The energy transition and energy security nexus: an outlook for the United Kingdom

Abstract

The energy transition and achieving net-zero goals were viewed as a straight road – in some quarters. Still, with the realities on the ground, energy security has emerged as another path governments must earnestly consider. The government of the United Kingdom has backed, and committed itself to achieving, a greener and clean-energy society through various policies and laws. However, the Russian–Ukraine crisis has raised a vital question of energy security for the government. This paper looks pragmatically at some issues and opportunities for the UK government. Energy security issues are not peculiar to the UK; many countries are saddled with these energy problems.

Keywords:

• energy transition
• net-zero
• energy security
• environment
• renewable energy
• energy policy
• climate change
• United Kingdom

1. Introduction

This paper seeks to conduct a conceptual exercise on energy transition and energy security, with a narrow examination of the UK government’s energy policies geared towards achieving its decarbonisation goals while also ensuring the security of energy supply. It has hardly been apparent that energy transition and energy security are presently inseparable – advised by the guiding principle of ‘the energy sustainability trilemma’, expounded as the need to balance energy reliability, affordability and sustainability.¹ At a time of energy crisis² in the UK, the question of energy transition while maintaining energy security dominates both the UK and global energy markets.

The impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on the global energy industry is undeniable, and its ramifications for different countries continue to unfold daily.³ Governments are seeking energy supply solutions amidst the present ongoing chaos in the global energy markets. Today, governments are making use of reactive efforts and energy policies to address the unbalanced energy markets.⁴ The United Kingdom’s government is not an exception. The British Energy Security Strategy⁵ highlights this point. Also, the UK’s net-zero strategy was submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a component of the UK’s long-term low greenhouse gas strategy under the Paris Agreement.⁶

Climate change actions and the reduction of greenhouse gases to mitigate global warming have made it vital for the UK government to appraise its energy transition and net-zero policies considering the Paris Agreement⁷ and Glasgow Climate Pact at the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26).⁸ In keeping with the Glasgow Climate Pact, actions are required from the government to ensure that limiting global warming to 1.5°C and commitments to net zero become a priority for the government. The UK government has enshrined some of these commitments into many legal and policy documents, but the foundation for the UK’s approach to addressing climate change is documented in the Climate Change Act 2008.⁹ Amongst recent government energy, climate change and environmental policies, the Environment Act 2021¹⁰ became a turning point in the UK’s relationship to nature, according to Juniper.¹¹ It articulates environmental targets which will help the UK in meeting its net-zero goals and have a chance of limiting the temperature increase to below 1.5°C.

However, the reality of the present global energy market has brought energy security to the fore. This has posed some challenges to the UK's energy transition and net-zero goals – issues further highlighted in the Skidmore review.¹² To ensure the security of the UK’s long-term energy supply, the government created a new Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.¹³ Resolving the energy security issues alongside meeting its commitments towards the energy transition will require some strategic and pragmatic thinking from policymakers.¹⁴ This paper aims to argue towards a pragmatic perspective for the UK if it were to meet the various set transition goals. Here lie some challenges and opportunities that will be explored in this paper. This paper does not analyse the effectiveness of the UK government’s energy policies, but aims to address and engage in the current discussion on the concepts of energy transition and the energy security ambitions of the UK government within its energy policies.

2. Understanding the energy transition

At the heart of economic development in every country lies energy.¹⁵ The need to find and utilise energy sources to meet people’s requirements has been a factor from the start of civilisation, and fossil fuels have been a big part of civilisation.¹⁶ Presently, approximately 78% of the UK’s energy comes from fossil fuels – oil, gas, and a small amount from coal.¹⁷ As the world looks to move away from heavy dependency on oil and gas resources, the importance of these natural resources cannot be denied.¹⁸ Also, since the world transitioned from high reliance on coal and wood to oil and gas – as the primary source of energy for industrialisation – it has been widely accepted that oil and gas have been vital to the economic growth of nations.¹⁹ Further, our civilisation was contingent on oil and gas resources, more than any other traded commodity.²⁰

Over time, several factors have influenced the transition from one energy source to another, but today the over-reliance on fossil fuels has been proven by science to be detrimental to the Earth; thus it is necessary for the world to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, which have a less negative effect on the climate, therefore mitigating the global climate change.²¹ Unlike the previous energy transitions that were based on inter-fuel competition, with coal, oil, or gas emerging as efficient energy sources that drove the economic growth and industrial development of many Western countries, this energy transition will be driven by government regulations and policies.²² Importantly, the need for governments and their policies and regulations to drive this net-zero transition is to ensure that the adverse effects of global climate change are averted or mitigated.²³ Presumably, collective actions taken on regional and national levels can have a powerful impact globally. Accelerating the energy transition will require strengthening the role of policies and, inevitably, the lack of key policies could derail the net-zero transition targets.²⁴ To put it differently, Yergin argued that the most important factor to drive this transition will be public policy.²⁵

Energy transition means different things to different countries, in particular the developing countries, where millions of people still lack access to electricity, or clean cooking fuel, and continue to burn wood or charcoal.²⁶ Certainly, this is not the case for the UK, where access to electricity and all forms of energy for various daily activities is obtainable. The energy transition is a vital step that needs to be taken to achieve a reduction of greenhouse gases and mitigate the climate change effects. Although most of the plans are marred with uncertainties,²⁷ the energy transition has been widely accepted, and the idea is to limit temperature rises to less than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.²⁸

2.1. The UK’s energy policy landscape

Energy policy in the UK was the responsibility of the Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), now broken up into four departments. The Department of Energy Security and Net Zero is tasked with securing affordable energy supply, from various sources including renewable sources and domestic nuclear sources, while ensuring that the country seizes the opportunities for net zero and decarbonisation of the economy. Further commitments within the Sixth Carbon Budget are to cut emissions by 78% by 2035.²⁹ It is key to note that this paper will not be conducting a comprehensive analysis of all UK energy policies, but rather taking a closer look at a few that intersect with the energy transition goals and energy security ambitions of the UK government.

Security, affordability and decarbonisation are three energy objectives that are centred around successive government policies, which were analysed based on strong evidence regarding the economics of the UK’s net-zero transition in the Skidmore review.³⁰ It is necessary here to clarify what is meant by a policy in this work. There are some theoretical uncertainties when attempting to define ‘policy’.³¹ Limiting the elaborate theoretical footwork on policy and avoiding the conceptual issues where researchers and scholars overlook the need to define conceptually what they mean by policy, this work will draw from Stephen Ball’s version of the meaning of policy as textual interventions into practice, that will be acted on.³² Particularly, the UK government’s policy is underpinned by evidence-based policymaking. In an attempt to formulate a more coherent approach to policy development, the UK central government under Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed evidence-based policy³³ as a key element in developing fresh thinking and increased policy capability.³⁴

Arguably, evidenced-based policymaking has shaped the UK government’s policymaking³⁵ since it was set out by the government of then Prime Minister Tony Blair, in the government’s White Paper in 1999: Modernising Government.³⁶ It is believed that the energy policies in the UK have been developed using the integration of experience, judgement and expertise with the best external evidence from systematic research,³⁷ therefore moving away from opinion-based decision-making towards evidence-based and, invariably, critical opinions and judgements of experts which make up high-quality reliable and valid evidence.³⁸ Environmental and climate change non-governmental organisations have been critical of the robustness of the UK government’s energy policies.³⁹ There are obvious difficulties in accepting the reality of the present global energy crisis. In a globalised environment like that of the energy industry, it has raised a new challenge for policymakers to understand the practical technique for adopting and evaluating policy innovations to better resolve energy security issues while engaged in the economy's decarbonisation.⁴⁰

According to Bordoff and O’Sullivan, a net-zero target is vital, as it is a major component that can enable a country to achieve the energy transition.⁴¹ The UK government has proposed plans and a timeline for the energy transition, but globally, there has not been agreement on the speed of the transition or how this will be achieved.⁴² For instance, China has set a 2060 carbon neutrality target, and India a 2070 net-zero target.⁴³ The energy transition is girdled with uncertainties and varied targets, thus giving this venture no uniformity globally.⁴⁴ There needs to be a movement away from the high use of fossil fuels towards the use of renewable energy sources for the transition to be achieved.⁴⁵ The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) reiterated that the energy transition presently is far from being on track, as governments continue to face economic recovery and energy security challenges, but progressive actions need to be taken as energy transition holds the key to solving the global energy and climate crisis.⁴⁶

It is a legal duty in the UK to reduce greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide as an approach to mitigate climate change risks.⁴⁷ Under the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK government further commits itself to a 2050 target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 100% of 1990 levels.⁴⁸ The Climate Change Act 2008 gave meaning to what are considered greenhouse gases in the UK: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride.⁴⁹ Most greenhouse gas emissions are from carbon dioxide, as these are produced from the burning of fossil fuels, while the major sources for the other greenhouse gasses include industrial processes and waste management, such as agriculture and landfill sites.⁵⁰

The net-zero strategies⁵¹ of the UK government accentuated the need for urgent action. According to the Skidmore review, it is also an opportunity for the UK government, which requires clarity, certainty and consistency of policies to harness the advantages of the transition.⁵² Arguably, amongst Western European countries, the UK has been leading the way in attempts to cut emissions. Further attempts by the UK government to cut emissions through carbon capture and storage saw the government inviting bids from technology companies in the UK’s first-ever carbon storage licensing round.⁵³ The Ten-Point Plan for a Greener Industrial Revolution⁵⁴ can be said to have laid the foundation for this. The proposed plans for the UK's economic recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic are through green initiatives,⁵⁵ in a bid for the country to continue to drive down its emission contribution presently and in the future.⁵⁶ However, many of the points for the green industrial revolution are focused on the actualisation of decarbonisation, with few concrete plans for the overhaul of the energy systems. Going green, for instance, will require zero-emission vehicles, green public transport, greener buildings, etc, which will logically mean higher dependency on electricity.⁵⁷ Therefore, the energy systems will be a key component in the energy transition, as, theoretically, the running of the economy will mostly be reliant on the power generation sector, as electricity will become the major source of energy. As a result, there will be a definite reconfiguration of the energy systems through the energy transition, decarbonisation, and energy security planning.⁵⁸ Each component raises issues for policymakers to address in terms of the financial implications, reserve capacity and storage infrastructures.

Granted that the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions have decreased over the years, more can be done to ensure that the legal targets set by the government are achieved.⁵⁹ Further, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), to avoid the severe impacts of climate change, there needs to be a rapid reduction of emissions and net zero must be reached by 2050.⁶⁰ The urgency of action was also repeated in the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report.⁶¹ The report called for immediate action to protect the Earth and cut the emissions, and warned that further warming could be devastating for millions of people globally.⁶²

According to the Net Zero Strategy, a large portion of the UK’s electricity is from renewable energy sources like wind farms and British nuclear reactors, which should ensure that families will be protected better from energy price rises and volatility of the global fossil fuel industry.⁶³ Sadly, the reality of things present in the UK does not align with the above, as the electricity bills of households have surged with the market.⁶⁴ This invariably points to the opposite, as the renewable energy facilities that were supposed to guarantee cheaper energy are not inexpensive at the moment. There is a need for a higher level of deployment of renewable energy sources before the prices of energy will fall, as speculated by the government policy documents, as clean electricity and electrification are completely key to the shift to the decarbonisation of energy systems.⁶⁵ This is also reflected in the envisaged rising share of electricity in the global energy consumption and governments will need to respond to this challenge.⁶⁶

3. Energy security at the fore

Energy is the lifeline of modern society; it cuts across all sectors and contributes to the development of economies around the world.⁶⁷ Further, energy supply, physical availability and affordability are the key components of the energy security definition.⁶⁸ Conceptualising energy security from a legal perspective promotes the uninterruptedness of energy supply proportionate to demand.⁶⁹ According to the IEA, energy security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.⁷⁰ This is similar to the definition of Yergin, although his definition was formulated from the perspective of a developed country; this indicates that the concept can mean different things to different governments and people.⁷¹ Therefore, with energy security, the time-related preferences made by the government and the manner it balances national security, economic and environmental issues are based on the perspective of the government.⁷²

As energy systems differ from one country to another, this therefore gives rise to different energy security issues and sometimes extends to other energy policy issues, which could range from climate change and energy poverty to the energy transition.⁷³ We must understand the specific energy security needs of the country, while appreciating the international legal landscape of energy. Further, Paterson argued that to meet the challenges raised by climate change, some consideration has to be given to the existing legal conceptualisation of energy,⁷⁴ because it has so far shown its inability to incorporate some of these contemporary problems, to overcome diverse temporal outlooks of key economic, political and technocratic actors, and to make suppositions based on legal concepts as they develop together with the economic and political restrictions.⁷⁵

To understand the linkage between energy security policies and climate change actions, broader views of energy security will be used here. For instance, Elkind's definition of energy security did not limit it to the availability of energy resources but also included reliability of supply, economic affordability, and sustainability.⁷⁶ These four elements attributed to energy security can be gleaned from the UK government's energy security strategy.⁷⁷ However, this strategy was highlighted as having some gaps in a publication by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, where it was maintained that greater emphasis should be given to energy-saving measures as a key strategy.⁷⁸ Admittedly, all four elements are essential to ensure the overall energy security of the UK, but governments usually prioritise some elements over others.⁷⁹ In principle, all of these elements are needed, but it would seem that they are at odds with each other. For example, while countries push for the increased use of sustainable–renewable energy sources, the country’s immediate needs for energy to fuel their economic growth and national development often overpower the long-term need for climate action.⁸⁰ This situation has become more pronounced recently because of the Russia–Ukraine conflict. This can be observed in the UK, as the government continues to issue licences for fossil fuel production in the North Sea.⁸¹

The intrepid plans of the UK government are to boost long-term energy security and independence. Albeit, this overlooks the need to have a short-term plan to mitigate the effects of the government’s present-day decisions. From a physical security perspective and as energy security is an element of national security, there seems to be a need to reassess the UK’s longer-term energy policy.⁸² The UK government is not alone in prioritising energy security, as according to the Energy Transitions Commission, in light of the present situation in the energy market countries are giving high priority to energy security, and seeking ways to balance this with broader decarbonisation policies and achievement of net-zero targets.⁸³ While there might be some incompatibility for the push to decarbonise while ensuring the security of supply, pragmatically the change or modification of the old energy systems to factor in the renewable energy systems will not happen overnight. Here lie some of the important roles the old energy system will have to play in the short term. This is because a high level of investment will be needed to modernise and expand grid infrastructure, as modern lives and economies become increasingly reliant on electricity.

4. The connection between energy security and energy transition in the UK

For modern societies to function smoothly, the availability of energy is crucial.⁸⁴ The adverse climate effects of the use of fossil fuels and coal for electricity generation have raised political and public concerns in the UK and globally.⁸⁵ Electricity generation is a key factor in the goal to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. This makes the security of the electricity supply key to the UK’s energy policy, and this was reflected in the British energy security strategy.⁸⁶ Climate change poses a notable danger to the Earth, people's lives, their livelihood, and the environment.⁸⁷ According to the International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD), the two major ways to address the danger of climate change are mitigation and adaptation.⁸⁸

Changing to low-carbon energy systems and increasing carbon sinks, which are actions that reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas, relate to mitigation,⁸⁹ while the strengthened adaptive capacity of human and natural systems to the changing climate and increased resilience to vulnerabilities and impacts refer to adaptive actions.⁹⁰ Mitigation and adaptive instruments could be key to helping tackle the climate change challenge that humanity is facing.⁹¹ Therefore, the requirement to understand the conceptual link between energy security and net-zero transition in the present UK economy and the global economy becomes central to the discussion. For the UK government, expanding renewable and nuclear energy seems to be the main strategy for achieving energy independence. However, there must be actions taken in the short term, as developing new sources of supply will take years.⁹² Securing affordable energy supply in the short term becomes a key point of action for the government.

Undeniably, the Russia–Ukraine conflict has caused a significant change, where many governments have altered their energy policies to achieve energy security, energy transition and climate actions.⁹³ Many governments have pledged to transition their economies away from fossil fuel as a source of energy, but the present reality of the global energy market has put the vital issue of energy security at the forefront of the agenda for most of these governments.⁹⁴ The push to ensure energy security presently, while simultaneously pushing for the economy to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, might not be as straightforward as earlier envisaged by governments.

Earlier suggestions that the UK will not be impacted by the Russia–Ukraine crisis, as the UK only gets approximately 4% of its gas from Russia, has been a miscalculation as the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as determined by the European gas market is invariably also decided by the global markets,⁹⁵ showing that the UK was not immune from the energy crisis. The energy crisis was viewed as a supply-side problem, and the initial reaction from the Boris Johnson government was to address the energy security problems in the British Energy Security Strategy⁹⁶ where finding a solution within the country and pushing for more ‘British Energy’ became a key strategy.⁹⁷ This meant a review of the shale gas moratorium⁹⁸ and encouraging more oil and gas activities in the north.⁹⁹ This demonstrates that the oil and gas industry still has a role to play in the UK’s energy security strategy and energy transition goals. In balancing out the increase in oil and gas industry activity, it would be wise for the government to push for increased activity towards carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) technology to offset the emissions from these activities.

Looking elsewhere, Joe Biden, the American president, was elected on the back of promises to ensure the growth of cleaner energy sources in America, but the reality of the global energy market has seen the president take steps that could be argued to oppose his climate change obligations.¹⁰⁰ Also, President Biden has released supplies from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve at a far more substantial scale than any previous US administration and continues to urge domestic petroleum companies to increase their oil and gas production.¹⁰¹ Denmark’s government is considering boosting its North Sea gas production, albeit temporarily, while also boosting its renewable energy supply.¹⁰² Arguably, energy security has now trumped a lot of energy transition agendas and strategies of various governments. This allows us to understand the different aspects of energy security and the connection to the geopolitical, environmental, and national questions for the United Kingdom.¹⁰³

The UK government is looking to grant several oil and gas licences in the North Sea, and the question arises how compatible the issuance of new exploration and production licences is with the UK's Climate Change actions,¹⁰⁴ given that under the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK is expected to phase out fossil fuels from the country's energy mix.¹⁰⁵ Globally, however, the oil and gas sector will be at the formational centre of the global energy mix.¹⁰⁶ In addition, there is the UK government's commitment to various national and international policies and guidelines, calling for actions to protect the environment and mitigate the effects of climate change.¹⁰⁷ The government's actions can be construed to oppose these. The Climate Change Committee identified significant risks in the government’s net-zero commitments under the Paris Agreement and the Sixth Carbon Budget, also reaffirmed by the High Court ruling¹⁰⁸ that the government failed to meet its obligations under the Climate Change Act, and requested further detailed policies to evidence how the UK’s carbon budget will be met.¹⁰⁹ Based on the realities in the energy market, a need for a balanced pathway to net zero is undoubtedly required.

At present, energy security is the main agenda for the UK government and many other governments. The UK government’s prerogative is to make sure that businesses and citizens have access to secure and affordable energy while decarbonising the economy.¹¹⁰ The government’s approval of the large new North Sea Jackdaw gas field, the government’s intention to open a new coal mine at Whitehaven in Cumbria¹¹¹ and the claim by the Business Secretary, regarding the need to protect the UK’s energy security while also turbocharging renewable energy sources and nuclear energy, give insights into some balancing strategies the UK government is adopting.¹¹² According to Kemfert and others, whether natural gas resources are needed, any further expansion of natural gas infrastructure puts energy transition and the net-zero targets at risk, and would inevitably be detrimental to achieving climate protection goals.¹¹³ Based on the present energy supply crisis, and inflation ensuring the energy supply clearly benefits the economy, but expectations continue to grow to meet decarbonisation goals. Here lies the argument for a balanced pathway where the government fairly and critically sets short-term and long-term policies to achieve its energy security and energy transition goals.

According to Fankhauser and others, for the UK to have energy security, a reduction in the reliance on fossil fuel would be needed, as investing in renewables and having more renewables raises security and lowers cost, therefore protecting the UK energy market from the volatilities associated with the fossil fuel prices.¹¹⁴ Today, there are efforts to increase the level of renewable energy sources in the UK's energy mix, while also ensuring energy security by continuing domestic production of hydrocarbon to meet the present and near future needs of the country, which seem to be the goal.¹¹⁵ This obviously would not go down well with a lot of climate and environment groups, and Greenpeace is considering taking legal action against the government.¹¹⁶ Inevitably, approving new hydrocarbon activities in the North Sea would lead to more emissions. According to a report by IISD, for governments to align with the Paris Agreement and reach its set phaseout targets, there is no room for any country to increase its production of hydrocarbons, as this will prevent achieving the global target of reducing emissions to the level of 1.5°C.¹¹⁷

The UK government attempted to unite climate change goals and energy security narratives around the recent publication of the ‘British Energy Security Strategy’.¹¹⁸ Environmental and climate change scopes of the UK’s energy security outlook were included. It can be said that the UK government’s immediate goal is to secure the UK’s energy supply needs, but doing so might be at variance with the climate change and net-zero transition goals of the government.¹¹⁹ It can be observed in the global energy market and the UK's energy market that the security of energy supply seems to be of greater importance, therefore preceding climate change, net-zero, and energy transition in terms of priorities.¹²⁰ Diversification of energy sources, especially clean energy, has become key to the plans of the government. According to the Energy Security Strategy, the UK government is currently focusing on several energy sources for energy security: oil and gas, nuclear, hydrogen and renewables (offshore–onshore wind and solar, and other technologies).¹²¹

Fankhauser and others claimed that the UK government’s attempt to ensure energy security and mitigate the high energy prices by developing new fossil fuel reserves will not reduce energy price pressures, because the price of UK gas is set on international markets and not domestically,¹²² and therefore the energy transition pathway needs to be strengthened, not weakened.¹²³ To achieve its net-zero targets, climate change policies will contribute to energy security and lower energy bills, if the government invests in zero-carbon energy, which will improve energy security, affordability and climate in the long term.¹²⁴ Then again, the UK government, like many other European governments, is seeking immediate or short-term remedies to the energy security issues that have affected the global energy industry, directly or indirectly because of the Russia–Ukraine conflict.¹²⁵ Arguably, any comprehensive strategy would include a short-term and a long-term plan. However, any short-term increase in the UK oil and gas production in the North Sea as proposed by the government will be ‘borrowing' emissions from the future.¹²⁶ Therefore, there is a need to make mitigating plans for the emissions in the short term. The size of the UK's contribution to global emissions is driven by the total CO₂ emissions up to the point of the net-zero target date, although achieving the energy transition will ensure the UK ends its contribution to global warming.¹²⁷

5. A pragmatic way forward: decarbonisation concessions

In the UK, the commitment remains to transition in the long term, but the dilemma is in the short term.¹²⁸ According to the House of Commons Environment Audit Committee, energy security and affordability issues should not result in the government halting or pausing its climate ambitions; rather, the government should view this as an opportunity to achieve synergies between affordability, security and sustainability in the country.¹²⁹ The transition from a carbon-intensive economy to a decarbonised economy could arguably offer some solutions to the energy crisis; however, reaching the net-zero goal pose a huge challenge, and therefore a carefully considered process is needed to actualise the goals set by the government.¹³⁰ In the UK, the present arguments revolve around a rapid alignment with government energy policies and implementation of the significant recommendations from the Skidmore review, which includes developing a new comprehensive energy plan for infrastructure delivery and key economic incentives for the development of new green technology.¹³¹ This would entail an overhaul of the grid infrastructure to a more flexible system, as proposed by the Skidmore review.¹³² Ensuring energy security while decarbonising will require certain concessions to be made, as the government needs to maintain and ensure energy supply from the present energy systems, while the new green infrastructures are developed and deployed. Testament to the vital need for a secure supply of energy, the recent call by the National Grid in the UK to put coal plants on standby as an emergency backup to bolster supply highlights some realities of energy supply today.¹³³

It is envisaged that there will be a sequence of trade-offs between energy security objectives and climate action objectives. Considering that renewable energy sources – solar and wind energy – are intermittent, this undermines the security of supply and poses a major challenge, but possible technological advances can resolve this problem.¹³⁴ Also, flexible grid systems, consistency of policy, financial support, a stable environment for new renewable energy technology development, unlocking business-model innovation and driving investment in clean energy technology for the future are examples of some recommendations of the Skidmore review evidenced by the economics of the UK’s net-zero transition.¹³⁵ To boost the security of supply, the UK government has planned to establish an organisation that will be in charge of building greater energy resilience for the UK by supporting new energy technologies.¹³⁶ Today, this falls within the objectives of the newly created government department – the Department of Energy Security and Net-Zero.

Perhaps when the government prioritises energy security before the energy transition, this could lead to a counter-productivity for the net-zero transition targets. It is widely understood that this is not an abrupt stop in the usage of fossil fuels but a transition, which highlights the relevance of oil and gas in the short term while planning for the rapid growth of renewable energy sources in the long term.¹³⁷ Multiple factors could lead the government to this compromise. The socio-economic factor becomes key.¹³⁸ For instance, to protect its industry, Germany has blocked the ban on new combustion engines.¹³⁹ Pascal Canfin, while criticising the German government’s decision to go back on the ban on new combustion engines, expressed that the ethos of the European Union (EU) climate law is to converge towards compromises.¹⁴⁰ The reneging by Germany, although not wholly accepted within the EU, has raised fears it could precipitate a series of compromises.¹⁴¹

In resolving the problems of energy supply security, the UK government has opened the door again for shale gas activities within the country.¹⁴² Therefore, if the science shows that it is safe and sustainable, and would cause minimal disturbance to people, the government will proceed with shale gas activities, inevitably paving the way for a reconsideration of the moratorium on fracking.¹⁴³ This somewhat subverts the energy transition goals of the UK government, but these plans and government actions continue to prove the level of importance presently attributed to energy security.

Renewable energy sources will soon need partners because of the intermittency and storage problem, as integrating these renewable sources will require complex management of the grid.¹⁴⁴ The problems of energy security, affordability and availability are major issues in the global energy sector, and according to Amin Nasser, there needs to be a continuous investment in fossil fuels until renewable energy sources can address disruptions in the global energy sector.¹⁴⁵

The question of the capacity of renewable energy sources to meet the global energy demand has yet to be unequivocally answered, and with practical evidence as there seems to be some level of disconnect from the reality of things, and theories of how it should be within the global energy market. An example is the firm response by Kwasi Kwarteng to climate activists, stating that he cannot put Britain's energy security at risk by following the pleadings and persuasions of the climate activists to shut down the domestic North Sea oil and gas production.¹⁴⁶ He further stated that the UK will need oil and gas in the coming decades.¹⁴⁷ This situation can be seen across a good number of oil and gas-producing nations, as presently the energy security of countries has become key to their socio-economic development, and the proposed energy transition seems to take a backseat to various governments’ agendas. We are presently seeing the synergy between energy security and energy transition actions.

The multi-year 25 per cent tax on the UK oil and gas industry received a backlash from the industry but did not deter the oil majors’ assurance to the government of their commitments to continued activity in the North Sea.¹⁴⁸ Recently, some oil and gas companies active in the North Sea argued that the windfall tax will undermine investment, inevitably putting the long-term energy security of the UK and Europe at risk and raised strong objections to the windfall tax with threats of taking their business outside of the UK.¹⁴⁹ The windfall tax–energy profits levy is supposed to remain in place until 2025.¹⁵⁰ As an encouragement to oil and gas companies to continue with hydrocarbon projects and reduce their tax bill, the UK government introduced the New Investment Allowances.¹⁵¹ The European and global energy landscape continues to change – as per the growing need for natural gas in the UK and Europe.¹⁵² With most governments having winter in mind, there needs to be a holistic assessment of all greenhouse gas emissions connected to natural gas and infrastructure expansion, together with their impact on the energy transition and net-zero goals of the UK.¹⁵³

5.1. Challenges: climate and energy policy

The Russia–Ukraine conflict will have a far-reaching and long-term impact on the UK government's effort to address climate change and on global efforts to mitigate global warming.¹⁵⁴ There will be immediate and far-reaching implications for the success of the Paris Agreement and the Glasgow Climate Pact, because of the Russian government’s action in Ukraine: energy prices are increasing rapidly, largely because of a sudden rise in the price of natural gas.¹⁵⁵ At the moment and over the long term, the financial attractiveness of renewable energy sources should be supported by high fossil fuel energy prices, in theory.¹⁵⁶ Yet the expected rapid switch from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources is not happening.¹⁵⁷ Accelerating the energy transition towards renewable energy sources seems to be the major goal if Europe has to move away from its gas dependency, but there is little evidence of this happening in the short term; rather, most government outlooks and energy policies look to make plans for the future rather than the present.¹⁵⁸ Energy security becomes the present argument put forward by the government. As evidenced since the early 1970s, when governments cannot find a reasoned rationale on the grounds of standard sustainable economic logic for certain energy policies, most times, these policies are promoted as energy security policies.¹⁵⁹

The energy transition is expected to reduce dependence on imported gas and oil, protect consumers from the volatility of global oil and gas markets, and reduce costs for consumers; however, it will also take time for the government to build a zero-carbon energy system that could supply the domestic energy needs for the UK economy.¹⁶⁰ Decarbonising the energy mix will result from the energy transition policies of the UK government.¹⁶¹ The net-zero transition will come at a high cost. The government will incur immense costs to achieve it. Given the uncertainty surrounding the energy transition, some calculations of the cost by various groups estimate the financial burden on the government to range from about £50 billion to £70 billion per year.¹⁶² According to Moslener, there is a deep uncertainty of unknown unknowns, which has delayed vital investments in energy transition technologies.¹⁶³ Some policymakers and analysts note that there is a lack of full-suite technological solutions needed to deliver or deploy the large renewable energy sources needed to reach the net-zero targets that have been set, reducing the emissions that the science community now recommends.¹⁶⁴ The collapse of BritishVolt, a battery start-up that was supposed to champion the UK’s ‘green industrial revolution’, has evidenced some uncertainties of this transition.¹⁶⁵ Using the case of BritishVolt to contextualise the financial implications of this energy transition, it is estimated that any purchaser that acquires the company would need access to significant financing – between £3 billion and £6 billion – to fund the capital expenditure required to complete the development of the gigaplant.¹⁶⁶ Beyond the frontiers of the energy transition, there are significant uncertainties, which will require a paradigm shift in strategies and actions by the government.¹⁶⁷

Arguably, to achieve some of the energy transition goals, some level of government support is needed for the development of new technologies that can support the transition.¹⁶⁸ This calls for a clear commitment from the government and policymakers, which would send a powerful signal to investors of the government’s energy transition plan, therefore encouraging investments into clean technology. BritishVolt received some financial support from the government, with about £100 million conditional on the resumption of the building of its site, in part to protect taxpayer money from going to waste.¹⁶⁹ Also maintained by Moslener, energy transition needs private investment to be successful.¹⁷⁰ It requires a concerted effort from all sectors of the economy – a public and private investment-conducive environment will be required, according to The Skidmore review.¹⁷¹ The financial support from the UK government has been called into question recently; in particular Ørsted, a renewable energy company in the UK, expressed its disappointment in the level of renewable energy support in the government’s budget for the renewable energy industry in the UK.¹⁷²

The Energy Transitions Commission, in its Insights briefing, alluded that sequencing will become important for energy transition targets to be met; this means that there has to be a level of continued investment in fossil fuels to meet the supply and demand need and maintain a balance while the energy transition is in progress.¹⁷³ However, the extent of this requirement is entirely reliant on the pace at which renewable energy investment scales up.¹⁷⁴

According to Ember, renewable energy sources became the cheapest form of electricity and are steadily replacing gas power generation in Europe.¹⁷⁵ This was limited to gas, though; coal power generation only declined in countries that closed their coal power plants.¹⁷⁶ However, the initial expectation was for renewable energy sources to replace coal rather than gas, because, from around 2011 to 2019, over 80% of new renewable energy sources came at the expense of coal. After all, there were not enough renewable energy sources online to substitute for both coal and gas.¹⁷⁷ Presently, coal energy is more emission-intensive than gas, while renewables continue to replace gas.

The UK government's ambitions to transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources are not enough; renewable energy sources must be stimulated through the deployment of policies for a continued time frame, research, and technology development (RTD) and, importantly, the focus and commitment of the UK government.¹⁷⁸ Companies within the UK renewable energy sector have called for tax breaks and a restructuring of the UK’s subsidy policies, because key financial support from the government would attract international investors into the sector.¹⁷⁹ The financial implication of the net-zero transition is not the only factor for the government to consider, as a lot of planning and construction will have to be done before the new energy systems come on stream, and this could take a decade or more.¹⁸⁰ It has to be clarified that these new energy systems will not come into existence overnight. The approach to prioritise the construction of big, centralised power generation facilities to solve the demand issues within the country, highlighted in the British Energy Security Strategy,¹⁸¹ was opposed by the Report by the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, which proposed a move to a smarter, more flexible, digitally enabled grid¹⁸² – albeit dependent on renewable energy technology innovations, which have shown some potential.

For the UK to achieve its set net-zero targets, the importance of sustained policy efforts in implementing an energy transition cannot be overemphasised. Conventional policy instruments that would influence energy policy in the UK could include direct command-and-control regulation, research and development funding, taxes, government subsidies or incentives directed at the renewable energy industry.¹⁸³ According to Fankhauser and others, strong policy safeguards should be in place if the UK government is to ensure energy security is compatible with climate security, and a quick net-zero transition.¹⁸⁴ Elkind, however, argues against government responses in periods like this, as the government is seeking a legislative or technological ‘silver bullet’, whereas none exist, because half measures do not essentially change energy supply or consumption patterns.¹⁸⁵ He further stated that much attention will be paid to the issue whilst the energy prices are high, but once the prices fall, the government will be lulled into a false sense of security, with no substantial decline in the energy intensity of its economy.¹⁸⁶ It is a developed economy – the UK economy relies on a lot of energy to maintain daily activities in the country. Energy powers the UK factories, government and office buildings, schools, and hospitals; it heats homes and keeps perishable foods cold.¹⁸⁷ Arguably, at the centre of modern day-to-day activities in the country sits energy. The predominance of fossil fuels for energy generation is at the core of this era's challenge to protect the global environment from the adverse effect of climate change.¹⁸⁸

5.2. Opportunities: performing while transforming

The Arab oil embargo of 1973 caused governments around the world to change their energy policies and regulations.¹⁸⁹ Unlike the oil shocks of the 1970s, the energy crisis at the moment has multiple dimensions – natural gas, oil, coal, electricity, food security and climate change – which therefore requires not only a diversification away from one energy source, but to change the nature of the energy system, and doing so while maintaining the affordable and secure provision of energy.¹⁹⁰ Possibly, the present energy transition provides the government with the opportunity to build a safer and more sustainable energy system that would not be exposed to the volatility of the global energy market.¹⁹¹ The policy actions taken by the government in improving the resilience of this transition will be a key component in deciding the outcome of this present energy crisis. Progress will come from balancing and progressing on the exigency of economic growth and development, energy security, and environmental sustainability.¹⁹²

Presently, one of the strongest arguments for transitioning away from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, as quickly as possible, is the Russia–Ukraine conflict, because of energy security.¹⁹³ For this energy transition to go according to plan, it has to be structured and managed properly; this requires considerable government engagement in the energy and climate domain which can help resolve the volatility of the markets, mitigate the risks that are bound to arise from the energy transition, and shorten the net-zero emissions pathway.¹⁹⁴ The recent UK Critical Mineral Strategy aims to speed up growth in the country's domestic capabilities, collaborating with international partners and enhancing the international markets to make them more transparent, responsible and responsive.¹⁹⁵ As evidenced globally, a growing number of legislative proposals and policies aimed at boosting energy security, achieving net-zero transition and commitments to climate actions could raise some geopolitical wrangling, but the idea is to have a concerted effort and a wide coalition to support these measures, one that includes everyone from oil and gas industry, to climate change activists, to environmentalists.¹⁹⁶ Further, the Skidmore review emphasised the need for the continuity of policy, clarity, certainty and consistency, as this will signal a conducive investment environment to both public and private actors.¹⁹⁷

In most markets, renewable energy sources are cheaper than most other forms of energy generation.¹⁹⁸ The argument that renewable energy sources are more expensive than fossil fuels and will lead to higher energy bills is inaccurate. The bad news is that those renewables were, until now, going to replace coal instead of gas. From 2011 to 2019, over 80% of new renewables came at the expense of coal.¹⁹⁹ Because there are not yet enough renewables online to replace both, that means the decline in coal is slowing because there are fewer renewables available to replace it – they are busy replacing gas – and yet coal is much more emissions-intensive than gas. This calls for a move away from coal energy.

Renewable energy sources will come with economic benefits and international competitiveness, as this will lead to an enormous investment in domestic manufacturing capacity.²⁰⁰ For energy security, and learning from the history of the global energy industry, the government should not contemplate outsourcing the renewable energy industries, as doing so could lead to geopolitical issues down the line and make the net-zero transition an expensive one.²⁰¹ Globally, investment in the energy transition grew by approximately 27% in 2021, which was a record as countries increased their climate policy agendas.²⁰² Most of the recorded investment went to renewable energy – wind, solar and other renewables.²⁰³

Demonstrating its key commitment to the net-zero transition, the UK government's Energy Security Bill presently in the House of Lords displays key commitments to drive about £100 billion of private sector investment by 2030 into new British industries and support over 400,000 clean jobs. Also, as mentioned earlier, the need for sustained research and support for new technology will be a key factor for the UK to achieve its net-zero transition goals. This Energy Security Bill proposes acceleration of the growth of low-carbon technologies and taking the next enormous leap in the technologies of the future, like hydrogen and fusion.

To ensure that the country is on a pathway that leads to a lower carbon society, it is necessary to apply a mitigation and adaptation environmental sustainability lens and climate lens to these projects to assess synergies and trade-offs, which invariably strengthens resilience. Although this can be complex, considering opportunities for joint actions will probably create long-term impacts and ensure that climate change actions’ goals for mitigation and adaptation are jointly supported by the government plans. To reiterate, we must implement multifunctional initiatives for the energy transition targets at national, subnational, and local levels. Also, the financing scheme becomes crucial.

6. Conclusion

Today, energy security and energy transition are inextricably connected, because evidently, governments want to take action to cut global emissions, but the same governments need the security of energy supply within their territories, therefore achieving energy security. Practicality and reality seem to indicate that hydrocarbons still have a major role to play in ensuring the energy security of nations around the world. Pursuing energy transition and explicating the major issues calls for a lot of policy direction from the government, which might need a novel approach to the energy transition, energy security and climate actions – possibly, to achieve a balanced pathway to its energy transition goals while maintaining energy security through short-term and long-term policy designs. Improving the effectiveness of policy responses calls for better and more rational analysis and understanding of the socio-economic problems facing the country.

The synergetic energy security and energy transition actions by the UK government seem to be the outcome of the present crisis in the global energy industry, but how well the decisions of the UK government work to pursue both goals simultaneously will be observed soon. With the need for urgent climate action, suggestions that the government should tackle these goals separately will not be feasible, although energy security is now arguably the top priority of the UK government and most governments globally. The UK government must champion climate action, and net-zero transition with sustained short-term and long-term policies, while being honest and realistic about the challenges the country faces, especially when the issues of energy security arise, or how expensive the pace of achieving the energy transition is.²⁰⁴ As opined by the Skidmore review, these goals can be achieved with clarity, certainty, consistency and continuity of policies by the government.²⁰⁵

Questions have been asked about the UK government’s genuine commitment to climate action, net-zero transition and environmental sustainability, but this is not peculiar to the UK government alone. Governments are grappling with ways to harmonise their energy security and energy transition goals simultaneously. Presently, the key challenge for the UK government will be to manage potentially conflicting goals in its energy security, climate action, energy transition, and net-zero goals.²⁰⁶ As argued in this paper, a realistic outlook must be taken by the government with a short-term and long-term perspective for a comprehensive resolution of this issue. Investigating the future alone, and ignoring the present and what needs to be done, will inevitably undermine any potential future progress.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewer for the insightful comments on the earlier drafts. The usual disclaimers apply.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 E Bonafé, ‘Revisiting the Energy Trilemma in the European Union’ (2022) 3 Global Energy Law and Sustainability 18; World Energy Council, ‘World Energy Trilemma Index: 2022’ (World Energy Council, 2022) <www.worldenergy.org/publications/entry/world-energy-trilemma-index-2022> accessed 16 February 2023; F Kempe, ‘Op-Ed: Making the Case for Oil CEO Sultan Al Jaber to Lead the UN Climate Conference This Year’ (CNBC, 17 January 2023) <www.cnbc.com/2023/01/14/climate-change-oil-ceo-sultan-al-jaber-is-ideal-person-to-lead-cop-28.html> accessed 7 February 2023; see also MS Barkindo, ‘Affordability, Security, and Emissions Reductions: The Sustainability Trilemma’ (Atlantic Council, 8 July 2022) <www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/affordability-security-and-emissions-reductions-the-sustainability-trilemma/> accessed 7 February 2023

2 In the UK the energy crisis is fuelling inflationary pressures, increasing food insecurity and squeezing household budgets, especially in poor households where a relatively high percentage of income is spent on energy and food. See Energy Transitions Commission, ‘Building Energy Security through Accelerated Energy Transition’ (7 March 2023) <www.energy-transitions.org/publications/building-energy-security/> accessed 8 March 2023

3 Financial Times, ‘Putin Orders Start of “Military Operation” in Ukraine’ (23 February 2022) <www.ft.com/content/3dd7fff0-2efe-4776-bbf2-dbef89f02118> accessed 11 June 2022; see also The Economist, ‘Ukraine at War | The Economist’ (2022) <www.economist.com/ukraine-crisis> accessed 11 April 2022; Global Conflict Tracker, ‘Conflict in Ukraine | Global Conflict Tracker’ (2022) <www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ukraine> accessed 11 June 2022

4 Derek Brower and Myles McCormick, ‘Joe Biden Raids US Oil Reserve After Failing to Bring Gulf Partners on Side’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/6748e5ae-a8ac-44e4-89e6-1ded3978bbcc> accessed 11 June 2022

5 See HM Government, ‘British Energy Security Strategy’ (Assets.publishing.service.gov.uk, 2022) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1067835/british-energy-security-strategy-web.pdf> accessed 11 June 2022

6 See Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), ‘Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener’ (UK Government 2021)

7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Paris Agreement’ (United Nations 2015)

8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Glasgow Climate Pact’ (UNFCCC 2021); see ‘UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) At the SEC – Glasgow 2021’ (2021) <https://ukcop26.org> accessed 28 November 2021

9 Climate Change Act 2008

10 Environment Act 2021

11 Tony Juniper, ‘The Environment Act 2021 – A Turning Point for Nature’ (Natural England, 2021) <https://naturalengland.blog.gov.uk/2021/11/23/the-environment-act-2021-a-turning-point-for-nature/> accessed 11 April 2022

12 C Skidmore, ‘Mission Zero: Independent Review of Net Zero’ (UK Government, 2023) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1128689/mission-zero-independent-review.pdf> accessed 27 February 2023

13 See Prime Minister's Office 10 DS, ‘Making Government Deliver for the British People’ (GOV.UK, 7 February 2023) <www.gov.uk/government/news/making-government-deliver-for-the-british-people> accessed 7 February 2023; see also E Staff, ‘Prioritising Net-Zero or Ignoring Non-Energy Emissions? UK’s Green Economy Reacts to SUNAK’s Department Shake-Up’ (edie, 9 February 2023) <www.edie.net/prioritising-net-zero-or-ignoring-non-energy-emissions-uks-green-economy-reacts-to-sunaks-department-shake-up/> accessed 27 February 2023

14 I Sanderson, ‘Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making’ (2002) 80 Public Administration 1

15 Jonathan Elkind and Carlos Pascual, Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications (Brookings Institution Press 2010) 1

16 Barry D Solomon and Karthik Krishna, ‘The Coming Sustainable Energy Transition: History, Strategies, and Outlook’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy 7422

17 See K Harris, ‘Digest of UK Energy Statistics: Energy’ (Gov.uk, 2022) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1094282/DUKES_2022_Chapter_1.pdf> accessed 16 March 2023

18 Thijs van de Graaf, The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 8

19 Leslie E Grayson, National Oil Companies (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1981) 1–3; see also David Humphreys, ‘Minerals: Industry History and Fault Lines of Conflict’ in Wojciech Ostrowski and Roland Dannreuther (eds), Global Resources Conflict and Cooperation (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 33–34

20 Christopher Tugendhat and Adrian Hamilton, Oil the Biggest Business (Eyre Methuen Ltd 1975) 1

21 Solomon and Krishna (n 16)

22 James Henderson and Anupama Sen, ‘The Energy Transition: Key Challenges for Incumbent and New Players in The Global Energy System’ [2021] The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) <www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Energy-Transition-Key-challenges-for-incumbent-players-in-the-global-energy-system-ET01.pdf> accessed 25 July 2022

23 Ibid

24 Jorge Blazquez, Rolando Fuentes-Bracamontes and Baltasar Manzano, ‘A Road Map to Navigate the Energy Transition’ [2021] The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) <www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/A-road-map-to-navigate-the-energy-transition-Insight-59.pdf> accessed 25 July 2022

25 D Yergin, ‘The Energy Transition Confronts Reality’ (Project Syndicate, 21 February 2023) <www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/energy-transition-four-major-challenges-by-daniel-yergin-2023-01?barrier=accesspaylog> accessed 4 March 2023

26 Daniel Yergin, The New Map: Energy, Climate, And the Clash of Nations (Penguin Press 2020) 407; see also David Pilling, ‘Can Africa Grow Without Fossil Fuels?’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/1e8c12fe-4823-41a1-8069-b6150876427d> accessed 2 June 2022

27 A Mooney, ‘Is 1.5C Still Realistic? The Crumbling Consensus over Key Climate Target’ (Financial Times, 16 March 2023) <www.ft.com/content/450a59bb-7c83-4d04-851f-0bbc120c09f7> accessed 23 March 2023

28 Yergin, The New Map (n 26) 377; see also ‘Energy Transition’ (Planète Énergies, 2021) <www.planete-energies.com/en/content/energy-transition> accessed 23 April 2022

29 Climate Change Committee, ‘The Sixth Carbon Budget: The UK’s Path to Net Zero’ (2020) <www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/The-Sixth-Carbon-Budget-The-UKs-path-to-Net-Zero.pdf> accessed 16 March 2023

30 S Hinson, ‘Energy Policy: An Overview’ (House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, 2020) <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8980/CBP-8980.pdf> accessed 16 February 2023; see also Skidmore (n 12)

31 See P Beilharz, ‘Reading Politics: Social Theory and Social Policy’ (1987) 23 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 388; J Ozga, ‘Policy Research and Policy Theory: A Comment on Fitz and Halpin’ (1990) 5 Journal of Education Policy 359; see also SJ Ball, ‘What Is Policy? 21 Years Later: Reflections on the Possibilities of Policy Research’ (2015) 36 Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 306; C Bacchi, ‘Policy as Discourse: What Does It Mean? Where Does It Get Us?’ (2000) 21 Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 45

32 SJ Ball, ‘What Is Policy? Texts, Trajectories and Toolboxes’ (1993) 13 Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 10

33 Evidence-based policymaking is an approach that assists the government and people to make well informed decisions about policies, programmes and projects by putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of policy development and implementation. See S Sutcliffe and J Court, ‘Evidence-Based Policymaking: What Is It? How Does It Work? What Relevance for Developing Countries?’ (ODI, 2005) <https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/3683.pdf> accessed 16 February 2023

34 BW Head, ‘Reconsidering Evidence-Based Policy: Key Issues and Challenges’ (2010) 29 Policy and Society 77

35 Policymaking is the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver ‘outcomes’ – desired changes in the real world. See UK Cabinet Office ‘Modernising Government’ (1999) <https://ntouk.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/modgov.pdf> accessed 16 February 2023

36 Ibid

37 See Sutcliffe and Court (n 33)

38 Ibid; see also L Shaxson, ‘Is Your Evidence Robust Enough? Questions for Policy Makers and Practitioners’ (2005) 1 Evidence and Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice 101

39 See BK Sovacool and others, ‘Policy Prescriptions to Address Energy and Transport Poverty in the United Kingdom’ [2023] Nature Energy; K Svobodova and others, ‘Decarbonization, Population Disruption and Resource Inventories in the Global Energy Transition’ (2022) 13 Nature Communications

40 See R Common, ‘Organisational Learning in a Political Environment’ (2004) 25 Policy Studies 35; see also R Pawson, ‘Evidence-Based Policy: In Search of a Method’ (2002) 8 Evaluation 157

41 Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, ‘Green Upheaval: The New Geopolitics of Energy’ (Foreign Affairs, 2022) <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-11-30/geopolitics-energy-green-upheaval> accessed 5 April 2022

42 Yergin, The New Map (n 26) 377–78

43 See BBC, ‘Climate Change: China Aims For “Carbon Neutrality By 2060”’ (BBC News, 2022) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-54256826> accessed 12 April 2022; see also ‘COP26: India PM Narendra Modi Pledges Net Zero By 2070’ (BBC News, 2022) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-59125143> accessed 12 April 2022

44 Energy Institute, ‘Could Current Global Events Derail the Energy Transition?’ (Energy Institute, 2022) <https://knowledge.energyinst.org/new-energy-world/article?id=126922> accessed 18 May 2022

45 S & P Global, ‘What Is Energy Transition?’ (S&P Global, 2020) <www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/what-is-energy-transition> accessed 22 April 2021

46 IRENA, ‘Energy Transition Holds Key to Tackle Global Energy and Climate Crisis’ (IRENA, 2022) <www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2022/Mar/Energy-Transition-Holds-Key-to-Tackle-Global-Energy-and-Climate-Crisis> accessed 12 April 2022

47 Climate Change Act 2008

48 Section 1(2) Climate Change Act 2008; see also Climate Change Committee, ‘The Sixth Carbon Budget’ (n 29)

49 Section 92(1) Climate Change Act 2008

50 See The Institute for Government, ‘UK Net Zero Target’ (2022) <www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/net-zero-target> accessed 12 April 2022

51 … the good news is that there is, still, a path to avoid catastrophic climate change. The science could not be clearer: by the middle of this century, the world has to reduce emissions to as close to zero as possible, with the small amount of remaining emissions absorbed through natural carbon sinks like forests, and new technologies like carbon capture. If we can achieve this, global emissions of greenhouse gases will be ‘net zero’. Delivering this requires urgent global action, ending coal-fired power generation, retiring petrol and diesel engines from all cars, and halting deforestation. These are the steps that the UK is calling for. See BEIS (n 6)

52 Skidmore (n 12)

53 North Sea Transition Authority, 'Bids Invited in UK’s First-Ever Carbon Storage Licensing Round' (NSTA, 2022) <www.nstauthority.co.uk/news-publications/news/2022/bids-invited-in-uk-s-first-ever-carbon-storage-licensing-round/> accessed 14 June 2022

54 The Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 'The Ten Point Plan for a Greener Industrial Revolution' (Government of UK 2020)

55 Ibid

56 Ibid

57 Ibid

58 R Bocca and HV Singh, ‘5 Strategies to Navigate the Shifting Frontiers of the Energy Transition’ (World Economic Forum, 2022) <www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/05/5-strategies-actions-navigate-energy-transition/> accessed 23 March 2023

59 See Climate Watch, ‘United Kingdom | Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions | Climate Watch’ (Climatewatchdata.org, 2022) <www.climatewatchdata.org/ghg-emissions?end_year=2014&regions=GBR&start_year=1990> accessed 12 April 2022

60 International Energy Agency, ‘Net Zero By 2050: A Roadmap for The Global Energy Sector' (IEA, 2021) <www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050> accessed 4 February 2022

61 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change' (IPCC 2022) <https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg3/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf> accessed 5 April 2022

62 Ibid

63 BEIS (n 6); see also The Department for Business, Energy, and Industrialised Strategy (BEIS), 'Heat and Buildings Strategy' (UK Government 2021)

64 Jessica Black, 'Energy Prices: Why Are Power Bills Going Up?' (BBC News, 2022) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-58558645> accessed 12 April 2022; see OFGEM, 'Price Cap to Increase by £693 From April' (Ofgem, 2022) <www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications/price-cap-increase-ps693-april> accessed 12 April 2022; see also National World, 'Why UK Energy Bills Are Rising and Increasing Gas Prices Explained' (Nationalworld.com, 2022) <www.nationalworld.com/lifestyle/money/why-are-energy-bills-going-up-how-much-will-bill-rise-in-april-2022-uk-increase-and-gas-prices-explained-3507001> accessed 12 April 2022

65 See Energy Transitions Commission (n 2). Achieving carbon neutrality will require decarbonisation of energy systems. Governments and the private sectors are expected to ramp up investments in low-carbon generation, energy efficiency, grids and storage. See World Energy Council (n 1)

66 Ibid

67 Ibid

68 BW Ang, WL Choong and TS Ng, ‘Energy Security: Definitions, Dimensions and Indexes’ (2015) 42 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 1077

69 John Paterson, ‘Reconceptualising Energy Security from a Legal Perspective in the Context of Climate Change’ in ST Hunter and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of Energy Law (Routledge 2021) 58–59

70 IEA 'Energy Security' (2022) <www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security> accessed 31 January 2022

71 Daniel Yergin, 'Ensuring Energy Security' (2006) 85 Foreign Affairs 69; see also John S Duffield and Brian Woodall, 'Japan's New Basic Energy Plan' (2011) 39 Energy Policy 3741; Christian Winzer, 'Conceptualizing Energy Security' (2012) 46 Energy Policy 36; Bert Kruyt and others, 'Indicators for Energy Security' (2009) 37 Energy Policy 2166

72 Elkind and Pascual (n 15) 2–3

73 Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell, 'The Concept of Energy Security: Beyond the Four As' (2014) 75 Energy Policy 415

74 John Paterson, ‘Reconceptualising Energy Security from a Legal Perspective in the Context of Climate Change’ in Hunter and others (n 69) 70–73

75 Ibid

76 Jonathan Elkind, ‘Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda’ in Elkind and Pascual (n 15) 121–29.

77 HM Government (n 5)

78 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2023, ‘Accelerating the Transition from Fossil Fuels and Securing Energy Supplies: Fourth Report of Session 2022–23’ 1

79 Ibid; see also Marco Antonio Vieira and Klaus Guimarães Dalgaard, ‘The Energy–Security–Climate-Change Nexus in Brazil’ (2013) 22 Environmental Politics 610

80 Ibid

81 Andreas Exarheas, ‘New North Sea Licensing Round Planned’ (Rigzone, 2022) <www.rigzone.com/news/new_north_sea_licensing_round_planned-08-apr-2022-168572-article/> accessed 20 June 2022

82 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2023 (n 78)

83 Energy Transitions Commission (n 2); see also J Blas, ‘Energy Security, Not Climate Change, Is the Theme for 2023’ (Bloomberg, 24 November 2022) <www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-11-24/energy-security-not-climate-change-is-the-theme-for-2023?leadSource=uverify+wall> accessed 22 March 2023

84 Konstantinos J Chalvatzis and Elizabeth Hooper, ‘Energy Security vs. Climate Change: Theoretical Framework Development and Experience in Selected EU Electricity Markets’ (2009) 13 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 2703

85 Ibid

86 HM Government (n 5)

87 IPCC, ‘Climate Change: A Threat to Human Wellbeing and Health of The Planet. Taking Action Now Can Secure Our Future’ (2022) <www.ipcc.ch/2022/02/28/pr-wgii-ar6/> accessed 20 June 2022

88 Jeffrey Qi and Anika Terton, ‘Addressing Climate Change through Integrated Responses: Linking Adaptation and Mitigation’ (International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 2022) <www.iisd.org/system/files/2022-03/climate-change-linking-adaptation-mitigation.pdf> accessed 7 June 2022

89 Ibid; see also art 5 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Paris Agreement’ (United Nations 2015)

90 Ibid

91 Art 6 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ‘Paris Agreement’ (United Nations 2015)

92 R Gross and others, ‘Review of Energy Policy 2022’ (UK Energy Research Centre, 2022) <https://d2e1qxpsswcpgz.cloudfront.net/uploads/2017/12/UKERC_Review-of-Energy-Policy-2022.pdf> accessed 2 March 2023

93 Trevor Houser and others, ‘US Policy Options to Reduce Russian Energy Dependence’ (Rhodium Group, 2022) <https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/US-Policy-Options-to-Reduce-Russian-Energy-Dependence.pdf> accessed 7 June 2022

94 Greg Muttit, ‘Countries Must Phase Out Oil and Gas Production – And Quickly: But How Fast Is Fast Enough?’ (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2022) <www.iisd.org/articles/analysis/phase-out-oil-gas-production> accessed 7 June 2022

95 Gross and others (n 92)

96 See HM Government (n 5)

97 Gross and others (n 92)

98 See Department for Business E&IS, ‘UK Government Takes Next Steps to Boost Domestic Energy Production’ (GOV.UK, 22 September 2022) <www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-government-takes-next-steps-to-boost-domestic-energy-production> accessed 14 March 2023; see also J Burgess, ‘IGas Slams Return of UK Shale Gas Fracking Moratorium’ (S&P Global Commodity Insights, 28 October 2022) <www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/energy-transition/102822-igas-slams-return-of-uk-shale-gas-fracking-moratorium?_its=JTdCJTIydmlkJTIyJTNBJTIyODk1ZjZiYzAtOTJjYy00ZjM0LTlmNTQtZmEyYzM3MjliYzE3JTIyJTJDJTIyc3RhdGUlMjIlM0ElMjJybHR%2BMTY3ODgwMzYyNH5sYW5kfjJfMTAwMjJfc2VvXzIxNzJmN2RhYjk2MWFjOGU5NzBmZTM2OWY3NDdhYmNhJTIyJTdE> accessed 14 March 2023

99 Gross and others (n 92)

100 Derek Brower, ‘Biden and Ukraine: From Climate Champion to Oil Price Panic’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/048ea270-cdd8-4c77-a8d4-0c67e2f9b921> accessed 13 April 2022

101 Yergin, ‘Energy Transition Confronts Reality’ (n 25); see also Strategic Petroleum Reserve, ‘History of SPR Releases’ (Energy.gov, n.d.) <www.energy.gov/ceser/history-spr-releases> accessed 4 March 2023

102 See PGJ, ‘Denmark to Boost North Sea Gas Production to Quit Russian Supply’ (Pgjonline.com, 2022) <https://pgjonline.com/news/2022/april/denmark-to-boost-north-sea-gas-production-to-quit-russian-supply> accessed 17 May 2022

103 Elkind and Pascual (n 15) 1–2

104 Fiona Harvey, ‘New North Sea Oil and Gas Licences “Incompatible with UK Climate Goals”’ (The Guardian, 2022) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/feb/15/new-north-sea-oil-gas-licences-incompatible-uk-climate-goals> accessed 13 April 2022

105 Section 1–2 of the Climate Change Act 2008; see Climate Change Committee, ‘A Legal Duty to Act – Climate Change Committee’ (2022) <www.theccc.org.uk/the-need-to-act/a-legal-duty-to-act/> accessed 28 July 2022; see also Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Phasing Out the Installation of Fossil Fuel Heating in Homes Off the Gas Grid’ (BEIS 2022) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1026356/domestic-offgg-consultation.pdf> accessed 28 July 2022

106 See D Rycroft ‘2022 Shows the Need for a Grown-up Conversation about Energy Policy’ (Energy Voice, 30 December 2022) <www.energyvoice.com/opinion/472333/2022-shows-the-need-for-a-grown-up-conversation-about-energy-policy/> accessed 4 March 2023

107 BEIS (n 6)

108 See ClientEarth, ‘Historic High Court Ruling Finds UK Government’s Climate Strategy “Unlawful”’ (ClientEarth, 18 July 2022) <www.clientearth.org/latest/press-office/press/historic-high-court-ruling-finds-uk-government-s-climate-strategy-unlawful/> accessed 16 March 2023; see also White & Case, ‘Landmark High Court Decision That the UK’s Net Zero Strategy Is Unlawful’ (White & Case LLP, 31 August 2022) <www.whitecase.com/news/media/landmark-high-court-decision-uks-net-zero-strategy-unlawful> accessed 16 March 2023

109 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2023 (n 78); see also Climate Change Committee, ‘The Sixth Carbon Budget’ (n 29)

110 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2023 (n 78)

111 A Launay-Smirnov, ‘Whitehaven Coal Mine Approval Jeopardises UK’s International Commitments’ (Ember, 10 March 2023) <https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/whitehaven-coal-mine-approval-jeopardises-uks-international-commitments/> accessed 16 March 2023

112 Nathalie Thomas, ‘UK Government Approves Jackdaw Gas Project in North Sea’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/a650f12e-65d7-4cf1-9d95-568d63229597> accessed 7 June 2022

113 Claudia Kemfert and others, ‘The Expansion of Natural Gas Infrastructure Puts Energy Transitions at Risk’ (2022) 7 Nature Energy 582

114 Sam Fankhauser, Steve Smith and Anupama Sen, ‘Delaying Clean Energy Transition Would Be ‘Lose–Lose’ for UK Energy Security, Households and the Climate’ (Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, 2022) <www.ox.ac.uk/news/2022-03-25-delaying-clean-energy-transition-would-be-lose-lose-uk-energy-security-households> accessed 20 June 2022

115 See ‘Kwarteng Advances Plans for Funding New Nuclear Projects, Including Sizewell C’ (GOV.UK, 2022) <www.gov.uk/government/news/kwarteng-advances-plans-for-funding-new-nuclear-projects-including-sizewell-c> accessed 14 June 2022

116 Greenpeace, ‘UK Government Grants Shell New Permit to Extract Gas from Jackdaw Field – Greenpeace Reaction’ (Greenpeace UK, 2022) <www.greenpeace.org.uk/news/jackdaw-permit-greenpeace-reaction/> accessed 7 June 2022

117 Dan Calverley and Kevin Anderson, ‘Phaseout Pathways for Fossil Fuel Production Within Paris-Compliant Carbon Budgets’ (IISD, 2022) <www.iisd.org/publications/report/phaseout-pathways-fossil-fuel-production-within-paris-compliant-carbon-budgets> accessed 7 June 2022

118 See HM Government (n 5)

119 Ibid; see also Vieira and Dalgaard (n 79)

120 Ibid; see also Roula Khalaf and Tom Wilson, ‘Energy Shock Shows Need to Rethink Green Transition, Aramco Chief Says’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/f8cc1070-abbe-4489-9c4d-1569eb836195> accessed 29 May 2022

121 See HM Government (n 5)

122 See Market Insider, ‘Natural Gas PRICE Today | Natural Gas Spot Price Chart | Live Price of Natural Gas Per Ounce | Markets Insider’ (Markets Insider, 2022) <https://markets.businessinsider.com/commodities/natural-gas-price> accessed 28 July 2022

123 Fankhauser, Smith and Sen (n 114)

124 Ibid; see also IRENA, ‘Majority of New Renewables Undercut Cheapest Fossil Fuel on Cost’ (IRENA, 2021) <www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2021/Jun/Majority-of-New-Renewables-Undercut-Cheapest-Fossil-Fuel-on-Cost> accessed 20 June 2022

125 Olaf Storbeck and David Sheppard, ‘Germany Fires Up Coal Plants to Avert Gas Shortage as Russia Cuts Supply’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/f662a412-9ebc-473a-baca-22de5ff622e2> accessed 20 June 2022

126 Fankhauser, Smith and Sen (n 114)

127 Ibid

128 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2023 (n 78)

129 Ibid

130 See E Staff, ‘Prioritising Net-Zero or Ignoring Non-Energy Emissions? UK’s Green Economy Reacts to Sunak’s Department Shake-Up’ (edie, 9 February 2023) <www.edie.net/prioritising-net-zero-or-ignoring-non-energy-emissions-uks-green-economy-reacts-to-sunaks-department-shake-up/> accessed 27 February 2023

131 Ibid; see also Skidmore (n 12)

132 Skidmore (n 12); see also N Foster, ‘The Skidmore Review Is a Wake-up Call to the UK: Act Now or Risk Losing Opportunities from Net Zero’ (The Carbon Trust, 31 January 2023) <www.carbontrust.com/news-and-insights/insights/the-skidmore-review-is-a-wake-up-call-to-the-uk-act-now-or-risk-losing-opportunities-from-net-zero> accessed 23 March 2023

133 See T Gillespie, ‘National Grid Uses Back-up Coal Plant for the First Time to Secure UK Power Supply’ (Bloomberg.com, 7 March 2023) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-07/uk-grid-uses-back-up-coal-plant-for-first-time-to-secure-supply?leadSource=uverify+wall> accessed 8 March 2023; see also A Lawson, ‘National Grid Puts Backup Coal Plants into Action for First Time This Winter’ (The Guardian, 7 March 2023) <www.theguardian.com/business/2023/mar/07/national-grid-power-plants-coldest-night-of-year-extra-electricity> accessed 8 March 2023

134 Yergin, The New Map (n 26) 398–402; see Chalvatzis and Hooper (n 84)

135 See Skidmore (n 12)

136 Martin G Hewitt, ‘UK Government Introduces New Future System Operator to Improve Energy Resilience’ (Environment Journal, 2022) <https://environmentjournal.online/articles/uk-government-introduces-new-future-system-operator-to-improve-energy-resilience/> accessed 20 June 2022

137 See H Croft, ‘How Can We Maintain Energy Security during the Transition?’ (RBC Capital Markets | Beyond the Ballot Episode, 2022) <www.rbccm.com/en/insights/beyond-the-ballot/episode/how-can-we-maintain-energy-security-during-the-transition> accessed 4 March 2023

138 Jing-Yu Liu and others, ‘Socioeconomic Factors and Future Challenges of The Goal of Limiting the Increase in Global Average Temperature To 1.5 °C’ (2018) 9 Carbon Management 447; see also UKCIP, ‘Socio-Economic Scenarios for Climate Change Impact Assessment: A Guide to Their Use in The UK Climate Impacts Programme’ (UK Climate Impact Programme [UKCIP], 2001) <www.ukcip.org.uk/wp-content/PDFs/socioeconomic_tec.pdf> accessed 28 July 2022

139 Power Nation, ‘Germany Rejects Europe’s Proposal to Ban Gas-Powered Vehicles by 2035’ (PowerNation, 14 March 2023) <www.powernationtv.com/post/germany-rejects-eu-proposal-on-gas-powered-vehicles-by-2035> accessed 17 March 2023

140 A Hancock, ‘EU Climate Agenda at Risk after German Pushback’ (Financial Times, 17 March 2023) <www.ft.com/content/64ecc598-fdf7-402a-9351-cd821a4ffc01> accessed 17 March 2023

141 Ibid

142 See ‘Scientific Review of Shale Gas Launched’ (GOV.UK, 2022) <www.gov.uk/government/news/scientific-review-of-shale-gas-launched> accessed 20 June 2022

143 Aubrey Allegretti, Helena Horton and Nadeem Badshah, ‘Ministers Launch Fracking Study, Paving Way to End Moratorium in England’ (The Guardian, 2022) <www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/apr/05/ministers-launch-uk-fracking-study-paving-way-to-end-moratorium> accessed 20 June 2022

144 Daniel Yergin, The New Map (n 26) 402

145 Khalaf and Wilson (n 120)

146 Dimitris Mavrokefalidis, ‘Climate Activists Disrupt Kwasi Kwarteng’s Business Lunch’ (Energy Live News, 2022) <www.energylivenews.com/2022/05/16/climate-activists-disrupt-kwasi-kwartengs-business-lunch/> accessed 31 May 2022

147 Ibid

148 Nathalie Thomas, Tom Wilson and Jim Pickard, ‘North Sea Operators Warn of Reduced Investment and Output’ (Financial Times, 2022) <www.ft.com/content/521bf3f8-67cd-4417-ba56-cabf700f57e4> accessed 7 June 2022

149 D Sheppard, ‘UK Oil and Gas Group Harbour Energy Says Windfall Tax “Has All but Wiped Out” Profit’ (Financial Times, 9 March 2023) <www.ft.com/content/7747b2b8-edc1-4ac2-9d84-8f0b7f599e03> accessed 9 March 2023

150 Thomas, Wilson and Pickard (n 148)

151 Ibid; see also UK Government, ‘New Temporary Tax Reliefs on Qualifying Capital Asset Investments From 1 April 2021’ (GOV.UK, 2022) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-temporary-tax-reliefs-on-qualifying-capital-asset-investments-from-1-april-2021/new-temporary-tax-reliefs-on-qualifying-capital-asset-investments-from-1-april-2021> accessed 7 June 2022

152 See Energy Transitions Commission (n 2)

153 Kemfert and others (n 113)

154 Bordoff and O’Sullivan, ‘Green Upheaval’ (n 41)

155 Mark Nicholls, ‘Russia–Ukraine Conflict: The Net-Zero Transition Just Got Harder – and More Urgent’ (Energy Monitor, 2022) <www.energymonitor.ai/policy/opinion-the-net-zero-transition-just-got-harder-and-more-urgent> accessed 13 April 2022; see also Sonja van Renssen, ‘Opinion: The Gas Price Spike – Perfect Storm or Stars Aligning?’ (Energy Monitor, 2021) <www.energymonitor.ai/policy/opinion-the-gas-price-spike-perfect-storm-or-stars-aligning> accessed 13 April 2022

156 Ibid

157 Dave Keating, ‘Will Rising Gas Prices Hasten the Switch to Renewables?’ (Energy Monitor, 2022) <www.energymonitor.ai/sectors/power/will-rising-gas-prices-hasten-the-switch-to-renewables> accessed 13 April 2022

158 Ibid; see also Gross and others (n 92)

159 Winzer (n 71)

160 Fankhauser, Smith and Sen (n 114); see Nationalgrid ESO, ‘A Day in The Life 2035: How A Fully Decarbonised Electricity System Might Operate’ (National Grid ESO, 2022) <www.nationalgrideso.com/document/246851/download> accessed 20 June 2022; see also IEA, ‘Energy Security in Energy Transitions – World Energy Outlook 2022 – Analysis’ (IEA, 2022) <www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2022/energy-security-in-energy-transitions> accessed 14 March 2023

161 Blazquez, Fuentes-Bracamontes and Manzano (n 24)

162 See The Institute for Government, ‘UK Net Zero Target’ (The Institute for Government, 2022) <www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/net-zero-target> accessed 12 April 2022; see also Climate Change Committee, ‘Net Zero – The UK's Contribution to Stopping Global Warming’ (2022) <www.theccc.org.uk/publication/net-zero-the-uks-contribution-to-stopping-global-warming/> accessed 14 June 2022

163 Ulf Moslener, ‘The Deep Uncertainties that Are Stalling Energy Transition’ (Engineering and Technology, 2022) <https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2022/05/the-deep-uncertainties-that-are-stalling-energy-transition/> accessed 14 June 2022

164 Elkind, ‘Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda’ (n 76) 129

165 A Lawson and J Jolly, ‘Battery Startup Britishvolt Enters Administration as Rescue Talks Fail’ (The Guardian, 17 January 2023) <www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jan/17/britishvolt-expected-enter-administration-tuesday> accessed 17 March 2023

166 H Dempsey, P Campbell and M O’Dwyer, ‘Britishvolt Owed up to £160mn to Creditors When It Collapsed’ (Financial Times, 14 March 2023) <www.ft.com/content/461f813e-3421-4a29-b1e9-67b94898bf1a> accessed 17 March 2023

167 Bocca and Singh (n 58)

168 Henderson and Sen (n 22)

169 H Dempsey, P Campbell and M O’Dwye, ‘Britishvolt: How Britain's Big Battery Hope Ran out of Charge’ (Financial Times, 20 January 2023) <www.ft.com/content/937ac165-5fcc-4ae8-bd00-3616d7a32cf1> accessed 17 March 2023

170 Moslener (n 163)

171 Skidmore (n 12)

172 reNEWS, ‘Orsted “Needs Time” to Analyse Impact of Budget on Hornsea 3’ (reNEWS, 16 March 2023) <https://renews.biz/84455/orsted-needs-time-to-analyse-impact-of-budget-on-hornsea-3/> accessed 17 March 2023

173 Energy Transitions Commission (n 2)

174 Ibid

175 Last year saw a decline in fossil fuels’ share of electricity production in the EU, from 39% in 2019 to 37% in 2021. Renewable electricity has had an average annual growth of 44 terawatt-hours over the past two years, and more than half of that new wind and solar power replaced gas plants. Charles Moore, ‘European Electricity Review 2022’ (Ember, 2022) <https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/european-electricity-review-2022/> accessed 13 April 2022; see also Keating (n 157)

176 Ibid

177 Ibid

178 Solomon and Krishna (n 16)

179 See N Thomas, ‘Wind Farm Developers Demand UK Tax Breaks to Offset Rising Costs’ (Financial Times, 26 February 2023) <www.ft.com/content/80dee308-a564-4ee4-b1f2-ab7dbed643cd> accessed 17 March 2023; see also H Dempsey and P Campbell, ‘Britishvolt Collapse Prompts Calls for Shake-up of UK Subsidy Policies’ (Financial Times, 28 January 2023) <www.ft.com/content/65515ed1-b887-495e-af34-ff9ba86ceeb2> accessed 17 March 2023

180 Elkind, ‘Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda’ (n 76) 123

181 HM Government (n 5)

182 House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2023 (n 78)

183 Solomon and Krishna (n 16)

184 Fankhauser, Smith and Sen (n 114)

185 Elkind, ‘Energy Security: Call for a Broader Agenda’ (n 76) 120

186 Ibid

187 Elkind and Pascual (n 15) 1

188 Ibid

189 Grayson (n 19) 7 –8; see also Alan H Gelb, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse (OUP 1988) 3

190 See Energy Transitions Commission (n 2)

191 Grasping the opportunity presented by the energy crisis will require a synchronised scaling up of a range of renewable energy technologies and scaling back of fossil fuels energy sources: ibid

192 Bocca and Singh (n 58)

193 Nicholls (n 155)

194 Jason Bordoff and Meghan L O’Sullivan, ‘The New Energy Order: How Governments Will Transform Energy Markets’ (Foreign Affairs, 2022) <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/energy/2022-06-07/markets-new-energy-order> accessed 28 July 2022

195 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Resilience for the Future: The UK’s Critical Minerals Strategy’ (BEIS, 2022) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-critical-mineral-strategy/resilience-for-the-future-the-uks-critical-minerals-strategy> accessed 28 July 2022; see also Jacqueline Holman, ‘UK Launches First Critical Minerals Strategy’ (Spglobal, 2022) <www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/energy-transition/072222-uk-launches-first-critical-minerals-strategy> accessed 28 July 2022

196 Bordoff and O’Sullivan, ‘The New Energy Order’ (n 194)

197 Skidmore (n 12)

198 See Nick Ferris, ‘More Renewables Does Not Have to Mean Higher Electricity Bills’ (Energy Monitor, 2022) <www.energymonitor.ai/policy/market-design/more-renewables-does-not-have-to-mean-higher-electricity-bills> accessed 13 April 2022

199 Ibid; see also Dave Jones, ‘Global Electricity Review 2022’ (Ember, 2022) <https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/global-electricity-review-2022/> accessed 28 July 2022

200 Nicholls (n 155)

201 Ibid

202 Will Mathis, ‘Energy Transition Fuels $755 Billion Of Investment In 2021’ (Bloomberg UK, 2022) <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-27/energy-transition-drew-record-755-billion-of-investment-in-2021> accessed 20 June 2022

203 Ibid

204 Nicholls (n 155)

205 Skidmore (n 12)

206 Kathryn Hochstetler and Eduardo Viola, ‘Brazil and The Politics of Climate Change: Beyond the Global Commons’ (2012) 21 Environmental Politics 753