Exploring ‘Accommodation’ to Understand the Behaviour of Rising Powers in the Global Nuclear Order: The Cases of India and Brazil

ABSTRACT

First put forth by Hedley Bull in the 1970s, the notion of ‘accommodation’ is an often-neglected approach to understanding the role, rights and responsibilities of emerging nuclear powers from the Global South in the nuclear order. The existing literature looks at the avenues and conditions through which the institutions of the nuclear order grant accommodation. However, analysis of the demands raised by rising powers at various stages of the nuclear order's development is severely lacking. The cases of India and Brazil, two rising powers with advanced nuclear capabilities, highlight some of the demands of accommodation raised by these states during the early development of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) – a cornerstone agreement in the global nuclear architecture. Two important demands – namely, regional security considerations in the global system and the adoption of the principle of mutual obligations and responsibilities – have shaped these states’ behaviour vis-à-vis the NPT.

KEYWORDS:

• global nuclear order
• accommodation demands
• India
• Brazil
• Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The nuclear order is a well-established structure held together by regimes and institutions working towards upholding the principles of nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation with the ultimate aim of nuclear disarmament. However, the nuclear ‘order’ has slowly descended into a certain ‘disorder’ in recent years with the withdrawal of the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK) from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 and rising threats of nuclear proliferation, the termination of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, the recent Russian suspension of New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the emergence of unstable global and regional dyads, such as India-Pakistan, India-People’s Republic of China (PRC), United States (US)-PRC, and so on. The situation has been further compounded by the recent Russia-Ukraine war which revealed the shortcomings of the nuclear order especially around the feasibility of nuclear guarantees to non-nuclear states. This has become evident in the potentially impending development of nuclear weapons in South Korea as a response to the growing nuclear threat from the DPRK (Hecker 2023).

Figure 1. The process of accommodation of rising powers in the global nuclear order.

The international order encompasses a set of rules, norms and institutions established by the great powers in order to find solutions to conflicts and avenues for cooperation (Mukherjee 2022). Hedley Bull (1977) has written about two different kinds of ‘order’ – international order and world order. While the linchpin of the international order is the state, the world order on the other hand focuses on human beings at the centre of its analysis, with the final goal of sustaining human relationships. For Bull, both the international and world order are brought together by a shared consensus over the rules of governance and management of human and inter-state relations.

This consensus is key to maintaining the ‘order’ in the international or world order. However, in a hegemonic world order where certain states have the power and legitimacy to decide the rules of the game, arriving at a consensus between powerful and weak states has been a herculean task. Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry (1999) emphasise the need for a healthy consensus between the hegemon and the lesser powers to be established through ongoing channels and mechanisms for the latter to “register their interests with the hegemon” (185). Hence, this article considers whether such a consensus between states exists and, more importantly, with the emergence of rising powers, how the existing nuclear order can maintain this consensus.

I begin by exploring the idea of consensus in the global nuclear order and suggest ‘accommodation’ as a tool for reviving this consensus. In the second section, I introduce the two case studies – India and Brazil – and employ ‘accommodation demands’ as a lens to study their behaviour within the nuclear order, specifically their relationship with the NPT covering a broad period between 1960 and the late 1990s. I conclude by giving a brief snapshot of the current landscape. For this article, I have qualitatively analysed records of meetings at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), articles and editorials from major daily newspapers, as well as interviews conducted with leading experts in nuclear policy, and secondary source literature.

The search for consensus in the global nuclear order

The discovery of the destructive and peaceful powers of the atom in the 1940s and 1950s revealed the crude and complex reality of the embedded hierarchy in the world order. The atom came to define and further cemented the unequal ordering of states in what came to be known as the ‘global nuclear order’. William Walker (2011, 33) defines the global nuclear order as “evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development, and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states.”

During the Cold War, the balance of power principle helped forge and uphold the consensus between the two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union. By the mid-1960s, the common goal was to arrest the arms race and prevent this new technology from falling into the hands of other states (Coe and Vaynman 2019). However, shortly after the Cold War ended, the loci of power shifted away from the superpowers to make way for a unipolar world, followed by an era of multipole expansion initiated by a de facto addition of new powers to the nuclear club. Naturally, this meant that the institutions and regimes that were once designed to suit the interests of a select few great powers now had to forge a renewed consensus with the new set of powers that had emerged on the international scene. These included, amongst others, countries such as India which declared its nuclear weapon status in 1998 and Brazil which, although not a nuclear weapon state, has displayed advanced nuclear capabilities. With a growing number of small and middle powers, the existing systems now had to face the question of how to absorb the emerging loci of power into the state system, which had not been the case previously.

The majority of non-nuclear states, as well as states with nuclear weapons without formal recognition of their nuclear status, remain unsatisfied with the pre-existing distribution of roles and obligations between them and the great nuclear powers.¹ As a result, one can see a conspicuous trend towards the withering of consensus. A major reason for this is that the great nuclear powers have fallen short of their obligations to maintain restraint in their deterrence relationships. The plea for nuclear restraint, which Bull described as a bulwark for preserving consensus in the international society and accommodating the nuclear ‘have nots’, seems to have fallen on deaf ears. While the 1980s saw a range of arms control measures concluded between the US and the Soviet Union, the initiative gradually took a backseat. The institutions of the international order aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation such as the NPT or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have mostly focused on arresting horizontal proliferation and, in fact, provided for legal devices to aid vertical proliferation. Hence, a lack of nuclear restraint on the part of great powers in the form of rapid modernisation of their nuclear arsenals (Cordesman 2023) has further fuelled the nuclear desires of the developing world and rising powers, thereby taking the ‘order’ further away from a consensus.

Reviving consensus: accommodation as an approach

Bull’s work points to the notion of international society as an open, malleable and dynamic structure embedded with potential for change and accommodation of varying interests. The global nuclear order is one of the sites within the international society where constituent members (states) ought to be bound by the principles of shared norms and beliefs for the smooth functioning of the order and preservation of stability. It is the complex interplay of forces of accommodation, along with coercion, resistance, cooperation and dependence that have been at play in the making of the global nuclear order (Hunt 2022).

It is also important to note that regimes and institutions do not operate in a power vacuum. The power yielded by strong states in the system defines the contours of engagement and conflict. The NPT, a keystone agreement in the nuclear order, came into existence as a result of a specific configuration of power that prioritised the national interests of the superpowers. While regimes and institutions designed the governance of commodities (in this case, nuclear weapons and technology) and the binding relationships that arise from it, lurking behind those formal processes are the shared fundamental interests of the great powers that dictate these arrangements. Thus, it is not merely consensus between the great and rising powers but also amongst the great powers themselves that is central to preserving the ‘order’ in the nuclear order. The main example of this is the global Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime (NNP) which, through the adoption of the NPT, “sanctified the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members’ nuclear arsenal” (Hunt 2022, 9). The NPT championed the superpower condominium and resegregated “most states in positions of atomic inferiority” (10). Any offer or demand for accommodation from great and rising powers respectively must account for the different power configurations and varying interests that have fuelled the construction of these regimes and institutions in the global nuclear order.

An obvious deficiency, however, in the existing literature is the linear and one-sided perspective of accommodation that focuses primarily on what the great powers or the institutions of the order can do to best accommodate the interests of rising powers. However, there is little examination of what rising powers need or demand from the order.

Understanding the behaviour of rising powers in the global (nuclear) order has become a complicated puzzle that several authors have tried to solve. The rise of a new power can be potentially disruptive to the existing system if the state in question has subversive intentions. This could be because the rising power may have a different vision of the world order, or it can be based upon fundamental cultural and ideological idiosyncrasies. On the contrary, the emergence of a rising power can further strengthen the existing institutional arrangements if it believes in the core principles that uphold the order. Thus, understanding the behaviour of rising powers in the international system becomes important for two reasons. From the standpoint of great powers, it can help forecast the actions of the rising power and help devise an appropriate strategy for their inclusion or containment. Second, it can help make the existing international system more dynamic and resilient to future shocks and ensure its preservation in the future against possible subversion by a newcomer. However, this is only possible if the great powers – currently the main agents of change in the international system – are open to incorporating ideas of accommodation into the very fabric of the institutional framework. This would entail not only a marginal increase in status, but also substantial material gains accrued to the rising powers.

Much of the relevant literature defines ‘accommodation’ as a processual tool in power transition theories. Kenneth E. Boulding (1978) mentions accommodation for peace as a process to achieve peaceful transitions between the hegemon and the emerging powers, with the goal of attaining “stable peace” in the international system (13). Similarly, Charles A. Kupchan et al. (2001) talk of “mutual accommodation” as a tool to achieve what he calls “warm peace” which facilitates cooperation and mutual reassurance between the hegemon and rising power (6).

Other scholars consider accommodation as an action of conceding a certain amount of power – either in status or material terms – to the rising power (or the challenger) with the goal of ‘accommodating’ the challenger in the international system through balancing its capabilities. Mlada Bukovansky (2016) asserts that true accommodation needs to be conducted in a way which satisfies “the status claims of aspiring powers without thereby aggravating the status anxieties and legitimate interests of the power or powers doing the accommodating” (105). In line with Bull’s idea, this kind of partial accommodation of rising powers is the only way forward. Thazha Varkey Paul’s (2016) work is especially important in this respect as he defines ‘accommodation’ as “mutual adaption and acceptance by established and rising powers, and the elimination or substantial reduction of hostility between them” (4). He emphasises status adjustment, the sharing of leadership roles and the expansion of spheres of influence of rising powers as some of the steps to grant accommodation to rising powers. Nevertheless, a thorough study of the perspective of developing states and rising powers, their nuclear desires and demands remains absent from the current literature.

Rising powers can adopt a variety of strategies to bargain and negotiate their position within the international order. These can range anywhere from integrative and distributive bargaining to forming coalitions with great powers or developing states. Some of these tactics may be driven by the colonial past and loyalty to the Third World bloc, what Amrita Narlikar (2010, 6, 11) calls the Third Worldist approach. It is also important to pay attention to how the rising power frames its demands that it raises at international platforms, that is, whether its demands are couched in ideational, moralist terms or in terms of efficiency. Whether a rising power assumes a leadership role or prefers to take a back seat on issues of strategic prominence can also reveal a lot about the intentions and behaviour of the rising power. Based on these categorisations, one can decipher if the rising power aims to be a status quoist power or a revisionist power.

While the above categorisation provides an insight into the strategies that different rising powers can adopt in furthering their demands and by extension their position in the international system, what exactly are these demands? States as consumers of nuclear technology and material in the global nuclear order exhibit certain patterns of behaviour that can be identified by observing their demands at particular points in their history of engagement with other actors in the order. This requires us to trace our steps back to the negotiations of some key nuclear instruments, revisit the positions taken by these states, identify the key demands of accommodation raised and study the extent to which such demands were met by the great powers. This process can help explain the past and, most importantly, the present patterns of behaviour we see from rising powers. Accommodating these demands can lead to a revival of consensus amongst member states in the international society and ensure stability in the order, particularly the global nuclear order (Figure 1).

The cases of India and Brazil

Brazil and India have been ardent advocates for the right of developing states to exchange and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The two states participated actively at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC)² that negotiated the NPT. Common concerns such as preservation of sovereignty while exercising nuclear safeguards, instituting stringent non-proliferation norms without jeopardising the rights to free and fair access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and a promise of general and complete disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, featured on the agenda of both states at the international forums.

Nonetheless, the two states adopted very different paths in their nuclear journeys as exhibited by the range of demands that they presented at the institutions of the nuclear order. Brazil’s emergence on the regional and global stage as a rising power at the beginning of the 1990s, combined with the end of the Cold War and economic stabilisation, was accompanied by a developmental agenda. This meant a demand for recognition of its civil nuclear capabilities and consideration of its unique regional security predispositions vis-à-vis Argentina into the nuclear framework that was forming at the time, despite its brief flirtation with a nuclear weapons programme in the 1970s and 1980s. India’s demands, on the other hand, encapsulated the plethora of contradictions and complexities that plagued its principled yet pragmatic stand on nuclear issues. Much of India’s struggle in the early years of the nuclear order (1950-90), when it was still a nascent power, was around the regional security threat from the PRC’s nuclear ambitions, along with concerns about Chinese aid to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. For most of this period, India demanded that the ENDC and later the Conference on Disarmament as well as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee addressed its problem with the PRC, and urged the negotiating parties to account for its security needs in the nuclear arrangements and treaties under discussion. However, the end of Cold War and the economic reforms in 1991 resulted in a new era of economic growth, thus India entered the club of rising powers. Its nuclear test in 1998 sealed its ‘rising power’ status. Thereafter, one sees a clear shift in its pattern of demands, moving away from hard security concerns to seeking status for its newly acquired Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) position.

While there are numerous differences in the nuclear paths that India and Brazil chose, comparing the two cases is instructive for two reasons. First, although the demands raised by the two states, as discussed in detail in the following sections, varied at different points in time, they arose out of the inherent discrimination embedded in the way the nuclear order and its institutions were first conceptualised. Therefore, in order to better understand the shortcomings of the nuclear order and envision any future change, it is important to look at the alternative approaches to the global nuclear order that were suggested. One of the ways this can be achieved is to identify the peripheral voices in the making of the order by studying the demands of weak and developing states. The cases of India and Brazil offer a much-needed lens for this exercise.

Second, it is important to note that while India is still not a member of the NPT, Brazil is a willing non-nuclear weapon signatory to the treaty and while it has contested a few nuclear arrangements, it is very much part of the NPT-led order. However, in this article I discuss the developments at the international and institutional level that changed Brazil’s approach in the 1990s and how (if at all) these changes led to its decision to join the NPT in 1998. Thus, Brazil can be seen as a prescriptive case study for India and other developing states that have continued to opt out of the NPT architecture.

India has a chequered history with the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear order at large. While supporting the goal of disarmament and non-proliferation, India along with non-aligned nations was broadly excluded from the making of the nuclear order. Nonetheless, India’s substantial involvement in the negotiation of key treaties such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the NPT infused the general debate around nuclear issues with perspectives from the Third World and non-nuclear states. India’s position on disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy helped to include voices on the margins, especially those states which were newly independent. Issues such as sovereignty, equality in application of rules and obligations, general and complete disarmament, bans on nuclear testing and so on were highlighted by Indian delegates at several institutions. Many innovative solutions relating to some of these issues were presented for the first time by India.

For instance, in April 1954, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru became the first head of state to call for a ‘standstill agreement’³ banning nuclear tests. Throughout the 1960s, India took an active part in the negotiations for the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, in 1988 India presented a proposal for complete and universal nuclear disarmament to the UNGA at the Third Special Session on Disarmament, which later came to be known as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (UNGA 1988). In 1996, India was part of the Group of 21 countries that called for a “phased elimination of nuclear weapons” at the Conference on Disarmament (Ministry of External Affairs 2013). Today, India is party to three out of four multilateral export⁴ control regimes which regulate the flow of nuclear technology and dual-use equipment and delivery systems to states – the Missile Technology Control Group (MTCR) in 2016; the Wassenaar Agreement in 2017; and finally, the Australia Group in 2018.

Brazil’s relationship with the nuclear order has followed a similar, if not identical, path as India. During the period 1960-80, Brazil was mostly seen as anti-regime as it strongly criticised the NPT viewing it as a biased and discriminatory treaty that preserved the status quo of great powers. As a Third World state at the time, Brazil staunchly defended its right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy while also balancing its hardcore military ambitions to build nuclear weapons. Brazil strongly negotiated for nuclear-weapon-free zones such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco that was opened for signature in 1967, along with calling for complete nuclear disarmament. In 1962, it participated in the ENDC as one of the eight members of the non-aligned nations. The majority of Brazil’s concerns about the emerging nuclear order mirrored those widely discussed by India. In 1990, Brazil officially ended the possibility of building a nuclear weapon when it closed its nuclear site in Serra do Cachimbo. After more than four decades of what was seen as recalcitrant behaviour, Brazil introduced a range of regime-compliant measures in the 1990s. Starting with building a regional confidence-building arrangement with Argentina in a joint declaration on Brazilian-Argentine nuclear policy in 1990, the agreement approved the establishment of a Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) between the two countries. In the following year, another agreement between the two countries for the peaceful use of nuclear energy was signed which created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) aimed at execution and management of the SCCC. Further in 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed the Quadripartite Agreement with ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that entered into force in 1994. Afterwards, Brazil ratified the NPT and the CTBT in 1998 and continued its engagement in civilian uses of nuclear energy with other states. Today Brazil runs one of the most advanced nuclear industries possessing competencies across all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle from uranium enrichment to fuel fabrication.⁵

Both countries formed part of the ENDC after the eight non-aligned nations were added to the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962. Together Brazil and India advanced the cause of the Third World states at the ENDC, especially those that did not possess any formal protection from the two superpowers at the time. Both states held strong connections to the Non-Aligned Movement and dispossessed Third World states. In fact, as I will show in the following section, many of the concerns raised by the two states in the ENDC were of a similar nature, revolving around notions of justice, sovereignty, but most importantly, accounting for regional security threats in the design of nuclear non-proliferation instruments.

Today, India is touted as a major rising power and Brazil is a major developing power in the international order; both stand to be important players in the global nuclear order, with a projected growth rate of 7 percent in the 2022-23 fiscal year (Ahmed and Ohri 2023). India’s economy is forecasted to overtake Japan and Germany by 2030 (Shan 2022). This rapid development will take place alongside a burgeoning population. This explains India’s keen interest in renewable energy of which nuclear energy is a crucial component. The government has plans to increase nuclear energy output from the present 6.78 gigawatts to 22.48 gigawatts by 2031, giving nuclear energy a share of 6 percent of the total energy produced (Bundhun 2022). Similarly, Brazil also looks to expand its nuclear power plants with the goal of achieving self-sufficiency in nuclear fuel. It possesses one of the largest uranium reserves in the world and plans to add 10 gigawatts of nuclear energy “in the next 30 years” (World Nuclear News 2022).

As stated at the beginning of this section, however, there are stark differences that exist between the two states. While India refused to sign the NPT in 1968 and to date continues to hold this position, Brazil resisted the NPT until it finally acceded to the treaty in 1998. Additionally, India declared itself a de facto nuclear weapon state in 1998 outside the remit of the non-proliferation regime. On the other hand, Brazil, despite possessing the technical know-how, decided to renounce the development of nuclear weapons in the late 1980s. While there are rumours about its potential plan to develop the bomb, there is no credible evidence to substantiate such a claim. Despite these fundamental differences, the journey of both states in the global nuclear order up until the early 1990s has been similar. Both have reacted to the institutional stimulus and the underlying great-power hierarchies emanating from the institutions and regimes of the established global nuclear order. In the next section, I attempt to unpack this stimulus by exploring what kind of demands were presented by these states at the institutions of the global nuclear order and to what degree these demands were met (accommodated). As the nuclear order includes a whole gamut of regimes and institutions, it is impossible to cover all such sites for analysis; thus I will use the NPT as the main institutional site to assess the behaviour of the two countries. Several decades later, it is still difficult to ascertain the extent to which these states have been accommodated within the institutional framework. However, I conclude that both India and Brazil have been partially accommodated, with Brazil being extended a far greater accommodation than India given the different aspirations and nuclear paths that these two states shared in the latter half of their nuclear journeys. However, the great powers and the institutions they control have still failed to reach a genuine acceptance of their rising status.

Before we proceed, a qualifier is warranted. The notion of accommodation as used in this article is relative. What might look like successful accommodation for one state may not carry the same meaning for the other. Accommodation is a function of and is contingent upon existing demands by a state at a particular point in time. A case can be made that if India or any other non-member state is accommodated into the NPT, it may carry the risk of unravelling the NNP regime. Instead of making the existing regime more just and fairer by such an inclusion, other non-nuclear weapon states may oppose such a move, thus making the whole exercise counterproductive. While this concern is valid, it is worth noting that the demands of the existing non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT have been starkly different from outlier states such as India. With the acceptance of allegiance to either of the superpower blocs, the non-nuclear weapon states joined the NNP regime and reconciled with the hierarchical ordering at the time because of a promise of eventual disarmament by NWS. Nevertheless, clear fissures in that agreement have emerged over the last few decades as also illustrated during the negotiations of the TPNW in 2017. The consensus seems fractured not only between the NPT and non-NPT member states but even amongst the nuclear and non-nuclear NPT member states. Additionally, this article does not argue that the only way to accommodate the aspirations of India and other non-NPT states is to open the treaty for their inclusion, but merely points to a pressing need for addressing these demands of accommodation by the great powers. Such an accommodation may not necessarily come in a conventional way that might fundamentally hamper the current systems but can pave the way for reimagining accommodation by discussing innovative strategies that can recognise and grant status to the rising power of states that are no longer outliers. This article is a novel undertaking in that direction.

India’s demands for accommodation

India’s underlying position on the NPT was grounded in the principle of “an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers” as laid out in the UNGA resolution 2028 (XX) (UNGA 1965, 8). This principle acquired formal legitimacy on 19 November 1965 following efforts from both India and Brazil amongst others to “achieve the solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as contained in their Joint Memorandum of 15 September 1965” (7). What this meant was that regardless of whether a state possessed nuclear weapons, all states across the board should be held to equal rules, responsibilities and obligations. For the nuclear weapon states, this meant a genuine effort towards reducing their nuclear arsenal with the eventual goal of complete disarmament and a pledge towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology to non-nuclear states. For the non-nuclear weapon states, this meant a promise not to acquire nuclear weapons from nuclear states. However, this principle did not find its way into the text of the NPT nor was it accepted by the nuclear weapon states.

In its statements at the ENDC negotiations for the NPT on 16 February 1966, India expressed its discontent regarding how different categories of nations were given different privileges in the treaty and argued that there could not be “nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations with alliances and non-nuclear nations without alliances embodied in the NPT” (ENDC 1966a), hinting at the security alliances that were extended to some NATO countries. When the NPT was discussed at a subsequent ENDC meeting held on 18 August 1966, India emphasised that “it is not a question of somebody asking for something [referring to the demand for security guarantees] […] it is a question of a balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities” (ENDC 1966b). In the context of the NPT draft that was being discussed at the time, a 27 October 1966 editorial in The Times of India argued that “the nuclear Powers assumed no balancing responsibility [and that the amendment introduced by] the non-aligned movement [of which India was the chief leader] introduced the required balance” (Vohra 1966a). Elaborating on this amendment, the editorial claimed that the document “appeal[ed] to the nuclear Powers not to proliferate the weapons while the discussion on the treaty [NPT] continu[ed].” However, during the negotiations both the US and the United Kingdom (UK) were unwilling to accept mutual obligations and insisted that “other questions and ideas [referring to disarmament and non-armament goals put forth by India] should not be tied to a non-proliferation treaty” (Ibid). The reluctance in accepting mutual obligations by the nuclear weapon powers at the time remained until the very end of the NPT negotiations.

The second most important demand put forth by India during the negotiation of the NPT was a recognition and addressal of its regional security situation. At the peak of the NPT negotiations in the mid-1960s, India was faced with two hostile neighbours, the PRC and Pakistan. India had already been involved in a border war with the PRC in 1962, followed by the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964 and another major war with Pakistan in 1965. Because of these developments in the region, India wanted its regional security imperatives to be recognised in the NPT draft. However, the draft text at the time lacked any failsafe measures to protect India in case of a nuclear threat from the PRC. In the negotiations, India tied its regional security threat to the larger goal of disarmament especially because “national security would get addressed if international security was taken care of and that is where India was approaching the idea of nuclear disarmament.”⁶ It was important for India that any NPT draft took account of the urgent need to put in place measures for gradual but complete disarmament given that it was experiencing both nuclear and conventional threats from two of its neighbours. Although Pakistan did not constitute a major security threat, its growing nuclear energy programme initially supported with aid offered by the US under the ‘Atoms for Peace’ project and the culmination of its strategic partnership with the PRC in the 1960s worried India. Tying its challenging regional situation to the ultimate goal of disarmament, India emphasised ‘non-armament’ by nuclear weapon powers during the negotiations and stressed that this should be a crucial pillar of the non-proliferation regime.

It has been argued by some scholars that the security threat from the PRC was not an important factor in India’s decision not to sign the NPT.⁷ However, there is evidence suggesting that the Chinese threat was widely debated within the Indian government around the time that the NPT was being negotiated. The need for a “fresh outlook at the Government’s nuclear policy in view of the growing threat from China” was stressed in several Lok Sabha⁸ sessions and government and opposition leaders questioned what steps the government had taken so far to address the “Chinese nuclear blackmail” (The Times of India 1966a).

The institutional design of the non-proliferation regime overlooked regional threats facing developing states like India. There was a growing recognition that India’s stance was not understood at the UNGA debates or the ENDC. While “the speeches [by the Western bloc] showed that there [was] much sympathy for India, there is little understanding of its security problems and much anxiety to sweep them under the carpet, thus making it clear that India will have to look to itself for its security” (The Times of India 1966b). India, at several points in the negotiations as well as in its bilateral meetings with the US, UK and the Soviet Union, made clear that it required some kind of security assurance from the West to move ahead with this treaty and break the deadlock. The exact nature of this assurance was unclear but it had to be a formal and legal guarantee of protection by the superpowers for non-nuclear states like India in the event of a nuclear threat or attack from an adversary. Such a demand had to also be balanced with India’s non-aligned status in the Cold War so that it did not bind itself to any one power bloc. Nonetheless, because a consensus between the US and the Soviet Union on the NPT draft had almost emerged, neither of the great powers was willing to risk an impasse by accommodating the demands of countries such as India. The Indian dilemma was highlighted by drawing a direct correlation between ensuring regional security as one of India’s demands from the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its behaviour at international forums. There was concern that India would not be able to exercise its choice if it signed the non-proliferation treaty as proposed by the Soviet Union and the US, as those drafts did not accommodate any of India’s concerns about its regional security (Vohra 1966b).

Several other factors – like sovereignty concerns regarding the inspections and safeguards regime by the IAEA and the gatekeeping of nuclear technology for peaceful uses by the great powers that the NPT promoted – also directly played into India’s decision not to sign the treaty. These, when combined with India’s demand for equal obligations and considering regional frameworks within the wider non-proliferation architecture, remained unaccommodated. India saw no benefits to signing the NPT and, on the contrary, considered membership a grave breach of its national and strategic interests. The NPT was carefully curated to suit the interests of the great powers and hence, India decided to distance itself. This was perceived as India’s recalcitrance towards the non-proliferation regime, making it a pariah in the global nuclear order.

An important point to note is that demands of accommodation are never static and thus respond to the external stimulus. In the Indian case, after successfully conducting the nuclear weapon tests in Pokhran, Rajasthan in 1998, its security needs vis-à-vis the PRC and Pakistan were more or less addressed. With these tests, India acquired the status of a de-facto nuclear weapon state, notwithstanding the lack of formal legitimacy under the NPT framework. Subsequently, since 1998 India shifted its demands in a bid to secure status in the nuclear order as a NWS. Some authors have argued that even though India remains outside the NPT framework, it has conformed (Joshi 2018)⁹ to the NNP regime in principle; this has served India’s goals of being accommodated and worked in favour of the great powers by not altering the existing non-proliferation norms, making it a win-win for both sides. However, demands for status accommodation still linger in India’s decision-making. Even with the 2008 Indo-US civil nuclear deal which many argue officially ended India’s nuclear pariah state status, there were heavy concessions made from the Indian side and the accommodation (if any) was not entirely on India’s terms. The NSG waiver granted to India, which made the nuclear agreement possible, was a first step by the great powers towards recognising India’s role in the nuclear order. However, this agreement came at a grave cost for India. Although the US agreed to supply nuclear fuel to India, there was no iron-clad guarantee of a life-long supply (Bhatia 2017, 137). At the same time, as a result of the deal, India had to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities, place 15 of its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and faced a continued ban on receiving sensitive nuclear technology, including enrichment and reprocessing facilities. In response, India aligned its export control norms to those of the NSG and committed to actively participate in the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations. Overall, while India has conformed to non-proliferation norms, its modest attempts to suggest innovative nuclear norms such as de-alerting nuclear weapons and restraint-based behaviour (Leveringhaus and De Estrada 2018), amongst others, are an attempt to gain recognition that has been largely unsuccessful. Without due accommodation of these changing demands, India’s cooperation with the nuclear order will remain partial.

Brazil’s demands for accommodation

Brazil shared similar concerns as India during the NPT negotiations about not being an equal party to the agreed rules and decisions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Non-nuclear, developing states like Brazil felt a deep sense of exclusion from the larger nuclear framework that was ultimately adopted. Emphasising the principle of mutual responsibilities and obligations, Brazil protested that the NPT was “asymmetrical” and did not provide “a balance between duties and obligations” (Rosenbaum and Cooper 1970, 82). It was argued that the nuclear powers by signing the treaty were not surrendering anything, but the non-nuclear countries were “asked to mortgage their future development and to trust in promises of nuclear assistance which may never materialise” (82). This was especially concerning for countries like Brazil which, at the discussion stage of the NPT, were potential nuclear powers and felt that renouncing their right to conduct explorations in nuclear energy would be tantamount to hitting the brakes on their economic and social development. This was an unfair bargain and a hefty price to pay just to be member of the nuclear order. The treaty “neglected the spirit of reciprocity enumerated in several General Assembly resolutions [such as the UNGA resolution 2028 (xx)] that express the concept of mutual obligations which was to characterise a fair non-proliferation package” (89).

Brazil’s fundamentalist position on non-proliferation and disarmament emanated from its status as a developing state. Economic independence lay at the very core of Brazil’s bargaining within the NPT at the ENDC. The right to explore peaceful uses of atomic energy was a necessary condition for Brazil to sign the treaty. Summarising his government’s position succinctly, Brazil’s representative Correa da Costa stressed the importance of the right to explore uses of nuclear energy in his 1967 address at the ENDC: “It is imperative that no actual or potential hindrances prejudice the full utilisation by our countries of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes otherwise, we should be accepting a new form of dependence which is certainly inconsistent with our aspirations for development” (ENDC 1967, 15). Brazil also highlighted the fundamental distinction between peaceful explosive devices and nuclear explosions for military purposes. Costa placed emphasis on the development of nuclear energy not only for “great civil engineering projects but also an ever-increasing variety of applications that may prove essential to speed up the progress of our [Brazilian] peoples” (15). However, the final text of the NPT limited the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions to the great nuclear powers and, in what can be at best called a courtesy gesture, stipulated under Article V that any potential benefits accruing from the peaceful nuclear explosions could only be made available to the non-nuclear weapon party states by the nuclear weapons states.¹⁰ This was seen as a gross violation of Brazil’s sovereignty and the self-limitation expected of non-nuclear states cemented the monopoly of the nuclear weapon powers.

A second aspect that featured prominently in Brazil’s demands at the ENDC was the sheer lack of any mechanisms to incorporate regional peculiarities and security imperatives into the global proliferation architecture. The NPT turned a blind eye to regional rivalries and complex deterrence relationships that existed in Latin America (Brazil and Argentina) or in South Asia (India and the PRC-Pakistan nuclear nexus). The starting point for nuclear proliferation is arguably regional (Goldemberg et al. 2018) and hence any solution to proliferation must create space for regional approaches. The absence of such an approach is a major shortcoming of the NPT regime. The diplomatic and geopolitical rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, combined with both conducting secret nuclear programmes under authoritarian regimes, fuelled a nuclear race between the two countries. While there is no concrete evidence that either had intended to build a nuclear bomb, both countries saw each other as potential security threats. Meanwhile, the NPT that was primarily tasked with curbing nuclear proliferation failed to provide any viable alternatives or failsafe measures to ensure Brazil’s security.

As a result of a lack of accommodation of its security needs combined with suppression of its right to explore peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Brazil refused to sign the NPT and, over the following years, built a credible and self-sustaining model of nuclear governance with Argentina, which culminated in the Guadalajara agreement between the two countries for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in 1991 (IAEA 1991). This agreement established the Brazil-Argentina ABACC aimed at ensuring nuclear security by verifying that no nuclear material was diverted towards military uses in the two countries, which was achieved through the application of a full-scope safeguards system in both countries, the aforementioned SCCC. This helped preserve the sovereign rights for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardising their privacy and safeguarding them against the intrusive inspections regime as stipulated under the NPT and implemented by the IAEA. In the same year, a quadripartite agreement was signed between Brazil, Argentina, IAEA and ABACC which came into effect in 1994 and consolidated the system of safeguards and, in many ways, conferred legitimacy upon ABACC.

The global nuclear order extended partial accommodation to Brazil as it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1996 while still not a signatory to the NPT or the Additional Protocol. The de facto acceptance of Brazil’s regional and bilateral nuclear security and safeguards by the IAEA and its acceptance into the nuclear export control group (the NSG) worked as an incentive for Brazil to finally ratify the NPT and the CTBT in 1998. However, to date, Brazil has not accepted the IAEA Additional Protocol which imposes stringent measures of inspection and monitoring on the nuclear facilities of member states. ABACC systems, however, run parallel to IAEA safeguards and in certain cases provide a fuller coverage of non-proscribed military uses of nuclear material, something that is not covered by the INFCIRC 153¹¹ on which the IAEA full-scope safeguards were designed (IAEA 1994). For instance, the Quadripartite Agreement states that the safeguards should be applied to nuclear material that is being used in nuclear propulsion, something that the IAEA safeguards exempt the states from (Goldemberg et al. 2018). Therefore, any reactor fuel being used in a submarine is subject to safeguards in agreement with IAEA under the Quadripartite Agreement. As both Brazil and Argentina are tied to a security community through this agreement, they are incentivised to make this process diligently executed to ensure the smooth functioning of the overall arrangement. This has so far helped manage the pressure from Western nuclear powers on the two countries to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol.

In 2011, the NSG acknowledged ABACC indirectly. It recognised regional accounting and control arrangements for nuclear material (hinting at ABACC) as a legitimate procedure qualifying for the transfer of uranium Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technology to a non-nuclear weapon state such as Brazil. The growing accommodation of Brazil’s regional nuclear systems could perhaps be linked to its rising power status, but it is difficult to prove a direct causation. If anything, such an accommodation has been a result of its very different and perhaps less complicated demand for the right to use nuclear energy rather than seeking nuclear weapon state status as in the Indian case.

Despite this progress, a major challenge remains. Indeed, the NSG exemption comes with a crucial caveat; ENR transfers to countries which have concluded regional safeguards measures are dependent on the adoption of the Additional Protocol. The document states that:

suppliers should authorise transfers, pursuant to this paragraph, only when the recipient has brought into force Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and an Additional Protocol based on the Model Additional Protocol, or pending this, is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors [author’s emphasis] (Jonas et al. 2012).

The convoluted language of this provision implies that there is an impending expectation for the Brazil (and Argentina) to sign the Additional Protocol; nonetheless, concerns exist among stakeholders that doing so might undermine the existing bilateral system of nuclear safeguards (Kassenova 2016; Spektor et al. 2019).

Conclusion

There are two primary demands of accommodation that can be identified in cases of rising powers such as Brazil and India vis-a-vis the NPT: the inclusion of a regional security framework in the global nuclear architecture and the implementation of mutual roles and responsibilities between nuclear and non-nuclear states. We see that Brazil has been granted partial accommodation in terms of its regional safeguards measures as part of the global system. As a result of this measure, Brazil was more cooperative towards the institutions of the nuclear order in the 1990s. Having said that, Brazil’s demands from the nuclear order have been very different in that the focus has been on achieving recognition as a responsible power with the right to civil nuclear capabilities. On the other hand, India continues to be on the margins of the nuclear order, being a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker largely owing to its pending formal recognition as a nuclear weapon state. While the Indo-US nuclear deal is considered a watershed moment in the bilateral relationship between the two states, to what extent the nuclear non-proliferation regime extended material accommodation to India in a sense that would have made a tangible difference is difficult to ascertain. At most, the 2008 deal bestowed upon India the status and prestige of an advanced nuclear power without transferring any hard material gains.

Even so, such bouts of accommodation are generally rare. It is only by integrating the emerging nuclear powers into the nuclear architecture and striking Pareto-efficient bargains that the consensus between the member states can be revived and stable security outcomes achieved. The NPT regime has so far managed to hold the fragile bargain of compliance from non-nuclear member states in return for a promise of disarmament. Without accommodating the interests of the rising powers and preparing for foreseeable shocks (challenges) to the existing frameworks (Smetana and Mahoney 2022), this fragile bargain is unlikely to survive. Incorporating the demands of rising powers by way of encouraging inclusivity and dynamism can act as a prescriptive measure towards upholding and strengthening the nuclear order.

Acknowledgements

Research for this article was made possible with the AberDoc funding scheme for the author’s ongoing PhD from Aberystwyth University.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shivani Singh

Shivani Singh is a third-year PhD candidate in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Aberystwyth, United Kingdom.

Notes

1 The movement that led to the adoption of the TPNW symbolised a call for change in the nuclear order by non-nuclear states. The treaty was premised on a general discontentment of the Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) over the unfulfilled promise of disarmament by the NWS as mentioned in Article VI of the NPT. Other contentious clauses of the NPT include Article V which only guarantees the NWS the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, the benefits of which can only be made available by the NWS to the NNWS.

2 The ENDC was constituted in 1961 under the aegis of the United Nations. The ENDC negotiated the NPT from 1965 to 1969. The NPT was adopted in 1968.

3 The idea of a ‘standstill agreement’ on nuclear testing was introduced by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for the first time at the Lok Sabha parliamentary session held on 2 April 1954.

4 India is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that was formed in 1974 and regulates the export of material, equipment and technology that can be used for nuclear weapons. Despite having applied for membership, its application has not been successful.

5 For a complete timeline of Brazil’s nuclear programme, refer to Patti (2021).

6 Interview with leading strategic expert on India’s security affairs held on 23 August 2022. The interview was conducted with the informed consent of the interviewee.

7 For an argument against security threats and in favour of status, see Rohan Mukherjee (2019).

8 The lower house of the Indian parliament.

9 For an account of the different stages in India’s nuclear journey, also refer to Joshi (2022).

10 See: https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/.

11 IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 153 elaborates on the conditions for the non-application of safeguards to nuclear material to be used in non-peaceful activities. Of relevance to this discussion is page 5, see: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1972/infcirc153.pdf.