“Think of a future Auckland”: Public Influencing in Unsolicited Development Proposals

ABSTRACT

Building on recent interest in unsolicited urbanism – private sector-led urban development proposals that bypass state-led strategic planning – this paper broadens the focus of existing literature from “back room” deal-making to influence campaigns that occur “in plain sight”. Prompted by highly visible unsolicited plans for waterfront redevelopment in Auckland, New Zealand, the paper discusses how public promotion of speculative proposals can be central to unsolicited urbanism. Even when they fail to materialise, the public visibility of such proposals has the potential to normalise property-led development at the expense of alternative visions, and imbue private developers with moral authority as civic visionaries.

摘要

基于最近对主动城市化的兴趣，绕过国家主导的战略规划的私营部门主导的城市发展提案，本文将现有文献的重点从“幕后”交易扩大到影响“公开”活动。在新西兰奥克兰非常引人注目的自发性滨水区重建计划的推动下，本文讨论了公众对投机性提案的宣传如何成为主动城市化的核心。即使它们未能实现，这些提案的公众知名度也有可能以牺牲替代愿景为代价，使房地产主导的发展正常化，并赋予私人开发商作为公民远见者的道德权威。

KEYWORDS:

• Unsolicited urbanism
• unsolicited proposals
• deal-making
• urban planning
• urban entrepreneurialism

1. Introduction

In May 2018, an ambitious redevelopment plan for central Auckland’s eastern waterfront was released by New Zealand architecture firm Archimedia, receiving prominent coverage in local and national media. Gone were the present-day industrial docklands that comprise much of the central city’s waterfront. Instead, the firm’s design images depicted green spaces and large lagoons, with a new stadium as its centrepiece (Wilson 2018a). The proposed stadium would sit beside 4000 new apartments, corporate offices, hospitality venues, cruise-ship berths and a Māori cultural centre. Areas of parkland, four inner-city beaches and an eight-kilometre boardwalk would provide public access to the waterfront site. Disconnected from any government plans or calls to reimagine Auckland’s waterfront, Archimedia’s plan assumedly came as a surprise to most elected officials and planners, let alone the public. Media coverage hailed it as a visionary and creative project that promised waterfront revitalisation, replacing industrial sites currently inaccessible to the public with sites of spectacle, leisure, consumption, commerce and residence (Swannix 2018, Wilson 2018a). Supporters touted the long-term, multi-generational returns the plan would realise (Wilson 2018a).

Several months later, in October 2018, another plan for a central city stadium was produced by a group of businesses called the Auckland Waterfront Consortium (AWC), once again to widespread media coverage. Their stadium would sit at the end of the centrally-located Bledisloe Wharf, beside 2500 new apartments, offices spaces for 6000 employees, and a cruise-ship terminal (Orsman 2018a). Innovatively designed, the stadium would be lowered 28-metres into the seabed, reducing the loss of harbour views. Design images depict people enjoying their evenings on terraced steps that wrap around the stadium and lead down to the water. The stadium and wider development, its supporters claimed, would instil pride in Aucklanders (Orsman 2018a). Dubbed “the Crater” and described as a “jaw-dropping” and “spectacular landmark”, the stadium’s design referenced the volcanic forms emblematic of Auckland’s topographic landscape (Swannix 2018, Orsman 2018a). Supporters argued the stadium to be a worthy icon for Auckland, consistent with iconic developments on the waterfronts of cities around the world (Goldie 2018, Wilson 2018b).

These proposals were focused on shifting waterfront redevelopment away from the western part of the waterfront, which had become a successful site of upmarket consumption (Murphy 2003, 2008), towards the eastern part of waterfront, dominated by a working port and large car parking facility. Proponents of the two plans urged ambition and action from Auckland Council, demanding the local state be spurred into action and follow the lead offered by these private sector visions of redevelopment. Such plans are what scholars have recently called “unsolicited urbanism” (Rogers and Gibson 2021, Gibson et al. 2023). But, unlike the shroud of state-enabled secrecy that surrounds what practitioners have come to call the “Australian model” of Unsolicited Proposals – public-private deal-making enabled by legislation, yet largely shielded from outside scrutiny – these recent plans for redeveloping Auckland’s waterfront signal a variant of unsolicited urbanism not yet well understood in urban studies literature. Without legislative provisions that give private sector interests a direct and discreet in-road into public decision-making, unencumbered by the democratic constraints of the public domain, Auckland’s unsolicited redevelopment plans are decidedly un-secret, hyper-public interventions. Without invitation or official impetus from the local or national state, such proposals have been purely speculative so far, aimed at stirring public and political imaginations.

Through analysis of the Auckland experience, this paper builds on recent calls for further research on unsolicited urbanism (Rogers and Gibson 2021, Gibson et al. 2023). We aim to expand the current remit of studies of unsolicited urbanism from “back room” deal-making between public and private sectors to also include projects of state- and citizen-influencing that occur “in plain sight”. Prompted by the audacious visibility of unsolicited plans for waterfront redevelopment in Auckland, we discuss how public influencing – efforts to actively shape imaginations through speculative plans circulated in the public domain – can be central to instances of unsolicited urbanism. While the waterfront plans we analyse are, at the time of writing, unrealised, we believe they are worthy objects of analysis as high-profile attempts to reshape urban mentalities and materialities. With the benefit of hindsight, these failed attempts may yet have significant effects (Baker and McCann 2020). Yet, even if such plans and proposals fail to materialise, their public visibility has the potential to normalise property-led development at the expense of alternative visions, imbue private developers with moral authority as civic visionaries, and be used as a complement to covert deal-making between private and public sectors.

2. Unsolicited Urbanism: From “Behind Closed Doors” to “In Plain Sight”

Large scale infrastructure and urban development projects involve a constellation of private and public interests (developers, finance agents, landowners, and local government actors including planners and councillors). From the 1980s, in the context of increased urban competition, property-led urban regeneration became a hallmark of urban entrepreneurial practices (Harvey 1989, Peck 2014). Under neoliberal urban governance structures, public-private partnerships (PPPs) became normalised especially with respect to largescale waterfront regeneration programmes (Cook and Ward 2012, Doucet 2013, Boland et al. 2017). These partnerships engaged in the “speculative construction of place” (Harvey 1989) and were usually led by quasi-public planning agencies (Dovey 2005). The PPP structures reflected an explicit property-led urban regeneration logic and modelled a form of state/private developer interaction that normalised the calculative practices of property development within the public sector. While accounts of urban entrepreneurialism usually view the state as reactive (see McGuirk et al. 2021 for a summary of this tendency), within these arrangements the city or local government was usually positioned as the initiator of the redevelopment masterplan and, as such, public interests guided the resultant real estate processes. The legitimacy of PPPs was predicated on public sector oversight and competitive bidding for private sector contracts. These arrangements conformed to the doctrinal ideals of New Public Management and “neoliberal urbanism” (Peck 2017a, 2017b), representing a form of “solicited urbanism” in which the state developed plans, goals and rules, but frequently and formally engaged with private actors to realise those things. In contrast to early entrepreneurial urban governance praxis (McGuirk et al. 2021), where planning agencies initiate and oversee competitive bidding processes from private sector interests, “unsolicited urbanism” marks a new means of urban development (Rogers and Gibson 2021; Gibson et al. 2023). Rather than a departure from neoliberal urbanism as such, unsolicited urbanism is illustrative of the anti-competitive tendencies exhibited, in practice, by neoliberal urbanism. Unsolicited urbanism signifies a distinction between the competitive ideals of neoliberal urbanism and the actually-existing tendency of markets and profit-making actors to suppress and evade competition.

Unsolicited urbanism is defined as a “city-reshaping” process “whereby powerful market actors, with access to investment capital, secure favourable monopolistic deals in the city, by premeditating plans and predetermining outcomes” (Rogers and Gibson 2021, p. 528). The key features of unsolicited urbanism are: (1) “reconfiguring democracy through development”, (2) “planning as deal making” and (3) “reconceptualising the site” (Rogers and Gibson 2021, p. 532). Within the Australian context, unsolicited urbanism is constructed as the outcome of a set of historical planning practices that have formalised a process whereby private real estate interests initiate development plans rather than waiting for requests from the state. Drawing on details of the redevelopment of Melbourne and Sydney’s waterfronts, Rogers and Gibson (2021) chart the manner in which private interests fundamentally planned and produced large-scale waterfront redevelopments. The features of these developments included spectacle (a casino) and private residential development. The purpose of these redevelopments was to maximise the economic value of strategic urban sites. Significantly, the operation of dealmaking processes under unsolicited urbanism privileges a set of key private sector actors: developers and consultants. These agents are deemed to possess the required expertise and commercial skills to unlock the full economic potential of a redevelopment. Importantly, these agents enter into dealmaking practices via secretive, confidential and commercially sensitive processes (Rogers and Gibson 2021, Gibson et al. 2023). In effect, the commercial histories and scale of these actors are considered sufficient to suspend traditional planning practices and avoid public scrutiny. Reflecting on the outcomes of various examples of hybrid urban planning models that privilege private corporate interests (see Young and Markham 2017, McManus and Haughton 2021), Gibson et al. (2023) view these practices as having few public benefits.

Analysis of unsolicited urbanism has attended to covert forms of unsolicited urbanism whereby private interests are thought to capture the deal making process and, without substantial public oversight or opportunities for intervention, public benefits tend to be minimised. However, under conditions where deal making is normalised, as a form of “dull compulsion” (Peck 2014), and the expertise of the private sector interests are celebrated, we argue that unsolicited urbanism takes variegated and sometimes overt forms, including pre-emptive and publicised private-led plan making. In contrast to covert unsolicited urbanism, designed to monopolise financial benefits for specific actors, an overt form of unsolicited urbanism might involve publicly visible attempts to pressure the state to adopt plans that prioritise a set of privileged real estate interests and expertise. In this paper, we examine how overt unsolicited urbanism has been practiced in Auckland, involving real estate interests actively and publicly promulgating large scale urban development plans designed to remake the city. Not without its many specificities, we use Auckland as a tentatively indicative case: one whose discrepancy with existing studies of unsolicited urbanism prompts us to expand the concept from its concern with covert action to also include public influencing, whether as an alternative to back-room dealing or as a complement to it.

3. Unsolicited Waterfront Redevelopment Proposals in Auckland

Through a review of the plans and media coverage related to the unsolicited waterfront redevelopment proposals of Archimedia and the Auckland Waterfront Consortium (AWC), we highlight three dimensions of the public influencing “work” done by the proposals, their proponents and supporters. First, redevelopment plans, particularly their centre-piece stadia, were framed as offering redemption from a range of imagined problems facing central Auckland. Second, redevelopment plans were lauded for their potential to create an iconic space that would generate local pride and world-class status. Third, the redevelopment plans and their private sector proponents were framed as visionary, breaking with perceived state inaction to be positioned as examples of civically beneficent forethought. These discursive manoeuvres were central to the way such unsolicited proposals sought authority and legitimacy in the public domain.

3.1. Redemptive Redevelopment

Both unsolicited redevelopment plans were publicly framed – in redemptive and even “silver bullet” terms – as having the ability to solve a host of problems understood to beset Auckland’s current and future prosperity and liveability. The prospect of a new downtown stadium was touted as the solution to the withering state of live entertainment in Auckland. While critics questioned the demand for a new stadium, given the city’s professional sport teams rarely attract over 15,000 spectators (Rudman 2016, Donnell 2018), proponents argued that if designed well, a new stadium would reinvigorate public interest in live sport (New Zealand Herald 2016a, Wilson 2018b). Alastair Richardson, Director of Cox Architecture Australia, referred to Adelaide Oval which had “dramatically increased average crowd attendances since opening and replacing AMI Park”. Likewise, supporters of a new stadium argued the current premiere stadium, Eden Park, needed to be replaced. Wedged between the inner-city residential suburbs of Mt Eden and Kingsland, Eden Park is routinely criticised for the lack of transport options available to fans. The stadium is also legally limited in the late-night events it can host, described by Grieve (2020, n.p.) as the “ultimate triumph of nimbyism”. Furthermore, dire financial futures have been forecasted for Eden Park by international consultancy PricewaterhouseCoopers (Murphy 2021, Orsman 2021). It was repeatedly argued that the limitations of Eden Park are placing limitations on the city, and that a new downtown stadium would instead grant Auckland unrestricted potential to host larger and more regular events. For sports commentator Chris Rattue (2016), a new stadium could launch the city’s rugby and rugby league teams into a “new era”. Should Auckland bid for the Rugby World Cup or Commonwealth Games again, as is anticipated within the next two decades, local politicians claimed that a new stadium is necessary for successful campaigns (Auckland Council 2018).

The unsolicited plans were also framed as a solution to perceived under- or mis-utilisation of prime waterfront land currently occupied by Ports of Auckland, an Auckland Council-owned company. The Auckland waterfront has become a contentious political issue in New Zealand, as anticipated port relocation carries significant implications for Auckland’s central city, its wider regional economy, and that of the potential new location (Wilson 2021). Journalist John-Michael Swannix (2018, n.p.) wrote “Auckland’s waterfront should be the jewel in its crown, but its dominant features are more prosaic than they are picturesque”. Likewise, Auckland Mayor Phil Goff claimed that the “waterfront is a gem for all of us Aucklanders, and we need to reconnect it” (Swannix 2018, n.p.). Both Archimedia and AWC seek to redevelop industrial waterfront sites into places of spectacle, consumption, commerce, residence and recreation, and present their speculative stadium plans as catalysts. Journalist Simon Wilson (2018b, n.p.) wrote “great waterfront buildings can define everything around them – wouldn’t a stadium be a good thing for Auckland?” Associate Professor of Urban Design at Unitec, Dr Dushko Bogunovich suggests a waterfront stadium could become the final piece amongst an impressive ensemble, in the Harbour Bridge, Viaduct Harbour, Silo Park, Tamaki Drive and Kelly Tarlton’s Aquarium (New Zealand Herald 2016b). Rob Hutchinson of Ngāti Whātua (the Indigenous group with tribal authority over central Auckland) was also optimistic, suggesting a downtown stadium could become an eastern gateway to the city (New Zealand Herald 2016c). To emphasise the potential ability of their stadiums to catalyse development, design images used in the Archimedia and AWC proposals depict other regenerated surroundings. This includes the completion of other projects in progress throughout the city, such as the Quay Street revamp and Tank Farm Park (Swannix 2018), and the construction of several skyscrapers (Gibson 2018). The design images therefore proposition Auckland as a project waiting to be completed, implying the stadium and associated developments to be the final addition, a lynch-pin project for Auckland’s much valued (symbolically, culturally and monetarily) waterfront space.

3.2. Iconic Redevelopment

The unsolicited plans were presented as delivering an iconic centrepiece for Auckland, enabling a sense of local pride but also promising wider attention, befitting “world-class” status. From journalists and columnists (Donnell 2018, Goldie 2018, McKay 2018, Wilson 2018b), to politicians and members of the general public (Greater Auckland 2018, Swannix 2018, Wilson 2018a), commentators argued that to improve the inner-city waterfront would be to improve Auckland itself. AWC Member Richard Goldie (2018) and journalist Simon Wilson (2018b) both alluded to cities abroad that boast grand waterfront sites, including Sydney, Abu Dhabi, Bilbao, London and San Francisco. Former National Party Infrastructure Spokesperson, Judith Collins, suggested that if designed innovatively as the Sydney Opera House was, a new waterfront stadium may become a tourist attraction in its own right (Swannix 2018). Richard Goldie (2018) and former Waterfront Auckland Chairman Bob Harvey (New Zealand Herald 2016c), both argued that a bold waterfront building would align Auckland with other cities in the Asia-Pacific. Goldie (2018, n.p.) writes:

important buildings in Oceania traditionally occupy [the waterfront]. This would position Auckland as the quintessential oceanic city among our Asia Pacific neighbours and globally. Imagine rounding North Head on a cruise liner and seeing this beautiful glowing form. That’s an Instagram image, a memory to take home, our ‘Sydney Opera House moment’. So think of a future Auckland – Wynyard Quarter to the west, Bledisloe Quarter to the east, and a continuous active engaging waterfront link all the way between, crowned by a stunning waterfront building – magnificent!

Likewise, AWC Deputy Chair Michael Sage asked if Aucklanders want their waterfront to be an ugly industrial site or “absolutely world class and something to be proud of” (Orsman 2018a, n.p.). Through public influencing efforts, stadium development proponents implied world-class venues are prerequisites for world-class cities. Former Auckland Warriors (rugby league team) franchise Director Jim Doyle (2020) warned Auckland will fall behind the likes of Sydney, Dunedin, Perth and soon Christchurch, should a new stadium not be developed. The aspiration that, through a new downtown stadium, Auckland may attain global status was demonstrated by supporters who emphasised the competitive edge a new stadium would give the city (Goldie 2018, Orsman 2018a, Wilson 2018b).

Some critics argued that stadiums have negative impacts on public spaces as they are exclusionary inward-facing structures that sit idle beside on gameday (Eastmond-Meine 2016, New Zealand Herald 2016b, Greater Auckland 2018, Lawrence 2018, Swannix 2018). They warned of the lifeless nature of stadia, and that development would define the waterfront for decades to come. Columnist Mark Thomas (2018) questioned the need for a new stadium, alluding to the success of stadium refurbishments abroad. Drawing on the liveable cities index, Thomas (2018) explained that new stadium builds are typical of cities vying to improve their reputations. Cities towards the top of the index, most recently topped by Auckland itself (The Economist 2021), tend to save money by refurbishing existing stadiums. Furthermore, a KPMG study found that of 100 European stadium developments over the past two decades, the vast majority were built between six and thirteen-kilometres beyond the city CBD, and only eight within it (Thomas 2018). Stadiums considered successful were typically developed on empty sites, linked to transit routes, but unburdened by residential surroundings. Thomas (2018) therefore suggests a refurbishment of Mt Smart Stadium, eleven-kilometres away from the CBD, would be most appropriate for Auckland. The question of what constitutes “world-class” status for a city was, thus, open to debate and interpretation.

Supporters for the stadium-centric redevelopment plans persistently drew on cases of urban spectacle in Australia, working to emphasise its absence in Auckland. In a New Zealand Herald (2016a) article titled “What kind of stadium does Auckland need?”, sports commentators Wynne Gray, Chris Rattue and Patrick McKendry all referred to Suncorp Stadium in Brisbane as the model to replicate. In their own column Rattue (2016, n.p.) wrote: “close your eyes and think of the amazing Suncorp Stadium in Brisbane and the fantastic sport atmosphere that comes booming out of that place … now open the eyes and make it happen in our city”. While Suncorp Stadium can seat 52,000 spectators and lies nearby the Brisbane CBD (Rattue 2016), the new 30,000-seat Bankwest Stadium in Western Sydney is also upheld as an ideal model (Doyle 2020). Former Auckland Warriors rugby league franchise Director Jim Doyle (2020) praised the New South Wales stadium management strategy which focuses on developing smaller yet intimate and atmospheric stadiums. Alastair Richardson, Director of Cox Architecture Australia, also suggested Auckland adopt a two-stadium strategy in establishing both a dedicated cricket ground and a rugby and football-specific stadium, as Australian cities. Ironically, the use of apparently successful and iconic Australian stadiums to amplify a conspicuous absence of one in Auckland jars with recent public concern in Sydney, for example, over the lack of public benefit associated with the state government’s plans to redevelop several stadia (Winestock 2018). Sweeping these complications to one side, public influencing strategies in Auckland have used partial representations of “successful” stadia elsewhere to enable political and public consideration of property-led urban regeneration on the waterfront.

3.3. Visionary Redevelopment

Through public influencing work, the prospective developers behind unsolicited proposals in Auckland were hailed as visionaries for the city. Upon launching their proposal, Archimedia Principal Lindsay Mackie said: “we thought we could do something that was really visionary […] really wonderful in terms of experience, but also really feasible too, so that there was an economic base to what we were doing” (Swannix 2018, n.p.). Infrastructure Minister Shane Jones was enthusiastic about the ambition displayed by the private sector, when discussing the Archimedia plan, saying “it is incredible to see such a visionary creative project coming out of Auckland” (Wilson 2018a, n.p.). Some critics have warned that the legacy of waterfront redevelopment will last for decades to come, urging further deliberation over the matter (Greater Auckland 2018). However, journalist Hayden Donnell (2018) asks why the city should wait for a utopian redevelopment plan. Some supporters for stadium development have admitted that the speculative plans may not be perfect, but reiterate that they are more substantial than any other waterfront redevelopment plans that have come before. The highly publicised nature of the unsolicited stadium plans allowed for obvious contrasts to be drawn between the waterfront in its current state, and what the proposals envisioned. In producing dramatic and spectacle-filled changes for the inner-city, the private sector actors position themselves as visionaries for the city. Central to these public influencing efforts is the engagement of visual materials such as design images, which are intended to persuade and seduce viewers based on their desires. Through such strategies, the private sector is able to grant themselves authority, legitimising their role in planning the city's future. From the position of legitimacy that prospective stadium developers seek to assume, they are able to normalise and standardise project-based and property-led redevelopment efforts, at the intended expense of alternative urban regeneration approaches.

As private entities were positioned as visionaries in the public domain, pressure was placed on local government to follow their lead. In presenting their proposal to Auckland Council, AWC attempted to leverage public funding for a $15 million feasibility study, to be repaid should their plans be approved (Niall 2019). AWC Chairman David Wigmore explains that “without a council mandate to get on with feasibility, our ability to raise money is quite difficult”, and that “until we have got that political issue resolved with a degree of certainty, there is no point in having a further conversation” (Niall 2019, n.p.). Wigmore further noted that a foreign private equity firm registered interest in their speculative plans, but that opportunities for private funding were not possible without local government collaboration (Niall 2019). Meanwhile, international event promoters Live Nation were claimed to have indicated interest in developing a downtown stadium in Auckland, costing between $1.1 and $1.5 billion (Orsman 2018b). The company records $7.7 billion in annual revenue and has a stake in 167 venues worldwide (Orsman 2018b), with ventures already present in New Zealand (Doyle 2020). Director of Live Nation New Zealand, Stuart Clumpass, claimed the company is willing to invest if a plan is affirmed by local government. Former director of the Auckland Warriors franchise, Jim Doyle (2020, n.p.) claimed that “stadium developments and operations across the world have taken a leap into the modern world of global capital and special purpose funding”. They further argue that through public-private partnerships, development risk and cost is significantly reduced for government. Michael Sage of AWC claimed “if we delay this, the window of opportunity that’s currently open to solve Auckland’s waterfront stadium issue in an optimal zero cost way will shut” (Truebridge 2018, n.p.). Sage then warned that if the offer of private funding for stadium development is left unenacted upon by Auckland Council, “history will not judge us kindly” (Truebridge 2018, n.p.). In public discourse, local government is positioned as reluctant and recalcitrant, in the face of private proposals that framed as beneficent acts of civic visioning.

The highly-publicised nature of unsolicited redevelopment plans in Auckland allowed bidders to place pressure on local government in the public arena. In their article titled “The best stadium proposal yet deserves the best political leadership yet”, journalist Simon Wilson (2018c) expresses their frustration at the lack of Council response to AWC’s “ambitious” plans. Earlier that year, writing about Archimedia’s proposal, Wilson (2018a) urged Auckland Council to be bold, follow the bidder’s lead and to facilitate debate. They wrote that it is “time for Council to embrace the long-term and not be lost in short-term problems” (Wilson 2018a, n.p.). Other supports for the downtown stadium prospect urged action from Auckland Council. Sports commentator Chris Rattue (2016, n.p.) claims it is “time for leaders to lead”, while former Auckland Warriors franchise owner Eric Watson (2016) urges Aucklanders to elect a mayor and councillors with "visionary thinking". Alan McMahon of international property firm Colliers, a collaborator with Archimedia, claims that their waterfront redevelopment plan could provide Council with $500 million in revenue, and up to $40 million in rates annually. As another incentive for local politicians, Wilson (2018c) suggested a waterfront stadium could be the “big idea” to define Mayor Goff’s legacy. Crucially, the two unsolicited proposals from Archimedia and AWC were both launched a year prior to local elections. The highly publicised nature of unsolicited stadium proposals in Auckland gains speculative development plans widespread attention and interest, enabling private parties to mount pressure on local politicians. The 2019 mayoral candidates Phil Goff and John Tamihere both expressed enthusiasm for a new stadium, alongside other councillors (Orsman 2018a, Niall 2019). By offering speculative development plans to both politicians and the general public, prospective developers have used public influencing to grant informal and speculative plans a notable degree of recognition. The Auckland stadium proposal case study demonstrates the ways that unsolicited urbanism is enacted in a manner whereby public opinions, desires and visions are influenced in order to promote particular city futures.

4. Conclusion

After a period of abeyance, the Auckland Waterfront Consortium (AWC) recently announced its plan to re-launch a modified version its proposal for a multi-use redevelopment centring on a waterfront stadium dubbed “the Crater” (Jansen 2023). The consortium appears to have resuscitated its earlier campaign after a rival redevelopment plan for Eden Park, an existing inner-urban stadium, was announced days earlier. While none of the unsolicited proposals discussed in this paper have, so far, come to pass, the resumption of AWC’s dormant campaign of public influencing draws attention to the potential – or at least the ambition – of such efforts to secure their support through the public domain. This is shaping up to be a long game, the effects of which are impossible to predict. Yet, the apparent intent and discursive manoeuvres behind the public promotion of unsolicited waterfront redevelopment plans in Auckland are readily discernible. Public influencing has been mobilised by key real estate interests in a strategic fashion to garner, at minimum, the passive consent of members of the public as well as seeding the ground for support from public agencies and elected representatives at local and national level. As proposals that exist outside of existing strategic visions for the city, involving large amounts of public investment and opportunity costs, and competition from existing stadium operators, these campaigns attempt to capture the “hearts and minds” of Aucklanders and decision-makers through interventions in the public domain. The discursive substance of these interventions is to cast the central city as in need of redemption, requiring an iconic redevelopment to rejuvenate local pride and secure world-class status, and position private sector financiers and developers as beneficent visionaries with the requisite plan to realise these dreams.

This paper adds to existing analyses of covert deal-making between private and public sectors in urban development, making a case for the existence of a variant of unsolicited urbanism that mobilises power not from back-room dealing – whether sanctioned or not – but from public visibility. Such efforts, in and of themselves, are not entirely new to urban public discourse or urban studies scholarship. In any given city, there is typically no shortage of opportunities for wealthy real estate interests to promote their views. In academic literature too, there are striking similarities, for example, with the use of media for “elite storytelling”, as Nethercote (2022) examines in their account of the construction of “expert consensus” on housing policy. What is notable about the Auckland experience, and is potentially suggestive for further research elsewhere, is the lack of artifice to the public promotion of unsolicited plans. This is not a case where the interests of developers are carefully packaged to register, dispassionately, as expert consensus. Nor is it a case of non-transparent, collusive behaviour between private and public sectors. In the context of Auckland’s waterfront, property developers and other members of the local growth coalition are strategically stepping into the public spotlight in an attempt to create the social and political conditions conducive to unsolicited private sector city-making. The literal, direct implementation of unsolicited proposals is a test of success, but to focus only on that may miss other important, if indirect, achievements that result from them: occluding the financial (self-)interest of private sector, promoting their preferred visions for urban change, and elevating private sector leaders to the status of civic visionaries. These shifts, rather than a new waterfront stadium, might be their legacy.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).