Afghanistan’s Ill-fated National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism

Abstract

In late 2015, the Afghan government’s Office of National Security Council was tasked with leading the development and implementation of a National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Strategy; a decision rooted in both domestic and international developments. Based on personal observations from Arian Sharifi as Chair of the National CVE Committee and the penholder of the draft CVE Strategy, this essay provides an overview of the strategy, including its development process, in the hope that some of its main principles could one day be implemented in Afghanistan, and/or serve as a blueprint for other countries in the region.◼

Since assuming office as Afghanistan’s president in 2014, Ashraf Ghani sought to move away from the informal, ad hoc decision-making style followed by Hamid Karzai’s administration, and formalise government interventions in written policies and strategies. To that end, the Office of National Security Council (ONSC) led the development of four interlinked strategic documents – National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, National Security Strategy and National Campaign Plan – that would give overall direction to the security sector agencies.¹ Based on guidance from these big-picture documents, thematic strategies were developed that would cover specific areas, and the National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Strategy (referred to in this article as ‘the strategy’) was one such document intended to provide overall guidance in countering and preventing the spread of violent extremism in the country. The document was also intended to fulfil an international initiative, as its development was in response to US President Barack Obama’s call on all countries to enhance their efforts against violent extremism during the February 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,² as well as the UN’s Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, issued on 24 December 2015, calling upon member states to do the same.³

To commence the process, the ONSC established an inter-agency committee on countering violent extremism (National CVE Committee), comprising 23 government and non-government organisations, including security sector organisations, ministries of religious affairs, education, higher education, public health and women’s affairs, as well as the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the US and UK governments.⁴ Chaired by the ONSC, the CVE Committee was tasked with the development and implementation of a National CVE Strategy.⁵ After numerous rounds of discussion and consultation, the Committee decided that a close understanding of the issues surrounding violent extremism – its drivers, platforms, push and pull factors, agents, appropriate countermeasures and local stakeholders – was lacking, and that empirical research needed to be conducted across the country based on which the strategy would be developed. With technical assistance from the US and UK governments, comprehensive desk and field research was conducted across Afghanistan over a period of 16 months, and a strategy was developed based on the findings from this research. After final rounds of consultation on the final product, the strategy was presented to the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by President Ghani. Unfortunately, the Council put the approval and implementation of the CVE Strategy indefinitely on hold on the basis that counterterrorism operational actions took priority over CVE efforts, in light of the increasingly precarious security situation and the limited resources at the government’s disposal.⁶ Thus, despite allocating close to two years of work, field research across the country and funding of $3 million from the US and UK governments, the National CVE Strategy was never approved for implementation.

Taliban fighters stand guard outside a police station in Kabul, September 2021. Courtesy of dpa picture alliance / Alamy

The remainder of this essay presents a discussion on: the methodology used for data collection and analysis during the desk and field research; the main findings from the research, including drivers, platforms and agents of violent extremism in Afghanistan, as well as the countermeasures specified by the strategy; and, briefly, the main lessons learned in this experience and the possible applicability of some of those lessons to CVE efforts elsewhere in the world.

Research Process, Design and Methodology

The main goal of the research was to empirically identify the roots, causes, drivers, facilitators, catalysts, platforms and agents of violent extremism in Afghanistan, delineated geographically and demographically, and propose realistic and effective countermeasures to be used by the relevant state and non-state actors. Research was conducted in two phases, with technical assistance from the US and UK governments. Outsourced to Coffey International (now known as Tetra Tech)/Qara Inc. through the UK Embassy in Kabul, the first phase had three components, conducted simultaneously: a comprehensive desk research on international best practices on CVE; a multidisciplinary literature review on radicalisation/mobilisation/recruitment patterns in Afghanistan; and consultations with relevant officials within the Afghan government on the nature of violent extremism and possible courses of action to prevent and counter it. The first phase of research revealed a number of significant shortfalls in the understanding of violent extremism in Afghanistan, including: the limited literature covering extremism related only to the Taliban and Islamic State, ignoring other terrorist groups and forms of violent extremism; the deficiency in literature on the relationship between non-violent radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Jamiat-e-Islah and violent extremist groups; a lack of qualitative comparison in geographic and demographic distribution of violent extremism and its causes; and empirical ambiguity on the mechanism between radicalisation and violent extremist mobilisation, among others. As such, field research was designed to fill these and other gaps.

The second phase focused on field research, conducted in two separate but synchronised consignments, funded by the US and UK embassies, respectively. The ONSC maintained supervision of the substantive part of both projects, while the logistical side was handled directly by the donors. The US Embassy contracted Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), an NGO, to conduct country-wide field research.⁷ The centrepiece of this research rested on holding 12 regional discussion forums (RDFs) in the country’s eight geographical regions as follows:

• North - Balkh and Kunduz (2)

• West - Herat

• South - Kandahar and Helmand (2)

• Central - Bamyan and Wardak (2)

• East - Nangarhar and Laghman (2)

• South East - Paktia

• North East - Badakhshan

• Kabul - All stakeholders, including regional countries

Each RDF brought together around 200 participants from the respective region, maintaining a balanced age, gender, ethnicity and professional background representation. Of the 200 attendees, 60 came from the districts of the province where the conference was held, 10 came from each province in the region and the rest came from the provincial capital where the conference was held. Thus, to take the North as an example, 60 persons came from Balkh provincial districts, 80 from other northern provinces and 60 from the location of the conference, Mazar-i-Sharif. Of the total number of participants, at least 50 had to be female.

The RDFs were two-day events, each with a stimulus session, small focus group discussion sessions and a plenary panel. In the stimulus session, CVE articles and academic readings were summarised for the participants to provoke discussion, offering the participants different lenses through which to examine local and national CVE issues. Participants were then divided into small focus groups to discuss in detail local concerns regarding radicalisation, violent extremist mobilisation, recruitment groups patterns and related pull and push factors, as well as proposed preventive measures and countermeasures. All focus groups then met at a plenary session where they presented their findings and conclusions. From each focus group, at least five key issues were selected to be included in the RDF report. The reports were used as a starting point for an in-depth assessment of local needs, obstacles and opportunities to address violent extremism in the villages, districts and provinces.

To supplement this and achieve greater depth, the UK Embassy contracted Coffey/Qara to conduct a total of 201 semi-structured in-depth interviews in Kabul, Kandahar and Takhar, representing the central, southern and northern regions of the country. Maintaining a representative sample along age, gender, ethnicity and rural–urban diversity, these interviews aimed to assess perceptions of three broad groups on violent extremism and potential solutions, as follows:

• General public affected by violence and conflict (farmers, shopkeepers, business-persons, etc).

• Faith leaders, students (madrasa, school, and university), tribal elders and school and university teachers.

• Professionals whose role was to identify solutions, work with community members and alleviate stress in relation to violent extremism (government employees, defence and security personnel, members of local NGOs, women’s groups and youth groups).

The outcomes from these in-depth interviews were analysed and synthesised in a comprehensive report, submitted and presented to the ONSC. Utilising the findings and conclusions from the first and second phases of the research, the ONSC developed Afghanistan’s National CVE Strategy, which was sent to various national and international stakeholders for final consultation, and finally presented to the NSC.

How the Strategy Summarised the Main Research Findings on Violent Extremism

In Section I, the strategy identified the following working definitions, among others, which were developed based on the broad agreement found in the desk and field research:⁸

• Extremism: An extreme shift in attitude that departs significantly from the mainstream of society, supporting ideas that are far from what most people consider reasonable.

• Violent Extremism: Encouraging, condoning, justifying or supporting violence by individuals or groups, outside the limitation of the law, to achieve political, ideological, religious, social or economic goals.

• Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE): The use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from engaging in violence for political, ideological or social goals, and to mitigate recruitment and support for violent extremist groups.

In Section II, the strategy proposed a distillation of the research findings on drivers of violent extremism. The strategy started by pointing out how the research had revealed that extremism and mobilisation into violence in the Afghan context were two related – but different – issues. First, many individuals with extremist views never joined violent groups. Second, those extremists who joined violent groups did so for ideological and/or non-ideological reasons. Finally, individuals without extremist views joined violent groups and then became radicalised afterwards. Given these clarifications, research found the main drivers of violent extremism in Afghanistan formed two main clusters – foreign and domestic. The strategy then went on to discuss each driver in detail. Below, the author summarises the strategy’s portrayal of each one of them.

Foreign Drivers of Violent Extremism

Radical Islamist ideas came to Afghanistan in the 1970s, and took root in the 1980s during the Soviet invasion.⁹ Utilising Islamist groups as a proxy force against the Soviets and their Afghan allies, the West, the Arab World and some of Afghanistan’s neighbours, actively promoted violent extremist views among the Afghan population, particularly the millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The factional fighting and the emergence of the Taliban in the 1990s, in which some of the neighbouring countries had direct stakes, continued the radicalisation trends.¹⁰ Foreign interference and use of proxies continued after the US-led invasion with the resurgence of the Taliban and related violent extremist groups, most of them receiving funding, sanctuaries, training, support with recruitment and radicalisation, as well as weapons and other warmaking resources, from state and non-state actors within the region. Field research conducted for the project found that the legacy of the Afghan jihad left an enduring radicalising effect on much of the Afghan society and continued to impact violent extremism in the country.

Field research was also summarised as showing that individuals and organisations with extremist views in neighbouring countries and the Persian Gulf region continued to contribute to the promotion and growth of violent extremism in Afghanistan. The flow of funding, as well as ideological support from wealthy and radical individuals and organisations in the region, enabled many Afghan and foreign terrorist and violent groups to continue fighting against the Afghan Republic and its Western allies. Thus, the strategy’s summary concluded that both foreign state proxy warfare, historically and currently, as well as non-state actors’ promotion of extremist ideologies, were key drivers of violent extremism in Afghanistan.

Domestic Drivers of Violent Extremism

On the domestic front, five categories of factors – political, economic, social, educational and religious – were identified by the strategy’s summary of the field research as the main factors that enabled violent extremism.

The research showed how some of the main political factors conducive to violent extremism in Afghanistan were weak governance, corruption, nepotism and impunity for the elites. The failure of the central government to extend its control over the territory was a fundamental issue that rested at the root of many problems, including the state’s inability to provide security and deliver basic public goods and services to the people. Absence of government in many parts of the country resulted in increasing swaths of ungoverned or undergoverned territories, where either the insurgents or local warlords filled the gap. In the areas under their control, the insurgents either encouraged or forced individuals into joining their ranks, thereby luring or co-opting them into violence and extremism. In other places, warlords and local strongmen engaged in systematic harrassment and persecution of the residents, pushing many people into joining insurgent/extremist groups as a means to protect themselves.

Widespread corruption in the various layers and agencies of the government increasingly undermined state legitimacy, generating a sense of alienation and distrust within the people. People visibly saw how certain individuals in influential positions within the government – cabinet, parliament, the courts – became multi-millionaires, even billionaires within a few years. Their ascent to riches and power was supported by the overall political establishment, and backed by foreign presence. The opulent lifestyles – mansions, expensive cars, large and extravagant parties, excessive revelry, foreign travel, swollen bank accounts and so on – compared with the meagre lifestyles of the majority of Afghans, generated deep resentment within the people.

Nepotism was the norm in government hiring, generating extensive and complicated patronage networks. Appointment to most influential government agencies at the national, provincial and district levels was made based on patronage networks, where patrons would extend support and protection to the appointees in return for regular payments, which the appointees would then generate through corrupt practices. Ordinary citizens paid the ultimate price, which led them to increasingly sway from the government and towards insurgent and violent extremist groups.

Field research also revealed the belief that the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary were corrupt and unfair, rigidly enforcing the law on the poor and the weak, while favouring the impunity of the rich and the powerful. In many places, the police force was seen as a predatory actor, not as a protector of the people. Given widespread corruption and unfair practices in the court system, people’s trust in the judiciary had faded, leading many to seek alternate means of traditional justice, including tribal codes and informal dispute resolution mechanisms. Some even approached the Taliban-appointed judges for adjudicating disputes and ensuring justice. This directly undermined government legitimacy, pushing many people towards anti-government groups.

Among the economic factors driving radicalisation and violent extremism in Afghanistan were grievances such as poverty and economic deprivation. Disadvantaged communities were found to be less resilient and more vulnerable to exploitation by violent extremists through pragmatic recruitment, the lure of money, support and stability for their families and a sense of self-worth. Absolute poverty, as well as the perception of relative deprivation, were pointed out as significant drivers of violent extremism, demonstrated through grievances such as perceptions of inequality, unequal employment opportunities, unbalanced and unfair development, as well as systematic discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity and geographical location, among others. Young, uneducated, poor and unemployed men were identified as particularly vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups. Those recruited for economic reasons did not necessarily become radicalised and only saw joining violent extremist groups as an economic opportunity. In some cases, radicalisation occurred after recruitment, while in others it did not occur at all, yet mobilisation into violence was still taking place.

The urban–rural divide in access to economic opportunities was found to be a significant factor. An overwhelming majority of the Afghan population lived in rural areas. In comparison with urban dwellers, the rural population had limited access to public services such as healthcare, education, justice and so forth. With agriculture being the main mode of subsistence in rural areas, problems such as land ownership, uneven distribution of agricultural aid – as well as natural disasters affecting crops – were found to have a detrimental impact on a large segment of the population, leading to a sense of anger, marginalisation and susceptibility to violent extremist recruitment.

The strategy also identified a number of social factors that directly, or in combination with other factors, influenced violent extremism in Afghanistan. Issues such as social exclusion, marginalisation, discrimination (real or perceived), displacement, criminality, family demographics and domestic violence and gender issues were some of the main drivers of violent extremism. Household factors such as marriage, gender roles, intergenerational relationships, household structure and living arrangements also had a strong impact on violent extremism in Afghanistan. Young men were found to be a significant segment of the population that could suffer adversely from these social issues, and consequently be drawn to violent extremism. Although traditionally women have been viewed as victims of violent extremism, research showed that women in Afghanistan became sympathisers of violent extremists while, on rare occasions, engaging in violence as well. A lack of widespread participation by Afghan women in violent groups had more to do with restricted movement than lack of sympathy for the cause.

Several health-related factors were also identified, such as limited access to healthcare services, the low quality of healthcare, mental health issues and addiction, which were found to influence decisions to join extremist groups. Despite significant improvements in the healthcare system, most of the participants in field research were dissatisfied with access to clinics, hospitals and medicine. Decades of warfare had left Afghanistan with a legacy of a physically and mentally wounded population that required long-term treatment and care. Despite the prevalence of PTSD symptoms and illnesses associated with trauma, the issue of mental health remained stigmatised at national level, which in turn constrained funding and policy promotion, preventing local decision-makers from having to grapple with the issue. This had left mentally ill individuals vulnerable to predatory influences, including both extremist and criminal recruitment.

The strategy also incorporated several findings related to the state of education in Afghanistan. A lack of sufficient access to education, the state’s inability to purge school and university curricula of material that promoted extremism, the prevalence of an educational culture that discouraged critical thinking and the presence of extremist groups among student bodies at high schools and universities were all prominent factors that directly or indirectly influenced the spread of violent extremism. Access to education was often limited by factors such as poverty, insecurity and cultural practices.

Although the Ministry of Education had made efforts to remove all direct references to violence from textbooks, security problems had limited the Ministry’s introduction and implementation of a common and unified curriculum at all schools across the country. As such, some state schools followed a curriculum that was not approved by the Ministry. Furthermore, teachers had autonomy over what they taught without a proper monitoring system, leading in many cases to the preaching of extremist ideologies, anti-government sentiments and sympathy for violent extremist groups. There was widespread political activism in schools, particularly by radical groups, violent or non-violent. Some of these groups ran their own schools, extensively distributing materials in line with radical thought, leading to the formation of politically and ideologically charged environments. Certain non-violent extremist groups such as Jamiat-e-Islah and Hizb-ut-Tahrir had developed extensive networks of members and followers within the Ministries of Education, Higher Education and Hajj and Religious Affairs, thereby injecting extremist views in a systematic manner into the educational system in the schools, universities and madrasas (religious schools).

The prevalence of madrasas as substitutes for – or complementary to – the state-run school system was found to be a major factor in the promotion of violent extremism. Thousands of madrasas, many attached to mosques, operated across Afghanistan, particularly in rural areas, providing religious education to young boys. Although the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs had the responsibility to register all madrasas and monitor their curricula, it could only do so for a small fraction of the madrasas; the rest operated autonomously, many of them with links to madrasas in Pakistan and/or connections with violent extremist groups. Most unregistered madrasas were private establishments owned by religious scholars and were run as small businesses. Although not all madrasas propagated violent extremism, their curricula often promoted a radical interpretation of Islam, making students vulnerable to violent extremist thoughts. The madrasas – located inside and outside Afghanistan – remained a main recruitment ground for the Taliban and other violent extremist groups.

Concerning religious factors, the strategy’s summary of research findings pointed out that extreme and radical interpretations of religion have often been used to promote and justify violent ideologies and attract recruits. Imams, mullahs and other religious leaders enjoy substantial influence over the population, and their preaching of Islam goes wide and deep within the Afghan society. The charisma and sermons of mullahs in madrasas and mosques, when containing radical interpretations of religion, became a key driver of violent extremism. The authorities, influences and allegiances of mullahs varied such that some were found to directly provoke hostility toward the government; others were generally inclined towards violent extremism, while a smaller number supported the Afghan government.

Radical ideologies, even if they do not encourage violence, can pave the way for violent extremism. Salafism is one such school of thought that had been used to justify violence, though it should be noted that this is true only with the jihadi branch, as both the purists and political activists eschew violence. Although the Salafists were not organised into a centralised organisation in Afghanistan, they had a loose constellation of networks scattered around the country and were mainly centred on mosques and madrasas. Salafi groups/circles ran their own madrasas, produced publications, offered public courses on religious subjects and conducted preaching at mosques. These groups mainly operated in Nangarhar, Badakhshan, Kabul, Herat and Kandahar.

The Strategy’s Proposed Government Interventions

Section III of the National CVE Strategy outlined a number of general areas for the government to intervene as a way to prevent and counter violent extremism, drawing recommendations from the field research and an analysis of the findings by the National CVE Committee. Given that this was a national-level document, broad areas were identified and outlined without details, directing the various relevant government organisations to develop specific, detailed action plans in line with the general guidance of the National CVE Strategy. Below is a summary of the proposed interventions.

Review and Amendment of the Relevant Laws and Regulations

The Media Law was to be reviewed and amended, particularly with regards to two issues; first, a specific framework that would clearly define what type of broadcasting would be considered conducive to extremism and violence was to be developed. This would ensure that while fully respecting the freedom of speech in accordance with the provisions of the country’s constitution, media outlets would not exceed or abuse the limits permitted by the law. And second, a framework for the monitoring of social media outlets was to be developed to ensure that extremist groups and individuals would not abuse these platforms for promoting violent extremism.

The regulations governing mosques and preaching were to be reviewed and amended to ensure they did not leave room for misuse of these platforms by radical actors. In accordance with the amended regulations, the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs would prepare broad guidelines for the imams and mullahs across the country to follow during their sermons and speeches. The guidelines would ensure that preaching would promote the message of peace, stability and moderation.

The Access to Information Law and its related regulations were to be reviewed and amended, and steps were to be taken for its full implementation. This would increase transparency and government responsiveness, leading to closer relations between the nation and the state.

The Ministry of Justice would also conduct a comprehensive review of existing laws as related to violent extremism, identify gaps and propose new laws or amendments where needed, intended to criminalise incitement or other acts that would be conducive to violent extremism.

Improved Implementation of Available Policies and Strategies

Relevant government bodies were to develop specific action plans that would jointly lead to the full implementation of the National Strategy for Combating Corruption, the purpose of which was to ensure levels of corruption at the national, provincial and district levels would be substantially reduced. Resolving the corruption problem would lead to better service delivery to the people by the government, more equitable opportunities, poverty reduction, better law enforcement, wider implementation of the due process and the rule of law and, ultimately, increased legitimacy for the government. This would enhance popular support for the government and reduce incentives for supporting and joining extremist groups.

Moreover, special attention was to be paid at the highest level of government for a comprehensive implementation of the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework, as a means of enhancing the economy, generating more jobs, creating more equitable employment opportunities, reducing poverty and promoting peace and stability.

The government’s Strategic Communications Strategy was also to be implemented in full across the government and provide guidance and coordination to the strategic communications functions of all government agencies at the national, provincial and district levels. This was intended to increase public awareness on the government’s vision, mission, achievements, policies, strategies and plans, as well as the challenges it faced in various areas. It would also facilitate dialogue between the government and the people, a two-way communication stream that would ensure people’s grievances and wishes were heard by the authorities. This would, in turn, enhance popular trust in the government, driving people away from radicalisation and violent extremism.

Relevant government bodies were to develop specific action plans in accordance with the guidance provided by the National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 to counter recruitment and mobilisation narratives that specifically target women, amplify women’s voices in efforts to counter them and include gender-sensitive research that could inform counter violent extremist approaches. This would substantially increase women’s participation in the government and the private sector, as well as other social spheres, leading to the promotion of a more balanced and moderate socio-political environment.

Finally, the relevant government bodies were to develop specific action plans in accordance with the guidance provided by the National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 2250. This would enhance the position of young people, who formed the largest segment of the Afghan population, in various socio-political-economic spheres, generate more opportunities for them and reduce their vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation by violent extremist groups.

Strengthening Public Outreach

Government agencies with support from civil society and non-governmental organisations were to step up efforts to enhance a national spirit and identity, using best practices from Afghanistan’s history, as well as experiences from other countries. Initiating events such as celebrating national occasions and historical achievements, holding national sports events and arts functions, developing and promoting national narratives and slogans, and other symbolically significant activities could substantially strengthen a national spirit within the people, driving them away from violent extremism.

Government agencies were also to develop plans for regularly holding townhalls and public engagement events to increase public awareness about the government’s functions, hear people’s grievances and wishes, and generally increase dialogue and face-to-face interaction between authorities and the people. Various platforms, including community centres, media outlets, social media platforms, and academic and civil society spaces were to be utilised for this purpose.

The government’s Media and Communications Office was to increase and enhance coordination with the strategic communications units in all government ministries and agencies, provide general guidelines and share with them regular strategic messages to be communicated in a synchronised manner through all state platforms. This would ensure that the government would speak in one voice, avoiding contradictory statements and increasing the effectiveness of the government’s messaging. It would, in turn, enhance the state’s position within the society, diminishing the space for violent extremist groups.

Under guidance from the government’s Media and Communications Office, the Ministries of Education, Higher Education, Public Health, Hajj and Religious Affairs, Culture and the Ulema Council would work together to develop a national narrative on countering violent extremism and promoting peace and stability. That narrative would be shared with all government agencies, as well as civil society and non-governmental organisations, to be ubiquitously promoted across the country through all of their engagements and activities.

Capacity development programmes in strategic communications and public outreach for the relevant units of all government agencies would be initiated and conducted.

Distinguishing Between Ideology and Science/Knowledge in Academia

The Ministries of Education and Higher Education, in coordination with other relevant bodies, were to review all curricula for schools and universities – public and private – ensuring that they were void of any ideological messages – particularly any content that would directly or indirectly promote radicalism, violent extremism and terrorism. Those curricula were to be strictly observed by all public and private educational institutions across the country. In addition, the Ministry of Higher Education would conduct close monitoring of the Department of Sharia and related units in all universities, ensuring that the educational content is void of any extremist messages and that there is no relationship between the faculty and the known violent extremist groups.

The Ministries of Education and of Higher Education would take practical steps to promote and encourage critical thinking in all schools and universities, highlighting the importance of designing counternarratives in the context of Islam to help prevent radicalisation. As the basis of scientific and methodical enquiry, debates and arguments were to replace the dictatorial class settings that had been the norm in Afghanistan. This would encourage students to develop their own independent thinking, making them less vulnerable to accepting radical views.

The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs would: (a) enhance its oversight of the registered madrasas, ensuring that the contents of teaching and the way the mullahs taught students would not promote radicalism; and (b) take steps to increase the number of registered madrasas that would replace the unregistered and unregulated ones.

Continuing Empirical Research on Violent Extremism

Even though the research conducted for the development of this strategy substantially improved overall understanding about the drivers, catalysts, platforms and agents of violent extremism in Afghanistan, ongoing and more focused research was to be conducted over the following years so as to maintain up-to-date information on the topic, measure progress of CVE activities and regularly review and adjust countermeasure approaches. It was noted that the National CVE Strategy was ‘a living document’, intended to change and evolve in response to local conditions and experiences. Thus, research opportunities were to be developed that would be used by both public and private research institutions to conduct further research in this area.

Conclusion

Even though the National CVE Strategy was never approved by the NSC or implemented, the findings from the field research provoked intense discussion and debate in the various layers of government, including the top ranks. Before this research, the conventional belief within the Afghan government regarding violent extremism was that it was mainly a phenomenon imported from abroad through the imposed proxy war by some of Afghanistan’s neighbours. However, the research findings revealed that drivers of violent extremism in the country were complex and multifaceted. While the proxy war and deliberate promotion of extremism by certain countries in the region were undoubtedly essential, many issues related to Afghanistan’s domestic context that directly or indirectly caused and facilitated violent extremism, including: the strong links between religion and politics; a sense of political and economic deprivation; misunderstandings about Islam; limited focus on critical thinking in schools; a lack of communication among youth across the country; unemployment; corruption; and the radicalisation in the madrasas of returning Afghan refugees.

The findings also contradicted another implicit but widely held assumption about causes and drivers of violent extremism in Afghanistan: that they were ubiquitous across the country. Field research revealed great variations in the causes, drivers, facilitators and platforms of violent extremism within the different regions of the country. While most of the indicators tended to be shared by all regions, their nature, degree and working mechanisms differed from region to region, even province to province. Given that the strategy was developed following a whole-of-government approach to serve as an overall guide at the national level, it did not specify these regional variations and the concomitant proposed government interventions. That task was left to the individual action plans the concerned government agencies were directed to develop based on the general guidance provided by the National CVE Strategy.

The relevant government agencies were to develop their action plans after the NSC’s approval of the strategy and work through the National CVE Committee over the following five years to coordinate activities across the country. However, as the strategy was not approved, action plans were never developed. Within a few months of the submission of the strategy to the NSC, the National CVE Committee also ceased its weekly meetings, and soon discussion on CVE faded from the government’s agenda. The main reason for this was the rapidly deteriorating security situation within the country. Since the beginning of 2015, when international forces shifted from a combat mission to a support function, leaving the entire combat responsibility to the Afghan forces, the security situation began a sharp downward slide; problems on the battlefield – increasing insurgent and terrorist attacks, high casualties within the security forces, desertions and low recruitment rates, logistical problems, a lack of coordination and so on – consumed the government’s attention and resources. In the face of this precarious situation, the Afghan government was forced to focus on the day-to-day demands of the war, leaving efforts that could potentially have a long-term impact out of its agendas. The situation substantially worsened after the 2019 election and the contested results. After declaring victory, President Ghani became highly distrustful of his political rivals, surrounding himself with a close circle of young and inexperienced individuals, who later ended up being accused of high degrees of corruption and of having focused on maintaining power and building personal wealth with little to no care for the country’s prospects.¹¹ By this time, any discussion on CVE and related matters were completely buried and the draft strategy remained only in the ONSC archives.

Following the takeover by the Taliban in August 2021, the context within Afghanistan completely changed and the de facto rulers have no appetite for anything related to CVE. How long this situation will continue, and whether and when a more inclusive, structured and moderate government will be created in Afghanistan, remains unknown at the moment. But should such a government come to power at any point in the future, some of the findings of the research could potentially be used to develop a roadmap for PCVE.

Beyond Afghanistan, this experience offers a number of lessons that could potentially inform other states – particularly those in the region that share similar cultural and demographic conditions – in developing PCVE strategies. Some of these lessons are as follows:

• Conducting empirical research is critical to identify the roots, causes, drivers, facilitators, catalysts, platforms and agents of violent extremism; potential variations geographically and demographically; and tailored countermeasures to be used by the relevant state and non-state actors. This was perhaps the most integral lesson learned from the Afghan experience.

• While envisaging countermeasures to violent extremism, taking a whole-of-society approach with the government at the driver’s seat is important. Given that the causes and drivers of violent extremism are widespread and complex, interventions only by the government are not sufficient. Meanwhile, taking a loose and uncoordinated approach will also not be effective. The government must take the lead, providing guidance, resources and monitoring to the broad spectrum of instititions within society. This was repeatedly emphasised by almost all RDFs, as well as interviews conducted throughout the 16-month empirical research for the development of the Afghan National CVE Strategy.

• PCVE is a long-term effort, and a strategy must be envisaged with that long-term span in mind. PCVE efforts are subtle, intended to affect the mentality and psychology of individuals within a society. As such, their impact is gradual and incremental. Trying to acheive measurable objectives quickly would prove counterproductive. While the Afghan CVE Strategy was never implemented, the long road to its development clearly demonstrated this imperative.

• From the outset, buy-in from government leaders for CVE is important. Developing and implementing a national CVE strategy is a long, challenging and costly road in any country. As such, without strong buy-in and a firm commitment by the political leadership, its ultimate success is questionable. In the Afghan context, that buy-in did not exist from the outset, which was a major contributor to the strategy’s ultimate failure.

• Initiating PCVE in the middle of an on-going conflict is difficult, as there will always be other priorities that would trump its importance given that the main value of PCVE is in prevention and mitigation. By the time the Afghan government started looking into PCVE, the conflict was already beyond the stage of prevention. On the one hand, violent extremist groups were well-organised, developed and resilient by then, to the point where prevention was difficult at best. On the other hand, the pressing need for maintaining military pressure on the enemy clearly eclipsed the importance of preventive and mitigative measures, consuming valuable resources. Therefore, in the context of conflict, it is critical to include PCVE in any counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy from the outset.

• PCVE must be tailored to the national and local needs, and not imposed by donors, outsiders or copied from other experiences. In the Afghan context, even the need to develop a CVE strategy was imposed by the donors and the process was much affected by donor objectives, interests and budgetary constraints. One of the main reasons for a lack of political buy-in from the Afghan government was the fact that its views on violent extremism and how to counter it differed from those of the donor community. For instance, both presidents Karzai and Ghani had some ideas on bringing certain Islamist extremist individuals into the government to appease the Islamists, hoping this would lead to CVE. This approach, however, was not popular in the West. Thus, friction between the Afghan political leadership and the donor community became an impediment to developing and implementing effective CVE measures.

Finally, conducting effective PCVE measures requires strong institutions as it needs a long-term, consistent and coordinated effort. Counterfactually, even if the Afghan National CVE Strategy were to be approved, it would most likely face grave challenges in the way of implementation. The Afghan state lacks the needed strong institutions that would effectively implement the very ambitious strategy envisaged. Thus, keeping this fact in mind while designing a PCVE strategy in any context is critical. ◼

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Arian Sharifi

Arian Sharifi is a Lecturer and Associate Research Scholar at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. He has previously served in senior roles in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, including in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the National Security Council. Throughout his years of government service, Sharifi led the development of over 20 national-level policies and strategies, including Afghanistan’s National Threat Assessment, National Security Policy, Counter Terrorism Strategy, and others, and had a major voice in the country’s foreign policy. Outside Afghanistan, he has worked as an analyst for the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore, and consulted for the UN and NATO. He holds a PhD in International Security Studies from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Notes

1. The author served as Director of National Threat Assessment at the ONSC and had a direct role in the development of these and many other documents.

2. The White House, ‘FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism’, 18 February 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>, accessed 18 May 2023.

3. UN, ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’, 24 December 2015, accessed 19 May 2023.

4. A full list of the participating agencies is available from the author. The US and UK Embassies were included in the committee as they both provided technical assistance for the development of the strategy.

5. The author chaired the Committee.

6. The author personally presented the strategy at the National Security Council meeting.

7. Little information is available online: see <https://www.facebook.com/cpaungo/>, accessed 29 October 2023.

8. Derived from a synthesis of the research findings. Literal wording may differ from what went into the final National CVE Strategy, which is not publicly available.

9. Sina Research Group, Afghanistan Dar Se Daha-e-Akheer اخیر[Afghanistan in the Last Three Decades], p. 89; Mir Aqa Haqjoo, Afghanistan wa Madakhelat-e-Khareji [Afghanistan and Foreign Interference] (Tehran, Iran: Amin Socio-Political Foundation, 2001), pp. 62–65; Ahmad Shah Farzan, افغانستان Afghanistan: Az Moqawomat ta Piroozi [Afghanistan: From Resistance to Victory] (Mashhad, Iran: Ahmad Shah Farzan, 2003), p. 110.

10. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I B Tauris, 2002), pp. 105–16; M J Gohari, The Taliban: Ascent to Power (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 108; Rosemarie Skaine, The Women of Afghanistan Under the Taliban (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2001), p. 69.

11. See Jennifer Murtazashvili, ‘The Collapse of Afghanistan’, Journal of Democracy (Vol. 33, No. 1, January 2022), pp. 40–54; and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, ‘Quarterly Report to the United States Congress’, 30 January 2023, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2023-01-30qr.pdf>, accessed 27 October 2023.