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Research Article

Conflict sensitivity and activism: insights from Cambodia's resource conflicts

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Received 20 Jun 2023, Accepted 10 Apr 2024, Published online: 02 May 2024

ABSTRACT

This paper examines debates relating to international aid, civil society, and natural resource conflicts, through a case study of conflict sensitivity programming in Cambodia. The paper highlights the value of confrontational activism, yet the practice of conflict sensitivity can dissuade such activism. Embedded in the country's history and politics, the paper analyses the conflict sensitivity work of an international non-government organisation, revealing significant community-level success, including women's empowerment, but limitations in addressing systemic drivers of conflict. The case study also reveals how the application of conflict sensitivity contributed towards conflict and risk avoidance. In a global context of prevalent natural resource conflicts and related violence, this paper calls for critical reflection on the practice of conflict sensitivity, which continues to gain popularity globally. For development institutions and practitioners, conflict sensitivity has extensive value, but it must be implemented in ways that do not inadvertently dissuade more emancipatory civil society activism.

Introduction

This paper examines dynamics related to the practice of conflict sensitivity, that is, the systematic and deliberate approach to engaging with and addressing conflict dynamics, in Cambodia, where the state has pursued a “violent neoliberal” model of development, grounded in elite accumulation through community dispossession (Springer Citation2015). Natural resource governance has been at the epicentre of post-civil war conflict in Cambodia, particularly in relation to land and water. Some of the most significant systemic improvements in natural resource management, such as the 2012 moratorium on Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) and 2020 moratorium on mainstream Mekong dams resulted from persistent and often confrontational advocacy efforts, such as the Boueng Kak and Lower Sesan Two (LS2) protest movements (see Barter and Sar Citation2023). Although civic space for such advocacy has severely contracted in recent years, due to severe crackdowns by Hun Sen and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), pursuing such systemic reforms remains critical.

In such a context, this paper examines an international non-government organisation's (INGO) conflict sensitivity programming, suggesting that in practice it can encourage the avoidance of conflict and the political drivers of injustices. In turn, such practice can undermine the emergence and persistence of emancipatory tactics and movements that have played a critical role in advancing more equitable natural resource governance in Cambodia. Although only one case study, the findings and discussion contribute towards broader debates about the potentially depoliticising impacts of international aidFootnote1 actors and the need to critically assess the application of conflict sensitivity. As communities across Cambodia and elsewhere continue to face challenges related to natural resource governance, including significant state-backed or enabled violence (see Milne Citation2015), this paper argues that while conflict sensitivity can have substantial value in reducing violence, its improper implementation can be incongruent with transformative agendas and activism.

The possible tension between conflict sensitivity in practice and advocacy

This section first defines conflict sensitivity and related key concepts before looking at its possible tension with advocacy related to natural resource governance, suggesting that in practice, the two can be, at times, incongruent. At its core, conflict sensitivity is about understanding that any action or initiative in a conflict-affected environment interacts with that conflict and will have certain consequences, negative and/or positive. As Anderson (Citation1999, 1) explains, “when international assistance is given in the context of a violent conflict, it becomes a part of that context and thus also of the conflict”. In response, conflict sensitivity has emerged as “a term to describe different efforts, methods and tools for working in conflict zones with the objective of at least avoiding harm and, if possible, also contributing to peacebuilding” (Paffenholz Citation2005, 66).

Consequently, conflict sensitivity is designed as a deliberate and systematic approach to understanding and minimising negative and maximising positive impacts of aid-related activities. This involves understanding contextual nuances and how actors’ engagement might impact the context, while using this understanding to inform decision-making (Stabilisation Unit Citation2016). Contextual understanding is further broken down into causes and types of conflict, negative and positive peace, and gender dynamics and approaches to dealing with conflict (Abozaglo Citation2011). Gender-sensitive conflict analysis adds further depth by examining how gender inequality can be a driver of conflict and ensuring gender dynamics are addressed throughout all stages of analysis and action (Close, Groenewald, and Mora Citation2020). Ultimately, the goal of conflict sensitivity is not to entirely prevent conflict, but rather avoid conflict escalation and backsliding into violent conflict (Paffenholz Citation2005).

There is a broad array of tools to contribute towards conflict sensitivity of which do no harm (DNH) is the most prominent. DNH is about making the aid sector and its actors accountable, in response to the growing recognition of real and potential harm caused by the sector (Anderson Citation2023). The popularity of DNH has made it nearly synonymous with conflict sensitivity, with DNH commonly (mis)used within the aid sector, often interchangeably with conflict sensitivity. Rather, DNH is a specific tool and framework to contribute towards a broader approach to conflict sensitivity. A key tenet is the analysis of how aid interacts with myriad contextual dynamics (Anderson Citation1999). DNH is built upon six central lessons, developed from a comprehensive research and design process. Focusing on the context, it seeks to help understand the complex relations and interactions between actors. The six key lessons form the basis of the framework and related analysis, such as analyses relating to dividers and connectors (CDA Citation2016).

In Cambodia (and elsewhere), possible tension between advocacy and conflict sensitivity can arise in relation to the practice or implementation of the latter. This occurs when conflict sensitivity is interpreted and applied in ways that promote conflict avoidance and passivity, as occurred in the case study featured later in this paper. Consequently, activist-oriented actors criticise conflict sensitivity as potentially undermining and even being antithetical to emancipatory advocacy. For example, Hughes (Citation2007) has argued that international organisations’ avoidance of confrontation with the state has undermined social movements and the potential for more systemic change. Bächtold (Citation2015) has similarly contested that development actors’ technical approaches have become their own “anti-politics machine” that can diminish social movements. Joshi (Citation2020) argues that NGOs can have a debilitating effect on community mobilisation and advocacy initiatives by promoting non-confrontational alternatives that fail to address systemic problems with natural resource governance. Barter and Sar (Citation2023) also emphasise that confrontational advocacy has proven far more effective than reformist approaches in Cambodia.

Despite the importance of confrontation, activism and social change occur across a nuanced spectrum of often intersecting approaches. This ranges from “reformists” to “confrontationists”. The latter, while potentially yielding transformative results, can also escalate violence and polarisation. Alternatively, the former can achieve important, incremental changes that complement rather than replace other activist modalities (ibid). More broadly, advocacy and advancing rights-based agendas are embedded in complex processes of negotiation that often achieve mixed results, whether pragmatic improvements or difficulties in challenging structural injustices (McNamara Citation2021). The application and practice of conflict sensitivity then adds another layer to making sense of activism, while also recognising that civil society actors assert agency in different ways; they are not passive recipients of international ideas (Barter and Sumlut Citation2023).

Although the above critiques are not specific to conflict sensitivity, they all raise concerns about aid actors imposing values on activists. The criticisms reflect how conflict sensitivity can undermine emancipatory movements that confront the state. This carries acute relevance in Cambodia, where some of the most significant improvements in natural resource governance, such as the 2012 moratorium on ELCs, resulted from sustained and dynamic confrontation with an increasingly violent state; perhaps most notably the Boueng Kak protests. In theory, conflict sensitivity does not preclude such activism, but in practice it can actively dissuade such confrontation, particularly when DNH translates to risk avoidance. The prevalence of flawed implementation has led to conflict sensitivity being criticised as a box-ticking exercise that can perpetuate fundamental flaws in the aid system (Midgley et al. Citation2022).

This paper contributes to such debates by analysing the implementation of conflict sensitivity and natural resource governance programming by an INGO in Cambodia. The paper does not claim that conflict sensitivity and advocacy are inherently in opposition, but instead suggests the practice or implementation of the former can be antithetical to the latter. This is an important consideration for development practitioners to ensure that conflict sensitivity does not inadvertently undermine the emergence or continuance of emancipatory social movements. A woman Cambodian conflict sensitivity facilitator interviewed for this paper explained some of this tension in her work:

This is our challenge, particularly for human rights organisations. They say that conflict sensitivity is passive, whereas human rights organisations always want to confront the issue. For us, conflict sensitivity is about options – we can't just have one approach.

Cambodia’s contemporary natural resource conflicts

Since the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 and subsequent UN-backed elections, Cambodia has undergone immense political, social, economic, and ecological transformations, which have triggered significant conflicts across the country. Armed conflict ended in the late 1990s, but the following decades have been marked by intense conflict over natural resources (Young Citation2021). This paper defines conflict as “incompatible activities” and not inherently negative, where effective conflict management can lead to positive outcomes (Tjosvold Citation2006). Natural resource conflicts in Cambodia, however, are routinely violent (see Milne Citation2022). The rest of this section provides a brief overview of some of these dynamics and their relevance to conflict sensitivity, advocacy, and natural resource governance in the current Cambodian context.

Following UNTAC, Cambodia rapidly shifted to a market-based economy during the 1990s, even including a commitment to free markets in its constitution (Kingdom of Cambodia Citation1993). The ensuing economic model has been labelled “violent neoliberalism”, as relative peace and stability enabled the rapid expansion of extractive industries across the country. The vast scale of extraction led to burgeoning inequalities, as elites profiteered, while displaced and dispossessed communities faced severe hardship (Springer Citation2015). Although the country has made significant progress in reducing poverty over the past three decades, inequality is pronounced. The proliferation of ELCs, damaging hydropower projects, and rampant logging of forests have become flashpoints for conflict between affected populations, private sector companies, and authorities (Young Citation2019). For example, by 2013, an estimated 700,000 people were affected by land disputes across the country (ADHOC Citation2014). Dispossession and marginalisation related to land were major driving forces of frustration across the country that led to increasing confrontation with the state by the late 2000s (Kelly Citation2017).

The impacts of rampant natural resource extraction and opposition have been widespread across Cambodia. Large-scale deforestation has severely degraded the environment, while denying communities access to non-timber forest products. Communities, often Indigenous people, living in remote areas have faced the most intense hardship, as they are unable to access resin and other sustainable resources for their livelihoods, while losing culturally significant land and waterways. Cambodia's vast riverine systems are also facing a crisis from illegal fishing and hydropower projects, most notably LS2 (Human Rights Watch Citation2021). Declining fish stocks, Cambodia's number one source of protein, are undermining livelihoods, reducing food security, and exacerbating conflict. As Strangio argues, “land, forests, and natural resources were all fed into a machine that produced little for ordinary people” (Strangio Citation2020, 129).

Opposition to such rampant resource extraction has taken several forms that have changed over the years, as civic space has expanded and contracted. At the peak of civil society activism in the early 2010s, the Boueng Kak and Borei Keila (locales in Phnom Penh) communities epitomised urban resistance, as they opposed forcible displacement to make way for urban development projects. The communities focused on community mobilisation and after failing to achieve success through dialogue, petition writing, and other engagement, they shifted towards protest and more adversarial tactics. Boueng Kak residents also engaged with the World Bank's accountability mechanism, which led to a temporary suspension of the Bank's funding to Cambodia (Tran Citation2011). At the height of the protests, both communities faced substantial violence from police and authorities, and many community members were detained, some on numerous occasions (Schröder and Young Citation2019). A drawn-out process of opposition and violent suppression ultimately led to a settlement of 12.44 hectares that remained deeply inadequate for displaced Boueng Kak residents (Equitable Cambodia Citation2023), but it did represent a significant improvement from the initial offer. It also brought greater attention to the need to address land conflicts and dispossession in Cambodia. Furthermore, women led both protest movements, challenging gender norms and foregrounding the gendered impacts of land dispossession.

A contrasting, but equally prominent case of resistance is the Prey Lang Community Network (PLCN). Established to protect the Prey Lang Forest, PLCN is grounded in principles of non-violent, direct action, where the network documents illegal logging and conducts forest patrols, amongst other approaches to forest protection. They also engage in national-level advocacy, such as a globally recognised protest in Phnom Penh where they wore blue Avatar masks (referring to the popular film) to symbolise their role as forest protectors (Carmichael Citation2011). Like the Boueng Kak and Borei Keila protestors, PLCN faces different forms of violence and suppression, including what Milne and Mahanty (Citation2019) call “bureaucratic violence in the green economy”. PLCN are still in existence, but struggle to operate freely, as authorities have heavily constrained their actions, such as requiring permission to conduct patrols. They are also facing incentives to become an NGO, which the network resists, to maintain its flexible and direct-action approach (PLCN Citation2021). Despite the challenges, they were successful in having Prey Lang declared a national park, but deforestation remains widespread, as witnessed during research for this paper; heavily laden logging trucks rumbled past during interviews.

Alongside the success of Boueng Kak, Borei Keila, and PLCN in contributing towards the eventual moratorium on ELCs, opposition to hydropower projects also garnered significant attention during the 2010s. Significant opposition to the LS2 dam, although not preventing its construction, contributed towards the government's 2020 moratorium on new dams along the Mekong. The confrontation with the state also resulted in improved resettlement for affected populations, while some communities were able to relocate to more favourable locations (Baird Citation2016). Adopting a far more adversarial approach, the direct-action group Mother Nature Cambodia and the communities’ confrontational protests ultimately led to the suspension of the proposed Areng Valley dam. Their distinctly adversarial approach garnered national attention in ways the decades of reformist approaches had struggled to ever achieve (Barter and Sar Citation2023). Civil society activism swelled during the 2010s, representing a dynamism beyond the dominant characterisations of Cambodian civil society as service-oriented NGOs (Norman Citation2014).

Conflict over natural resources was a key driver of opposition to the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP), which ultimately responded with a shift to “hegemonic authoritarianism” (Morgenbesser Citation2019). Following the closely contested and disputed 2013 election, the CPP escalated its violent suppression of civil society actors, particularly dynamic movements such as Boueng Kak and PLCN. In 2017, the main opposition party the Cambodian National Rescue Party was banned, alongside Mother Nature Cambodia, and critical news outlets like The Cambodia Daily (Young Citation2021). The 2016 introduction of the Law on Associations and NGOs essentially banned grassroots mobilisation and expanded government control over NGOs (Curley Citation2018). As of 2023, the potential for any confrontation with the state remains highly limited, as evidenced by prominent environmental activist, Ouch Leng, being arrested and detained in early 2021 for simply putting up a banner with an environmental message in Prey Lang National Park (Thul Citation2021). Although the moratoriums on ELCs and mainstream Mekong dams remain in place, conflict over natural resources remains widespread.

Amidst these natural resource conflicts and Cambodia's expansion and contraction of civic space following UNTAC, the role of international development actors has attracted extensive analysis. Despite the emergence and success of confrontational movements, international development assistance has been heavily criticised for depoliticising civil society actors in Cambodia (see Norman Citation2014). Development assistance has also led to a plethora of NGOs that give an “illusion of civil society’” (Ou and Sedara Citation2013), which is often attributed to the good governance agenda that has instrumentalised civil society for service delivery rather than activism (Henke Citation2011). The resulting diffusion of tension with the state is seen to undermine the potential resolution of structural injustices (Hughes Citation2007). Beyond Cambodia, this is seen to reflect a broader depoliticising trend within the development sector, exemplified by the shift from supporting emancipatory feminist movements to women's economic empowerment (Sciortino Citation2018), while INGOs often compete with domestic civil society actors (Barter and Sumlut Citation2023).

The ensuing analysis seeks to embed a case study of an INGO's conflict sensitivity and natural resource governance programming within the above dynamics. Specifically, the analysis explores how the programming engages with structural drivers of natural resource injustices, addresses gender dynamics, and influences the actions of populations involved in natural resource conflicts. As this section has illustrated, some of the most notable improvements in natural resource governance in Cambodia have emerged from dynamic and sustained confrontation with the state, but concurrently, the space for such activism has severely contracted in recent years. In theory, conflict sensitivity is complementary to advocacy and does not seek to avoid conflict, but practice can be significantly different; as will be shown, the implementation of conflict sensitivity has encouraged conflict avoidance that has arguably reduced the likelihood of influencing systemic drivers of unjust natural resource governance.

Methodology

This paper utilised a predominantly qualitative and ethnographic-centred approach. First, it is grounded in what Burawoy (Citation2009) refers to as the extended case method. This involves long-term ethnographies that value reflexivity and contextualisation, where the author has worked in Cambodia for more than three years; full-time from 2010 to 2012 at the height of Cambodia's natural resource disputes and intermittently in ensuing years. The author worked with both national and international civil society actors, for more than five years in other conflict-affected contexts, such as Myanmar and Somalia. The extended case method is complemented by 45 semi-structured interviews in Cambodia during 2020 and 2021. More than 90 per cent were in-person, with the remainder online due to COVID-19 restrictions. Interviewees included national and international NGO staff, Cambodian activists and network members, and people affected by natural resource conflict. The author conducted 29 interviews and a paid research assistant conducted 16 interviews, but they were not involved in subsequent analysis and writing. Interviews were in Khmer and/or English.

Interviewee breakdown

A mix of snowball and targeted sampling was utilised. The former is to enhance access to and trust with interviewees, with targeted sampling to ensure a diversity of participants, particularly in terms of gender, different approaches to activism, and varying relationships with aid actors. The research pursued a broad geographical and issue-based distribution, such as inter-community resource disputes, private sector land grabbing, and illegal fishing and/or logging. Interviews focused on understanding and application of conflict sensitivity, alongside other topics, such as dispossession, advocacy, and how people balanced different approaches to addressing natural resource governance. All interviewees are anonymised due to sensitivities. Site visits included Boueng Kak residents in Phnom Penh, PLCN members in Kratie and Strung Treng, and communities involved in conflict sensitivity training in Kratie, Mondulkiri, and Ratanikiri. Ethics approval was obtained from the author's university ethics committee.

Overview of conflict sensitivity in practice

The ensuing analysis focuses on the conflict sensitivity and natural resource governance programming of an INGO operating in Cambodia. It is a small INGO that operates with greater flexibility than large INGOs, such as Save the Children. The program funding is from a bilateral donor, while all staff are Cambodian, bar one senior manager. The conflict sensitivity programming was implemented by two Cambodian facilitators who work together with minimal oversight from the INGO. They work at the community and civil society organisation (CSO) levels, establishing significant trust through long-term relationships.

The two facilitators share conflict sensitivity skills through a mixture of workshops, site visits, and ongoing coaching. Indicative activities focus on contextual analysis, stakeholder mapping, the principles and application of DNH, communication techniques, gender analysis, and practical exercises in dispute resolution, such as role play for different scenarios. Communities of practice are also operational to encourage sharing and learning between partners and communities. All initiatives are delivered in Khmer through participatory methodologies that draw on international best practices, but are adapted to the Cambodian context, such as using locally relevant examples. Activities focus on explaining both the theory and practice of conflict sensitivity, particularly DNH. The programming operates in provinces with high incidents of conflict over natural resources, specifically Kratie, Mondulkiri, Ratanikiri, and Stung Treng.

The conflict sensitivity activities target two primary groups, namely CSOs working on natural resource issues and environmental defenders/activists operating at the community level. For the CSOs, the support is designed to be replicated at the community level and with other civil society actors, through a training of trainer approach. The support is also intended to not just enhance attendees’ skills, but to also institutionalise conflict sensitivity within organisations, such as in strategies and programmatic design. At the community level, support is designed for environmental defenders/activists to then provide conflict-sensitive leadership and guidance within their community. The conflict sensitivity programming is one component of the INGO's broader country program.

Results

The following results and discussion synthesise the collected data with the preceding literature analysis. Specific attention is paid to how the implementation of conflict sensitivity programming relates to natural resource governance, advocacy, and engagement with the state, gender dynamics, and the relationship between INGOs and other civil society actors. The following results are focused on interviews with people participating in conflict-sensitive programming and site visits, whereas interviews with other groups, such as Boueng Kak residents and PLCN members, primarily informed the preceding analysis. Interviewees are sometimes quoted at length, as this provides richness and nuance (Kiik Citation2020).

Finding one: peaceful and equitable resolution of local conflicts

There was clear evidence that the INGO's conflict sensitivity initiatives have positively contributed to the resolution of multiple local conflicts over natural resources in each surveyed province (Kratie, Ratanikiri, and Mondulkiri). In each province, interviewees outlined specific conflicts they faced, such as encroachment on community land by companies or other communities, illegal logging of protected areas or community forests, illegal fishing, and illegal hunting of wild animals. Other conflict dynamics included disputes amongst households and with local authorities. The impact of these conflicts was not just loss of access to resources and exclusion from natural resource governance decision-making, but also persistent and growing distrust and hostility between communities, authorities, and companies. For example, ELCs (despite the 2012 moratorium) continued to be granted without community consultation or sufficient compensation for any losses. This often contributed towards cycles of conflict and even violence, as frustrations and tensions grew between all parties.

In most cases, interviewees attributed conflict resolution to their ability to constructively engage in dialogue, control their emotions, and focus on peaceful solutions. Interviewees explained their analysis, particularly understanding drivers of conflict and the identification of dividers and connectors, clearly illustrating their application of conflict sensitivity and DNH principles. A man Community Forest Leader explained during an interview:

I learnt how to analyse conflicts. We try to find the root cause of the problems. For example, why logging? … Since I learnt about do no harm, I learnt how to identify the hot problems. I try to make the hot problems into cold problems. We don't face them with anger.

Most communities sought to educate the perpetrators and directly resolve the dispute by explaining the community position, such as the importance and regulation of protected areas or community forests. When direct negotiation failed, communities would seek out support from local authorities. This was also a positive because previously communities tended to avoid local authorities because they were often part of the problem. If local authorities were unresponsive or unhelpful, communities would then seek out higher-level authorities at district or even provincial levels. Although authorities may either be complicit in the dispute or unable to resolve it, community engagement can play an important role in creating demand for good governance and responsive authorities.

Despite the positive results, the affected communities also highlighted a continued reliance on NGOs, indicative of aid dependence, which is a major problem in Cambodia (Ear Citation2007). As Joshi (Citation2020) explains, when NGOs act as an intermediary, the resolution of a natural resource conflict may be expedited, but it can fail to address the systemic drivers of the conflict.

Case study: land encroachment in Ratanikiri

The following quotes are from an interview relating to a company taking community land and clearing it without permission or compensation. Local authorities were unable or unwilling to resolve the issue, leaving the community frustrated and unclear on how to obtain justice.

Our community had problems with a company. At that time, we tried to be patient. We tried not to have conflict with them. We wanted to negotiate with them. We filed complaints to the commune, district, and provincial level authorities, but they ignored us. Then we tried to go to NGOs who can help us … They helped facilitate the conflict resolution outside the judiciary and at the negotiation table. The benefit is that the company agreed to give the land back to the community.

Regarding the authorities, before we were prejudiced against them when we don't get what we want from them. But after the training, we learnt to think differently. For example, when we tried to contact them and they were not able to meet us, we tried to think that maybe they were busy. We could try to contact them next time. But normally, when we speak politely to them, they would collaborate with us.

When we have conflict with the company, we know that they have power. We’re concerned about our own safety. For me, I discussed with my people that if we didn't solve this problem, it would still affect our community, but if we respond strongly to them, it will only increase conflict. If we cannot manage the conflict properly, the other party might get angrier and we might have more trouble. (Forest Patroller, Ratanikiri, man)

Following investigations from local authorities, one of the INGO's partners facilitated a dialogue process with the company. The result was that cleared lands were returned to the community and the company agreed to respect the community's land. The community's relationships with authorities also substantially improved, although it also highlighted community dependence on NGOs.

Finding two: significant advances in women’s empowerment

Both facilitators and trainees explained that the INGO's conflict sensitivity initiatives had a positive impact on women's empowerment. The two INGO facilitators were both women with extensive experience working on gender issues, where they specifically designed workshops and coaching to address women's needs. They also sought out existing and emerging women leaders to be involved in the program. The impact was described in two main ways. First, the application of conflict sensitivity within the household was seen as contributing towards more harmonious households and reductions in domestic disputes. Second, conflict sensitivity advanced women's leadership, as they became more active in resolving disputes outside the household, such as with authorities and companies. Although the leadership impact depended significantly on individuals, the INGO's approach to conflict sensitivity specifically encourages women's participation in and influence on dispute resolution. These results are significant, but cannot be entirely attributed to the INGO, as other civil society actors also work on women's empowerment across Cambodia. The following quotes illustrate some of the impact.

For my own family, before my husband was jealous at me when I went out to do the work like this (forest patrolling). He didn't want me to do it and he said that it's not good for women to go out of the house. I just explained to him the reasons and invited him to join meetings with me. Now he's fine with me doing the forest patrolling. (Community Forest Patroller, Kratie, woman)

Before our women were shy. They were not daring to speak. They didn't participate. They just push their husbands to speak for them., but now it is different. In the meetings, there are more women than men. I trained women to be brave and share ideas about their own problems in the family and in the village. We encourage them to share their ideas, so that we can hear their problems to help them solve those problems. Now I am training another group of young women. I meet them every month. After getting these lessons, my women are braver. They even patrol the forest. (Community Leader, Kratie, woman)

Finding three: conflict sensitivity did not address systemic drivers of conflict

Despite evidence of peaceful conflict resolution with positive outcomes at localised levels, no interviewees identified engagement with systemic drivers of conflict beyond the local and immediate issues. The key drivers of conflict, such as illegal logging, unaccountable companies, ineffectual laws, and unresponsive local authorities, were not identified, nor addressed. Although the conflict sensitivity initiatives have tangibly improved relationships between affected communities and the perpetrators of land grabs, the potential for future conflict remains high. Community members consistently reported insecurity of land tenure and concern about their future, as threats persisted. Indeed, the use of bureaucratic violence (Milne and Mahanty Citation2019) and land grabs have remained paramount to the CPP's survival and political dominance, even following the 2012 moratorium (Loughlin and Milne Citation2021). The inability to address systemic drivers of conflict also extended to water governance and fisheries, as a man staff member from a CSO explained during an interview:

We have focused on dialogue about the fishery law, but it is still not implemented. There is lots of politics and it is difficult to operate. All the departments are difficult to work with. Illegal fishing and logging near waterways are still big problems, but there is still no fishery law … After the conflict sensitivity training, communities want to talk with commune or district chiefs, but even dialogue about community problems is difficult.

Another example involved one of the INGO's partners supporting a community with alternative dispute resolution because the official judicial system was seen as ineffectual and corrupt. The process successfully resolved a land dispute, but in doing so circumvented the judicial system. That was an intentional and pragmatic course of action, but it ended up reinforcing a reliance on NGOs to resolve community issues and failed to address systemic issues relating to a lack of accountability and manipulation of the judicial system in Cambodia. Thus, systemic drivers of conflict remain largely unaffected. Hughes (Citation2007) criticises such approaches for heading off a necessary confrontation with the state, while Joshi (Citation2020) highlights the deleterious impacts of such “forum shopping”.

Finding four: pragmatism or conflict avoidance?

Interviews with the INGO facilitators, civil society partners, and community members consistently highlighted seemingly pragmatic approaches to addressing natural resource conflicts, but these approaches also consistently leaned towards conflict avoidance. Whereas Boueng Kak, Areng Valley, and other protest movements achieved major success through pursuing confrontation and engaging with the political nature of the issues at hand, the conflict sensitivity programming encouraged what interviewees described as “softer” approaches. The facilitators reported conflict sensitivity being criticised as too “soft” an approach, when activists argued stronger advocacy was required for systemic change. As one man Cambodian activist proposed during an interview:

NGOs have been negotiating for twenty years with no outcome, but when we mobilise and confront, we see results.

Multiple CSO partner interviewees indicated they had shifted from “hard” (adversarial or confrontational) to “soft” (reformist) advocacy. This was explained as a response to the government's escalating authoritarianism over the past decade. Considering conflict sensitivity requires extensive engagement with contextual dynamics and accounting for various impacts and trade-offs when deciding courses of action, such shifts are logical. However, as the below quotes indicate, there is a risk that in practice conflict sensitivity can disproportionately lead to conflict avoidance. This is cause for concern considering how confronting political oppression in Cambodia has proven critical for achieving systemic changes to natural resource governance in Cambodia. Concurrently, the responses also illustrate concern for the potentially violent responses from authorities if confrontation is pursued, highlighting the balancing act between different approaches.

One partner pursues hard advocacy and confrontation. They say if we work with government, it undermines our work with the community. We say that if the community says we should also work with authorities, we are not following the government, but engaging them … Before, human rights defenders would confront the government, but after the conflict sensitivity training, they do not confront the government. They work together instead. (Conflict Sensitivity Facilitator, woman)

If we do advocacy or demonstrate against authorities, we will get a bad response for the community. We NGOs don't stay in the community, but our focal people are there, they can face harm … Other NGOs say we are too soft, but for the Cambodian context, sometimes it works. We never get better results from the court, so we need to pursue other avenues. The judicial system is very bad. NGOs prefer using do no harm and alternative dispute resolution. (CSO Partner, man)

Discussion

The above results are best understood in relation to broader debates about development assistance, civil society, and natural resource governance. International aid actors have contributed substantial funding towards Cambodia's recovery from war, both through the government and civil society actors, particularly as part of the good governance agenda. The consequent expansion of NGOs has been routinely criticised for undermining emancipatory civil society activism (Norman Citation2014) and “heading off confrontation with the state” (Hughes Citation2007). The above results add further nuance to such debates. In the post-UNTAC Cambodian context, confrontation with the state has not been readily forthcoming, but when it started to solidify in the early 2010s, it represented a distinct countermovement that achieved significant success; most notably, the moratoriums on ELCs and mainstream Mekong dams, both of which resulted from sustained, dynamic, and confrontational activism against the state's violent neoliberalism.

In such a context, the INGO's conflict sensitivity programming can be seen as achieving narrow successes against systemic natural resource governance injustices. At localised levels, the programming has positively contributed towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts with tangible benefits for affected communities. It has also supported women's leadership and participation in dispute resolution. However, the conflict sensitivity programming has largely failed to address the systemic drivers of natural resource conflicts, while also appearing, at times, to dissuade civil society actors and communities from adopting confrontational tactics. Considering Hun Sen and the CPP's authoritarian rule, it raises the question of whether the INGO's approach is pragmatic or potentially reinforcing the government's efforts to de-politicise and de-radicalise civil society. This question must be understood within Cambodia's historical context, where confrontation with the state, such as the Boueng Kak and Areng Valley protests, have yielded systemic changes to natural resource governance that reformists have struggled to secure (Barter and Sar Citation2023).

Although this paper focuses on Cambodia, the practice and implementation of conflict sensitivity programming has relevance across many contexts. Having worked in conflict-affected settings, such as Myanmar and Somalia, the author has witnessed other instances where conflict sensitivity is often interpreted as or leads to risk and conflict avoidance. For example, INGOs prioritising an outward portrayal of neutrality, despite Myanmar's military blatantly committing atrocities against civilians (Naw Citation2019). Although this is not explicitly a result of conflict sensitivity, it provides a seemingly principled rationale for avoiding engagement with such critical issues. Such logics and technical approaches have been criticised for creating an “anti-politics machinery” in Myanmar (Bächtold Citation2015). This occurs despite the theory of conflict sensitivity promoting engagement with and understanding risk and conflict, rather than avoidance.

As the Cambodian case study here has shown, conflict sensitivity has extensive merit, but attention must be paid to how it is implemented, particularly to minimise the likelihood that it promotes conflict avoidance and demobilises possible activism. For donors, INGOs, CSOs, and individual practitioners, this means careful consideration of how conflict sensitivity programming is implemented and ensuring facilitators are duly equipped. Considering the case study presented here, emphasis should be placed on conflict sensitivity not becoming conflict avoidance. Such emphasis could also be complemented with examples that highlight the potential benefits (and risks) of confrontation with the state, as occurred with Boueng Kak and the Areng Valley protest movements.

Conclusion

This paper highlighted how the implementation of conflict sensitivity achieved localised positive impacts but can divert action away from addressing systemic drivers of natural resource injustices. It also illustrated the dangers of viewing and implementing conflict sensitivity as a technical, operational exercise, rather than a broader strategic and institutional process. The analysis was embedded within broader debates about international aid and civil society, in Cambodia and elsewhere. For Cambodia, confrontation with the state has yielded some of the most significant systemic changes to address natural resource injustices, most notably the moratoriums on ELCs and mainstream Mekong dams. The implementation of conflict sensitivity, however, has the potential to dissuade such advocacy, as illustrated in the case study. This is not the intention of conflict sensitivity in theory, but can be the result in practice, when it inappropriately encourages conflict and risk avoidance. In a global context of prevalent natural resource conflicts and related violence, critical reflection on conflict sensitivity programming in practice is essential. For development institutions and practitioners, conflict sensitivity remains pertinent, but it must be implemented in ways that do not inadvertently dissuade more emancipatory civil society activism. This means recognising the risks of negatively influencing activism, intentionally or not, and accounting for such influence in program design and partnerships.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank all the interviewees who contributed their time and energy to make this paper possible, many of whom continue opposing injustice despite the challenges and insecurity. An additional acknowledgement and thank you to the John Monash Foundation for scholarship funding, the Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust for scholarship funding, and the University of Cambridge for fieldwork funding.

Disclosure statement

I, Dustin Barter, have no conflicts of interest to disclose. No financial interest or benefit has arisen from the direct applications of my research.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy and ethical restrictions.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the General Sir John Monash Foundation; Cambridge Political Economy Society Trust; and University of Cambridge.

Notes

1 Although “aid” can imply both “an unequal power relationship and one which is purely altruistic” (Oxfam Citation2023, 74), the term is used in this paper because the analysis specifically looks at how aid intersects with contextual dynamics and is anything but benign; not using the term aid can be problematic by falsely implying an equal power dynamic.

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