ISAF and European military transformation: German, Swedish and French counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003–2014

Abstract

This article examines the role of a subset of European militaries in responding to the Afghan insurgency during their deployment as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While part of a multinational coalition, their heterogeneous military transformation was crucial to fighting the insurrection and confronting American pressure. In comparing the counterinsurgency innovations of Germany, Sweden, and France, we find that Germany acted reluctantly, Sweden largely emulated American doctrine, and France became a counterinsurgency pioneer. We argue that these developments took time and were accompanied by conflicts within ISAF and between the respective national military and political leaderships.

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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 Winston Churchill, quoted in James C. Humes, The Wit and Wisdom of Winston Churchill:

A Treasury of More Than 1000 Quotations (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 15.

We thank the reviewers and the editor-in-chief for their time and effort in the review process.

2 Fareed Zakaria, “The U.S. needs to end the war with Afghanistan without losing the peace,” The Washington Post, last modified August 2, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-us-needs-to-end-the-war-with-afghanistan-without-losing-the-peace/2019/08/01/d7ffc890-b498-11e9-8f6c-7828e68cb15f_story.html (accessed July 29, 2023).

3 Unsigned, “Violence in Afghanistan last year was worse than in Syria,” The Economist, August 17, 2019, 69.

4 Andrew Quilty, August in Kabul: America’s Last Days in Afghanistan (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023).

5 U.S. Department of Defense definition quoted in John J. Garstka, “The Transformation Challenge,” NATO Review, March 1, 2005, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/03/01/the-transformation-challenge/index.html (accessed July 29, 2023). Similarly, John J. Garstka defined military transformation for NATO as “sustained, purposeful change, often on a large scale, undertaken with the strategic objective of creating or maintaining competitive advantage, or of countering an advantage put in place by an existing or a new competitor.” Ibid. For an overview of competing definitions and concepts of military transformation, see Elinor Sloan, Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook (Westport: Praeger, 2008), 1-15.

6 David J. Galbreath, “Western European Armed Forces and the Modernisation Agenda: Following or Falling Behind?,” Defence Studies 14, no. 4 (2014): 411.

7 Hew Strachan, “Strategy in Theory; Strategy in Practice,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 2 (2019): 171-190.

8 Sven Bernhard Gareis, Karl Haltiner and Paul Klein “Strukturprinzipien und Organisationsmerkmale von Streitkräften,” in Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft, ed. Bernhard Gareis and Paul Klein (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 14-25.

9 Theo Farrell, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

10 Barry Posen, The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1984).

11 Theo Farrell, Frans P. B. Osinga, James A. Russell, ed., Military Adaptation in Afghanistan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin and Helen McCartney, “‘Transformation in Contact’: Learning the Lessons of Modern War,” International Affairs 87, no. 2 (2011): 253-270; James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

12 For the fixation on American armed forces, see especially Frank G. Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Military Change during War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021).

13 For Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, possible areas of inquiry are strategic culture, civil-military leadership, (military) bureaucratic interests, militaries’ access to resources, strategic imperatives, coalition efficiency/burden sharing and/or transmission structure (norms and innovation). See Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “Military Transformation in NATO: A Framework for Analysis,” in A Transformation Gap? American Military Innovations and European Military Change, ed. Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 1-13.

14 Alexander Salt, “Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 1 (2018): 98-126; Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991-2012 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 88-115; Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008); James A. Russell, “Into the Great Wadi: The United States and the War in Afghanistan,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 51-82; Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008); Theo Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 (London: The Bodley Head, 2017).

15 Department of the Army/Marine Corps Combat Development Command, ed., Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army/Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006); Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 219, 234-236, 274-275.

16 NATO, “Allied Command Transformation,” May 4, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52092.htm (accessed July 29, 2023).

17 Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, 248.

18 Terriff, Osinga, Farrell, A Transformation Gap.

19 Sebastian Harnisch, “Deutschlands Rolle in Afghanistan: State-Building-Dilemmata einer Zivilmacht,” Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 4, no. 223 (2011): 223-251.

20 Klaus Brunner and Stefan Fröhlich, ed., Zehn Jahre Deutschland in Afghanistan (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011).

21 Philipp Münch, Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Militärische Handlungslogik in internationalen Interventionen (Freiburg: Rombach, 2015).

22 Maren Tomforde, “Neue Militärkultur(en): Wie verändert sich die Bundeswehr durch die Auslandseinsätze?,” in Forschungsthema: Militär: Militärische Organisationen im Spannungsfeld von Krieg, Gesellschaft und soldatischen Subjekten, ed. Maja Apelt (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 193-219.

23 Anja Seiffert, “‘Generation Einsatz’ – Einsatzrealitäten, Selbstverständnis und Organisation,” in Der Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan:

Sozial– und politikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, ed. Anja Seiffert, Phil C. Langer and Carsten Pietsch (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012), 79-99.

24 Anja Seiffert and Julius Hess, “Generation ISAF – Operational Realities, Self-Image and Organization,” in The Armed Forces: Towards a Post-Interventionist Era?, ed. Gerhard Kümmel and Bastian Giegerich (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2013), 279-301.

25 Timo Noetzel, “Germany’s Small War in Afghanistan: Military Learning amid Politico-strategic Inertia,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no. 3 (2010): 486-508.

26 Benjamin Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” Security Challenges 6, no. 1 (2010): 87-103.

27 Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe, Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag: Instrumente und Planungsstrukturen für den ISAF Einsatz (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2008).

28 Magnus Johnsson, Strategic Colonels: The Discretion of Swedish Force Commanders in Afghanistan 2006-2013 (Ph.D. Diss., Uppsala University, 2017).

29 Swedish Government, “Sveriges samlade engagemang i Afghanistan under perioden 2002-2014,” March 2, 2017, https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/statens-offentliga-utredningar/2017/03/sou-201716/(accessed July 29, 2023).

30 Oriane Barat-Ginies, L’engagement militaire français en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2011: Quels engagements militaires pour quelles ambitions politiques? (Paris: Harmattan, 2011).

31 Olivier Schmitt, “French Military Adaptation in the Afghan War: Looking Inward or Outward?,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017), 577-599.

32 Christoph Lafaye, L’armée française en Afghanistan: Le Génie au combat, 2001-2012 (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2016).

33 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and transl. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 127.

34 Ibid., 89.

35 Anthony King, Europe’s Armed Force: From Rhine to Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14.

36 Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), 1. For an overview on U.S. Army doctrine, see Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011).

37 Bert Chapman, Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2009), 2.

38 Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine, 157-174.

39 Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, 3.

40 Frans P. B. Osinga and James A. Russell, “Conclusion: Military Adaptation and the War in Afghanistan,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 290.

41 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 61-75.

42 Ibid., 61.

43 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften (HDv 100/100) (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: Bonn, 2007), Chapter 2.

44 The regulations of the 100 series deal with the principles of command and control of troops throughout the Army’s area of responsibility.

45 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften (HDv 100/100), Chapter 2.

46 Tom Dyson, “Managing Convergence: German Military Doctrine and Capabilities in the 21st Century,” Defence Studies 11, no. 2 (2011): 252.

47 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften (HDv 100/100), Chapter 12, II.

48 Ibid., Chapter 13, II.

49 Thomas Wiegold, “Es begann als ‘Insel der Stabilität’: Zehn Jahre Bundeswehr in Kunduz,” last modified October 6, 2013, https://augengeradeaus.net/2013/10/kundus-zehn-jahre-bundeswehr/(accessed July 29, 2023).

50 Timo Noetzel, Benjamin Schreer, “Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking,” The RUSI Journal 154, no. 1 (2009): 20.

51 Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 125.

52 Department of the Army/Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Field Manual No. 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5.

53 Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 28; Conrad Crane, “United States,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency Warfare: Origins, Operations, Challenges, ed., Thomas Rid and Thomas A. Keaney, (London: Routledge, 2010), 59-72; Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 147.

54 Michael Fitzsimmons, “Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 3 (2008): 337-365.

55 On the difference and problem of the shift from U.S. counterterrorism to counterinsurgency, see Michael J. Boyle, “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?” International Affairs 86, no. 2 (2010): 333-353.

56 [British] Ministry of of Defence, Army Field Manual, Vol. 1, Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations (London: Ministry of of Defence, 2007); Robert Egnell, “Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: What now for British Counterinsurgency?,” International Affairs 87, no. 2 (2011): 302; Christopher Griffin, “British and American Military Operations in the Battle of Helmand, 2006-2011,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (2013): 417.

57 Noetzel, Schreer, “Missing Links,” 18.

58 Tom Dyson, “Organizing for Counterinsurgency: Explaining Doctrinal Adaptation in Britain and Germany,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (2012): 34.

59 Schreer, “Political Constraints: Germany and Counterinsurgency,” 87-103.

60 Ina Wiesner, “Die Transformation der Bundeswehr in Deutschland,” in Transformation der Sicherheitspolitik: Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz im Vergleich, ed. Thomas Jäger and Ralph Thiele (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 96.

61 Dyson, “Organizing for Counterinsurgency,” 40.

62 The future analysis and concept development departments were then merged into the newly created Planning Office.

63 The Bundeswehr was careful not to introduce the term “general staff,” which historically has had a negative connotation for Germany.

64 Dyson, “Managing Convergence,” 258.

65 See Harald Braun “Evaluierung von Auslandseinsätzen: Die Bewertung der Qualität von Auslandseinsätzen der Bundeswehr,” last modified October 12, 2009, https://www.yumpu.com/de/document/read/21219718/ausgabe-09-2009-evaluierung-von-auslandseinsatzen-reader- (accessed July 29, 2023).

66 Dyson, “Organizing for Counterinsurgency,” 41.

67 Klaus Naumann, Der blinde Spiegel: Deutschland im afghanischen Transformationskrieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2013), 91. An English translation of the specifications can be found at German Army Office, “Preliminary Basics for the Role of Land Forces in Counterinsurgency,” last modified June 5, 2010, http://info.publicintelligence.net/GermanyCOIN.pdf (accessed July 29, 2023).

68 Uwe Larsen, “Einsatz in einem komplexen und dynamischen Umfeld – Counter Insurgency,” Europäische Sicherheit 5, no. 1 (2009): 36-39.

69 Martin Zapfe, “Sicherheitskultur und Strategiefähigkeit: Die ressortgemeinsame Kooperation der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Afghanistan” (Ph.D. Diss, Universität Konstanz, 2011), 17.

70 Winfried Nachtwei “Der Afghanistaneinsatz der Bundeswehr: Von der Stabilisierung zur Aufstandsbekämpfung,” in Der Taliban-Komplex: Zwischen Aufstandsbewegung und Militäreinsatz, ed. Conrad Schetter and Jörgen Klußmann (Frankfurt: Campus, 2011), 42.

71 Zapfe, “Sicherheitskultur und Strategiefähigkeit,” 225.

72 European Court of Human Rights, “The investigation by the German authorities following a lethal airstrike in the context of NATO operations in Afghanistan did not breach the Convention,” last modified February 2, 2021, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-6940295-9330841&filename=Grand%20Chamber%20judgment%20Hanan%20v.%20Germany%20-%20Investigation%20following%20a%20lethal%20airstrike%20during%20NATO%20operations%20in%20Afghanistan%3A%20no%20violation%20of%20the%20Convention.pdf (accessed July 29, 2023).

73 The corresponding command structure in Iraq was Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) and NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I).

74 Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan, 176-178.

75 ISAF, “ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” last modified August 26, 2009, https://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf (accessed July 29, 2023).

76 “Afghanistan: US-General McChrystal fordert neue Bundeswehr-Strategie,” Zeit Online, last modified January 20, 2010, https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010-01/mcchrystal-afghanistan-bundeswehr?utm_referrer=https%3A//www.google.com/ (accessed July 29, 2023).

77 Noetzel, Schreer, “Missing Links,” 17.

78 Nachtwei, “Der Afghanistaneinsatz der Bundeswehr,” 40.

79 For the development of the operational requirements of the U.S. COIN, see Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,” Global Politics and Strategy 52, no. 5 (2010): 157-182.

80 The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” last modified December 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarkspresident-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan (accessed July 29, 2023); John J. Mortimer, Jr., The Afghan Surge: January 2009-August 2011 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2023).

81 Nachtwei, “Der Afghanistaneinsatz der Bundeswehr,” 38.

82 Klaus Brummer, “Überzeugungen und Handeln in der Aussenpolitik: Der Operational Code von Angela Merkel und Deutschland Afghanistanpolitik,” in Zehn Jahre Deutschland in Afghanistan, ed. Klaus Brummer (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 143-169.

83 Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, “Drucksache 17/654,” last modified February 9, 2010, https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/17/006/1700654.pdf (accessed July 29, 2023).

84 Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe, “Mission Command without a Mission: German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, 205.

85 Dyson, “Managing Convergence,” 255.

86 Stephan Löwenstein, “Zur Durchsetzung des Auftrags,” FAZ Blog, last modified July 27, 2009, https://blogs.faz.net/sicherheit/2009/07/27/auftrag-39/ (accessed July 29, 2023).

87 Dieter Weingärtner, “Recht und Einsatz: ‘Von Rechtsunsicherheit kann keine Rede sein’,” Kompass: Soldat in Welt und Kirche, last modified July 31, 2010, https://www.auslandsdekanat.de/fileadmin/kms/kompass/2010/03/kompass201003_09/index.htm (accessed July 29, 2023).

88 Christian Patz, “Conference Report Counterinsurgency and State-building in Afghanistan: Danish and German Lessons Learned 18-17 January 2013, Atlantic Hotel, Kiel, Germany,” Institut für Sicherheitspolitik an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, last modified January 18, 2013, https://www.ispk.uni-kiel.de/de/news-archiv/2014/downloads-2014/abschlussbericht-dt-daen-coin-konferenz-2013.pdf (accessed July 29, 2023), 4.

89 Jan H. Rassaerts, “Der Leitfaden Aufstandsbewältigung des Heeres,” Europäische Sicherheit & Technik, 1 (2014), 49.

90 Inspekteur des Heeres, Leitfaden Aufstandsbewältigung (Strausberg, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2013). The title “Aufstandsbewältigung” (insurgency handling) reflects the Bundeswehr’s restrictive use of terms that are considered historically loaded, in that the term “Aufstandsbekämpfung” (counterinsurgency) does not appear in the title and only in a single place in the text.

91 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4) (Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, 2011).

92 Inspekteur des Heeres, Leitfaden Aufstandsbewältigung, 18.

93 [British] Ministry of of Defence, Army Field Manual, Vol. 1, Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations, Chapter 4.

94 Inspekteur des Heeres, Leitfaden Aufstandsbewältigung, 24.

95 Inspekteur des Heeres, Leitfaden Aufstandsbewältigung, 27.

96 Robert Dalsjö, “From Self-Sufficiency to Solidarity: The Transformation of Sweden’s Defence and Security Policies,” in International Symposium on Security Affairs, ed. NIDS (Tokyo: Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies, 2012), 146; Svenja Post, Toward a whole-of-Europe Approach. Organizing the European Union’s and Member States’ Comprehensive Crisis Management (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2015), 323.

97 Dalsjö, “From Self-Sufficiency to Solidarity,” 150.

98 Carl Bergqvist, “Den Svenska försvarsreformens drivkrafter 1994-2004” (BA thesis, Swedish National Defence College, 2014), 14.

99 Swedish Armed Forces, Joint Military Doctrine Peace Support Operations (Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces, 1997).

100 Försvarsmakten, Militärstrategisk doktrin (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2002).

101 Försvarsmakten, Doktrin för markoperationer (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2005).

102 Försvarsmakten, Doktrin för luftoperationer (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2005).

103 Försvarsmakten, Militärstrategisk Doktrin (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2011).

104 Försvarsmakten, Operativ Doktrin (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2014).

105 Försvarsmakten, Arméreglemente Taktik (Stockholm: Försvarsmakten, 2013).

106 Thomas Vrenngård, “Svenska reglementens relevans för afghanistaninsatsen: En jämförelse avseende skydd av lokalbefolkningen” (Student thesis, Swedish National Defence College, 2010), 5.

107 Ibid., 5.

108 Ibid.

109 Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, 203.

110 Barat-Ginies, L’engagement militaire français en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2011, 27-29, 43-45, 151.

111 Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de presse: 13 ans d’intervention militaire française en Afghanistan,” last modified December 20, 2015, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/334266/4644903/file/DOSSIER%20DE%20PRESSE_%20Afghanistan.pdf (accessed July 29, 2023), 3.

112 Ibid., 14; Barat-Ginies, L’engagement militaire français en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2011, 51-52.

113 Barat-Ginies, L’engagement militaire français en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2011, 154-157.

114 Ministère de la Défense, “Dossier de presse: 13 ans d’intervention militaire française en Afghanistan,” 6.

115 Barat-Ginies, L’engagement militaire français en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2011, 156-158.

116 Christophe Lafaye, “France’s Lessons,” Parameters 51, no. 1 (2021): 57.

117 Etienne De Durand, “France,” in Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges, 11-27.

118 Armée de terre, Doctrine de contre-rébellion (Paris: Centre de doctrine d’emploi des forces, 2009).

119 Armée de terre, Les opérations militaires d’influence (Paris: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations, 2008).

120 De Durand, “France,” 16.

121 Armée de terre, Les opérations militaires d’influence.

122 Armée de terre, L’exercice du commandement en opérations pour les chefs tactiques (Paris: Centre de Doctrine d’emploi des forces, 2010).

123 Armée de terre, Gagner la bataille, conduire à la paix: les forces terrestres dans les conflits aujourd’hui et demain (Paris: Centre de Doctrine d’emploi des forces, 2007).

124 Ibid., 27-34.

125 Ministère de la Défense, Contre-insurrection (Paris: Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d’expérimentations, 2013).

126 Ibid., 9.

127 Ibid., 41-45.

128 Michael O. Holenweger and Alexander C. Hochuli, “Strategic Communication and European Security,” in Technology, Ethics and the Protocols of Modern War, ed. Artur Gruszczak and Pawel Frankowski (London: Routledge, 2021), 19.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Marcel Berni

Marcel Berni ([email protected]) is a research fellow at the Chair of Strategic Studies, Swiss Military Academy at ETH Zurich. He has published articles and essays on the Vietnam War, Swiss history, and contemporary issues of international strategy as well as the history of violence. His dissertation on communist prisoners during the Vietnam War was awarded the André Corvisier Prize for the best doctoral thesis on military history and was published in German as Außer Gefecht: Leben, Leiden und Sterben “kommunistischer” Gefangener in Vietnams amerikanischem Krieg (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2020).

Alexandre C. Hochuli

Alexandre C. Hochuli ([email protected]) was a research associate at the Chair of Strategic Studies, Swiss Military Academy, ETH Zurich from 2013 to 2016. Today, he is an independent researcher based in Zurich, Switzerland.