Why Agamben Cannot Save Us: A Political Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s “Coming Politics”

Abstract

Giorgio Agamben's critical stance on biopolitics and sovereignty is primarily concerned with the problem of the “state of exception” as the paradigm of contemporary Western politics. According to Agamben, human life has been reduced to a “bare life” by a state of exception founded on the relation between the law and sovereignty. In response, Agamben's redemptive politics is a counterargument to the contemporary nihilistic-exceptional politics and capitalism of spectacle. This “coming politics” is founded on some basic ideas such as “playing with the law,” “profanation,” “gesture,” “free use” and finally “form-of-life.” This essay will first explain the role of these ideas in Agamben's coming politics, then, it will demonstrate that all these ideas (or political strategies) are based on a deep belief in the power of thought. Therefore, it seems fair to assert that Agamben's coming politics is a kind of theoretical or philosophical politics and its hero or subject could be called “philosophers.” It will be argued that from a political standpoint, this philosophical politics not only cannot be redemptive but might also result in a form of political passivity and the maintenance of the current political order.

Key Words:

• Giorgio Agamben
• Form-of-Life
• Play
• Profanation
• Redemptive Politics

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Professor Stephen Healy and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments that helped me to enhance the accuracy and clarity of my essay.

Notes

1 Ernesto Laclau (2007) considers Agamben’s reading of modern politics reductionist and incorrect. Laclau believes that Agamben reduces modern politics to exceptional phenomena such as totalitarianism, thus blocking all its liberating possibilities. From Laclau’s point of view, this way of thinking cannot lead to any liberatory politics, and its only result is “political nihilism”: “The myth of a fully reconciled society is what governs the (non-)political discourse of Agamben. And it is also what allows him to dismiss all political options in our societies and to unify them in the concentration camp as their secret destiny. Instead of deconstructing the logic of political institutions, showing areas in which forms of struggle and resistance are possible, he closes them beforehand through an essentialist unification. Political nihilism is his ultimate message” (22). Laclau’s critique focuses on Agamben’s reading of modern politics and his ideas in Homo Sacer, but this essay shows why Agamben’s positive thought leads to this passivity.

2 This is the same mechanism that Debord (1994, 20) proposed for the society of the spectacle, that is, the mechanism in which “everything is exhibited in separation from itself.” And “Separation is the alpha and omega of the spectacle.” See also Agamben (2007b, 82)

3 Matthew Sharpe (2009) believes that Agamben’s political thought is heavily influenced by Kabbalah mysticism. According to Sharpe, this mysticism leads to a kind of “utopian messianism.” He also emphasizes that mixing politics and ontology leads to a misunderstanding of politics and narrows the field of political action. Sharpe, however, does not deal with other aspects of Agamben’s idea of a coming politics, and his emphasis is more on the theological aspect of his thoughts. Although, without a doubt, the theological aspect of Agamben’s thought is very important and decisive, for understanding and ultimately criticizing his thought on a coming politics, concepts such as playing with the law, form-of-life, and gesture are significant. Moreover, the key question is why such a political perspective—whether theological or ontological—could not be redemptive? For the role of theology in Agamben’s thought, see Dickinson (2011).

4 This is a life of which Agamben (2017, 887ff.) finds an “example” in monasticism, where he tries “to construct a form-of-life, that is to say, a life that is linked so closely to its form that it proves to be inseparable from it.” See also DeCaroli (2016)

5 According to Stefano Franchi, the main problem of Agamben’s political thought is human desoeuvré or argos (worklessness). Agamben, according to Franchi (2004, 38), believes that Aristotle defined politics based on action and praxis, whereas human nature is being-potential. But if politics is possible because of human praxis, then “Agamben’s political thought, paradoxically, is a thought of the impossibility of politics.” Franchi considers this a kind of “passive politics,” but he believes that, in the term “passive politics,” the emphasis should be on passive not politics (passive politics). This means to consider passivity not as a kind of reaction but as the essence of every action. According to Franchi, from this perspective a passive politics must not be reactive but active. In Agamben’s own language, potentiality is prior to actuality, and his coming politics is a politics of pure potentiality. But what can potential mean without actuality? If the possibility is not transferred to action and realization, basically no change will happen. The issue here is not whether potentiality precedes actuality; clearly, every actuality is realized because it was possible (potential). The point is that any effect and change is ultimately the result of action, and in pure potentiality is nothing but stillness.

6 Gavin Rae (2018) shows that, although Agamben considers biopolitics as based on a kind of “metaphysics of will” that he tries to overcome, this does not mean the negation of all will and therefore political passivity. He makes a distinction between “will-as-instrument” and “will-as-impetus” and believes that Agamben’s coming politics is ultimately based on the latter and on the realization of individual will: a will necessary to transform a life into a form-of-life. Rae believes that with form-of-life we must consider “thought” in the sense of poiesis, which is beyond the politics of praxis. Although I agree with Rae that Agamben’s coming politics is based on individual will, the main point here is to ask whether this individual politics can be salvific and lead to a fundamental change in the political situation.

7 In “Gorgias,” Plato (1997) depicted a discussion between Socrates and Callicles about how practical (political) life and philosophical life relate to one another. Callicles criticizes Socrates and his philosophical outlook in a severe and serious manner. These criticisms center on Socrates’s idealism and the unfavorable effects of his political ideas in real life. Callicles contends that Socrates’s ideas are not only inapplicable in real-world situations but also make a person unable to act and participate in political life within the polis. Therefore, he advises Socrates to take the path of practical politics instead of wasting his abilities, a path that leads to real changes in the lives of citizens.

8 Stephen Healy (2016) has shown the importance of the “common” in Agamben’s form-of-life and in his interpretation of Franciscan monism. There are, however, two important points here. First is to mention that, while certainly there were numbers of common activities among Franciscan monks, making up a kind of brotherhood, the final goal of any mysticism is the salvation of the individual soul. Second, and more important, is to ask what would be the result of transferring this “community” into contemporary politics except as a kind of individual politics or what Healy calls “individual salvation”?

9 In this sense, Agamben’s political thought is very similar to Max Stirner’s. As Newman (2016) has explained, both thinkers’ key ideas are very close: ideas that explore individuality, the lack of any political alternative, the emphasis on subjectivity without identity, profanation, and what Newman finally calls “ontological anarchism.”

10 Maybe this is why Negri (2003, 192) believes such thinking finally leads to a kind of “mysticism.”

11 The same point is mentioned by Matthew Sharpe (2009) who, following Arendt, believes that to combine politics with ontology leads to a misunderstanding of political facts and to political passivity.

12 In his sharp criticism of Agamben and Jean-Luc Nancy, Brian Elliott believes that these two philosophers’ ideas about community and resistance do not lead to any effective political action. According to Elliott (2011), these thinkers’ radical passivity is influenced by Heidegger’s fatalism, which eliminates individual agency. Elliot believes that Agamben and Nancy, under the influence of Heidegger, have eventually reached a kind of mysticism that not only does not lead to political change but also obscures political realities. However, although Agamben has undoubtedly been influenced by Heidegger, he has always emphasized that there is no “work” (ergon) or destiny for the human being. Agamben explicitly rejects fatalism. In my opinion, although Agamben’s political passivity has a mystical aspect, it is not fatalistic. This passivity is more a kind of stoicism that relies on the power of individual thought. However, another important point here is the role of political “logic” in Agamben’s thought. As Elliott writes, “Everything indicates that Agamben grasps the idea of the camp as a destiny in the Heideggerian sense of an epochal sending (Geschick) of a historical community” (264). Based on Agamben’s ideas regarding biopolitics and the state of exception, Elliott is right that the camp and its exceptional structure seems like a destiny for Western politics. However, in my opinion, this is more rooted in Agamben’s methodology rather than Heidegger’s thought. Unlike Foucault, who spoke about “analyses of power” and was against any “theory” and “universalism,” Agamben has always tried to create a kind of political “theory.”

13 Similar and even more demonstrative examples can be seen in other Middle Eastern countries, such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, etc., where the main problem is still the creation of a more democratic constitution, the creation of civil institutions, and the minimal increase of individual freedoms. In a situation where many people are still suffering from hunger, how can this “as if not” and an individual politics lead to a fundamental change except for everyone crawling into the corner of their own solitude and trying to regain a potential freedom from within? In countries that can be described as politically still prelaw (in the sense that, using Kantian concepts, human “autonomy” is not approved and the law is not based on the “general will” and “human reason” but on the opinion and ideology of the sovereigns), how can one play with the law? How can people whose basic freedoms have not yet been confirmed in the law talk about crossing the public and private spheres? Imagine that, in a country where hijab wearing is compulsory, instead of fighting to overcome this oppression, women behave “as if the hijab is not compulsory.” And will there ever be a change in their situation? In fact, this strategy stabilizes the existing situation. For people who are under the rule of authoritarian and totalitarian governments, “poverty” already exists and covers all areas of life. The world is already “inappropriable” for them, and this is exactly what government wants. The situation is similar regarding the issue of playing with the law. The countries that still lack democratic law clearly illustrate the problematic link between sovereignty, the law, and playing with the law. In these countries, the sovereign is who plays with the law, using it as a tool to justify violent behavior. Bureaucracy in these countries is a way for the sovereign to play with the law and thus with citizens’ rights. The sovereign justifies violence by obscuring legal concepts and by a game of interpretating the law through lenses such as national security. Given the fact that law in such countries is not based on the general will, sovereigns misinterpret the law according to their own goals. People not only cannot play with the law but also are confused in the face of it, as they cannot recognize their real rights.

14 In Homo Sacer Agamben (2017, 7–8) writes: “And only a reflection that, taking up Foucault’s and Benjamin’s suggestion, thematically interrogates the link between bare life and politics, a link that secretly governs the modern ideologies seemingly most distant from one another, will be able to bring the political out of its concealment and, at the same time, return thought to its practical calling.”