The Rohingya repatriation myth: why repatriation from Bangladesh to Myanmar is (nigh) impossible

ABSTRACT

Almost a million Rohingya refugees remain trapped in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, more than six years after being driven from Myanmar. The stated policy of the international community remains voluntary repatriation. This paper lays out our argument that the narrative of repatriation is a myth, not a genuine possibility any time in the next decade or more. Our central argument is that full repatriation of the whole refugee population is completely impossible regardless of outcome of the civil war in Myanmar, probably ever, and even repatriation of a sizeable minority is speculative, reliant on either the Arakan Army winning clear territorial control or a democratic government coming to power that gains clear control over the military. Even in these best-case scenarios, we argue that the demographic pressure of some 1.2 million Rohingya potentially returning to Rakhine State would be so destabilising as to make it an impossibility.

Introduction

Almost a million Rohingya refugees remain trapped in squalid, overcrowded, and dangerous refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, more than six years after being driven from Myanmar in a vicious act of ethnic cleansing. The stated policy and express hope of the international community remains voluntary repatriation to Myanmar, as soon as safety and rights can be guaranteed. This goal has not shifted over time, and remains central to Bangladeshi policy too. However, despite some very limited efforts by the former National League for Democracy (NLD) government (led by Aung San Suu Kyi) and the current military State Administration Council (SAC), the prospect of large-scale repatriation remains as elusive as ever. Indeed, we would argue that after six years and a coup in Myanmar, the prospect of informed, voluntary, safe, and sustainable repatriation of the whole population has become impossible, and repatriation of a minority only a faint prospect, leaving most Rohingya refugees stranded in limbo, a recipe for disaster on all fronts.

This paper lays out our argument that the narrative of repatriation is a myth, not a genuine possibility any time in the next decade or more. Quietly, in unofficial conversations with us, many experts and key staff with non-government organisations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies seem to agree. Some even present views more dire than ours. Nonetheless, the official – indeed only – policy and objective of NGO and UN agencies, Bangladesh, and major donor countries remains repatriation of the entire refugee population back to Rakhine State, Myanmar, at some point in the future.

Certainly, the situation is highly complex and mired in politics – of Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the international system. We do not explore these political dynamics in this paper, although that would make a very interesting study. Rather, we outline the reasons for our dismal view, and the only possible scenarios we see for a limited return of a minority: scenarios we consider unlikely, but the only possibility in any foreseeable future.

Our central argument is that, due to the factors outlined below, full repatriation of the whole refugee population is completely impossible, probably ever and certainly in any vaguely plausible outlook in the next decade or two. Further, we argue that even repatriation of a sizeable minority of the refugees is speculative, reliant on significant change within Myanmar. A gradual repatriation of some may be possible, for example if the Arakan Army (AA) wins full territorial control of the region, but even then, we argue (below) why numbers would be limited. But for now, with the military who perpetrated most of the atrocities against the Rohingya in control of the apparatus of state, the myth of repatriation seems based more on realpolitik or unsubstantiated optimism in the Spring Revolution or eventual victory of international justice than any current evidence or sense of reality.

Our analysis draws on more than a decade of engagement with civil society in Rakhine State, and multiple research projects during this time. While this paper does not directly present findings from any specific research, it does draw on observations gleaned in recent interview research with over 200 locals working to strengthen intercommunal peace in Rakhine after the ethnic cleansing, plus extensive social media monitoring and informal discussions with dozens of analysts, aid workers, and commentators. For space and confidentiality, we do not provide citations of those sources. One of us has also visited Cox’s Bazar and has an ongoing project exploring attempts to strengthen social cohesion between refugees and host communities there. So, while not based on a single dataset, our analysis draws on extensive research for multiple related projects.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The first elaborates on the current situation, particularly official policy of the international community, elaborating both the situation faced by the refugees and the situation inside Myanmar created by the raging civil war. The second discusses multiple reasons we believe a large-scale return is impossible for the foreseeable future, and even a partial repatriation is problematic. This includes analysis of the various possible outcomes of the civil war, nationally and within Rakhine State. The third section unpacks what we see to be further key risks, including demographic issues, before the final section offers some concluding thoughts about policy implications.

The current situation

There are 975,350 Rohingya in Bangladesh as recognised refugees, the majority in 33 highly congested camps in Cox’s Bazar (UNHCR 2024a). Some 32,574 have relocated to Bhasan Char Island, and more live in Bangladesh unofficially, outside the camps. Smaller numbers have fled to other countries, including India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, leading the UNHCR to cite a total of almost 1.2 million current Rohingya refugees (UNHCR 2024b).

Repatriation remains the official policy of all state actors and major international agencies involved. It remains the first stated strategic objective of the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan 2023, which outlines the priorities and funding agreements between the international community and the Government of Bangladesh. And, while most international actors remain adamant the conditions and processes are not yet suitable, there have been repeated tokenistic attempts at repatriation since 2017. For example, a thousand or so Rohingya were repatriated in 2018, although it quickly became clear these people were living under severe restrictions, with no freedom of mobility and closely watched by the military (Saha 2023). A few more were repatriated under a bilateral deal announced in May 2023: an initial 1,140 were selected, although it is not clear how many actually left, and the process was strongly criticised by the UN and other agencies (OHCHR 2023). A new plan was announced in October 2023, brokered by China, although, even if successful, it currently only aims at returning around 3,000 refugees (Al Jazeera 2024), and it appears even this measly effort has stalled in the context of recent fighting between the Myanmar military and AA. Indeed, Bangladeshi authorities are now far more worried about a further influx from Myanmar than anticipating any sort of repatriation to Myanmar (Paul and Ganguly, 2024). The primary exodus from the Bangladesh camps in recent months appears to be by boat to Indonesia and similar safer havens, not back to Myanmar. Boat arrivals in Aceh, for example, are currently in the order of 1,000 people per week (OCHCR 2023).

What is clear is that all repatriation attempts to date involve very small numbers, do not have the support of the international community, and very few Rohingya are interested. This latter point is despite their meagre existence and the rising dangers in the camps. The UN has cut the value of food aid, in the context of Gaza and global funding shortfalls, from $12 to $10 per person per month, despite rising food costs (Reuters 2023). At the same time, lawlessness and criminality are on the rise in the camps, with ten or more armed groups vying for control, all implicated in drug/human trafficking, extortion, torture, kidnapping, and assassination of moderate Rohingya leaders (Saha 2023). The situation is intolerable and unsustainable, yet there are no alternative options being put on the table.

Meanwhile, civil war rages across the border in Rakhine State, where an estimated 630,000 Rohingya remain (UNHCR 2024b). While the Myanmar military remains well-armed and in clear control of key state institutions, a large majority of the Myanmar people plus most ethnic-based armed resistance groups have fought them since the February 2021 coup, significantly reducing the military’s control over territory. Rakhine State has largely charted its own direction, with the rise of the AA (Ware and Laoutides 2023). After making significant territorial gains in the 2018–2020 period, the AA consolidated positions and focused on institution building during the first 2.5 years after the coup. It used this time to create and strengthen its civil control over much of the northern half of the state, through its United League of Arakan (ULA) administration, which has extended legal and some service provision across large parts of the state.

Notably, the AA/ULA have been quite inclusive in their language and practices towards the Rohingya and other minorities, with only a few exceptions, speaking consistently of autonomy and self-determination for all the people living in Rakhine. So, while they don’t accept the Rohingya name or group identity/group rights for the Rohingya, they have avoided framing the Rohingya as external, illegal, or migrants, and even have included significant numbers of Rohingya in senior roles in the ULA. Moreover, we have confirmed reports that Rohingya have even been voluntarily recruited into the AA fighting forces – in small numbers, of course – and it should be noted that larger numbers of Rohingya remain notably cautious, even afraid, of the AA/ULA. Nonetheless, this inclusivity is a marked change from NLD, SAC, or previous Rakhine nationalist policy.

The AA’s informal ceasefire with the military broke down in late 2023, and they have been on the offensive ever since. They have taken significant new territory from the military, including some intensive fighting in Maungdaw, just across the border from the camps. One significant result of this violence has been another mushrooming of internally displaced people, with an estimated 335,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) now across Rakhine State (UNHCR 2024c). Given where some of this fighting has occurred, and the relatively lower sociopolitical power of the Rohingya, there have been concerns they are being disproportionately harmed in the war between the AA and Myanmar military. Nonetheless, UNHCR estimate that, of these IDPs, 153,600 are Rohingya (120,000 still from the 2012 violence), while over 180,000 are ethnic Rakhine or other non-Muslim minorities (UNHCR 2024c). These figures suggest recent displacement may not have been highly targeted towards Rohingya, despite the large number of Rohingya IDPs.

The current fighting also suggests that it is not impossible that the AA may gain full control of the Bangladesh border in the coming months or years, and perhaps even of the state capital, Sittwe. This means that that the idea of AA control of the northern half of Rakhine State at some point in the future, including all areas from which the Rohingya have fled from and continue to reside in, is a plausible scenario.

Analysis of possible civil war outcomes

So, with this context analysis, we move on to analyse the prospects of repatriation. The question of repatriation is deeply intertwined with questions of territorial control and stability in northern Rakhine. At the risk of oversimplification, we suggest that, conceptually, there are only four conceivable outcomes of the civil war in Myanmar, as it pertains to Rakhine State and hence the Rohingya. These are: ongoing instability, Myanmar military control, AA victory and control, or an National Unity Government (NUG)-like democratic government coming to power nationally and AA laying down weapons.

1. Stalemate with ongoing instability. We consider this the most likely scenario: that Myanmar military and AA forces continue to actively contest or coexist in the region, for the foreseeable future, without either side gaining complete victory and without political settlement. Whether a ceasefire is achieved or armed conflict remains the norm, while there is contested control and two armies remain, safety of returnees could not be guaranteed. Repatriation would remain extremely difficult, if not impossible, and any return, formal or ad hoc, would risk triggering a return to open conflict. Even if numbers of Rohingya give up on the Bangladesh camps and try return on their own, unplanned and unsupported, the demographic pressure would risk reigniting extreme nationalist violence against Rohingya in many parts of the state. We will discuss this further below. Thus, our conclusion is that, under this scenario, any large-scale repatriation, supported by the international community, is impossible, and informal return of any significant numbers of people highly unlikely, and dangerous.

2. Victory by the Myanmar military in Rakhine State. This currently appears a highly unlikely scenario. The military have been losing borderguard posts and military bases across the northern half of Rakhine State and southern Chin State every week, with large numbers of troops surrendering or defecting and a rapid loss of military hardware. They appear unable to halt the advance of the AA, who have deep-seated popular support from the Rakhine people and many ethnic minorities, including some in the Rohingya community. Nonetheless, even if the Myanmar military did the seemingly impossible and turned the tide in Rakhine, and then went on to totally defeat and disarm the AA in the coming years, we argue that UN-led repatriation would remain impossible and any large-scale voluntary return would seem highly unlikely. Internationally supported repatriation would require a government committed to Rohingya human rights and citizenship, and the Myanmar military are the principal perpetrators of the 2017 ethnic cleansing and genocide. They have not changed their stripes, in the least. The safety and protection of the Rohingya could not be assured under any military-backed Myanmar government, and few Rohingya would be prepared to return to live under military control. Conclusion: under this scenario, repatriation is also impossible, and informal return of any significant numbers of people extremely unlikely.

3. Victory by the Arakan Army. The momentum of battles in Rakhine State, and the popular support for the AA, make this scenario plausible, although the AA are still a long way short of achieving such a goal. Still, if, hypothetically, the AA did defeat the Myanmar military and establish firm territorial control over townships across the northern half of the state, including Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and the whole border with Bangladesh, this would move the question of Rohingya repatriation away from the orbit of the military/SAC to the AA and their international engagements with Bangladesh and international donors. Whether the AA established control over Rakhine while other civil wars in Myanmar continued to grind on, or their victory came as part of a wider victory by resistance forces across Myanmar, if the Arakan Army gain effective territorial control in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and other parts of northern and central Rakhine, the policy, decisions, and practice of the AA dictate what would be possible.

This is where there is a glimmer of hope. The AA and ethnic Rakhine people are desperate for a level of autonomy and self-determination that will be impossible to attain without international recognition. Whether full independence, sovereignty, and statehood, or an autonomous region within a Myanmar federation/confederacy, the AA would require international support to make this a reality. There is absolutely no hope they will receive this without agreeing to work on Rohingya repatriation, and this motivation offers hope for limited repatriation.

We have already noted that the AA have been quite strategic, and largely recognise Rohingya rights (individually, if not collectively). This suggests they already recognise this fact. A future is thus conceivable in which – if they gain territorial control – the AA might bargain international recognition and reconstruction support, plus maybe rights to natural gas pipelines and deep seaport royalties, in exchange for Rohingya repatriation. Nonetheless, for the reasons outlined below, we strongly believe, even in this most optimistic of scenarios, no more than a large minority of Rohingya could possibly ever return, probably only gradually, and more likely only into a narrow corridor in Maungdaw that could minimise the need to return all former Rohingya land or disburse a million Rohingya all over Rakhine State.

(d)

NUG-like democratic government coming to power. We include this scenario for completeness of analysis. While we sincerely wish this was a realistic prospect, we think it is exceptionally unlikely. The reason is that, to have any direct impact on Rohingya repatriation, such a government would need to both achieve power over the Myanmar military, forcing their return to barracks and submission to parliament and political process, as well as convince the AA to lay down their weapons or integrate into a federal army firmly under central government control. It is these two aspects we consider almost inconceivable. We must note that the former NLD government failed to act to either prevent or remedy the ethnic cleansing, or initiate meaningful repatriation steps with the military in the background. And, while the NUG have distinguished themselves from the former NLD government, and their rhetoric and policy-making towards Rohingya rights and citizenship is very good, they have little popular support in the northern half of Rakhine State and are unlikely to ever be in a position to govern Rakhine State in the manner described here. Moreover, while the NUG and other resistance groups have moved substantially in their attitudes towards questions of Rohingya rights and citizenship, they would be hampered unless the military was completely subdued, and, even then, still be plagued by the same issues outlined in the next section, similar to the issues the AA would face if they had territorial control and sought to facilitate repatriation. Again, repatriation of a minority of Rohingya may be conceivable under this extremely unlikely scenario, but repatriation of all or the majority would remain impossible.

Key risks

Ultranationalists and demographics

The number one reason repatriation of a majority of Rohingya to Rakhine state is impossible, under any scenario, is that Rakhine ethnic ultranationalists have not gone away. These people dominated state politics before the rise of the AA, and many were blatantly anti-Rohingya, some even calling for precisely the sort of ethnic cleansing that occurred in 2017. Anecdotally, some have been reluctantly convinced by the AA strategy of inclusivity (even towards Rohingya) as the only path towards international recognition for their autonomy dreams. Others, however, certainly have not changed their minds, and have merely been silenced by popular AA support. It would not take much to see these nationalists return to centre-stage, and potentially changing popular opinion. An impending planned (or unplanned) mass return of a million-plus Rohingya would be just the sort of trigger that could tip that balance. It is far easier to be magnanimous and offer inclusivity and even near equal status when there are only 630,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine than if there were suddenly about to be 1,800,000-plus in the state!

Which brings us to our key point about demographics. The Rohingya question was politically very sensitive at the time the 2014 census data were collected. As a result, Rohingya were not enumerated. Instead, the census merely estimated that around 1,090,000 people residing in northern Rakhine State were not enumerated (UoM 2015). In retrospect, that figure appears quite simply wrong, even for 2014. We know that, now, there are now almost 1.2 million Rohingya in Bangladesh and beyond, plus 630,000 remaining in Rakhine. In private conversations with us, many now acknowledge that the 2014 figure was merely the lowest end of the then-estimated range, reported to try to avoid inflaming ultranationalist Buddhist sentiment at the time. But the upshot is that most ethnic Rakhine, even those with more moderate views towards Rohingya, are not aware of this. The apparent materialisation of some 500,000-plus extra Rohingya, out of thin air in just a decade, plays directly into either of two narratives widely perpetrated by the ultranationalists: either the Rohingya are breeding dangerously fast, or many Bengali see advantage in claiming to be Rohingya and want to move into Rakhine State and take over land. Neither are true (although Rohingya do have a high birthrate), but narratives do not have to be true to inflame nationalist sentiment and conflict. Repatriation of all Rohingya refugees would result in a Rohingya population in Rakhine State 70 per cent higher than most people believe it was before the ethnic cleansing! That would be exceptionally destabilising.

Our point is simply that, even in the most optimistic scenario conceivable, such as the AA having complete territorial control over the northern half of Rakhine State and willing to trade Rohingya repatriation for international recognition, repatriation of more than a third to half the Rohingya now in Bangladesh would almost certainly trigger racial tension and significantly empower the now-silenced voice of the ultranationalists. In this light, repatriation of the whole Rohingya population is inconceivable. The most optimistic scenario may allow a minority to be repatriated over time, but the majority of Rohingya will almost certainly not be allowed to return.

Our recent research exploring the work and attitudes of Rohingya and Rakhine civil society peace entrepreneurs is most illuminating in this context. We asked more than 70 local civil society leaders, who are actively working within Rakhine state for peace and reconciliation between the communities, their thoughts about the Rohingya repatriation. Without exception, they were reluctant to respond, indicating their doubts about any plausible repatriation plan, and demonstrating concern about the impact of any repatriation on the stabilisation of relations that has been achieved in recent years.

Our conclusion is that, while repatriation of a minority of Rohingya may be possible, under this most highly optimistic of scenarios, repatriation of all or the majority remains impossible. Some of our best informants quietly, anonymously, suggest more than a couple of hundred thousand is the absolute ceiling on the number who could be repatriated in the coming decades, and then only if the most optimistic conditions conceivable were achieved. This leads back to our argument that the repatriation of the majority of Rohingya is impossible, a myth perpetrated simply because no one has any acceptable alternative, and this myth suits the international order that wants to avoid mass informal migration.

Drugs and gangs

Further complicating the above are two other powerful challenges: the rapid growth of amphetamine trafficking, and the rise in power of competing Rohingya armed groups and gangs. Regarding the drugs, it is not clear at this stage who controls the trade, although all parties appear to be dabbling and prospering from it. And regarding Rohingya gangs, there is clearly a power struggle and lack of popular support for any one group. The political economy and power of vested interests of both is not entirely clear at this stage, and not all criminal/gang participants are Rohingya, but these questions matter little for the above analysis. Even if uncontested territorial control was achieved by the AA or a future democratic Myanmar state, the drug trade and security threats posed by powerful organised gangs returning to Rakhine State, amongst the repatriated, only make the idea of voluntary, safe, and sustainable repatriation even more difficult and unlikely. Security would require significant control to be achieved and maintained over both – an extremely challenging prospect.

Donor policy implications

Stepping back, one might argue that international NGOs and UN agencies have little choice but to perpetuate this myth of repatriation to Rakhine state as the (only) goal of assistance to the Rohingya, both because there are no other potential options, but more fundamentally because today’s international political order relies on the notion of temporary asylum and repatriation after a conflict, rather than allowing mass migration. This has resulted in a growing number of protracted refugee crises around the world, the Rohingya being one of the larger and more severe. Still, regardless of why, we maintain that this notion of repatriation of all of the Rohingya is a myth with no possible means to achieve it, and that perpetuating it only stifles discussion of alternatives, worsening the plight of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya. It seems more designed to temporarily relieve pressure on an international system without answers, and realistically help the Rohingya.

Our dire assessment has significant policy implications for international donors and humanitarian-development organisations. The first is that the short-term humanitarian response approach to the Rohingya camp situation needs to shift, to acknowledge the probability of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya in Bangladesh for the mid- to long-term. Bangladesh does not want that, Rohingya do not want that, and the international donors and humanitarian-development community do not want that. However, obfuscating this almost certain reality behind a utopian myth only further slams the door on any other future. The situation for the Rohingya in the camps is intolerable and unsustainable, and perpetuation of the repatriation myth only makes this worse. We don’t have a lot of answers, but maintain that continuing to confine them to camps in Cox’s Bazar indefinitely is a recipe for violence and an escalation of criminal activity, creating conditions less and less conducive to any future repatriation. Alternatives policies must be found.

This brings us to our second policy implication: significant creativity and diplomacy will be required to envisage alternative futures and pathways outside of Rakhine State for at least, say, half the current Rohingya in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has been fairly accommodating, in comparison to many other countries hosting large refugee populations, but policy shifts in that country may be required. More importantly, in thinking about Myanmar, perhaps a shift required in international donor and agency policy is in thinking about where the Rohingya could be repatriated to within Myanmar. Our analysis suggests powerful conflict triggers remaining in Rakhine State, regardless of the most optimistic scenario unfolding. Most Rohingya express the desire to return to Myanmar, but many Rohingya have also expressed a demand for freedom of movement to travel and live anywhere within Myanmar. Thus, perhaps in the highly unlikely (although desirable) event that the military caves and some sort of democratic government comes to power in Myanmar, could it be conceived of that Rohingya should be offered repatriation to other parts of Myanmar, not simply back across the border into Rakhine State? This idea is not without serious complications, and may not even be a good alternative. But we offer it more as illustrative of the sort of creative policy shifts which will be required to even contemplate a future for the Rohingya people.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anthony Ware

Anthony Ware is an Associate Professor in Humanitarianism and Development at Deakin University, Australia. His research focuses on humanitarian/international development approaches in conflict-affected situations, with a particular interest in conflict-sensitivity, do no harm, everyday peace, peacebuilding, and countering violent/hateful extremism via community-led programming. He has published 6 books and more than fifty academic papers/chapters.

Costas Laoutides

Costas Laoutides is an Associate Professor in International Relations at Deakin University, Australia. His area of expertise is ethno-political and separatist conflict, and its resolution. He is the co-author of Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict (Hurst/Oxford University Press, 2018, with Anthony Ware) and the sole author of Self-Determination and Collective Responsibility in the Secessionist Struggle (Routledge, 2015).