Wagner Group: Comparing and contextualizing the Russian monster

Abstract

Though the same descriptors have been applied to Wagner Group and US/Western Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), this article differentiates the two experiences to better appreciate Wagner Group’s unique characteristics. To make this differentiation, the article examines the distinctions between defensive and offensive violence, the access to crewed weapons, and an integrated team approach. In this way, the article presents Wagner Group as offensively minded, kitted out with crewed weapons, and operating outside of an integrated team. The article closes with resulting questions to consider regarding Russia’s stance toward weaponry and how Wagner Group’s characteristics might have contributed to the June 2023 uprising.

Acknowledgements

The views expressed in the article are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Department of National Defence or the Government of Canada.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 Lisa O’Carroll, “Prigozhin mutiny was monster acting against his creator, says top EU diplomat,” Guardian, June 26, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/26/prigozhin-mutiny-monster-acting-creator-eu-diplomat-josep-borrell (accessed September 20, 2023).

2 Roger Cohen, “Putin’s Beast That Would Now Devour Him,” New York Times, June 25, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/25/world/europe/russia-putin-prigozhin-wagner-ukraine.html (accessed September 20, 2023).

3 Apart from direct quotes, this article employs the term private military and security company (PMSC).

4 Steve Fainaru, “Iraq contractors face mounting losses,” NBC News, June 16, 2007, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna19256869 (accessed September 20, 2023).

5 Noah Shachtman, “Blackwater Mercs Likely to Stay in Iraq, Despite Gov’t Ban,” Wired, January 29, 2009, https://www.wired.com/2009/01/blackwater-bann-2/ (accessed September 20, 2023).

6 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220. The author notes that before the United States engaged the security privatization market in a substantial way, there were firms like Executive Outcomes and Sandline International that did offer violence offensively and with reliance upon crewed weapons. Note, however, that by the turn of the century, Executive Outcomes was no more and the leadership team behind Sandline International shifted to form Aegis, a firm that followed the mold presented in this article.

7 “Rules and Regulations,” Federal Register 73, no. 40, (February 28, 2008): 10944, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2008-02-28/pdf/FR-2008-02-28.pdf (accessed September 20, 2023); James Cameron, “Private security companies in post-conflict situations: Privates on parade,” World Today, May 2007, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2007-05/private-security-companies-post-conflict-environment-privates (accessed September 20, 2023).

8 United Kingdom, “Chief of the General Staff’s Briefing Team Report 2007(2),” 2007, 4.

9 United States Senate, “Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” First Session, 110^th Congress, January 23, 2007, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110shrg42309/html/CHRG-110shrg42309.htm (accessed September 20, 2023).

10 Sarah K. Cotton, et al., “Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” MG-987-SRF, RAND Corporation, 2010, 66–7; Gary Schaub, JR., and Volker Franke, “Contractors as Military Professionals?,” Parameters 39, no. 4 (2009–2010): 98; Andrew Mayeda, “MPs seek cost of private contractors,” Ottawa Citizen, November 26, 2007, A5;. Gloria Galloway, “Canada spending millions on private security in Afghanistan,” Globe and Mail, November 27, 2009, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-spending-millions-on-private-security-in-afghanistan/article4292821/ (accessed September 20, 2023).

11 For an example assessment, see Dimitry Adamsky, “Cross-domain coercion: the current russian art of strategy,” Proliferation Papers 54, Security Studies Center, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, November 2015, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf (accessed September 20, 2023).

12 Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the Color Revolution,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 28, 2014, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140529_Russia_Color_Revolution_Summary.pdf (accessed September 20, 2023).

13 Robert Coalson, “Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s Plan for Ukraine,” Huffington Post, September 2, 2014, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/valery-gerasimov-putin-ukraine_b_5748480 (accessed September 20, 2023); Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’,” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/ (accessed September 20, 2023).

14 Sergey Sukhankin, “‘A black cat in the dark room’: Russian Quasi-Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) – ‘Non-existent,’ but Deadly and Useful,” Canadian Military Journal 19, no. 4 (2019): 47–8.

15 Coalition Provisional Authority, “Coalition Provisional Authority Order. Number 3 (Revised) (Amended),” December 31, 2003, 2.

16 United States Department of Defense, “Instruction: Policies and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix,” Number 1100.22, December 1, 2017, 19.

17 Christopher Spearin, Private Military and Security Companies and States: Force Divided (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 114.

18 The author recognizes Blackwater’s “Little Bird” helicopters in Iraq. Note, however, that Blackwater was authorized only for defensive usage, the fleet ranged between only 2-8 units depending on the period, and they had no mounted weaponry.

19 Meredith Buel, “US Admiral: Commercial Ships Need Armed Guards to Fight Pirates,” VOA, April 20, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/US-Admiral-Commercial-Ships-Need-Armed-Guards-to-Fight-Pirates-91719979.html (accessed September 20, 2023).

20 John J. Pitney, JR., and John-Clark Levin, Private Anti-Piracy Navies: How Warships For Hire Are Changing Maritime Security (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014), 97.

21 Sébastien Roblin, “The Wagner Mutiny Hit Russia’s Air Force Hard. Really Hard,” Popular Mechanics, June 27, 2023, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a44348988/wagner-group-rebellion-impact-on-russia-air-force/ (accessed September 20, 2023); Harold Vazquez, “What happened when the Russian Air Force attacked Wagner’s rebels?” Economist, June 27, 2023, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2023/06/27/what-happened-when-russias-air-force-attacked-wagners-rebels# (accessed September 20, 2023).

22 United Nations, “Resolution 1973,” Security Council, S/RES/1973 (2011), March 17, 2011, 1–6, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement (accessed September 20, 2023).

23 “Russian Private Military Companies: Their use and how to consider them in operations, competition, and conflict,” Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, April 2020, 84, https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo153830/202004%20AWG_Russian%20PMCs%20Report.pdf (accessed September 20, 2023).

24 Adam R. Grissom, et al., “Russia’s Growing Presence in Africa: A Geostrategic Assessment,” RAND, RR-4399-AF, 2022, 28.

25 “Russian Private Military Companies,” xi.

26 United States Senate, “Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee.”

27 Chris Kinsey, “Problematising the Role of Private Security Companies in Small Wars,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 4 (2007): 609.

28 Robert Young Pelton, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006), 139.

29 Citations from Kevin Flower, et al., “U.S. Army: ‘We will respond’ to contractor killings,” CNN, April 1, 2004, https://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/01/iraq.main/ (accessed September 20, 2023).

30 “First Battle of Fallujah,” Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/First-Battle-of-Fallujah (accessed September 20, 2023).

31 Swiss Peace, “Private Security Companies and Local Populations: An exploratory study of Afghanistan and Angola,” November 2007, 6, 28.

32 Adamsky, “Cross-Domain Coercion,” 24; Janis Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy,” National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, Policy Paper 2, April 2014, 13.

33 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Putin’s Real Security Crisis: The Most Important Lesson of the Wagner Rebellion Is the FSB’s Failure,” Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-security-crisis-wagner-rebellion#:∼:text=In%20the%20wake%20of%20the,security%20services%20to%20that%20mutiny (accessed September 20, 2023).

34 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Why Putin Needs Wagner: The Hidden Power Struggle Sustaining Russia’s Brutal Militia,” Foreign Affairs, May 12, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/why-putin-needs-wagner (accessed September 20, 2023).

35 Soldatov and Borogan, “Putin’s Real Security Crisis.”

36 Reuben Johnson, “‘Everybody has weapons’: Russia’s balkanized military sparks civil unrest concerns,” Breaking Defense, December 19, 2022. https://breakingdefense.com/2022/12/everybody-has-weapons-russias-balkanized-military-sparks-civil-unrest-concerns/?org=1674 (accessed September 20, 2023).

37 Seth G. Jones, et al., “Russia’s Corporate Soldiers: The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2021, 27, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-corporate-soldiers-global-expansion-russias-private-military-companies (accessed September 20, 2023).

38 “Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies,” Sputnik International, April 13, 2012, http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20120413/172789099.html (accessed September 20, 2023).

39 Sergey Sukhankin, “Russian Mercenaries Pour Into Africa and Suffer More Losses (Part Two),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 10 (2020), https://jamestown.org/program/russian-mercenaries-pour-into-africa-and-suffer-more-losses-part-two/ (accessed September 20, 2023).

40 Jason Burke, “Wagner-linked Putin ally: ‘Dying west thinks Russians are third world scum’,” Guardian, May 4, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/04/putin-ally-yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-dying-west-russians-third-world-scum (accessed September 20, 2023).

41 United States Senate, “Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department of Defense Budget Posture in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2019 and the Future Years Defense Program,” April 26, 2018, 67, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-44_04-26-18.pdf (accessed September 20, 2023).

42 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 196; Lucy Sweeney, et al., “Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as Vladimir Putin’s chef, revealed as Wagner Group mercenary boss,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, October 22, 2022, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-10-23/yevgeny-prigozhin-the-rise-of-vladimir-putins-so-called-chef/101555386 (accessed September 20, 2023).

43 Marten, “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces,” 196.

44 United Nations, “Report of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya,” Human Rights Council, A/HRC/48/83, November 29, 2021, 8, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G21/355/67/PDF/G2135567.pdf?OpenElement (accessed September 20, 2023).

45 United Nations, “CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians – UN experts,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, October 27, 2021, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/car-russian-wagner-group-harassing-and-intimidating-civilians-un-experts (accessed September 20, 2023).

46 For instance, see David Lewis, “Contesting liberal peace: Russia’s emerging model of conflict management,” International Affairs 98, no. 2 (2022): 653–73.

47 Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, “Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation,” Sociological Forum 7, no. 1 (1992): 138.

48 Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by other means (New York: Routledge, 2008), 97.

49 David Pilling, et al., “Wagner’s future in Africa in question after Russian mutiny,” Financial Times, June 28, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/93381925-9b2e-4c57-b669-7c592536cffc (accessed September 20, 2023).

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Notes on contributors

Christopher Spearin

Dr. Christopher Spearin ([email protected]) is a professor in the Department of Defence Studies of the Royal Military College of Canada, located at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto.