A critical appraisal of the case for progressive unionism in Northern Ireland today

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the case for progressive unionism in Northern Ireland today. The paper locates the progressive currents within unionism and explains the forces that have frustrated their development. It contends that analysis of the leadership provided by unionists in civil society and the attitudinal profile of the pro-union electorate nonetheless signals the existence of space to cultivate more progressive forms of unionism. This challenges the largely negative appraisals of unionism in popular discourse. Unionism is shown to possess a diversity and potential that is often unrecognised. The paper therefore promotes a more sophisticated understanding of unionism and its possible political futures.

KEYWORDS:

• Unionism
• loyalism
• Northern Ireland
• peace process
• ideology

Let’s face it, unionism doesn’t appear to do thought-through strategies, preferring instead to turn in on itself and then nurture break-away factions.

Alex Kane, The Irish Times (2023)

Northern Ireland never worked for all of its people. Unionism has seen to it that it never will.

Susan McKay, The Guardian (2022)

Almost every liberal reform on this side of the border has been introduced by Westminster in the teeth of unionist opposition. Rarely was an opportunity passed over to be narrow, insular and ungenerous.

Suzanne Breen, The Belfast Telegraph (2022)¹

Introduction

A study by Coulter et al. (2021) provides substantial evidence that shows Northern Ireland has become a more pluralistic, secular society where armed violence has dissipated and political conflict has diversified. Yet, little evidence of the pervasiveness of this change is found in commentary concerning contemporary unionism. Many see unionism as an anachronism that is incapable of strategically articulating a positive, future-orientated vision for Northern Ireland. Unionism, the argument goes, is defined by what it is against and has little to say about what it wants to achieve. Consideration of the progressive currents within unionism and how these might be developed is less evident in popular discourse. By locating these currents, this paper reveals a diversity and potential within unionism that is often unacknowledged. It contends that although there are reactionary and conservative currents within unionism, which periodically find expression through mainstream unionist parties, there is fertile ground within the pro-union electorate to cultivate more progressive forms of unionism. Ultimately, the paper promotes a more balanced view of unionism that does not underplay its capacity to be a progressive political project.

Definitions and disclaimers

It may seem odd to begin a paper with a section on definitions and disclaimers, but for a paper like this it is largely unavoidable. The paper deals in too many contested terms and is too bound up with contemporary politics to let such things pass without comment. Readers must know where they stand from the outset. The paper uses the terms progressive, reactionary and conservative to describe ideological currents² and political practices.³ The term progressive is associated with an advocacy of social change that fosters social inclusion⁴ and/or active citizenship.⁵ The term reactionary designates a desire to return to a previous social order that limited those qualities. The term conservative is applied to attempts to maintain a prevailing balance of social forces. The paper defines progressive unionism in relation to various projects and initiatives undertaken by those committed to maintaining the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is accepted that these projects and initiatives are variably constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed. It is further acknowledged that such expressions of progressive unionism may contain reactionary and conservative currents. Progressive unionism is therefore understood as a combination of impulses and tendencies, whose overall effect is to further social inclusion and/or active citizenship.

In making such distinctions, the paper will inevitably be seen to be making implicit value judgements. This is an unavoidable element of subjectivity that any study of progressive politics will contain. However, the paper is by no means a flight into mere subjectivity, nor is it an attempt to make a case for progressive unionism. Rather, its purpose is to show that such a case exists and is stronger than simplistic readings of unionist politics permit. It does this by calling upon a range of scholarship and data. The paper is therefore best understood as an evidence-based challenge to forms of political doxa and orthodoxy, which limit the field of vision concerning the politically possible in Northern Ireland.

Rethinking unionism today

The claims made about the nature and potential of contemporary unionism in this paper rest upon a particular conceptual approach. Central to this approach is the contention that unionism is not a monolith, but a diverse set of articulations loosely bounded by a shared commitment to maintaining the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Important work has been done to disentangle these articulations and make sense of unionist political culture. This paper recasts aspects of this scholarship to provide a more robust conceptualisation.

Todd’s (1987) contribution to the debate provides the foundation for the approach taken in the paper. Here, Todd identifies Ulster loyalism and Ulster Britishness as the main ideological traditions within unionism. According to Todd, Ulster loyalism is defined by an ethno-sectarian understanding of a Protestant collective self as besieged by a hostile Catholic collective other. The primary imagined community that Ulster loyalists purport to belong to is therefore said to be distinctly Protestant, with loyalty to the British state conditional upon its capacity to safeguard the perceived interests of the Protestant people. This leads to a propensity amongst those committed to Ulster loyalism, Todd continues, to frame their analysis of politics in terms of good and evil, making it a particularly rigid ideology with a restricted range of adaptability. Yet, as Todd takes care to point out, Ulster loyalism’s limited reliance on religious observance and ability to draw on ritual practices, most notably those associated with the Orange Order, ensures its capacity to endure as an important aspect of unionism.

Todd contends that religion is of secondary importance to the Ulster British. Their commitment to the union, Todd argues, is primarily sustained by the belief that the British constitution is an effective guarantor of liberal democracy and a truly pluralist society. Supposed threats to the integrity of the union are therefore strenuously opposed by the Ulster British. Such opposition, Todd explains, often draws upon negative views of collective others. The Ulster British tend to view Irish nationalism as illiberal and regressive. Ulster loyalism is usually dismissed by them as a retrograde unionism or engaged as an inconvenient ally. Elements within the British state that are perceived to threaten Northern Ireland’s constitutional status are also strongly criticised for displaying a lack of principle. Taken collectively, this can create a certain rigidity that when politically manifest can blur the lines between Ulster Britishness and Ulster loyalism, fostering the impression of a general unionist intransigence. However, Todd cautions against such surface level analysis and suggests that the commitment to liberalism within Ulster Britishness creates an openness and amenability to social change that is lacking in Ulster loyalism. In Todd’s analysis, Ulster Britishness principally represents unionism’s progressive currents.

A key strength of Todd’s (1987) argument is the way they relate their conceptualisation of Ulster loyalism and Ulster Britishness to concrete expressions of unionism. Todd maintains that although unionists can draw on both ideological traditions, they are inclined to lean more towards one than the other, creating regularities in political practice that reveal how each tradition is more than mere abstraction. However, the passage of time has revealed two main limitations to Todd’s formulations. First, the designation of Ulster loyalism to describe the more reactionary and conservative tradition has been rendered increasingly questionable by developments within working class loyalism. Second, a rival ideological configuration has been posited within unionism that is not accounted for in the paper. Overcoming these limitations requires examining Porter’s (1996) work on unionism.

In Rethinking Unionism, Porter delineates three main types of unionism. Porter largely recasts the currents in unionism constitutive of Todd's Ulster loyalism and Ulster Britishness as cultural and liberal unionism respectively. As Porter explains, cultural unionism draws heavily on religious themes and selective representations of the Ulster Protestant experience that frame Irish Catholics in oppositional terms and justify a fraught conditional loyalty to the British state. In contrast, liberal unionism is characterised by a belief that equal citizenship within the UK offers the most favourable means of enabling a culturally rich and diverse society, which can engender vigorous opposition to both Irish nationalism and the British state when it treats Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’. Porter contends that both types of unionism are flawed. Cultural unionism advances an antiquated interpretation of citizenship that has little in common with those that prevail within Great Britain, leaving it politically isolated and unable to move beyond an ethno-sectarian framing of politics in Northern Ireland. Liberal unionism, on the other hand, displays a greater commitment to progressive values, but has a tendency not to adequately grasp the need for exceptional measures in Northern Ireland to secure meaningful accommodation between those with divergent constitutional aspirations. To combat these perceived shortcomings and better enable political progress, Porter advocates civic unionism.

Porter distinguishes civic from cultural and liberal unionism through its proponents’ valuation of the Union. Whereas liberal and cultural unionists tend to view the maintenance of the constitutional status quo as an end to which all others are subservient, Porter explains, the commitment to the Union amongst civic unionists is secondary to enhancing the quality of political and social life of all citizens in Northern Ireland. For civic unionists, Northern Ireland cannot function effectively without due recognition of its cultural diversity and the contending political aspirations of its inhabitants. Civic unionists are therefore favourably disposed to dialogical processes that seek to positively channel political conflict by enhancing due recognition amongst contending parties. Civic unionism is largely defined by a progressive belief that the persistence of the Union is best secured through reasoned adaptation and accommodation in the pursuit of an inclusive, prosperous society.

This conceptualisation of civic unionism, however, has not been without critics. Although welcoming Rethinking Unionism as a serious contribution to discourse concerning unionism and urging unionists to engage with the text, Aughey (1996) questions the extent to which civic unionism is representative of existing unionist political culture, suggesting that Porter may be guilty of importing ‘a view from nowhere’. However, as will be shown below, ideas associated with civic unionism have since been deployed alongside those related to liberal and cultural unionism to frame unionist politics in a variety of ways, creating regularities in political practice that disprove any suggestion that Porter’s contribution is merely of abstract significance.

A greater challenge to Porter’s conceptualisation of unionism is that its classifications are not sufficiently well defined. The ubiquity of culture and its political salience to each of the different types of unionism identified by Porter throws into question the appropriateness of designating just one classification as ‘cultural unionism’. This paper reworks Porter’s tripartite schema accordingly:

• Religio-Cultural Unionism – Beliefs, representations and practices are primarily informed by a selective reading of the Ulster Protestant experience. Often uses religious rhetoric and imagery as ways of understanding and communicating political matters, although religious observance is not a prerequisite for engaging in such articulation. Tends to frame Irish Catholics in oppositional terms and finds ritual expression mainly through Orangeism. Loyalty to the British state is conditional on its capacity to safeguard the perceived interests of a variably defined ‘Protestant people’.

• Liberal-Constitutionalist Unionism – Beliefs, representations and practices are primarily informed by the view that the UK constitution offers the most favourable means of facilitating social advancement and political progress in Northern Ireland. Comfortable with blended identities and intercultural dialogue, but believe that social integration is best pursued by ensuring equal citizenship within the state. Sceptical of attempts to frame politics in terms of the competing interests of cultural groups, preferring to focus on the extent of access to citizenship and the quality of the democratic decision-making procedures within the state. Loyalty to the British state is conditional on its willingness to afford those in Northern Ireland equal citizenship and not treat the region as ‘a place apart’.

• Civic-Cultural Unionism – Beliefs, representations and practices are primarily informed by the understanding that dialogical processes and due recognition are instrumental to enabling social advancement and political progress in pluralistic societies. Comfortable with blended identities and intercultural dialogue, and willing to depart from political norms evidenced in Great Britain in certain circumstances to enable accommodation between those with divergent constitutional aspirations in Northern Ireland. Commitment to the union is viewed as secondary to advancing social inclusion and active citizenship.

These changes promote greater appreciation of the encompassing and differential role played by culture in each classification by spotlighting the more narrow focus on juridical culture in liberal constitutionalist unionism, as well as the importance of more expansive cultural forms to religio-cultural and civic-cultural unionism.

In the interest of conceptual precision, the paper proposes a further change to Porter’s formulations. Rather than viewing each classification simply as a ‘type’ of unionism, it contends that they are better understood as ideological tendencies. Thinking in terms of tendencies operating within a wider ideological formation makes it easier to visualise the complex operations of unionist ideology by allowing for a greater appreciation of how such classifications are rarely, if ever, found in their ideal-typical form. As alluded to above, the political beliefs and practices of individual unionists might combine elements of each classification to produce hybrid ideological currents. What relates the classifications to concrete political phenomena within unionism is the regularities within political practice that they explain. These regularities are identifiable patterns within the various articulations of unionism. Or, in plainer terms, they are discerned as some electors exhibit a propensity to lean more towards one classification than the others. Conceptualising the classifications as distinct ideological tendencies therefore permits better sense to be made of how unionism maintains certain regularities, while also functioning as a dynamic, composite ideology, which permits a range of political interpretations and practices.⁶ Naturally, these interpretations and practices have a greater or lesser chance of finding expression within a given party system.

Political parties and the mediation of unionist political culture

Political parties play a significant role in mediating unionist political culture. A fundamental task for unionist parties is to read the balance of forces within the electorate and devise an approach most likely to maximise appeal. This might lead a party to draw on aspects of the different ideological tendencies discussed above to build a broad electoral coalition. Alternatively, a party might target a more specific section of the electorate to effectively compete with rivals. The strategy pursued and its success largely depend on internal party dynamics, which profoundly shape how parties read and respond to the shifting mood of the electorate. However, this is not all there is to winning electoral support within unionism. Success is also influenced by the prevailing form of party competition and past electoral fortunes.

Conventional wisdom holds that politics in Northern Ireland operates an ‘ethnic dual party system’ whereby party competition is largely orientated around a bipolar constitutional cleavage (Mitchell, 1995). This system is propelled by a rationale that privileges intra-bloc over inter-bloc competition. Accordingly, competition between unionist and nationalist parties for votes tends to be rare as both compete for votes amongst their constitutional fellow travellers. This promotes intra-bloc ethnic outbidding as parties seek to present themselves as the staunchest defenders of the political, cultural and economic interests of ‘their people’. A mode of ‘ethnic tribune politics’ then prevails that subordinates other social cleavages in such a way as to ensure that parties are encouraged to ‘accommodate and transmute’ intra-bloc divisions within the frameworks of unionism and nationalism (Coulter, 1994a, p. 4; Mitchell et al., 2009, p. 29). This process of accommodation and transmutation permits a suppression of aspects of unionist political culture.

Tilley et al. (2021, p. 226) note that the prevailing party system in Northern Ireland is largely sustained by ‘top down’ electoral management, with parties defining the range of choices available to electors and thereby the active political cleavages at election time. This has had significant ramifications within unionism. In their analysis, Tilley et al. reveal that the DUP and UUP now pursue similar approaches to constitutional and socio-economic questions. The main discernible point of distinction, Tilley et al. (2021, p. 234) show, is ‘the UUP position has become a little more socially liberal than the DUP over time’. Considering such convergence in the policy platforms of the two largest unionist parties, it is unsurprising that Tilley et al. find little evidence of policy driven voting behaviour to account for their divergent electoral fortunes, despite uncovering an undeniable pluralism within the pro-union electorate.

Situated alongside this evidence, the shrewdness of an observation of unionist politics made by Mitchell (2022) is clear. Mitchell argues that the convergence of the main unionist parties after 2003 greatly benefited the DUP. Having replaced the UUP as the largest party in unionism, the DUP has faced an opponent offering broadly similar policies, leaving it free to make the case that if the main point at stake is ensuring the strength of unionism, it is best to unite behind the unionist party that has shown itself most able to garner electoral support. This is a powerful argument and provides an insight into the considerable latitude ethnic tribune appeals have afforded the DUP to supress those currents of unionist political culture that do not find expression in its programme.

However, the surge in the Alliance Party’s vote share in elections after 2019 has led some to question the enduring relevance of the ethnic dual party system. For example, Murphy (2023, p. 98) contends that it is perhaps now more apt to speak of ‘a two and a half party (or two and a half bloc) system’. Whilst it is certainly true that Alliance’s recent electoral augmentation signals a definite attenuation of the strength of ethnic tribune politics, it is important not to undervalue the enduring significance of such forms of electoral mobilisation. Highlighting the continuing dominance of unionism and nationalism within the party system, constitutionally aligned parties received around 80 per cent of votes in the 2019 General Election and a similar share of first preference votes in the 2022 Assembly election. The dynamics associated with the ethnic dual party system and the possible suppression of aspects of unionist political culture they permit remain very much relevant. This paper argues that the actualisation of such potential for suppression has militated against the institutionalisation of more progressive forms of unionism. It shows how an embrace of reactionary and conservative currents by mainstream unionist parties has inhibited the development of progressive unionism and created a gap between these parties and the politics practiced and desired by segments of the pro-union electorate. The party politics of so called new unionism and new loyalism will now be examined to establish a contextual backdrop for this argument, which will be reinforced with an analysis of various forms of leadership displayed by unionists in civil society and attitudinal data drawn from the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT), Northern Ireland Assembly Election (NIAE) and Northern Ireland General Election Study (NIGES) surveys.⁷

The party politics of new unionism and new loyalism

Products of political discourse in the 1990s, the terms new unionism and new loyalism have been deployed to explain ideological shifts within unionist party politics that emerged during the peace process. These shifts marked an attempt to facilitate conflict transformation in Northern Ireland by more firmly embedding forms of civic-cultural unionism within the political mainstream (Ervine & McAuley, 2001; Patterson, 2012). Such efforts formed a complex process of brokering between contending perspectives as liberal-constitutionalist and religio-cultural unionism remained potent ideological tendencies within unionism. This section explores new unionism and new loyalism in turn to unpack how this process unfolded and discern its contemporary salience.

New unionism is usually associated with developments in the UUP under the leadership of David Trimble. Patterson (2004) contends that the change of direction signalled by new unionism owed much to Trimble’s analysis of the structural dynamics of political conflict in Northern Ireland. This analysis held that the incorporation of Sinn Fein into a devolved settlement through a de facto acceptance of the consent principle would signify a substantial victory for unionism. In keeping with this analysis, the PIRA ceasefire in 1994 could be argued to mark the beginning of a protracted admission of defeat whereby republicans came to accept a partitionist settlement (Patterson, 2023). From this perspective, engaging in dialogue with republicans, accepting power-sharing political institutions and the institutionalisation of an Irish dimension are all prices worth paying to ameliorate violence and safeguard the union in the long-term. In this sense, Trimble clearly recognised the merits of the reasoned adaptation and accommodation associated with civic-cultural unionism.

However, the civic-cultural currents characteristic of Trimble’s unionism were conditioned by the ideas concerning equal citizenship associated with liberal-constitutionalist unionism. Trimble could not accept the continued participation of Sinn Fein in government in the absence of transparent decommissioning as this would amount to a significant breach of democratic values that would doubtless not be tolerated elsewhere in the UK. Trimble was willing to cede that Northern Ireland could have bespoke political arrangements, but not that it must forgo the basic democratic standards expected by citizens elsewhere in the UK. Unionists needed to be assured that the Good Friday Agreement did indeed herald a new beginning in which all parties are pledged to exclusively democratic means of conflict regulation. This explains why Trimble sought written assurances regarding decommissioning from the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, before signing the Agreement and why failure to deliver on decommissioning played such a significant role in his downfall. The melding together of liberal-constitutionalist and civic-cultural currents of unionism required that minimalist criteria concerning both components be satisfied (for an elaboration of this argument see Nesbitt & English, 2001).

The decommissioning issue alone, however, did not account for the electoral decline of the UUP as a political force under Trimble. The structural analysis favoured by the ‘Trimbleistas’ underestimated the power of religio-cultural unionism to frame unionist dissatisfaction with the peace process. For many unionists, an acceptance of the consent principle as a precursor to a settlement was not a great victory but the minimum they could be expected to accept (Aughey, 2006). This meant British government policy concerning decommissioning, parading, prisoner releases and police reform deemed by some unionists to benefit republicans at their expense could be effectively tapped by those inclined to religio-cultural unionism who were opposed to the process of change set in motion by the Agreement. After the Agreement, Trimble was relentlessly attacked by unionists inside and outside his party for a supposed lack of strategic vision, with some going as far to suggest he was a traitor guilty of ‘unpardonable’ sin (Paisley, 1999). These attacks proved effective, leading to the UUP being displaced by the DUP as the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland in 2003.

Contrary to the fears of some commentators, the rise of the DUP did not mark an end of new unionism (see Guardian, 2003). Rather, the faltering project continued as both main unionist parties, albeit in differing ways with varying emphases, combined a minimalist civic-cultural unionism with a selective liberal-constitutionalist unionism and aspects of religio-cultural unionism. Despite talk of ‘sack cloth and ashes’, the DUP was very much willing to do a deal with Sinn Fein. This much was acknowledged in the party’s 2003 manifesto, which promised a renegotiation of the terms of the Good Friday Agreement.

The PIRA decision to complete decommissioning and formally end its armed campaign in 2005 provided the space in which such negotiations could flourish. As these negotiations progressed, the DUP sought to strike a similar balance between the civic-cultural and liberal-constitutionalist tendencies within unionism to that sought by the UUP years earlier. With decommissioning achieved, the DUP made ensuring Sinn Fein’s support for the PSNI a key element to enabling a return of devolved governance. With this secured at St Andrews in 2006, the DUP could claim that it had played a leading role in reconciling Sinn Fein to the rule of law and ensuring the basic standards for power-sharing were met.

The degree of continuity in the package signed up to by the DUP and the Good Friday Agreement was nonetheless striking. In entering devolved government with Sinn Fein in 2007, the DUP signalled a shift in unionist politics in which engaging in dialogue and sharing power with republicans overwhelmingly became common sense. However, this is not to say that the DUP fully embraced a progressive political vision like that aspired to by those such as Porter. As alluded to above, what emerged after St Andrews was a distinct ideological hybridity within the main unionist parties. This is illustrated well by how both have responded to issues concerning symbols, the Irish language, same-sex marriage and Brexit.

Take the parties’ responses to the protests launched by some unionists in relation to the decision to limit the flying of the Union flag from Belfast City Council buildings in 2012. Bringing the flying of the Union flag from public buildings into line with practices evidenced elsewhere in the UK to reach out to those with a different cultural and political outlook is in accordance with the ideas pertaining to civic-cultural and liberal-constitutionalist unionism. Yet, the response of the main unionist parties was to distribute pamphlets suggesting that through its support of the initiative the Alliance Party was attempting to ‘make Belfast a cold house for unionists’; condemn the subsequent violence of protestors; and insist that attempts to overturn the decision must be lawfully pursued (Melaugh, 2013). This reactionary episode reflects what Todd (2021, p. 55) refers to as the ‘paradoxes’ of the ‘two communities’ framing of political discourse in Northern Ireland whereby rather than serving as the basis for a civic-cultural unionism dedicated to improving the quality of life for all in Northern Ireland, the language of due recognition is co-opted by politicians to perpetuate ethno-sectarianism by stealth. In other words, the commitment to aspects of civic-cultural and liberal-constitutionalist unionism amongst the DUP and UUP after St Andrews has been significantly cut through with religio-cultural unionism and suggestions that policies welcomed by Irish nationalists are necessarily detrimental to unionists and what Porter (1996, p. 72) refers to as a ‘Protestant-British ethos’.

Further proof of the importance of religio-cultural unionism to the approach taken by the main unionist parties is evident in their handling of the Irish language. Despite provisions for statutory recognition of minority languages elsewhere in the UK, both main parties steadfastly opposed the introduction of a stand-alone Irish Language Act. While much of this opposition has centred around costs, it is hard to miss the zero-sum cultural logic accompanying such calculations. Disrespectful remarks concerning the Irish language made by unionist politicians and claims that a prospective act is merely a ‘trojan horse for Gerry Adams to use in his campaign against unionism’ may play well with the party faithful, but they also attest to just how inadequate the main unionist parties’ drive has been to push the issue beyond a limiting ethno-sectarian frame (see BBC News Online, 2014a; Belfast Telegraph, 2017; Hennessey et al., 2018; Tonge et al., 2014).

A less obvious example of the enduring significance of religio-cultural unionism has been the UUP and DUP approaches to same-sex marriage. Although the UUP’s official position on same-sex marriage is that it is a matter of conscience for members, the party’s MLAs played a notable role alongside their DUP opponents in blocking legislation to bring Northern Ireland into line with the rest of the UK in terms of marriage equality (BBC News Online, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b). In this respect, MLAs in both parties were representing the attitudinal profile of their party membership and the religious beliefs of segments of the electorate (Hennessey et al., 2018; Tonge et al., 2014). However, this conservative appeal to the religious sentiments of some Ulster Protestants clearly transgresses the principle of equal citizenship within the UK and a strong case can be made that it is counterintuitive to building a truly inclusive society. It is hard to reconcile opposition to same-sex marriage with either liberal-constitutionalist or civic-cultural unionism. Such opposition is most appropriately understood through the lens of religio-cultural unionism and the particular, if contested, representations of the ‘Protestant people’ it permits.

The selective liberal-constitutionalist unionism pursued by the main unionist parties in recent years is perhaps best illustrated by their mainly muddled approach to Brexit. Having supported Brexit, the DUP have been unable to formulate a workable solution to the conundrum of where and how to draw regulatory and trade borders, voicing opposition to all proposals so far forwarded. A pro-remain party at the time of the referendum in 2016, the UUP has been similarly flummoxed by Brexit. Whilst supportive of the British government’s decision to implement Brexit, the UUP have sent out largely mixed signals about what policy it believes should be pursued, with the party suggesting that the Northern Ireland Protocol was ‘fundamentally flawed’ in its entirety, yet actively seeking mitigations to enable its reform and largely accepting the mitigations achieved by the Windsor Framework (UUP, 2021, 2023).

This is not to say that unionist opposition to the unfolding of the Brexit process has been entirely wrong-headed. The argument advanced that the process has served to treat Northern Ireland as ‘a place apart’ and undermined its position within the union has some merit. After all, the process did lead to the modification of Article VI of the Act of Union (1800), which set out that Northern Ireland should be kept on an equal footing in relation to other regions within the UK regarding trade. It has also been acknowledged by leading actors that mistakes were made in earlier phases of the process in relation to the concerns expressed by unionists, leading to the substantial changes secured through the Windsor Framework (Adams, 2023). The principle of equal citizenship associated with liberal-constitutionalist unionism could frame a reasonable critique of Brexit. Whether supporting Brexit could ever be made fully compatible with a consistent liberal-constitutionalist unionism in practice is another matter. What is perhaps of greater relevance is how these liberal-constitutionalist currents have differentially influenced the approach the main unionist parties have taken to devolution. The DUP’s decision to collapse devolved institutions in 2022, owing to unsatisfactory progress regarding the Protocol has opened up a point of distinction between it and the UUP, with the latter expressing a greater desire to get the institutions up and running to address the various issues confronting people in Northern Ireland. In this sense, the UUP’s position shows greater evidence of the pragmatism and commitment to dialogue associated with civic-cultural unionism than that adopted by the DUP. With devolved institutions still inactive, however, it is fair to say the new unionism project set in motion by the peace process has stalled as a combination of religio-cultural unionism and selective liberal-constitutionalist unionism have impeded the development of civic-cultural unionism and the realisation of a progressive agenda in the leading unionist parties conducive to the furtherance of social inclusion and active citizenship. How this has created a gap between the mainstream unionist parties and the politics practiced and desired by segments of the pro-union population will be established later in the paper. First, attention must turn to new loyalism to give a broader contextual backdrop to the development of party-political unionism.

Loyalism is a difficult term to define as it cannot readily be separated from unionism. Following Mulvenna (2015), this paper defines loyalism largely in class terms as distinctive modes of working-class unionism that have assumed both constitutional and paramilitary forms. It holds that although new loyalism is often used to describe developments in loyalism following the Combined Loyalist Military Command ceasefires in 1994, the ideological currents that gave these developments shape were not entirely new but arose from existing aspects of loyalist thought (Aughey, 1989; McAuley, 1997; PUP, 1985). It further contends that ‘new loyalism’ marked an ambitious attempt to construct a thoroughgoing civic-cultural unionism, which has been frustrated by an inability to reconcile tensions between progressive and regressive elements within loyalism.⁸

The ceasefires in 1994 and the subsequent deepening of the peace process created space for these more progressive elements to assume a greater role within the politics of Northern Ireland. The PUP and UDP, with links to the UVF/RHC and UDA respectively, emerged as articulate voices for change and accommodation. Representatives from both parties proved to be amongst the most committed to selling the Good Friday Agreement within unionism. Although the UDP collapsed in 2001, the PUP has persisted as a political force and provides insights into the changing ideological character of new loyalism.

Perhaps one of the most distinctive features of the PUP in relation to unionism is the party’s advocacy of socialism. Unperturbed by the British Labour Party’s decision to abandon Clause IV of its constitution in 1995, the PUP included a commitment to ‘common ownership’ in its constitution a year later (PUP, 2016). Further highlighting its socialist credentials, the party set out a robust challenge to neoliberalisation in its 1997 manifesto:

The Progressive Unionist Party repudiates the values and ethos of the New Right which now permeate the social services and which have led to a contract culture amongst those responsible for the provision of health, education and social welfare services. The party demands a strengthening, not a weakening, of the Health Service … The party calls for a review of all Social Security benefits and demands an end to the policies and strategies of the New Right which seek the erosion of the Welfare State.

Animated by ‘bread and butter’ politics that the party believes have not been satisfactorily addressed by the largest unionist parties, the PUP has sought to protect and expand social services and entitlements; direct capital flows towards deprived communities; address educational inequalities through reform and fully reinstating university grants; and provide an adequate stock of social housing to address homelessness (PUP, 1997, 2003, 2007). The PUP has arguably been the party that has most consistently sought to attend to the needs of working-class unionists.

However, the PUP’s commitment to socialism has wavered. The PUP, like most other parties in Northern Ireland, has got caught up in ‘the great moving right show’. McCabe (2013) explains this phenomenon in terms of a ‘double transition’, in which the process of conflict transformation initiated by the peace process was accompanied by the neoliberalisation of socio-economic policy in Northern Ireland. Cohering with this perspective, Coulter and Shirlow (2019, p. 3) argue that while the DUP and Sinn Fein were often at odds over cultural issues while in government, ‘they frequently found common cause when it came to the introduction of distinctly neoliberal social and economic strategies’. Despite its earlier repudiation of the ‘New Right’, the PUP has also accepted tenets of the neoliberal common sense. For example, in its 2011 manifesto the party joined the chorus of voices calling for Northern Ireland to compete with the low rate of corporation tax in the Irish Republic; declared that its previous opposition to tuition fees was unrealistic; and supported a draconian three strikes eviction policy for social housing tenants (PUP, 2011).

The PUP has nonetheless remained committed to working inside and outside formal political channels to promote wide-ranging social change, active citizenship and economic renewal. The party was the first pro-choice unionist party and have consistently sought to advance women’s rights; has regularly sought to embed environmentally conscious policies; afforded Linda Ervine a platform to speak to its party conference on the cultural significance of the Irish language to unionists in 2012; and declared support for same-sex marriage in 2013. In short, the PUP has taken a progressive and multifaceted approach to conflict transformation.

It may therefore be asked why the PUP has had such limited electoral success if there is indeed space to advance progressive politics within unionism. Four interlocking reasons explain the PUP’s limited electoral support. First, the PUP was established after the UUP and DUP. This has meant that the larger unionist parties have always been able to make a credible case that they are better placed electorally to challenge nationalism than the PUP. Second, the PUP’s enthusiastic support of the Good Friday Agreement left it vulnerable to the same attacks that electorally undermined the UUP. Third, there have been some policy overlaps between the PUP and its competitors on important issues that have tempered its distinctiveness. For example, the PUP’s post-referendum approach to Brexit has been broadly in keeping with that of the main unionist parties.⁹ Finally, and arguably most importantly, the PUP’s links to violent and criminal elements are unappealing to many unionists.

The PUP’s links to the UVF/RHC have ensured that the party has been negatively impacted by the criminalising and stigmatising discourses attached to paramilitary violence, drug dealing and extortion (Edwards & Bloomer, 2004). As Shirlow (2012) argues, the construction of loyalism in the popular imagination has been largely one-sided, with commentators drawing heavily on its regressive elements to position loyalists as thoughtless, deviant and dispossessed of positive intent. The contributions that loyalists have made to conflict transformation in Northern Ireland have exercised considerably less influence upon public debate. This has meant that the PUP remains tethered to objectionable and illicit behaviours in the eyes of many electors, who have been afforded limited insight into its progressive political practices. The remainder of this paper presents evidence that points to the existence of space to develop the progressive currents exhibited through new loyalism, starting with the multiple forms of leadership displayed by unionists within civil society.

Leading in civil society

Many accounts of the peace process in Northern Ireland emphasise the importance of elite political leadership to brokering settlements and enabling political progress (Taylor, 2009). These accounts tend to downplay the substantial contributions to the process made by leaders in civil society. Cassidy (2008) likens some of these leaders to Gramsci’s organic intellectuals, whose class-conscious activism builds capacity within working-class communities and challenges perceived shortcomings with mainstream party politics. Cassidy further shows that unionism has had a considerable supply of such leadership, pointing to initiatives aiming to empower local people in their dealings with the state and promote ‘cross-community bridge-building’ (2008, p. 428). Unionists have displayed strong leadership within civil society.

Take the letter published by ‘civic unionists, pluralists and others’ in response to letters issued by ‘civic nationalism’ asking the Irish government to intervene in the Brexit process to safeguard rights in Northern Ireland (Moriarty, 2018). Although unhelpfully framed in the media in conflictual terms as a ‘riposte to civic nationalism’, the letter represented an effort amongst certain unionists to collaborate with others to render more visible their commitment to dialogue aimed at furthering ‘rights, truth, equality and civil liberties’ in Northern Ireland. The letter was also followed up with a series of dialogue events aiming to further due recognition between Sinn Fein and unionists from a range of backgrounds and sectors. Unionists within civil society are organising, sharing ideas and engaging responsibly to encourage social and political progress.

This commitment to engagement has also been evidenced by young unionists. Young people from unionist backgrounds have shown themselves more than willing to join with others to discuss how politics in Northern Ireland might be advanced. As the recent Peace Summits facilitated by the John & Pat Hume Foundation (2023) attest, these young people tend to view the antagonistic nature of politics in Northern Ireland as destructive and favour more agonistic approaches to managing cultural differences. Many of these young people further stress that they would prefer to see political debate in Northern Ireland more centred on issues around mental health, socio-economic inequalities and climate change. Similar sentiments are recorded in the Poreto Youth Manifesto, in which young people from Portadown and Donegal come together to set out shared objectives aimed at enhancing youth voice in the democratic process and enabling political progress on the island of Ireland (Politics in Action, 2023). These two initiatives challenge framings of politics in Northern Ireland that prioritise constitutional polarisation over exploring the wider shared concerns that reflect what McEvoy and Todd (2023, p. 16) refer to as ‘everyday universalist values’. It is also worth bearing in mind that these initiatives are but a drop in the ocean when set against the sheer quantity of such work that takes place daily in Northern Ireland.

The leadership displayed by unionists in civil society is by no means restricted to engaging in political dialogue. Shirlow (2019) signals the important contributions those from unionist backgrounds have made to conflict transformation and the local economy by building social enterprises. Consider for instance the Stewartstown Road Regeneration Project (SRRP). A product of grassroots organising that sought to bring communities divided by conflict together to work on matters of mutual concern, the SRRP has successfully rebuilt a two storey block of commercial space that Murtagh et al. (2014, p. 58) argue has ‘completely reshaped the [Suffolk/Lenadoon] interface, physically and socially’. Following the rebuild, crime in the surrounding area declined, investment increased and the commercial space proved profitable. Some of the profits were also used to develop local training programmes, benefit advice clinics and cross-community contact schemes, aimed primarily at children and young people. Unionists have played a part in delivering grassroots social transformation in Northern Ireland.

It is also instructive to consider the campaigns to legalise abortion and same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland when considering unionist leadership in civil society. Unionists did not sit at home while others drove these campaigns forward, they were actively engaged in them. Many of those who supported the Love Equality campaign, which brought over a thousand people on to the streets to campaign for same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland, were unionists (Donnan-Dalzell, 2018; Fenton, 2017). Furthermore, one of the leading advocates for extending access to abortion in Northern Ireland has been former PUP leader, Dawn Purvis, who served as the director of a Marie Stopes clinic in Belfast (Rustin, 2015). Moreover, unionists that campaigned for extended abortion access in Northern Ireland also participated in the Repeal the 8th campaign in the Irish Republic, contributing to the creation of cross-border solidarities (Pierson, 2018; Roberts, 2020; Roberts et al., 2022). Unionists have been practicing leadership within civil society that is often at variance with that offered by mainstream unionist politicians. The remainder of this paper presents attitudinal data that shows how this leadership, committed to advancing social inclusion and active citizenship, is more in keeping with that desired by the pro-union electorate.

The attitudes of the pro-union population

Too often the potential of unionism has been measured against the extent to which it appeals to Unionists as opposed to unionists. This is an analytical mistake with significant political consequences. As Coulter (1994b, p. 20) points out, a unionist is simply someone that expresses a commitment to maintaining the Union, whereas a Unionist is one whose commitment to the Union is accompanied by ethno-sectarian renditions of identity that promote a distinctly Protestant way of life. Focusing on Unionists therefore unduly narrows the field of vision concerning the politically possible within unionism. If the diversity and potential within unionism is to be satisfactorily understood attention must be directed to unionists. This bears directly on how survey data should be analysed.

The views of unionists could be discerned through such analysis by exploring the submissions made by those who identify as unionist. This has an intuitive appeal. However, many of those whose long-term preference is to maintain the union do not identify as unionist (see Appendix 1: Table A1). Those identifying as unionist have also been shown more invested in the prevailing mode of ethnic tribune politics in Northern Ireland than those who identify as neither unionist nor nationalist (Coulter et al., 2021). Omitting those who favour maintaining the union but do not expressly identify as unionist would therefore provide an unduly narrowed understanding of the pro-union population. This is equally true of using religious affiliation as a proxy for political belief as has often been done in studies of politics concerning Northern Ireland. As Nolan (2023) points out, Northern Ireland has become a much more secular society in the last ten years, with an increasing number of electors identifying as having no religion and religious observance within Protestant churches falling. It is therefore unsurprising that a significant number of those who wish to maintain the union do not identify as Protestant (see Appendix 1: Table A2). For these reasons and to ensure the broadest spectrum of pro-union opinion is captured, the ensuing analysis probes the views of those whose long-term constitutional preference is for Northern Ireland to remain within the UK. Examining the size of this group in relation to electoral trends proves illuminating.

As Figure 1 shows, the support for unionist political parties amongst electors has declined in the post-Agreement period.¹⁰ Unionist parties have failed to match the level of support from the electorate achieved in the 2005 election in each of the 4 subsequent General Elections. Their appeal in Assembly elections has similarly diminished, with unionist parties unable to achieve 30 per cent of first preference votes as a percentage of the electorate in elections after 2007. Moreover, the most recent Assembly election marked the worst ever performance of unionist parties in terms of securing first preference votes from electors. Yet, evidence from the NILT surveys suggests the pro-union population has fallen no lower than 48 per cent in the post-Agreement period, reaching a high of 73 per cent in 2010 and holding around 60 per cent in the immediate aftermath of Brexit. This highlights the limits to the existing approaches of electoral mobilisation within unionism and signals possible space within the pro-union electorate to cultivate more progressive alternatives. The remainder of this paper presents attitudinal data that suggests such space can be so cultivated.

Figure 1. Pro-union population and unionist party vote share as a percentage of the electorate (NILT, CAIN, ARK & EONI).

Analysis of the NILT, NIAE and NIGES surveys strongly suggests that aspects of unionist political culture have been supressed by the DUP and UUP. Pro-union electors display a pragmatism and commitment to social change that has at best found partial expression in these parties’ policy platforms. In fact, there has often been a considerable measure of consensus between the pro-union and pro-Irish unity populations on a range of issues, rendering the soundness of the frequently antagonistic character of politics in Northern Ireland questionable. This has been the case even in relation to the issue that has arguably proved the most disruptive to the region’s politics, Brexit.

Pro-union electors have exhibited pragmatism throughout the Brexit process, which while finding confused expression in the UUP, has been at odds with the approach pursued by the DUP. Like many pro-Irish unity electors, most of those who are pro-union have sought a close relationship with the EU following Brexit (see Appendix 1: Table A3). Additionally, a plurality of pro-union electors favoured mitigating regulatory and customs checks on goods travelling between Northern Ireland and the Irish republic, as well as on goods travelling between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (see Appendix 1: Tables A4 and A5). Further in keeping with the views of those who favour Irish unity, a minority of pro-union electors viewed the Protocol as mainly bad for Northern Ireland in 2021 (see Appendix 1: Table A6). Pro-union electors were certainly less likely to enthusiastically support the Protocol than those seeking Irish unity, but there is little evidence that most thought it was “fundamentally flawed” in its entirety. That just 22 per cent of pro-union electors favoured scrapping the Protocol over maintaining devolved institutions in 2022 provides further proof of this contention (see Appendix 1: Table A7). It is therefore unsurprising that a poll commissioned by the University of Liverpool in 2023 suggests that a majority of both pro-union and pro-Irish unity electors welcome the changes secured to the Protocol through the Windsor Framework (Carroll, 2023). The evidence strongly indicates that there was scope for a more pragmatic approach to Brexit within unionism than was pursued by the main unionist parties, who have largely pandered to minority positions on the issue. The DUP’s claim to be the main voice for unionism on Brexit has mainly rested upon its electoral mandate derived from its position within Northern Ireland’s distinctive party system, not on a clear-sighted representation of unionist political culture, the more pragmatic currents of which it has often suppressed.

Following the evidence also points to a reasonable degree of consensus between a large segment of the pro-union electorate and those supportive of Irish unity on the desirability of addressing socio-economic inequalities. The 2021 NILT survey indicates that a plurality of pro-union electors believe that income distribution in Northern Ireland is unfair, and an overwhelming majority want those with larger incomes to pay a higher rate of tax than those with smaller incomes (see Appendix 1: Tables A8 and A9). The survey further shows that most do not believe that the Executive is doing enough to alleviate poverty and that social security should enable families to have a normal standard of living (see Appendix 1: Tables A10 and A11). Most of those in favour of maintaining the union, like most of those disposed to Irish unity, believe that social security should enable families to live in dignity (see Appendix 1: Table A12). It therefore appears that there is indeed space to cultivate progressive, left leaning unionism and the PUP’s more social democratic approach to socio-economic issues is not as without support within the pro-union electorate as its electoral fortunes might otherwise suggest.

The PUP’s support for the legalisation of same-sex marriage and extending abortion access in Northern Ireland was also in keeping with the views of many pro-union electors. Just 28 per cent of pro-union electors opposed legalising same-sex marriage (see Appendix 1: Table A13). The opposition to same-sex marriage expressed by other unionist politicians may have found support amongst their fellow party members, but its appeal amongst the wider pro-union electorate was limited. Additionally, just 30 per cent of pro-union electors opposed legalising abortion. In fact, those who are pro-union have been shown more socially liberal on the matter of abortion than proponents of Irish unity (see Appendix 1: Table A14). The views of those unionists who campaigned in civil society to bring about change on these issues were representative of a broad segment of the pro-union population. It is also insightful that a sizable number of DUP voters adopt socially liberal positions on the issues, while most younger pro-union electors do likewise (see Appendix 1: Tables A13 and A14). This suggests that there is greater scope for liberal-constitutional and civic-cultural unionism to frame the approach taken to such matters by unionist parties than has so far prevailed in practice.

The evidence further suggests that the antagonistic approach to cultural matters pursued by unionist political parties is at odds with aspects of the attitudinal profile of the pro-union electorate. Almost ten years on from the Belfast flag dispute, a majority of pro-union electors favour flying the Union Flag from public buildings on designated days (see Appendix 1: Table A15). Furthermore, most are favourably disposed to intergroup contact between those from different religious backgrounds and want to see progress towards removing the peace lines that divide local communities along ethno-sectarian lines (see Appendix 1: Tables A16–A18). Moreover, most believe that the culture and traditions of ‘the Catholic community’ add to the richness and diversity of society in Northern Ireland (see Appendix 1: Table A19). The evidence further suggests that a significant number of DUP voters are favourably disposed to various forms of intergroup contact, with younger pro-union non-voters proving to be among the most favourably disposed to such contact (see Appendix 1: Tables A20 and A21). The commitment to promoting dialogue, due recognition and political progress displayed by unionists, young and old, within civil society is largely in keeping with the aspirations of the wider pro-union electorate. It would therefore appear that there is space for unionist parties to pursue a more agonistic approach to cultural matters.

However, just 14 per cent of pro-union electors supported an Irish Language Act in 2019 (see Appendix 1: Table A22). This suggests that the approach taken to cultural matters by the DUP and UUP has not been entirely without electoral logic. Whether these parties’ wider pursuit of religio-cultural unionism is a sound long-term strategy for unionism is nonetheless debatable. The evidence presented in this section strongly suggests that the pro-union electorate is much more favourably disposed to politics seeking equal citizenship within the UK and/or reasoned accommodation with opponents to facilitate an inclusive, prosperous society. Suppressing those progressive currents within unionist political culture seeking pragmatism, due recognition and social change seems unlikely to grow and sustain unionism. It might therefore be argued that the future of unionism is tied to the capacity of mainstream unionist parties to tap into those aspects of civil society leadership that display a certain potential to harness broader segments of pro-union opinion.

Conclusion

Northern Ireland has never been a binary society and the two communities framing of social life in the region has always been limited. These limitations are becoming even starker in a more diverse, secularising society where armed violence has dissipated and political conflict has diversified. Much of the negative readings of contemporary unionism in popular discourse fail to adequately acknowledge how these social shifts have affected unionists. This paper challenges such readings by broadening understanding concerning unionism. It argues that unionism possesses a diversity and potential that is often left out of popular accounts. By focusing on the plurality within unionist political culture, the paper provides a more nuanced rendering of unionist politics. It contends that the progressive party-political projects within unionism initiated during the peace process have stalled. The realisation of a progressive agenda through new unionism has been frustrated as both main unionist parties have combined a minimalist civic-cultural unionism with a selective liberal-constitutionalist unionism and aspects of religio-cultural unionism. Additionally, the attempt to create a throughgoing civic-cultural unionism through new loyalism has been largely undermined by an inability to reconcile progressive and regressive elements within loyalism. However, the paper has shown that there is space to cultivate the progressive currents within unionism. The declining electoral fortunes of unionist political parties points to a need to consider alternatives. Moreover, analysis of the leadership displayed by unionists within civil society and the attitudinal profile of the pro-union electorate reveals a commitment to pragmatism, due recognition and social change that has often been at variance with the approaches pursued by mainstream unionist parties. While the perpetuation of the dynamics of an ethnic dual party system will likely continue to enable a certain suppression of these progressive currents, continuing to neglect them is unlikely to aid such parties build the broad coalition that will sustain unionism in the long-term. The case for progressive unionism today draws its strength from this simple reality.

Data

Both the NILT, NIAE and NIGES surveys are publicly available.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

None

Notes on contributors

Dean Farquhar

Dean Farquhar achieved his PhD concerning youth non-voting in Northern Ireland from the University of Liverpool in 2021. As a part-time student, Dean worked for the University’s Widening Participation and Outreach team during his research, delivering sessions on politics to young people from around the Merseyside area. Since leaving Liverpool to return to Northern Ireland, Dean has commenced a career as a youth worker. Currently, Dean is focusing on peacebuilding and promoting emotional resilience in young people. He hopes that this paper stimulates debate within and about unionism.

Notes

1 I chose these commentators as they often provide some of the more nuanced analysis of unionism in Northern Ireland. Yet, as these quotes show, their framing of unionism at times embraces negative generalisations. Such generalisations stand in the way of a developed understanding of unionism and its potential.

2 Ideological currents are understood to be combinations of ideological elements. The patterning of these currents forms discourses, which produce regularities that are described in the paper as ideological tendencies. Ideological formations are therefore taken to contain tendencies that are the product of currents forming discourses that arise from the articulation of elements. More details can be found below and in Ramos (1982).

3 Following Mouffe (2000) political practices are taken to be any practice that seeks to influence ‘the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organise human coexistence’.

4 Following the United Nations (2016), social inclusion is defined as ‘the process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or other status, through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice and respect for rights’. In the context of Northern Ireland, this may be understood as furthering the commitments set out in Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act (1998).

5 Active citizenship is understood as the pursuit of those educative practices that Pateman (1970) associates with participative democracy.

6 Although somewhat idiosyncratic, my use of tendency here is not entirely dissimilar to Miliband’s (1985) use of the term ‘to denote a spectrum of thought, in which are to be found many different positions and points of emphasis, put forward by people who belong to different generations, traditions, parties and movements, and who do not necessarily agree with each other on many important issues’. As Miliband continues, ‘it is precisely this diversity which’ can help ‘to obscure the degree to which the people concerned do work within an identifiable spectrum of thought’.

7 Technical notes for the NILT data can be accessed here: https://www.ark.ac.uk/ARK/nilt/datasets/technotes.html

Technical notes for the NIGES data can be accessed here: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/humanities-and-social-sciences/research/research-themes/transforming-conflict/ni-election-survey-19/

Technical notes for the NIAS data can be accessed here: https://www.qub.ac.uk/research-centres/the-democracy-unit/NorthernIrelandAssemblyElectionStudy2022/

8 Loyalists have referred to their own activities as progressive/civic loyalism. This paper holds that progressive/civic loyalism can be understood as an attempt to develop civic-cultural unionism as outlined above, especially given how regularly Porter’s civic unionism is invoked by loyalists to explain the ideological contours of the progressive/civic loyalist project.

9 The PUP also rejected the Alliance Party motion to limit the flying of the union flag on designated days at Belfast City Council.

10 There was no NILT data to match with that pertaining to the Assembly Election in 2011 for Table A1.

Appendix 1

Table A1. Long-term constitutional preference by political identity (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Unionist	Nationalist	Neither	Other	Don't know
Pro-Union	61%	5%	33%	0%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity	2%	63%	33%	1%	1%

Table A2. Long-term constitutional preference by religion brought up in (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Catholic	Protestant	No Religion
Pro-Union	15%	79%	6%
Pro-Irish Unity	78%	17%	5%

Religion brought up in is used in surveys to capture the broader impact of religious tradition on outlook. I used it here to show that even speaking in the broadest terms, there are a significant number of those who are pro-union that situate themselves outside the Protestant tradition. When personal religious beliefs are factored in, the 2021 NILT shows that of the 28 per cent of the electorate without religion: 9 per cent favour remaining in the UK with direct rule; 34 per cent favour remaining in the UK with devolution; 32 per cent favour Irish Unity; and 25 per cent provided a different answer or didn’t know.

Table A3. How close or remote a relationship do you think the UK should have with the EU in future? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Very close	Fairly close	Neither close nor distant	Fairly remote	Very remote	Don't know
Pro-Union	26%	41%	20%	5%	2%	5%
Pro-Irish Unity	61%	25%	6%	1%	1%	5%

Table A4. Checks on goods travelling across the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland (University of Liverpool, NIGES, 2019). As the University of Liverpool run polls as well as election surveys, this is the clearest way of citing the evidence.

	Acceptable	Unacceptable	(Don't know)	(Refused)
Pro-Union	27%	43%	29%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity	18%	66%	14%	2%

Table A5. Checks on goods travelling between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (University of Liverpool, NIGES, 2019).

	Acceptable	Unacceptable	(Don't know)	(Refused)
Pro-Union	23%	47%	30%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity	34%	46%	18%	2%

Table A6. Which of these statements best matches your view on the Protocol? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	On balance, a good thing for NI	A mixed bag for NI	On balance, a bad thing for NI	I don't know enough to have a strong opinion	Other	Don't know
Pro-Union	9%	40%	39%	11%	0	0
Pro-Irish Unity	66%	22%	4%	8%	0	0

Table A7. Preferences between scrapping the Protocol or keeping power-sharing (Garry et al., 2023).

	Scrap protocol	Keep power-sharing	Neither	Don’t know
Pro-Union	22%	47%	10%	22%
Pro-Irish Unity	4%	76%	7%	12%

Question wording: ‘The Protocol should be scrapped even if it means the end of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive’, ‘The Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive should be maintained even if there are difficulties with the Protocol’, ‘Neither’ and ‘Don’t Know’.

Table A8. How fair or unfair do you think the income distribution is in Northern Ireland? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Very fair	Fair	Unfair	Very unfair	Can't choose
Pro-Union	2%	33%	35%	8%	22%
Pro-Irish Unity	1%	18%	45%	19%	17%

Table A9. Think people with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes. (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Much larger share	Larger	The same share	Smaller	Much smaller share	Can't choose
Pro-Union	12%	55%	28%	0	0	4%
Pro-Irish Unity	24%	54%	18%	0	0	3%

Table A10. Agree/disagree – the Northern Ireland Executive is doing all that it can to reduce poverty? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Can't choose
Pro-Union	1%	9%	27%	36%	21%	6%
Pro-Irish Unity	0	5%	19%	42%	28%	5%

Table A11. Social security benefits should enable an individual or family to have a normal standard of living (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	I don't know
Pro-Union	13%	41%	28%	13%	2%	2%
Pro-Irish Unity	29%	41%	15%	13%	1%	2%

Table A12. Social security benefits should enable an individual or family to live a life in dignity (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	I don't know
Pro-Union	20%	59%	15%	4%	1%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity	42%	48%	7%	2%	0	1%

Table A13. It was right to make same-sex marriage legal in Northern Ireland (ARK, NIGES, 2019).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Refused
Pro-Union	25%	25%	17%	21%	7%	3%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity	27%	30%	18%	16%	5%	3%	1%
Pro-Union Voter (18–30)	29%	26%	16%	17%	5%	6%	0
Pro-Union Non-Voter (18–30)	45%	30%	12%	4%	2%	7%	0
Pro-Union Voter (30+)	20%	23%	17%	27%	10%	2%	1%
Pro-Union Non-Voter (30+)	28%	29%	20%	14%	4%	4%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (18–30)	40%	30%	19%	8%	2%	2%	0
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (18–30)	27%	27%	31%	12%	0	4%	0
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (30+)	26%	30%	17%	18%	7%	2%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (30+)	16%	34%	23%	11%	4%	10%	1%
DUP Voter	18%	24%	15%	29%	11%	2%	1%
Sinn Fein Voter	22%	30%	18%	20%	9%	1%	1%

Table A14. Abortion should be legal in Northern Ireland (University of Liverpool, NIGES, 2017).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Refused
Pro-Union	13%	30%	16%	13%	17%	11%	0
Pro-Irish Unity	12%	26%	21%	16%	17%	7%	2%
Pro-Union Voter (18–30)	16%	48%	10%	10%	11%	6%	0
Pro-Union Non-Voter (18–30)	21%	33%	12%	7%	10%	18%	0
Pro-Union Voter (30+)	13%	28%	18%	16%	19%	6%	1%
Pro-Union Non-Voter (30+)	10%	26%	15%	11%	17%	21%	0
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (18–30)	6%	34%	29%	9%	14%	9%	0
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (18–30)	13%	41%	25%	6%	9%	6%	0
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (30+)	12%	25%	21%	19%	16%	6%	1%
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (30+)	13%	17%	15%	13%	30%	9%	4%
DUP Voter	10%	31%	15%	17%	20%	6%	0
Sinn Fein Voter	9%	22%	21%	19%	21%	7%	1%

Table A15. Which of these statements about flags on public buildings in Northern Ireland comes closest to your own view? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Union flag flown from all public buildings all the time	Union flag flown on designated days only	Union flag not flown at all from any public building	Don't know
Pro-Union	36%	52%	6%	6%
Pro-Irish Unity	2%	38%	56%	5%

Table A16. Which one of these statements comes closest to your own view about the Peace Lines in Northern Ireland being removed (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Left the way they are now	Come down now	Come down in the future	Keep Peace Lines, but opened up for some accessibility	Keep Peace Lines, but change to look more appealing	Don't know
Pro-Union	6%	19%	49%	5%	5%	16%
Pro-Irish Unity	4%	23%	53%	4%	2%	14%

Table A17. Prefer own religion or mixed-religion workplace? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Own religion only	Mixed religion workplace	Other	Don't know
Pro-Union	4%	89%	4%	3%
Pro-Irish Unity	3%	90%	3%	3%

Table A18. Prefer to send children to own religion or mixed-religion school? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Own religion only	Mixed religion school	Other	Don't know
Pro-Union	22%	71%	5%	2%
Pro-Irish Unity	26%	65%	7%	2%

Table A19. Agree/disagree – The culture and traditions of the Catholic community add to the richness and diversity of Northern Ireland society? (ARK, NILT, 2021).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Pro-Union	14%	47%	26%	7%	3%	2%
Pro-Irish Unity	49%	37%	10%	2%	1%	1%

Table A20. Would you yourself mind or not mind if one of your close relatives were to marry someone of a different religion? (University of Liverpool, NIGES, 2019).

	Would mind a lot	Would mind a little	Would not mind
Pro-Union	10%	19%	72%
Pro-Irish Unity	8%	28%	64%
Pro-Union Voter (18–30)	15%	14%	71%
Pro-Union Non-Voter (18–30)	4%	2%	94%
Pro-Union Voter (30+)	11%	25%	64%
Pro-Union Non-Voter (30+)	5%	11%	84%
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (18–30)	5%	29%	66%
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (18–30)	8%	21%	71%
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (30+)	10%	29%	61%
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (30+)	5%	20%	75%
DUP Voter	15%	25%	60%
Sinn Fein Voter	10%	33%	58%

Table A21. What type of school would you prefer to send you child to? (University of Liverpool, NIGES, 2019).

	Own religion only	Mixed-religion school
Pro-Union	38%	62%
Pro-Irish Unity	57%	43%
Pro-Union Voter (18–30)	46%	54%
Pro-Union Non-Voter (18–30)	18%	82%
Pro-Union Voter (30+)	45%	55%
Pro-Union Non-Voter (30+)	25%	75%
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (18–30)	59%	41%
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (18–30)	44%	56%
Pro-Irish Unity Voter (30+)	59%	41%
Pro-Irish Unity Non-Voter (30+)	43%	57%
DUP Voter	56%	44%
Sinn Fein Voter	69%	31%

Table A22. There should be an Irish Language Act (University of Liverpool, NIGES, 2019).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Refused
Pro-Union	3%	11%	17%	21%	35%	11%	2%
Pro-Irish Unity	46%	32%	12%	3%	1%	4%	1%