or scare the receiver. From more assertive official Russian statements to disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, third-party influencers and military, para-military, and nuclear signalling, the aim is clear: to intimidate and force perceptions and actions in accordance with Russia’s interests.

The continued emphasis placed on IPb measures reflects the central role it plays in Russian strategic thinking. Consequently, the three Nordic countries are all targeted by information operations that seek to split unity on various levels, impress upon the populations and decision-makers the negative consequences of challenging Russia’s security needs, and add to this additional fear by cyber-attacks and military signalling, often in response to policy decisions Russia deem as confrontational.

Russia is actively shaping a hostile (domestic) image of the studied Nordic countries, particularly Finland. A Nordic NATO enlargement has resulted in Russian debates on a new security posture in Russia’s northwestern territories. This is best exemplified by plans to reinstate the Leningrad military district to bolster military presence and coordinate the Arctic-Baltic axis. Russia also highlights the use of ‘all available means’ to secure Russian interests. Simultaneously, most of Russia’s cyber- and other attacks seem less about causing actual irretrievable damage and more about sowing uncertainty and fear. Hiding behind third parties, plausible deniability is maintained in line with Russia’s reflexive control theory. This also effectively circumvents NATO’s deterrence, asserting pressure without causing escalation.

When it comes to the different categories of NATO membership, this study indicates that Russia targets the newest NATO member the hardest. The aim is to intimidate Finland and deter NATO from establishing a robust deterrence and defence posture in Northern Europe. Russia seeks to shape the content of Finnish NATO membership by warning of the escalatory dangers of placing military infrastructure on Finnish soil. Although clear intimidation tactics are also visible towards Norway, its long-standing membership means Russia has a good overview of Norwegian security policy and calibrated deterrence. Although some recalibration has occurred to demonstrate resolve towards Russia after 2022, Norway’s unilateral restrictions remain intact.¹⁰³ These calibrations are challenged by Finland’s membership, which is less willing to restrict Allied activity in Finland’s northern territory.¹⁰⁴ In addition, Russia plays on various domains to assert its presence on the Svalbard archipelago located in a geopolitical hot spot vis-à-vis Russia’s strategic capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. As for Sweden, Russia has sought to play on its status as a pending member. It has continued to warn of the negative consequences of future Swedish membership. Russia’s information campaign builds on long-standing negative coverage of Sweden including the dissemination of distorted stories of Swedish islamophobia to create tension between, among others, Sweden and Turkey. This possibly slowed down decision-making processes related to Sweden’s accession to NATO, aligning with Russia’s objective of a non-aligned Sweden and a disunified NATO. As Sweden is set to formally join NATO by March 2024, Russian IPb advances is likely to reflect a more aggressive stance. That is, similar to Russia’s approach towards Finland, the Kremlin will be interested in limiting NATO’s footprint on Swedish soil. Russia is also likely to continue to play on divisive issues in Swedish society.

As Russia has lost important influence venues, heavier emphasis is placed on distorting narratives, eroding cohesion (on various levels), and creating fear and uncertainty. This includes weakening Nordic citizens’ confidence in their political leadership (ability to protect their countries) and creating fear regarding the consequences of the Nordic countries’ security policies in relation to Ukraine and Russia. The collected observations focus on open and semi-covert observations, but they mirror trends highlighted by Nordic intelligence services on Russian covert and clandestine operations.

According to the stability-instability paradox, when the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between states increases.¹⁰⁵ Gannon et al. argue that as more attention is devoted to grey zone challenges, a challenger may be dissuaded from challenging the ‘status quo’ or choose to ‘behave more aggressively and risk a war’.¹⁰⁶ Russia has chosen to act more aggressively and shows an increased appetite for risk-taking. This includes using a broad spectrum of measures that work towards a common goal of enhancing Russian interests. Here, the informational-psychological dimension is key.

Mirroring theorising on grey zone strategies, three important lessons emerge. First, Russia’s knowledge about the various Nordic countries is used to both shape and prepare the information environment. As tensions rise, Russia uses this preparation to target the Nordic countries more aggressively, testing boundaries and asserting its presence in areas where it can uphold plausible deniability or limit escalation risks. Second, although hard to measure compared to traditional deterrence theory, Russia emphasises the coercive capability of its non-military means. Today, social media and the proliferation of information channels have multiplied how Russia seeks to influence Norway, Finland and Sweden’s security policy debates. Russia combines these channels with military threats to try and shift Nordic debates toward a preference for de-escalatory measures (be it on sanctions policy, religious activity, memory policy, or military activity) over increased deterrence. Lastly, the continuation of Russian IPb advances and the hardening of known Russian narratives, despite a changing security landscape, speak to a longevity in Russian strategic thinking. This aligns with a broader Russian reconfiguration of its strategic stance towards Europe, where Russia is looking to edge gradually toward its objectives rather than making an all-out grab.¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

Circling back to the initial research questions, Russia’s information confrontation strategy towards the Nordic region after 2022 follows three broad tracks. It seeks to intimidate the various countries’ deterrence postures, undermine cohesion across various levels, especially across the U.S.-NATO-EU axis, and reduce Western support for Ukraine. The absence of regional and most bilateral cooperation and Russia’s view of the Nordic countries as ‘unfriendly’ U.S. satellites means the region, to a larger extent, is seen as part of Russia’s increased confrontation with the West. Consequently, a more aggressive stance is discernible as Russia pressures the Nordic states using available and tested tools and measures. Paired with Russia’s distrust of Western intentions, the risk of intended Russian escalation to test Nordic and NATO reactions has increased.

This should be considered as the Nordic countries and NATO reconfigures their deterrence and reassurance postures vis-à-vis Russia. So far, the Nordic region enjoys a stronger deterrence posture as a Nordic NATO region is within reach. However, Russian attempts to shape the future constellation of NATO’s presence in the Nordic region are visible. NATO’s deterrence is believed to alleviate the worst brunt of Russian aggression. It is also important to emphasise the strategic failures of Russian attempts to influence the various Nordic countries’ security policies. This is evident with the historic shifts towards increased deterrence by all countries, including Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership decisions, as a response to Russian military action elsewhere. In this sense, it is tempting to conclude that Russia has been unsuccessful in its objectives. However, Russia continues its sub-threshold intimidation, including using non-military means. This implies a continued belief in the utility of IPb and aligns with Russian strategic reasoning that these can have a coercive effect, especially as part of Russia’s information-psychological efforts to impact adversaries. This includes weakening situational awareness and an adversary’s resolve to challenge Russia.

Russia’s belief that it is in a constant confrontation with the West shapes the ways in which it pursues its interest, both in the long-term and on a day-to-day basis. Taken together, this challenges traditional Western thinking on deterrence and the dichotomous notion of war and peace. Theoretically, then, this article engages a broader discussion on coercion theory and the need to expand our understanding of coercion beyond military means. It shows how information operations can be used as a coordinating tool between non-military and military (including nuclear) tools, the latter category aiming to inflict psychological effects through military signalling. This is particularly relevant when considering the stability-instability paradox, where nuclear parity and relative Russian conventional strength vis-à-vis the U.S. and NATO, incentivises Russian sub-threshold intimidation activity. That is as long as Russia remains disinterested in a direct (military) conflict with NATO. Similarly, temporarily reduced Russian conventional strength provides it with an impetus to use nuclear and non-nuclear means of intimidation. The article provides new and rich empirical insights on Russian information operations in a relatively understudied region and also in an emerging European security policy context, including practical insights and theoretical underpinnings to approaches that constitute a key part of Russian security policy towards Europe. Western and Nordic decision-makers can use these insights to gain a better understanding of Russia’s drivers and behaviour towards the Nordic region and across the various categories of NATO membership.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Forsvaret; Utenriksdepartementet.

Notes on contributors

Karen-Anna Eggen

Karen-Anna Eggen is a PhD fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and is affiliated with the Centre for International Security. She is completing her PhD in political science at the University of Oslo, focusing on Russian information confrontation and information operations in the Nordic region. Her research interests include Russian strategy and security policy, influence operations, transatlantic relations and NATO, and security policy in Eastern Europe, focusing mainly on Ukraine and Belarus.

Notes

¹ Finland officially became a member on 4 Apr. 2023. Sweden got the final approval by Hungary on 26 Feb. 2024, and became NATO’s 32^nd member on 7 Mar. 2024.

² Karen-Anna Eggen, ‘Russia’s Strategy Towards the Nordic Region: Tracing Continuity and Change’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/3 (2022).

³ Andrés Gannon, Erik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay, and Peter Schram, ‘The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution (2023).

⁴ But also in Estonia, Georgia, and eventually Syria, combined with heightened awareness of cyber-attacks and influence operations.

⁵ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival 58/4 (2016), 15.

⁶ Dmitry Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, Ifri (Nov 2015).

⁷ Tobias Liebetrau, ‘Cyber Conflict Short of War: A European Strategic Vacuum’, European Security 31/4 (2022), 497–516; Stefan Soesanto and Max Smeets, ‘Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, And Future’, Ch. 20 in Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (eds.), Deterrence in the 21^st Century – Insights from Theory and Practice (Breda: Netherlands Defence Academy 2021); Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, ‘The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace’, Security Studies 26/3 (2017), 452–81; Rebecca Slayton, ‘What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment’, International Security 41/3 (2016), 72–109; Lennart Maschmeyer, ‘A New and Better Quiet Option? Strategies of Subversion and Cyber Conflict’, Journal of Strategic Studies 46/3 (2023), 570–94; Herbert Lin and Jaclyn Kerr, ‘On Cyber-Enabled Information Warfare and Information Operations’, Ch. 16 in Paul Cornish (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security (Online edn: Oxford Academic 2021).

⁸ Denmark and Iceland are also founding NATO members. Norway was chosen due to its land border with Russia.

⁹ e.g. Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion’; Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke (eds), Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New York: Oxford UP 2019).

¹⁰ Eggen, ‘Russia’s Strategy Towards the Nordic Region’; Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, Cooperation and Conflict 1/4 (1966), 66–69.

¹¹ Ibid.; Lyle J. Morris, Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk, and Marta Keep, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation 2019), 8.

¹² The Norwegian Police Security Service, ‘National Threat Assessment’, Annual report (2023), https://www.pst.no/alle-artikler/trusselvurderinger/ntv-2023/ Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, ‘Foreign Intelligence and Influence Operations’, Annual report (2023), https://supo.fi/en/intelligence-and-influence-operations.

¹³ Gannon et al., ‘The Shadow of Deterrence’, 29, 33.

¹⁴ Valery Gerasimov, ‘The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and of Carrying Out Combat Operations’, (Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii: Novyye vyzovy trebuyut pereosmyslit’ formy i sposoby vedeniya boyevykh deystviy), Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier 8 (2013); President of Russia, ‘Annual Address to the Federal Assembly’ (10 May 2006); Robert Jervis, The Illogic Of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 1984), 31; Michael Kofman, ‘Drivers of Russian Grand Strategy’, Stockholm Free World Forum, Briefing No. 6. (2019); Makhmut A. Gareev, ‘Strategicheskoye sderzhivaniye: problemy i resheniya’, 8 Oct. 2008, http://old.redstar.ru/2008/10/08_10/2_04.html.

¹⁵ Joe Cheravitch, ‘The Role of Russia’s Military in Information Confrontation’, CNA, Occasional Paper IOP-2021-U-030078-Final (Jun. 2021).

¹⁶ President of Russia, ‘Meeting of the State Council [Заседание Государственного Совета], 22 Oct. 2022, Speech, Retrieved from http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70169.

¹⁷ Juha Kukkola, The Military Strategic Effects of the Russian National Segment of the Internet (Helsinki: National Defence Univ., 2023).

¹⁸ V.B. Veprintsev, A.V. Manioli, A.I. Petrenko, and D.B. Frolov, Operations of Information-Psychological Warfare (Moscow: Goryachaya liniya 2019); Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion’, 27–28.

¹⁹ A. Raskin, and I. Tarasov, ‘Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo v sovremennoy voyne’, Informatsionnye voyny 4/32 (2014), 2–6; Jolanta Darczewska and Piotr Żochowski, ‘Active Measures – Russia’s Key Export’, Centre for Eastern Studies¸ Point of View (May 2017).

²⁰ Uku Arold, ‘Peculiarities of Russian Information Operations’, Sõjateadlane 2 (2016), 26.

²¹ V.A. Lefebvre, ‘Reflexive Control in Socio-Economic Systems’, Information & Security 22 (2007), 28–32; Timothy Thomas, ‘Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and The Military’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 7 (2004), 237–56.

²² Catherine Belton, Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2020).

²³ Igor Panarin, The First World Information War: The Dissolution of the USSR, (Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna: razval SSSR) (Saint Petersburg: Piter 2010); Alexander Bartosh, ‘Information and Psychological Struggle Acquires a New Quality’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie 35 (2023); Gerasimov, ‘The Value of Science Is in the Foresight’.

²⁴ Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘The Conceptual View of Activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Information Space’, 1 Jan. 2011; Russian Security Council, ‘Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation’, 5 Dec. 2016.

²⁵ See, e.g., Russian Security Council, ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’, (Strategiya natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii), 2 July 2021. The National Security Strategy is considered Russia’s key document for strategic planning.

²⁶ Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘Information Confrontation’, (Informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), Voyennyy Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar’, undated c.; V.F. Prokofiev, Secret Weapons of Information War, ‘Taynoye oruzhiye informatsionnoy voyny’ (SINTEG 2003 2nd ed.).

²⁷ V.F. Prokofiev, Secret Weapons of Information War.

²⁸ Bartosh, ‘Information and Psychological Struggle Acquires a New Quality’; Ilya V. Sergeev, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare as a Form of Escalation of Inter-State Conflict’, Informatsionniye voyni 2/34 (2015), 38–41. (40)

²⁹ Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, ‘Information Confrontation’, (informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), Terminology; Igor Panarin, ‘The system of information confrontation’, (Systema informatsionnoe protivoborstvo), Voennoe-Promychlenny Kurier 41/257 (2008).

³⁰ Ilya V. Sergeev, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare as a Form of Escalation of Inter-State Conflict’, (Informatsionno-psikhologicheskaya voyna kak forma eskalatsii mezhgosudarstvennykh konfliktov), Informatsionnyye voyny 2/34 (2015), 38–41. (40)

³¹ See e.g., K.A. Trotsenko, ‘Information Confrontation at the Operational-Tactical Level of Control’, Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) 8 (2016), 20.

³² Keir Giles, ‘Handbook of Russian Information Warfare’, NATO Defense College, Fellowship Monograph (2016); For a thorough discussion on Russian information-psychological confrontation, see Katri Pynnöniemi, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare in Russian Security Strategy’, in Robert Kanet (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Russian Security Policy (London and New York: Routledge 2019), 214–26.

³³ Lesley Kucharski, ‘Russian Multi-Domain Strategy Against NATO: Information Confrontation and U.S. Forward-Deployed Nuclear Weapons in Europe’, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (2018), 2.

³⁴ Cheravitch, ‘The Role of Russia’s Military in Information Confrontation’, 7.

³⁵ Pynnöniemi, ‘Information-Psychological Warfare in Russian Security Strategy’, 216.

³⁶ Lata, Annenkov, and Moiseev (2019); Larisa V. Vorontsova and Dmitriy Frolov, Istoriya i sovremennost’ informatsionnogo protivoborstva (Moscow: Garyachaya linja 2019), 77.

³⁷ Valery Gerasimov, ‘Vectors of Military Strategy Development’, (Vektory Razvitiya voyennoy strategii), Tsentr Strategicheskikh Otsenok i Prognozov. 7 Mar. 2019.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Emil Arntzen, ‘Understanding Russian Information Confrontation’, Master’s thesis, Brunel University London, (2022), 17. This is also emphasised in the 2021 National Security Strategy.

⁴⁰ Emilio J. Iasiello, ‘Russia’s Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea’, Parameters 47/2 (2017); Lesley Kucharski, Mike Albertson, Marimar Calisto, and Brian Radzinsky, ‘Countering the “Information Confrontation” Strategies of Russia and China’, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Workshop Summary (2022), 5.

⁴¹ Dmitry Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 33.

⁴² Timothy Thomas, Russian Military Thought: Concepts and Elements (MITRE Corporation August 2019); I.N. Dylevskiy, V.O. Zapivakhiyn, S.A. Komov, S.V. Korotkov, and A.A. Krivchenko, ‘On the Dialectic of Deterrence and the Prevention of Military Conflicts in the Information Age’, Voennaya Mysl’ 7 (2016), 5; Ryszard Szpyra, ‘Russian Information Offensive in the International Relations’, Security and Defence Quarterly 30/3 (2020), 31.

⁴³ See, Oscar Jonsson, The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines between War and Peace (Washington DC: Georgetown Press 2019), 120–22.

⁴⁴ Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven CT: Yale UP 1966).

⁴⁵ Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, and Ryan Maness, ‘Fancy Bears and Digital Trolls: Cyber Strategy with a Russian Twist’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/2 (2019), 212–34.

⁴⁶ Vorontsova and Frolov, Istoriya i sovremennost’ informatsionnogo protivoborstva, 81.

⁴⁷ Norway, Sweden, and Finland have all expelled and denied visas to Russian diplomats and alleged intelligence officers to reduce the growing intelligence pressure in their countries.

⁴⁸ Prior to 2022, Sweden was the most criticised of the three Nordic countries, particularly for being ‘anti-Russian’ and ‘Russophobic’. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Policy and diplomatic activities of the Russian Federation in 2021 (Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2022 godu)’, Feb 2022, 51.

⁴⁹ Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Media Question in Connection with Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden Publishing Materials on Russia’s Intelligence Activities’, 21 Apr. 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1864875/ Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Activities of the Russian Federation in 2022 (Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2022 godu)’, 25 Mar. 2023.

⁵⁰ The data consists primarily of written text and documents on various digital platforms. Standard search words related to Russia and the Nordic region are identified prior to the search. Incidents or new categories identified during the initial collection are explored further. The data also builds on anonymous background conversations with relevant Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian experts.

⁵¹ See Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O vstreche pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.G. Titova s Poslom Shvetsii v Rossii M.Mard’, 18 May 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813802/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova’s Answer to a Media Question in Connection with Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden Publishing Material Concerning Russia’s Intelligence Activities’; Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Press Release on the Regional Meeting of the Russian Ambassadors to the United Kingdom, Ireland, the North European and Baltic Countries’, 5 June 2023, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1874774/?lang=en.

⁵² Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O regional’nom soveshchanii poslov Rossii v stranakh Severnoy Yevropy i Pribaltiki pod rukovodstvom pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii V.G.Titova’, 9 Sep. 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1829157/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘EU Ban on Cars with Russian Licence Plates’, Press briefing, 4 Oct. 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1907469/ RIA Novosti, ‘Lavrov nazval zayavleniya Finlyandii ob antirossiyskikh sanktsiyakh khamskimi’, 26 Sept 2023, https://ria.ru/20230926/sanktsii -1,898,717,236html?in=t Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommentariy ofitsial’nogo predstavitelya MID Rossii M.V.Zakharovoy v svyazi s prezentatsiyey Vneshnepoliticheskoy deklaratsii Pravitel’stva Shvetsi’, 16 June 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1818155/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O vstreche Pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V.G.Titova s Poslom Norvegii v Moskve R.Kvile’, 24 Oct. 2022 https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1834817/.

⁵³ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions During a Joint News Conference with Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Carlos Faria’, 4 July 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1820504/?lang=en De Fresnes, Tulikukka, ‘Kansanedustajat ovat nyt Venäjän infovaikuttamisen kohde – Ano Turtiainen kertoi Venäjän tv:ssä “globalistien” vallankaappauksesta Suomessa’, Yle News, 6 May 2022, https://yle.fi/a/3–12,430,606 Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O real’noy istorii podachi Finlyandiyey i Shvetsiyey zayavki v NATO’, 27 Aug. 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1827550/.

⁵⁴ Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Foreign Ministry Statement on Russia’s Withdrawal from the Barents Euro-Arctic Council’, 18 Sept. 2023, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1904899/ Clas Svahn, ‘Ryska ambassadören: Sverige ett legitimt mål’, Dagens Nyheter, 29 Mar. 2023, https://www.dn.se/varlden/ryska-ambassadoren-sverige-ett-legitimt-mal/ RBK, ‘V Finlyandii priznali izderzhki ot vstupleniya v NATO i pomoshchi Ukraine’, 26 Sept. 2023, https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/651271fe9a794782de7a2d2b.

⁵⁵ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Kommentariy ofitsial’nogo predstavitelya MID Rossii M.V.Zakharovoy v svyazi s prezentatsiyey Vneshnepoliticheskoy deklaratsii Pravitel’stva Shvetsi’; Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Foreign Ministry Statement on Finland completing the process to join NATO’, 4 Apr. 2023, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1861613/?lang=en https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1809455/.

⁵⁶ See e.g., Gleb Chugunov, ‘Finland Stopping African Aid is Europe’s Worst Colonial Policy: Russian Lawmaker’, Sputnik Africa, 20 June 2023, https://en.sputniknews.africa/20230620/finland-stopping-african-aid-is-europes-worst-colonial-policy-russian-lawmaker−1,060,053,533html.

⁵⁷ RIA Novosti, ‘Rossiyskoye posol’stvo zayavilo o nepriyemlemykh vypadakh so storony Norvegii’, 2 Oct. 2023, https://ria.ru/20231002/vypady−1,900,035,521html.

⁵⁸ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘The Foreign Ministry’s Statement on Sweden’s NATO Membership’, 16 May 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813545/?lang=en Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on the Presentation of the Swedish Government’s Foreign Policy Declaration’, 16 June 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1818155/ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Intervyu direktora Vtorogo Yevropeyskogo departamenta MID Rossii S.S.Belyayeva po populyarizatsii informatsionnomu agentstvu “Rossiya segodnya”’, 8 Sept. 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1829007/ Ekaterina Blinova, ‘US-Nordic Summit Pushes NATO Agenda of Containing Russia in the North’, Sputnik, 13 July 2023, https://sputnikglobe.com/20230713/us-nordic-summit-pushes-nato-agenda-of-containing-russia-in-the-north−1,111,860,121html Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘O vstreche Pervogo zamestitelya Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii V.G.Titova s Poslom Norvegii v Moskve R.Kvile’.

⁵⁹ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Intervyu direktora Vtorogo Yevropeyskogo departamenta MID Rossii S.S.Belyayeva po populyarizatsii informatsionnomu agentstvu “Rossiya segodnya”’; Al Jazeera, ‘Putin Tells Finnish President: Joining NATO would be “Mistake’’’, 14 May 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/14/russia-suspends-electricity-supply-to-finland-finnish-operator.

⁶⁰ Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Russia Warns of Nuclear, Hypersonic Deployment if Sweden and Finland Join NATO’, Reuters, 14 Apr. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-warns-baltic-nuclear-deployment-if-nato-admits-sweden-finland-2022-04-14/.

⁶¹ See e.g., Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Ob otvetnykh merakh v otnoshenii Finlyandii’, 17 May 2022, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1813662/.

⁶² Brendan Cole, ‘Russian State TV Host Names Western Countries It Would Be “Easy” To Bomb’, Newsweek, 1 Dec. 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/solovoyov-russia-tv-bomb-ukraine-russia-war−1,763,895.

⁶³ Lasse Boehm and Alex Wilson, ‘EU Energy Security and the War in Ukraine: From Sprint to Marathon’, European Parliament, Briefing (Feb. 2023).

⁶⁴ See e.g., The Moscow Times, ‘Kremlin Endorses Report on U.S. Involvement in Nord Stream Sabotage’, 9 Feb. 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/02/09/head-of-russias-tretyakov-gallery-replaced-after-culture-ministry-standoff-a80183.

⁶⁵ See, Malte Humpert, ‘Fiber-Optic Submarine Cable Near Faroe and Shetland Islands Damaged; Mediterranean Cables also Cut’, High North News, 24 Oct. 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/fiber-optic-submarine-cable-near-faroe-and-shetland-islands-damaged-mediterranean-cables-also-cut.

⁶⁶ Reuters, ‘Norway Will Patrol its Oil and Gas Platforms with help from Allies, PM Says, PM says’, 30 Sept. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/norway-receive-help-uk-germany-france-boost-security-pm-says-2022-09-30/.

⁶⁷ Sondre Moen Myhre and Sigrid Gausen, ‘Uidentifiserte droner kan drive spionasje i Norge. Men hva er det egentlig de er ute etter?’, Aftenposten, 19 Oct. 2022, https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/699VQ8/uidentifiserte-droner-kan-drive-spionasje-i-norge-men-hva-er-det-egentlig-de-er-ute-etter.

⁶⁸ Andrew Metrick and Kathleen H. Hicks, ‘Contested Seas: Maritime Domain Awareness in Northern Europe’, CSIS, Report March (2018), 7.

⁶⁹ See, Osman Kibar, ‘OPERASJON LAZAREV: Slår alarm om kartlegging av Norges kritiske infrastruktur’, Dagens Næringsliv, 22 Oct. 2021, https://www.dn.no/magasinet/teknologi/spionasje/russland/etterretningstjenesten/operasjon-lazarev-slar-alarm-om-kartlegging-av-norges-kritiske-infrastruktur/2-1-1,085,420 Benjamin Fredriksen, Beth Mørch Pettersen, Gyda Katrine Hesla, Inghild Eriksen, and Håvard Gulldahl, ‘Kabelmysteriene’, NRK, 26 June 2022, https://www.nrk.no/nordland/xl/russiske-tralere-krysset-kabler-i-vesteralen-og-svalbard-for-brudd-1.16007084.

⁷⁰ Robert S. Mueller, ‘Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election’, US Department of Justice 1/2 (2019); Eugene Kondratov and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, ‘Russia’s Hybrid Interference Campaigns in France, Germany and the UK: A Challenge against Trust in Liberal Democracies?’, Geopolitics 28/5 (2023).

⁷¹ Yle News, ‘Russian Troll Factory Sets Sights on Finnish News Outlets, Editors’, 4 May 2022, https://yle.fi/a/3–12,431,006.

⁷² Radwarem, ‘Project DDOSIA Russia’s answer to disBalancer’, 13 Oct. 2022, https://www.radware.com/security/threat-advisories-and-attack-reports/project-ddosia-russias-answer-to-disbalancer/.

⁷³ NoName057(16), ‘Message’, Telegram, 13 July 2023, https://t.me/noname05716/4087. Other attacks were perpetrated against the Norwegian National Security Authority, Gassco, The Norwegian Coastal Administration, Kongsberg, Kongsberg Maritime, and Statistics Norway. See, Kjell Persen, ‘Disse russiske hackerne knyttes til koranhevn-SMS’, TV2 Nyheter, 5 Aug. 2023, https://www.tv2.no/nyheter/utenriks/disse-russiske-hackerne-knyttes-til-koranhevn-sms/15938716/.

⁷⁴ Yle News, ‘Pro-Russia Hacker Group Suspected of Targeting Finnish Parliament, Sanna Marin Websites with DoS Attack’, 4 Apr. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,025,824. See also, Helsinki Times, ‘Finnish Parliament’s Website Brought Down by Russian Hacker Group’, 10 Aug. 2022, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/22011-finnish-parliament-s-website-brought-down-by-russian-hacker-group.html Yle News, ‘Several Finnish Websites Report Cyber-Attacks’, 5 Oct. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,053,726.

⁷⁵ SoCRadar, ‘An Ongoing DDoS Campaign Targeting Sweden’, 20 July 2023, https://socradar.io/an-ongoing-ddos-campaign-targeting-sweden/ Alicia Heimersson, ‘Nya hackerattacker mot Sverige – SOS måltavla’, 19 Feb. 2023, https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/nya-hackerattacker-mot-sverige-sos-maltavla-/ Mandiant Intelligence, ‘Hacktivists Collaborate with GRU-Sponsored APT28’, 23 Sept. 2022, https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/gru-rise-telegram-minions.

⁷⁶ Jenni Jeskanen, ‘Kostamuslainen hotelli­virkailija kertoo HS:lle, kuinka Venäjä ohjaa tulijoita rajalle – Pormestari vakuuttaa tilanteen olevan hallinnassa’, Helsingin Sanomat, 19 Nov. 2023, https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art−2,000,010,001,486html Kelly Greenhill, ‘Asymmetric Advantage: Weaponizing People as Nonmilitary Instruments of Cross-Domain Coercion’, Ch. 12 in Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke (eds), Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (New York NY: Oxford UP 2019).

⁷⁷ Thomas Nilsen, ‘Land Forces at Kola Reduced to One-Fifth, Norwegian Intelligence Says’, Barents Observer, 13 Feb. 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/02/four-fifths-kola-land-forces-wiped-out.

⁷⁸ Russian Defence Ministry, ‘Novosti’, 21 Dec. 2022, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id = 12449212@egNews.

⁷⁹ Oscar Strøm Korsnes, ‘Russland med militærøvelser i Østersjøen: − Et signal til Vesten’, VG, 2 Aug. 2023, https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/mQd0vL/russland-med-militaeroevelser-i-oestersjoeen-et-signal-til-vesten.

⁸⁰ Kristian Åtland, Thomas Nilsen, and Torbjørn Pedersen, ‘Military Muscle-Flexing as Interstate Communication: Russian NOTAM Warnings off the Coast of Norway, 2015–2021’, Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 5/1 (2022).

⁸¹ Eggen, ‘Russia’s Strategy Towards the Nordic Region: Tracing Continuity and Change’.

⁸² Reuters, ‘Swedish Defence Minister Calls Russian Violation of Airspace “Unacceptable”’, 2 Mar. 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/swedish-armed-forces-says-russian-fighter-jets-violated-swedish-airspace-2022-03-02/.

⁸³ Statecraft, ‘Russian Fighter Jets Violate Finnish Airspace Amid Visa Ban Row’, 19 Aug. 2022, https://www.statecraft.co.in/article/russian-fighter-jets-violate-finnish-airspace-amid-visa-ban-row.

⁸⁴ Runar Spansvoll, ‘Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway’, RUSI, 168/3 (2023), 84.

⁸⁵ McLeary, ‘Russians Tried to Jam NATO Exercise; Swedes Say They’ve Seen This Before’.

⁸⁶ The Norwegian Intelligence Service, ‘Focus 2023’, Annual report (2023), https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus, 21.

⁸⁷ Anya Fink, ‘The Wind Rose’s Directions: Russia’s Strategic Deterrence during the First Year of the War in Ukraine’, French institute of international relations, Proliferation Papers, No. 65, 21 Aug. 2023.

⁸⁸ RBK, ‘Kak skazhetsya na situatsii na Ukraine vkhozhdeniye Shvetsii i Finlyandii v NATO’, 17 May 2022, https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/05/2022/6282529c9a794715621ecc12.

⁸⁹ Synne Lykkebø Hafsaas and Synne Sørenes, ‘Millioner av job-tabletter på vei ut i tomme hyller – ber folk unngå hamstring’, NRK, 1 Mar. 2022, https://www.nrk.no/vestland/millioner-av-jod-tabletter-pa-vei-ut-i-tomme-hyller-_-ber-folk-unnga-hamstring-1.15873362.

⁹⁰ The Norwegian Intelligence Service, ‘Focus 2023’, 21.

⁹¹ Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Epokha protivostoyaniya’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2 July 2023, https://rg.ru/2023/07/02/epoha-protivostoianiia.html.

⁹² Yle News, ‘Putin Advisor: Finnish Leadership Seeks Confrontation with Russia’, 1 Aug. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,043,287 VK Press, ‘Nochnyye drony na Pskov zapuskali iz Latvii, Finlyandii i Estonii: strany NATO atakuyut Rossiyu?’, 30 Aug. 2023, https://www.vkpress.ru/life/nochnye-drony-na-pskov-zapuskali-iz-latvii-finlyandii-i-estonii-strany-nato-atakuyut-rossiyu/?id = 165759 Tsargrad, ‘Finlyandya vyzyvayet Rossiyu na voynu: Pochemu medlit Putin’, 3 Sept. 2023, https://tsargrad.tv/articles/finljandija-vyzyvaet-rossiju-na-vojnu-pochemu-medlit-putin_858607.

⁹³ Aleksei Zhuravlyov, ‘Message’, Telegram, 20 Sept. 2023, https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/7382.

⁹⁴ Chugunov, ‘Finland Stopping African Aid is Europe’s Worst Colonial Policy’.

⁹⁵ RT, ‘FSB Exposes NATO State’s “Spying Operation” Against Moscow’, 15 Aug. 2023, https://www.rt.com/russia/581318-russia-finland-intelligence-network/.

⁹⁶ Ulrika By and William Hernvall, ‘Ministern: Påverkanskampanjer mot Sverige kopplas till Ryssland’, Dagens Nyheter, 26 July 2023, https://www.dn.se/sverige/ministern-paverkanskampanjer-mot-sverige-kopplas-till-ryssland/.

⁹⁷ ABC News, ‘Turkey’s President Condemns Quran Burning in Sweden, Signals It’ll Obstruct NATO Membership’, 29 June 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/turkeys-president-condemns-quran-burning-sweden-signals-obstruct−100,490,476 Antje Tolpo and Tiina Lundell, ‘MOT Got Hold of a Secret Intelligence Report, According to which Russia was Planning to Interfere with the Accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO’, Yle, 4 Dec. 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74–20,063,067 Albin Lindström, ‘Ryssland rider på desinformationsvåg’, Svenska Dagbladet, 2 Aug. 2023, https://www.svd.se/a/4ogB39/ryssland-rider-pa-desinformationsvag-om-sverige.

⁹⁸ Ulrika By and William Hernvall, ‘Ministern: Påverkanskampanjer mot Sverige kopplas till Ryssland’.

⁹⁹ NoName057(16) is also affiliated with the Anzu Team platform. Elena Teslova, ‘Russia calls burning of Quran in Stockholm “another provocative act of Islamophobia”’, Anadolu Agency, 28 Jan. 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-calls-burning-of-quran-in-stockholm-another-provocative-act-of-islamophobia/2799814.

¹⁰⁰ Russian Security Council, ‘Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, (Morskaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii), 31 July 2022, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document34/.

¹⁰¹ Russian Foreign Ministry, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskaya i diplomaticheskaya deyatelnost Rossiyskoy Federacii v 2022 godu’, 25 Sept. 2023.

¹⁰² Thomas Nilsen, ‘Bishop Iyakov, Who Backs Putin’s War, Raised Giant Cross at Svalbard without Norway’s Knowledge’, Barents Observer, 12 Aug. 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2023/08/russia-worlds-arctic-power-said-war-blessing-bishop-who-week-raised-giant-patriotic Hallvar Norum et al., ‘Russisk hackergruppe skal ha startet angrep mot Norge’, NRK, 29 June 2022, https://www.nrk.no/norge/russisk-hackergruppe-skal-ha-startet-angrep-mot-norge-1.16020947 Persen, ‘Disse russiske hackerne knyttes til koranhevn-SMS’; Atle Staalesen, ‘Moscow Protests Norwegian Exploration in Svalbard Waters’, Barents Observer, 15 Mar. 2021, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2021/03/moscow-protests-norwegian-exploration-svalbard-waters Trine Jonassen, ‘Russia Accuses Norway of Increased Military Presence on Svalbard’, High North News, 7 Oct. 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russia-accuses-norway-increased-military-presence-svalbard.

¹⁰³ See e.g., Astri Edvartsen, ‘USA Demonstrated New Weapons System – Wanted To Deter Russia Without Escalating’, High North News, 11 Nov. 2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/usa-demonstrated-new-weapons-system-wanted-deter-russia-without-escalating.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas Nilsen, ‘“High Time to Scrap Self-Imposed Restrictions”, Says Former Norwegian Commander. This Week’s Flight Map Shows Why’, Barents Observer, 23 Aug. 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/08/high-time-scrap-self-imposed-restrictions-says-former-norwegian-commander-august-22.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca NY: Cornell UP 1984), 31

¹⁰⁶ Gannon et al., ‘The Shadow of Deterrence’, 3, 29–32.

¹⁰⁷ Michael J. Mazarr, ‘Struggle in the Gray Zone and World Orders’, War on the Rocks, 22 Dec. 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/struggle-in-the-gray-zone-and-world-order/.