Natural Selection, Mechanism and Phenomenon

ABSTRACT

Natural selection is a general process that operates in different populations. To characterise natural selection as a mechanism within the framework of the new mechanistic philosophy, it is required to identify a pertinent phenomenon for which natural selection is responsible. Firstly, every case identified by evolutionary biologists as instances of natural selection must align with this mechanistic characterisation. Secondly, natural selection should genuinely be responsible for the attributed phenomenon. While philosophers often posit producing adaptation as the quintessential phenomenon, Pérez-González and Luque challenge this perspective, contending that not all instances of natural selection are cases where natural selection produces adaptation. This paper further supports Pérez-González and Luque’s objection and demonstrates that natural selection is also not responsible for the increased frequency of traits with a greater expected number of offspring. Furthermore, the paper argues that even if there is a phenomenon that allows for the mechanistic characterisation of natural selection to encompass all instances, it is improbable that natural selection assumes responsibility for it. Consequently, characterising natural selection as a mechanism emerges as an implausible stance.

KEYWORDS:

• Natural selection
• mechanism
• phenomenon
• adaptation
• fitness
• causation

Acknowledgments

I extend my gratitude to André Ariew, Hannah Rubin, and the two anonymous referees for their invaluable comments and discussions on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks are owed to Xiucui Li for her unwavering support throughout the process of completing this paper.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 See Havstad (2011) for the source of this research.

2 For a more in-depth discussion of causation, selection and fitness, refer to Matthen and Ariew (2009).