Space sensors and missile defense

Abstract

The United States must continue to push the major concentration of its missile defense tracking sensor architecture to space to improve the overall performance of the nation’s Missile Defense System against an increasingly diverse missile threat.  Without the ability to track the missile payload throughout the flight, especially hypersonic payloads, the ability of a missile defense system to intercept the payload diminishes significantly and the armed forces will be unable to engage and intercept the threat with any meaningful consistency.  The country must overcome technological, acquisition, commercial, and policy challenges in order to deploy a space tracking layer and achieve what ultimately may be viewed as the greatest leap in capability that could be achieved in missile defense today.  Current development and initial deployments efforts require continued funding and advocacy for satellite and ground system development as well as emphasis on the development of responsive launch capabilities.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to offer a special thanks to the senior reviewers of this article, whose inputs, criticisms, and commentary greatly improved its quality: Dr. Kathleen Bailey, Dr. Peppi DeBiaso, Dr. Peter L. Hays, and Dr. Keith B. Payne. He would also like to thank several people for their time and willingness to be interviewed and to review early drafts of the article, including Vice Admiral Jon Hill (MDA Director), Dr. Derek Tournear (Space Development Agency Director), Mr. Rich Ritter (MDA Sensors, Command and Control), Mr. Walt Chai (MDA Space Sensors), and Mr. Stan Stafira (MDA Chief Architect). I would like to extend a special thanks to Dr. Tournear’s staff and the staff at Space Force, Space Systems Command for their review of my write-up on Space Force developmental systems. Any errors that may be found in these sections are mine alone. I would also like to thank Amy Joseph for her invaluable support throughout the development and production process. Finally, the author would like to express his appreciation to the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Sarah Scaife Foundation for their generous support that made researching and writing this article possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Steve Lambakis, Space as a Warfighting Domain: Reshaping Policy to Execute 21st Century Spacepower (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, May 2021), https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Space-as-a-Warfighting-Domain-pub-5.21.pdf.

2 Cited in Samantha Beu, “Sensor Tech Key to Effective Missile Defense,” National Defense, April 2, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/4/2/sensor-tech-key-to-effective-missile-defense See also Statement of Dr. John F. Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee on Fiscal Year 24 Strategic Forces Posture, March 8, 2023, 13, https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/ASD%20Plumb%20Written%20Statement%20-%20HASC-SF%20FY24%20Strat%20Forces%20Posture.pdf.

3 Since 1983, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and its predecessor organizations, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), have been responsible for researching, developing, testing, and fielding missile defenses. Before SDIO, the Army, Navy, and Air Force missile defenders looked to space for a tactical advantage. See Steve Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 217–35.

4 Missiles have been used in several conflicts for more than 30 years, especially in Middle East confrontations, and they will continue to be a threat in future conflicts involving U.S. forces. The use of missiles in Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022 and 2023 is only the latest conflict featuring the use of many and different kinds of missiles. Yet this conflict also provides a window into the future we are likely to experience.

5 Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2–5, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/DIBMAC%20Slicky%202020.pdf.

6 Admiral John C. Aquilino, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2022.

7 Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (DIBMAC), 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2–5, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/DIBMAC%20Slicky%202020.pdf. The report was prepared by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center in collaboration with DIBMAC and published in July 2020. See also Tom Karako and Masao Dahlgren, Complex Air Defense: Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), 4, https://www.csis.org/analysis/complex-air-defense-countering-hypersonic-missile-threat.

8 DIBMAC, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 2–5; Karako and Dahlgren, Complex Air Defense, 4.

9 Aquilino, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 10, 2022.

10 Karako and Dahlgren, Complex Air Defense, 1, 2. DIBMAC, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 38.

11 DIBMAC, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 26.

12 Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, written testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, June 15, 2021.

13 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2021: Annual Report to Congress, November 2021, 60–3, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.

14 China’s space-based kinetic weapons research has “included methods of reentry, separation of payload, delivery vehicles, and transfer orbits for targeting purposes.” The FOBS “demonstrated the greatest distance flown (∼40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time (∼100+ minutes) of any PRC land attack weapon system to date.” U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving The People’s Republic of China 2022: Annual Report to Congress, November 2022, 93, 94, 98, file:///C:/Users/Steve/Documents/NIPP/Space%20Sensors%20Project/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

15 Written Statement, General Glen D. Vanherck, Commander United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 24, 2022; Defense Intelligence Agency, 2022 Challenges to Security in Space, March 2022, 18, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf?emci=d66ab957-0ac0-ec11-997e-281878b83d8a&emdi=46671803-99c0-ec11-997e-281878b83d8a&ceid=194288.

16 DIA, 2022 Challenges to Security in Space, March 2022, 18.

17 Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Board Meets on Space-Based Hypersonic Threat,” Washington Times Online, September 14, 2022.

18 Jen Judson, “Strategic Command Boss Reveals No. 1 Need for Missile Defense,” Defense News Online, August 12, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2022/08/12/strategic-command-boss-reveals-his-no-1-need-for-missile-defense/. See also Joe Gould and Courtney Albon, “Russia and China’s Space Weapon Plans Spur High-Level Pentagon Meeting, Defense News, August 30, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/08/30/russia-and-chinas-space-weapon-plans-spur-high-level-pentagon-meeting/.

19 DIBMAC, 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, 12.

20 Steven T Dunham and Robert S. Wilson, The Missile Threat: A Taxonomy for Moving Beyond Ballistic (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Corporation Center for Space Policy and Strategy, August 2020), 1, 8.

21 The list uses the taxonomy described in greater technical detail in Dunham and Wilson, The Missile Threat, 9–19.

22 Author conversations with MDA Director, VADM Jon Hill (July 14, 2022), and MDA Chief Architect, Mr. Stan Stafira (August 2, 2022).

23 The distances of satellites from Earth deprive the missile defense system of the ability to use the data received in near-real time. It takes time for data to travel the 22,000 miles to Earth, which means that by the time the interceptor kill vehicle receives the data, the target will likely be in another position in space, making it unlikely that the kill vehicle can acquire it. See the discussion on “latency” in Chapter 4.

24 Kareem Fahim and Sarah Dadouch, “Yemen’s Houthi Militants Launch New Attack on UAE as Conflict Widens,” Washington Post, January 24, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/24/yemen-houthis-uae-missiles-coalition/.

25 David Vergun, “Defense Official Says Ukrainians Continue Strong Resistance against Russian Invaders,” DoD News, March 21, 2022; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2973122/defense-official-says-ukrainians-continue-strong-resistance-against-russian-inv/.

26 Meredith Roaten, “Budget 2023: Pentagon Requests Funds to Finish Guam Missile Defenses,” National Defense, March 29, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/3/29/mda-story; Jason Sherman, “2026 Target for INDOPACOM’s No. 1 Priority, Guam Defense System, Appears to be Slipping,” Inside Defense, December 5, 2021; Brent Sadler, “Guam Needs Effective Missile Defense Now, Not in 2028,” The Heritage Foundation, July 18, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/guam-needs-effective-missile-defense-now-not-2028.

27 Cited in Beu, “Sensor Tech Key to Effective Missile Defense.”

28 Karako and Dahlgren, Complex Air Defense, 3.

29 DIA, 2022 Challenges to Security in Space, 4, 17, 18, 28, and 29.

30 For a more in-depth description of the Missile Defense System and how it works, see Megan Crouse, “The Technological Challenges of Complex Missile Defense,” Military & Aerospace Electronics, August 26, 2022, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14280041/missile-defense-sensors.

31 Cited by Theresa Hitchens, “The Nuclear 3 Body Problem: STRATCOM ‘Furiously’ Rewriting Deterrence Theory in Tri-Polar World,” BreakingDefense.com, August 11, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/the-nuclear-3-body-problem-stratcom-furiously-rewriting-deterrence-theory-in-tri-polar-world/.

32 DSP was bell-ringer only, but SBIRS staring sensors also provide missile tracking to improve defense opportunities.

33 Courtney Albon, “Space-Based Infrared Satellite Launch to Complete Missile Warning System,” C4ISRnet, August 3, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2022/08/03/space-based-infrared-system-satellite-launch-to-complete-missile-warning-system/. See also US Air Force, Fact Sheet: Space Based InfraRed System, May 2019, https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104549/space-based-infrared-system/ and Lockheed Martin promotional site at https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/sbirs.html.

34 Jen Judson, “Missile Defense Agency Priorities Include Hypersonics, Guam, Hill Says,” Defense News Online, August 12, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2022/08/12/missile-defense-agency-priorities-include-hypersonics-guam-hill-says/.

35 LRDR incorporates “S-band” radar. A radar sends out electromagnetic waves that propagate through the atmosphere and space at high speed. Whenever the radar signals hit an object, the wave reflects back to the radar. Rain, fog, snow, ice, and heat can influence atmospheric conditions and affect radar detection. S-band radars can make accurate observations under severe weather conditions. See Cadence System Analysis, S-Band Radar Advantages and Disadvantages, blog accessed August 13, 2022, https://resources.system-analysis.cadence.com/blog/msa2022-s-band-radar-advantages-and-disadvantages.

36 Theresa Hitchens, “Long-Range Missile Defense Radar Ready to ‘Plug in’ at NORTHCOM within ‘Months,” BreakingDefense.com, August 10, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/08/long-range-missile-defense-radar-ready-to-plug-in-at-northcom-within-months/ See also https://mda.mil/system/sensors.html.

37 With a change in software, this radar can be forward deployed to get eyes on missiles launched out of threat countries or an organic sensor for the THAAD system. U.S. THAAD systems are currently operationally deployed in South Korea and Guam.

38 Hill testimony, June 15, 2021.

39 Jason Shermon, “Pentagon Moving to Convert SKA from Experiment to Operational Capability by 2022,” Inside Defense, March 23, 2020.

40 Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, written testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee, April 28, 2019, 16.

41 “BOA is a system within the C2BMC enterprise that receives raw infrared sensor information on boosting and midcourse ballistic objects and feeds that track data to C2BMC (S8.2-1 and beyond) for use in cueing BMDS sensors and weapon systems, and for situational awareness.” Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, “Sensors,” FY17 Ballistic Missile Defense Systems, 283, https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2017/bmds/2017sensorsC2.pdf?ver=2019-08-19-113818-147. See also Crouse, “The Technological Challenges of Complex Missile Defense,” August 26, 2022.

42 Kevin Knodell, “Kauai Residents Raise Concerns over Planned $1.9 Billion Missile Radar,” Star Advertiser, January 18, 2022, https://www.staradvertiser.com/2022/01/18/hawaii-news/kauai-residents-raise-concerns-over-planned-1-9b-missile-radar/.

43 “Our missile warning systems have focused on detecting the heat signature generated by the booster (rocket) to determine where an incoming missile attack is headed and when it will impact. But this approach does not account for maneuvering done by the payload rather than the booster. And if we do not know the missile’s trajectory or target with confidence, defending against it becomes more complicated.” Dunham and Wilson, 2.

44 Interview with VADM Jon Hill.

45 A single high altitude nuclear detonation could cause failure of all LEO satellites not specifically hardened against this effect in weeks to months.

46 Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy Summary, June 2020, p. 1, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF See also Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, “Space Dominance Requires Taking Technology and Policy Risks,” Defense News Online, September 14, 2020; DoD, Defense Space Strategy Summary, p. 3. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 2019, p. 14, http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.

47 See website “Ballistic Early Warning System,” https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Ballistic_Missile_Early_Warning_System, accessed September 2, 2022.

48 See website “Ballistic Early Warning System.”

49 Website article, “Missile Early Warning: Peeking over the Curtain,” Military.com, https://www.military.com/history/missile-early-warning-peeking-over-the-curtain.html, accessed September 3, 2022.

50 R. Cargill Hall, Missile Defense Alarm: The Genesis of Space-Based Infrared Early Warning, NRO, July 1988, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/docs/foia-mda.pdf. See also Website article, “Missile Early Warning: Peeking Over the Curtain.”

51 Defense Secretary Harold Brown, “Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development), Subject: Midas System,” June 25, 1962, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB235/05.pdf; see also General B.A. Schriever, Commander of Air Force Systems Command, Subject: DoD Program Change (4.4.040) on MIDAS (239A), August 13, 1962, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB235/06.pdf.

52 DSP also provides dual phenomenology (IR and radar) for greater confidence and less likelihood of some sensor or computer glitch providing false warning of an attack.

53 R. Cargill Hall, Missile Defense Alarm, 27.

54 Interview with Roger Cole, “A Resilient, Layered Space-Based Architecture is Well-Suited to Missile Warning Systems,” Breaking Defense, December 20, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/12/a-resilient-layered-space-based-architecture-is-well-suited-to-missile-warning-systems/.

55 Sandra Erwin, “DoD to End Procurements of Geosynchronous Missile-Warning Satellites,” Space News, September 21, 2022, https://spacenews.com/dod-to-end-procurements-of-geosynchronous-missile-warning-satellites/.

56 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Development Agency’s satellite plan gets new name, but focus on speed stays,” BreakingDefense.com, January 23, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/space-development-agencys-satellite-plan-gets-new-name-but-focus-on-speed-stays/#:∼:text=By%20Theresa%20Hitchens%20on%20January%2023%2C%202023%20at,Layer%20communications%20mesh%20network%20in%202024.%20%28Northrop%20Grumman%29.

57 From the March 12, 2019 Secretary of Defense memo (signed by Acting Secretary of Defense, Patrick M. Shanahan) on the “Establishment of the Space Development Agency.”

58 Amanda Miller, “Emerging Emphasis on Missile Tracking Reflected in Space Force’s 2023 Budget Request,” Air Force Magazine Online, April 26, 2022, https://www.airforcemag.com/emerging-emphasis-on-missile-tracking-reflected-in-space-forces-2023-budget-request/.. According to the SDA public website, https://www.sda.mil/transport/, “SDA’s Transport Layer will provide assured, resilient, low-latency military data and connectivity worldwide to the full range of warfighter platforms. SDA’s Transport Layer is envisioned, modeled, and architected as a constellation varying in size from 300 to more than 500 satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) ranging from 750km to 1200km in altitude. With a full constellation, 95% of the locations on the Earth will have at least two satellites in view at any given time while 99% of the locations on the Earth will have at least one satellite in view. This will ensure constant world-wide coverage around the globe.”

59 Author’s interview with Dr. Derek Tournear, August 5, 2022.

60 SDA refers to its capability releases for Low Earth Orbit as “Tranches.” Tranche 0 consists of demonstration satellites and Tranche 1 will consist of the first operational constellation.

61 “There’s 10 launches total and the launches are one month apart,” Tournear said. “It’s basically one-a-month starting in September 2024.” Cited in Hitchens, “Space Development Agency’s Satellite Plan Gets New Name.”

62 Courtney Albon, “SpaceX rocket launches Space Development Agency’s First Satellites,” Defense News Online, April 2, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2023/04/02/spacex-rocket-launches-space-development-agencys-first-satellites/.

63 Greg Hadley, “SDA Taps Raytheon for Seven More Missile-Tracking Satellites,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, March 6, 2023, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/sda-taps-raytheon-for-seven-more-missile-tracking-satellites/.

64 Kelley M. Sayler, “Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2023, 1, 2, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23588919/hypersonic-missile-defense-issues-for-congress-jan-24-2023.pdf See also Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall, “Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, January 26, 2022, 1, 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11623.

65 Sandra Erwin, “Millennium Space’s Missile-Warning Satellite Clears Design Review,” SpaceNews Online, November 27, 2022, https://spacenews.com/millennium-spaces-missile-warning-satellite-clears-design-review/.

66 Tournear interview. See also Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Targets 2027 for Resilient On-Orbit Posture Initial Capability,” BreakingDefense.com, May 17, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/space-force-targets-2027-for-resilient-on-orbit-posture-initial-capability/.. See also Rachael Zisk, “The National Defense Space Architecture: Inside Space Force’s Splashy New Initiative,” Fast Company, December 9, 2022, https://www.fastcompany.com/90821502/the-national-defense-space-architecture-inside-space-forces-splashy-new-initiative; Theresa Hitchens, “Space Force Asks Industry Input for Second Phase of MEO Missile Warning/Tracking,” BreakingDefense.com, April 3, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/04/space-force-asks-industry-input-for-second-phase-of-meo-missile-warning-tracking/

67 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force to Activate Sensor on Wide-Field-of-View Missile Warning Satellite,” SpaceNews Online, October 24, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-to-activate-sensor-on-wide-field-of-view-missile-warning-satellite/.

68 Hill testimony, June 15, 2021.

69 Theresa Hitchens, “MDA Director Sees New Space Investment,” BreakingDefense.com, June 29, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/06/mda-director-sees-new-space-investment/.

70 See also, CSIS Interview Transcript, “Complex Air Defense: Countering the Hypersonic Missile Threat,” February 9, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/complex-air-defense-countering-hypersonic-missile-threat-0.

71 Highly elliptical orbits (HEO) can have apogees of more than 30,000 miles.

72 Author interview with Mr. Stan Stafira, MDA Chief Architect, August 2, 2022.

73 Samantha Beu, “Space Assets Critical to Defeat Hypersonic Threats,” National Defense Magazine Online, September 23, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/9/23/space-assets-critical-to-defeat-hypersonic-threats.

74 Courtney Albon, “New Missile Warning, Tracking Force Design Could Accelerate SDA Tranche 1 Tracking Layer,” InsideDefense.com, August 26, 2021, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/new-missile-warning-tracking-force-design-could-accelerate-sda-tranche-1-tracking-layer; David Vergun, “Space Development Agency Transitioning to U.S. Space Force,” DOD News, August 26, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2747675/space-development-agency-transitioning-to-us-space-force/.

75 Sherman, “Pentagon Moving to Convert SKA from Experiment to Operational Capability by 2022.”

76 Lieutenant General John E. Shaw, Deputy Command U.S. Space Command, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Force Subcommittee, May 11, 2022 [draft].

77 Hill testimony, June 15, 2021.

78 Raytheon Intelligence & Space, “Why Space-Based Assets Are Crucial for Effective Missile Defence,” Shephard Media, June 29, 2021.

79 Samantha Beu, “Sensor Tech Key to Effective Missile Defense,” National Defense Magazine, April 2, 2021, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/4/2/sensor-tech-key-to-effective-missile-defense.

80 Author’s interview with Mr. Walt Chai, MDA Director for Space Systems, June 29, 2022.

81 Megan Crouse, “The Technology Challenges of Complex Missile Defense,” Military-Aerospace Electronics, August 26, 2022, https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14280041/missile-defense-sensors.

82 Author’s interview with Dr. Derek Tournear, SDA Director, August 5, 2022.

83 Author’s interview with Mr. Walt Chai. Ground user equipment is almost always a separate program element and often controlled by another Service like the Army or Navy.

84 Author interview with VADM Hill.

85 See, for example, Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Procurement Chief Criticizes Over-Engineered Satellite Programs,” SpaceNews Online, September 20, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-procurement-chief-criticizes-over-engineered-satellite-programs/.

86 Donald Rumsfeld, “Missile Defense Program Direction,” Office of the Secretary of Defense Memo, January 2, 2002, http://fas.org/ssp/bmd/d20020102mda.pdf. 

87 Lt. Gen. Ronald T. Kadish, On the Missile Defense Program, Statement before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veteran Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Report, July 16, 2002.

88 Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish, The Missile Defense Program, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, March 7, 2002, https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_kadish7mar02.pdf.

89 Robert Joseph, “The Missile Defense Agency Must Be Free to Move Quickly and with Limited Restrictions,” Defense News Online, September 15, 2021.

90 HBTSS will look down from orbit to view objects against the warm Earth background that will be rich with clutter. Once deployed, DSS would view objects in midcourse flight against the cold background of space. Author interviews with Stan Stafira and Walt Chai.

91 The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System is the process used by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to fulfill its statutory responsibilities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), including but not limited to identifying, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint military capability requirements. https://www.dau.edu/acquipedia/pages/ArticleContent.aspx?itemid=643#:∼:text=JCIDS%20is%20the%20process%20used,prioritizing%20joint%20military%20capability%20requirements.

92 Author interview with Derek Tournear.

93 One of the problems in the past has been one of mission creep, where the developer is told Pentagon stakeholders to keep adding in requirements, which adds not only to the cost of the satellite but also to the length of time it takes to put it on orbit, making the development and procurement of the satellite unaffordable. The lower the satellite cost, the simpler and more stable the requirement, the easier it will be to get through the development cycle and place it on orbit.

94 Author interviews with Derek Tournear and Walt Chai. See also Kelley M. Saylor, “Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2022, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23118899/hypersonic-missile-defense-issues-for-congress-oct-3-2022.pdf.

95 Rachael Zisk, “The National Defense Space Architecture: Inside Space Force’s Splashy New Initiative,” Fast Company, December 9, 2022, https://www.fastcompany.com/90821502/the-national-defense-space-architecture-inside-space-forces-splashy-new-initiative.

96 MDA is building the HBTSS prototype (STSS and Near Field InfraRed Experiment were the prototypes for HBTSS) which will be handed off to someone else for production. MDA paid for new BM signal processor for the ships—from air warfare to ballistic warfare. MDA is used to proceeding this way. THAAD is owned by Army, but MDA produces it. MDA prototyped the multi-mission signal processor and the navy took it over and took it to sea. A good partnership with the Navy. We made it operation and Navy picked it out for construction and MDA is not in the business of building signal processors for ships anymore. SPY-6 radar is BMD capable, but is not based on MDA requirements—so we don’t know what we’re going to get with that radar. They took a different path. The (Baseline 10 Flt III) ship’s capability will take a step backwards when it is installed and their capability will be less than the SPY 1 ships out there, because it’s not just about the radar, it’s also about the processing of the data and the combat control.

97 The Global Positioning System of satellites was a hard pill to swallow for the nation. Initially it was put up to support nuclear warfighting, but the warfighter and the rest of the country eventually found out how important the precision timing coming off the system was. At first, the cost of the maintaining the constellation looked unreasonable, but eventually the GPS system came to be so important for the United States and the world that paying for it became a no-brainer.

98 Sandra Erwin, “New Guidance from Space Force Acquisition Boss: ‘The Traditional Ways Must Be Reformed,” SpaceNews Online, November 1, 2022, https://spacenews.com/new-guidance-from-space-force-acquisition-boss-the-traditional-ways-must-be-reformed/.

99 "With so many new capabilities being provided by industry, commercial services are taking off in ways that we never probably imagined just a few years ago," said Brigadier General Timothy Sejba, program executive officer for space domain awareness and combat power at the USSF Space Systems Command. Sandra Erwin, “New Space Force Procurement Shop Subscribes to the Space-As-a-Service Model,” SpaceNews Online, November 21, 2022, https://spacenews.com/fighting-fomo-with-comso/ See also Jon Harper, “Spacecom Leader Warns of Potential ‘Failure Modes’ as DOD Pursues Commercial Space Capabilities,” DefenseScoop.com, January 24, 2023, https://defensescoop.com/2023/01/24/spacecom-chief-warns-of-potential-failure-modes-as-dod-pursues-commercial-space-capabilities/ See also Theresa Hitchens, “White House Advisory Group to Explore DoD Use of Commercial Space,” BreakingDefense.com, February 23, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/white-house-advisory-group-to-explore-dod-use-of-commercial-space/.

100 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Nominee Sees Growing Threats to U.S. Satellites from Rival Powers,” SpaceNews Online, September 13, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-nominee-sees-growing-threats-to-u-s-satellites-from-rival-powers/.

101 Author interview with Derek Tournear.

102 Courtney Albon, “Space Force May Seek Commercial Fleet to Augment Wartime Needs,” Defense News Online, October 19, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/battlefield-tech/space/2022/10/19/space-force-may-seek-commercial-fleet-to-augment-wartime-needs/. SSC is implementing the Commercial Augmentation Space Reserve (CASR) approach that is somewhat similar to the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet (CRAF) model.

103 See, for example, Sandra Erwin, “Military to Tap Commercial Industry for ‘Space Mobility’ Services,” SpaceNews Online, February 21, 2023, https://spacenews.com/military-to-tap-commercial-industry-for-space-mobility-services/.

104 Theresa Hitchens, “24 Hours from ‘Go’: Next Space Force ‘Responsive Launch’ Experiment Aims to Loft Satellite in a Hurry,” BreakingDefense.com, September 28, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/09/24-hours-from-go-next-space-force-responsive-launch-experiment-aims-to-loft-satellite-in-a-hurry/; Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Lays Out Timeline for 2023 Rapid-Response Launch Experiment,” SpaceNews Online, November 6, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-lays-out-timeline-for-2023-rapid-response-launch-experiment/.

105 Courtney Albon, “Next Space Force Chief Should Focus on Resiliency, Raymond Says,” C4ISRNET.com, November 3, 2022, https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2022/11/03/next-space-force-chief-should-focus-on-resiliency-raymond-says/; Courtney Albon, “U.S. Acquisition Exec on Being Faster, Stronger and More United in Space,” C4ISRNET.com, December 8, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2022/12/05/us-acquisition-exec-on-being-faster-stronger-and-more-united-in-space/.

106 For an excellent discussion of the SKA program and associated management challenges, see Michael Schlacter, “How Commercial Space Spurred DoD Innovation,” Defense AT&L, March-April 2018, https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/DATLFiles/Mar-April_2018/Schlacter.pdf.

107 Michael Marrow, “U.S. Still Lacks ‘Whole-Of-Nation’ Vision for Space, Report Warns,” InsideDefense.com, August 24, 2022.

108 Lambakis, Space as a Warfighting Domain, 82–9. Theresa Hitchens, “’Out of Control’: DoD Reviews Use of Super-Secret SAP Classification, for Space Programs and Beyond,” BreakingDefense.com, February 14, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/out-of-control-dod-reviews-use-of-super-secret-sap-classification-for-space-programs-and-beyond/; Sandra Erwin, “Pentagon Working with Congress on Unclassified Space Strategy,” SpaceNews Online, February 15, 2023, https://spacenews.com/pentagon-working-with-congress-on-unclassified-space-strategy/.

109 Theresa Hitchens, “U.S. Strategic Space Review Signed Out, But No Unclassified Version is Coming,” BreakingDefense.com, November 1, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/exclusive-us-strategic-space-review-signed-out-but-no-unclassified-version-is-coming/.

110 TN Science Desk, “Japan Eyes a Space-Based Missile Defense System with 50 Satellites Tracking Enemy Missiles,” Times Now, November 16, 2022, https://www.timesnownews.com/technology-science/japan-eyes-a-space-based-missile-defense-system-with-50-satellites-tracking-enemy-missiles-article-95556333.; Erwin, “New guidance from Space Force acquisition boss.”

111 Space has been used for decades to enhance and facilitate military operations on Earth. Over the past four decades there has been significant political turmoil around: 1) deployment of terrestrial- or space-based kinetic or non-kinetic weapons to terminate or destroy a satellite, or, 2) deployment of weapons in orbit for missile defense, space control, or striking targets on Earth. Decisions for or against the deployment of space-based sensors have not had to factor in the highly intense political arguments that typically charge space weapon debates.

112 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force to Seek Budget Boost Beyond 2023, China’s Capabilities Are ‘Close to Ours,’” SpaceNews Online, October 25, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-to-seek-budget-boost-beyond-2023-chinas-capabilities-are-close-to-ours/ and Thomas Novelly, “Citing Growing Threat from China, Space Force Leaders Say They Need More Money,” Military.com, October 28, 2022, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/10/28/citing-growing-threat-china-space-force-leaders-say-they-need-more-money.html.

113 Courtney Albon, “Space Force Budget Presents a Bridge Strategy for Missile Warning, Tracking Architecture,” C4ISRNET.com, April 19, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/space-force-budget-presents-bridge-165954127.html.

114 Amanda Miller, “Dickinson: U.S. Space Command Is Studying New Ways to Use Existing Satellites,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, November 29, 2022, https://hypeaviation.com/story/dickinson-us-space-command-is-studying-new-ways-to-use-existing-satellites/83331/.

115 Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Chief: The Use of Space Technology in Ukraine ‘Is What We Can Expect in the Future’,” SpaceNews Online, December 4, 2022, https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-chief-the-use-of-space-technology-in-ukraine-is-what-we-can-expect-in-the-future/.

116 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 2022, IV, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Nominee Sees Growing Threats to U.S. Satellites from Rival Powers,” SpaceNews Online, September 13, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-nominee-sees-growing-threats-to-u-s-satellites-from-rival-powers/; Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Briefing on Military Space Race Catches Jeff Bezos’ Attention,” SpaceNews Online, October 19, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-briefing-on-military-space-race-catches-jeff-bezos-attention/; Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy Summary, June 2020, p. 1 https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/17/2002317391/-1/-1/1/2020_DEFENSE_SPACE_STRATEGY_SUMMARY.PDF. See also Gen. John W. "Jay" Raymond, “Space Dominance Requires Taking Technology and Policy Risks,” Defense News Online, September 14, 2020.

117 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 17. Alasdair Pal, “China Poses Increasing Threat in Military Space Race, Top U.S. General Says,” Reuters, November 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/china-poses-increasing-threat-military-space-race-top-us-general-says-2022-11-28/.

118 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 18.

119 Trefor Moss, “Both the U.S. and China Have Secretive Programs to Develop Unmanned, Reusable Spaceplanes,” Wall Street Journal Online, September 4, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-launches-experimental-spaceplane-11599217896.

120 For a summary of the growing China space threat to U.S. systems, see Lambakis, Foreign Space Capabilities, 19–26, and; Lambakis, A Guide to Thinking About Space Deterrence and China (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2019), 11–22, and Sandra Erwin, “Raymond on China’s Space Program: ‘It’s Alive, Well and Concerning,’” SpaceNews Online, December 17, 2020, https://spacenews.com/raymond-on-chinas-space-program-its-alive-well-and-concerning/.

121 Courtney Albon, “Pentagon Leaders Discuss China’s Space Ambitions at Classified Meeting,” Defense News Online, September 8, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/pentagon-leaders-discuss-china-space-154830430.html?guccounter =1&guce_referrer = aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig =AQAAAH6nPE3Xu5_TarNVEXX8_WTZhZBc1v_UON7uNof-iZUBKXKPFtEYaGtttBpqcrYWLJY65piWcc1mrQzBnFZaAZ3XKEKvrh98XXgAhFhdCZgIF5JhB81nK6xZvDbznYbWMXyt3GwNzaaj1OcyNP9KNKgMEYiPFuszrkEl3Cnwt6YF.

122 Pavel Luzin, “Cosmos ASATs and Russia’s Approach to Space Weapons,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 17, Iss. 121, August 14, 2020. Russia has demonstrated two different types of space weapons. See Greg Norman, “Russia Tests Anti-Satellite Missile in Pursuit to Make Space a ‘Warfighting Domain,’ Us Officials Say,” Fox News, December 16, 2020, https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-space-command-russia-tests-anti-satellite-missile. Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 27–9.

123 Stephen Kitay, DASD (Space), “Defense Official Briefs Defense Space Strategy to Reporters,” June 17, 2020, Transcript at: https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2225281/defense-official-briefs-defense-space-strategy-to-reporters/.

124 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Official: Russian Missile Tests Expose Vulnerability of Low-Orbiting Satellites,” SpaceNews Online, December 16, 2020, https://spacenews.com/space-force-official-russian-missile-tests-expose-vulnerability-of-low-orbiting-satellites/.

125 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 28; Lee Ferran, “Space Force Commander Cannot ‘Forgive’ Russia for ‘Reckless’ ASAT Test,” BreakingDefense.com, October 14, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/10/space-force-commander-cannot-forgive-russia-for-reckless-asat-test/.

126 Ann M. Simmons and Micah Maidenberg, “Moscow Threatens U.S. Satellites,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2022. Joey Roulette, “Russia's Anti-Satellite Threat Tests Laws of War in Space,” Reuters, October 27, 2022, https://kfgo.com/2022/10/27/russias-anti-satellite-threat-tests-laws-of-war-in-space/#:∼:text=Oct%2027%2C%202022%20%7C%2011%3A10%20PM%20By%20Joey,executives%20about%20the%20safety%20of%20objects%20in%20orbit.

127 Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, 29.

128 See Steve Ranger, “US Intelligence: 30 Countries Building Cyber Attack Capabilities,” ZDNet, January 5, 2017, http://www.zdnet.com/article/us-intelligence-30-countries-building-cyber-attack-capabilities/.

129 High Altitude Nuclear Explosions in LEO pump up the Van Allen radiation belts and cause failure of unhardened satellites while an atmospheric EMP would affect activities on Earth and limited effects in space. Kitay “Defense Official Briefs Defense Space Strategy,” June 17, 2020. For a good summary of the EMP threat, see Mitre, Electromagnetic Pulse: The Dangerous but Overlooked Threat, September 2020, https://www.mitre.org/publications/project-stories/electromagnetic-pulse-the-dangerous-but-overlooked-threat.

130 See Kitay, “Defense Official Briefs Defense Space Strategy.” .

131 Ferran, “Space Force Commander Cannot ‘Forgive’ Russia for ‘Reckless ASAT Test.” See also Theresa Hitchens, “Cyber Attack Most Likely Space Threat—Maj. Gen. Whiting,” BreakingDefense.com, September 16, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/cyber-attack-most-likely-space-threat-maj-gen-whiting/.

132 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Development Agency Missile Tracking Data Will Inform NC3,” BreakingDefense.com, November 11, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/space-development-agency-missile-tracking-data-will-inform-nc3/.

133 Hitchens, “Space Development Agency Missile Tracking Data Will Inform NC3.”

134 DIA, 2022 Challenges to Security in Space, 4.

135 Jason Sherman, “MDA Readies Missile Defense Destroyers for New ‘Big Deal’ Mission: Tracking Space Objects,” InsideDefense.com, June 14, 2022.

136 General Saltzman, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General Bradley C. Saltzman to be General and Chief of Space Operations, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing Transcript, September 13, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-63_09-13-2022.pdf.. Not only will we need the terrestrial and space platforms to do this mission, significant work also needs to be done in the software arena: “When I think about space domain awareness and the number of sensors worldwide that we are going to need in order to effectively evaluate and determine what is on orbit and where it is and what it is doing and then have the tools—the software tools—on the ground to take all that data in and turn that data into information and decision-quality information, those are some near-term issues that I think we are going to have to address from a software and a hardware standpoint.”

137 Jeff Foust, “Guetlein: Improved Space Domain Awareness Essential for National Security,” SpaceNews Online, September 28, 2022, https://spacenews.com/guetlein-improved-space-domain-awareness-essential-for-national-security/.

138 Amanda Miller, “Dickinson: U.S. Space Command Is Studying New Ways to Use Existing Satellites,” Air & Space Forces Magazine Online,” November 29, 2022, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/dickinson-us-space-command-is-studying-new-ways-to-use-existing-satellites/.

139 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force in Discussions with Industry on Future Market for Space Surveillance Data,” SpaceNews Online, October 4, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-in-discussions-with-industry-on-future-market-for-space-surveillance-data/.

140 Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Nominee Sees Growing Threats to U.S. Satellites from Rival Powers,” SpaceNews Online, September 13, 2022, https://spacenews.com/space-force-nominee-sees-growing-threats-to-u-s-satellites-from-rival-powers/#:∼:text=Space%20Force%20nominee%20sees%20growing%20threats%20to%20U.S.,the%20Senate%20Armed%20Services%20Committee%20Sept.%2013%2C%202022.

141 Sandra Erwin, “DoD to End Procurements of Geosynchronous Missile-Warning Satellites,” SpaceNews Online, September 21, 2022, https://spacenews.com/dod-to-end-procurements-of-geosynchronous-missile-warning-satellites/ See also Courtney Albon, “Next Space Force Chief Should Focus on Resiliency, Raymond Says,” C4ISRNET.com, November 3, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/next-space-force-chief-focus-145539085.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYmluZy5jb20v&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAH6nPE3Xu5_TarNVEXX8_WTZhZBc1v_UON7uNof-iZUBKXKPFtEYaGtttBpqcrYWLJY65piWcc1mrQzBnFZaAZ3XKEKvrh98XXgAhFhdCZgIF5JhB81nK6xZvDbznYbWMXyt3GwNzaaj1OcyNP9KNKgMEYiPFuszrkEl3Cnwt6YF.

142 Lt Gen Bradley C. Saltzman, Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Bradley C. Saltzman, US Space Force Nominee for Appointment to be Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force Advanced Policy Questions, prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee nomination hearing for Lt. Gen Bradley C. Saltzman, September 13, 2022.

143 Resilience is not just about what is in orbit. There are also ground systems that require protection. Greg Hadley, “Keys to Space Resilience: It’s More Than Orbits, Says DOD’s Plumb,” Air & Space Forces Magazine Online, February 15, 2023, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/keys-to-space-resilience-its-more-than-orbits-says-dods-plumb/.

144 Patrick Tucker, “Space Force Trying to Prep Old Satellites for New Threats by 2026,” DefenseOne.com, April 20, 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/04/space-force-trying-prep-old-satellites-new-threats-2026/365917/ See also Testimony of Dr. Plumb, Before the House Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2023, 13.

145 Theresa Hitchens, “Space Acquisition Office Weighs Mission Priorities in Case Satellites Go Down,” BreakingDefense.com, January 18, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/space-acquisition-office-weighs-mission-priorities-in-case-satellites-go-down/#:∼:text=Space%20acquisition%20office%20weighs%20mission%20priorities%20in%20case,Hitchens%20on%20January%2018%2C%202023%20at%202%3A20%20PM.

146 The ability to pass data between assets in different orbits using optical crosslinks would allow defenders to maintain custody of the target missile without ever having to communicate with the ground, which is what current warning satellites in GEO do. Sandra Erwin, “Lockheed Martin Proposes Multi-Layer Space Network for Missile Defense,” SpaceNews Online, April 18, 2022, https://spacenews.com/lockheed-martin-proposes-multi-layer-space-network-for-missile-defense/. See also Theresa Hitchens, “Newest Sats Launched by DoD Include Jammer-Evading, Classified Payloads,” BreakingDefense.com, July 6, 2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/07/newest-sats-launched-by-dod-include-jammer-evading-classified-payloads/#:∼:text=Newest%20sats%20launched%20by%20DoD%20include%20jammer-evading%2C%20classified,Hitchens%20on%20July%2006%2C%202022%20at%201%3A30%20PM.

147 According to CSO General Saltzman, “If you can just take out a few satellites and radically degrade the capabilities, you don’t have a resilient architecture.” This has to be the “starting point of a discussion that we need to build a new type of space capabilities with resiliency baked in from the beginning.” Sandra Erwin, “U.S. Space Force Chief: The Use of Space Technology in Ukraine ‘Is What We Can Expect in the Future,” SpaceNews Online, December 4, 2022, https://spacenews.com/u-s-space-force-chief-the-use-of-space-technology-in-ukraine-is-what-we-can-expect-in-the-future/; Greg Hadley, “Study: Combine Missile Warning, Tracking Constellations into One Multi-Orbit System,” Air Force Magazine Online, June 7, 2022.

148 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, “Missile Defense Review,” 8, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

149 Colin Kahl, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy: “We need a missile warning, missile tracking and integrated air and missile defense that accounts for all of those [developments], which is why we’re making significant investments—not just in things like updating our interceptors for ballistic missiles or cruise missile defense, but also significant investments in space-based missile warning and tracking,” Courtney Albon, “Pentagon Leaders Discuss China’s Space Ambitions at Classified Meeting,” DefenseNews Online, September 8, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/pentagon-leaders-discuss-china-space-154830430.html.

150 See also Doug Lamborn, “Reagan’s Vision and the State of U.S. Missile Defense Today,” The Ripon Forum, December 12, 2022, https://riponsociety.org/article/reagans-vision-and-the-state-of-u-s-missile-defense-today/.

151 U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, “Missile Defense Review,” 8, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

152 Lieutenant General John E. Shaw, Deputy Command U.S. Space Command, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Force Subcommittee, May 11, 2022 [draft].

153 VADM Jon A. Hill, Written Statement: Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, June 15, 2021.

154 Courtney Albon, “Space Force Budget Presents a Bridge Strategy for Missile Warning, Tracking Architecture,” C4ISRNET.com, April 19, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/space-force-budget-presents-bridge-165954127.html. See also Sandra Erwin, “Space Force Official: To Beat China, U.S. Has to Spend Smarter,” SpaceNews Online, January 11, 2023, https://spacenews.com/space-force-official-to-beat-china-u-s-has-to-spend-smarter/.

155 Secretary Frank Kendall and Gen. John W. Raymond, “The U.S. Space Force Is Your Eye in the Sky,” Wall Street Journal Online, June 8, 2022.

156 For a good example of what can happen in the world of compromise, see Courtney Albon, “Lawmakers Chart ‘Middle Course’ on Space-Based Missile Warning Funding,” C4ISRNET.com, January 13, 2023, https://news.yahoo.com/lawmakers-chart-middle-course-space-162738016.html.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Steve Lambakis

Since joining National Institute for Public Policy in 1989, Dr. Steve Lambakis has written numerous reports on national security space and missile defense. Since 2000, he has supported the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Dr. Lambakis also is the Editor-in-Chief of Comparative Strategy, a leading international journal of global affairs and strategic studies sponsored by the National Institute.