Lethal Targeting and Adaptation Failure in Terrorist Groups

Abstract

If terrorist organizations wish to thrive, they often must adapt to lethal targeting. Over time, terrorist leaders can identify countermeasures that evade or erode state surveillance capabilities. Lower-level operatives will resist implementing these adaptations, however, so leaders must enforce their implementation. Leaders of groups with decentralized command relationships will struggle to directly monitor and enforce compliance. Leaders with limited resources at their disposal will also be unable to invest in the bureaucratic capacity to discipline operatives’ behavior. These organizational deficiencies become increasingly costly when state surveillance capabilities increase. I find support for this thesis by examining Arabic language correspondence from Usama bin Ladin’s compound related to the drone campaign in Pakistan. My argument contributes to theories of adaptation and the coercive power of warfighting technologies. It also suggests that advanced surveillance and strike capabilities may be insufficient for future counterterrorism success.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Joshua Schwartz, Matthew Fuhrmann, and Michael Horowitz, “Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counterproductive? Evidence from Eighteen Countries,” International Studies Quarterly 66, no. 3 (September 2022); Christopher Newton and Colin Tucker, “The Efficacy of Airpower in Counterinsurgency,” Security Studies 31, no. 2 (2022): 218-250; Asfandyar Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the US Drone War in Pakistan,” International Security 43, no. 2 (2018): 45-83; Patrick B., Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2016): 203-219; and Asfandyar Mir, and Dylan Moore, “Drones, Surveillance, and Violence: Theory and Evidence from a US Drone Program,” International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (2019): 846-862.

2 For exceptions, see: Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, “Kosovo and the Great Airpower Debate,” International Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 5-38; and Jenna Jordan, Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2019), 37, 42, 53.

3 See, e.g.: Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 133-164; Frank G. Hoffman, Mars Adapting: Military Change During War (Annapolis, M.D.: Naval Institute Press, 2021); Michael Hunzeker, Dying to Learn: Wartime Lessons from the Western Front (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Chad Serena, It Takes More than a Network: The Iraqi Insurgency and Organizational Adaptation (Redwood City, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014); and Theo Farrell, “Military Adaptation and Organisational Convergence in War: Insurgents and International Forces in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 45, no. 5 (2022): 718-742.

4 Stephen Biddle, Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2021), 46-107; and Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996), 139-179.

5 See, e.g.: Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach, Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism Campaigns that Killed bin Laden and Devastated Al Qaeda (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 165; Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?”; Michael V. Hayden, Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror (New York: Penguin, 2017), 336; and Michael G. Vickers, By All Means Available: Memoirs of a Life in Intelligence, Special Operations, and Strategy (New York: Penguin, 2023), 4.

6 For important exceptions, see: Farrell, “Military Adaptation and Organisational Convergence in War,” 736; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 195; and Calvert Jones, “Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in Diffuse Transnational Networks” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 555-569.

7 General Kenneth Frank McKenzie Jr., “Posture Statement of Commander, General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., Commander, U.S. Central Command,” March 15, 2022, https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/POSTURE-STATEMENT/; U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, “Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General Michael E. Kurilla, USA to be General and Commander, United States Central Command,” February 8, 2022, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/22-03_02-08-2022.pdf; and Department of Defense Inspector General, “Operation Enduring Sentinel, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022,” May 7, 2022, 8-11, https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/Article/3033660/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-freedoms-sentinel-and-operation-enduring-s/.

8 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Studies 18, no. 4 (2009): 719-755; and Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Security Studies 23, no. 3 (2014): 471–512.

9 Johnston and Sarbahi, “The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan”; Schwartz, Fuhrmann, and Horowitz, “Do Armed Drones Counter Terrorism, Or Are They Counterproductive?”; Newton and Tucker, “The Efficacy of Airpower in Counterinsurgency,”; Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?”; Mir and Moore, “Drones, Surveillance, and Violence.”

10 Robert Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” Security Studies 7, no. 2, (1997): 93-114; and James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2003).

11 For an overview, see: Milton C. Regan, Drone Strike-Analyzing the Impacts of Targeted Killing, (New York: Springer Nature, 2022), 176-195, 221-245.

12 Vincent Bauer, Michael Reese, and Keven Ruby, “Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration? Evidence from the Drone War in Pakistan,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 2 (2022): 297-326; and Peritz and Rosenbach, Find, Fix, Finish, 154, 158.

13 Vickers, By All Means Available, 232, 238-239. On the operational advantages of these platforms, see: Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate Over Drone Proliferation,” International Security 41, no. 2 (2016): 7-42; Sarah E. Kreps, Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); and Gjert Lage Dyndal, “Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” in John Andreas Olsen ed., Routledge Handbook of Air Power (New York: Routledge), 107-117.

14 In these latter circumstances, the United States still had to “confirm that the targets were AQ [al-Qaeda] or militant combatants.” See: Vickers, By All Means Available, 232-233; Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 337; Peritz and Rosenbach, Find, Fix, Finish, 159; and Leon Panetta, Worthy Fights (New York: Penguin Books, 2014), 241.

15 See, e.g.: Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?”; Peritz and Rosenbach, Find, Fix, Finish, 165; and Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 336.

16 Calculations are from data presented in Bauer, Reese, and Ruby, “Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration?” This dataset primarily uses manually coded case descriptions from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, which relies on local accounts and reporting.

17 Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?”; Bryce Loidolt, “Were Drone Strikes Effective? Evaluating the Drone Campaign in Pakistan Through Captured al-Qaeda Documents,” Texas National Security Review 5, no. 2 (Spring 2022): 54-79; and Nelly Lahoud, The Bin Laden Papers: How the Bin Laden Raid Revealed the Truth about Al-Qaeda, Its Leader, and His Family, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 2022), 99-116.

18 Aaron Rapport, “Hard Thinking about Hard and Easy Cases in Security Studies,” Security Studies 24, no. 3, (2015): 431-465.

19 Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby ds., Handbook of Political Science, Political Science: Scope and Theory Vol. 7, (Reading, Mass., 1975), 94-137.

20 Rapport, “Hard Thinking about Hard and Easy Cases in Security Studies.”

21 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3, 53.

22 Antonia Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Raffaele Marchetti, and Ivan Zaccagnini, “Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare,” International Security 46, no. 4 (2022): 130-171.

23 Brian Jackson et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2007), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG481.html.

24 Evgeny Finkel, “The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust,” American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (April 2015): 339-353.

25 See, e.g.: Finkel, “The Phoenix Effect of State Repression”; Blake Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Elude Detection, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Sarah E. Parkinson, Beyond the Lines: Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2023).

26 Amy B. Zegart, “September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 78-111.

27 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); Tricia L. Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm, Terror in Transition: Leadership and Succession in Terrorist Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022); and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003): 473-507.

28 Amy Zegart, “Implementing Change: Organizational Challenges,” in Baruch Fischoff and Cherie Chauvin eds., Intelligence Analysis: Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations, (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011), 473-497.

29 Parkinson, Beyond the Lines; Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014); and Trica Bacon, Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

30 Kristin Harkness and Michael Hunzeker, “Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 6 (2015): 777-800.

31 Jacob Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013).

32 James Reason, Dianne Parker, and Rebecca Lawton, “Organizational Controls and Safety: The Varieties of Rule-Related Behaviour,” Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology 71, no. 4 (1988): 289-304.

33 Max Abrahms and Phillip K Potter, “Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015): 311-342; and Amira Jadoon, Andrew Mines, and Daniel Milton, “Targeting Quality or Quantity? The Divergent Effects of Targeting Upper Versus Lower-Tier Leader Leaders of Militant Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 67, no. 5 (2023).

34 Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence, 11-12; and Jackson et al, Aptitude for Destruction; Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2005), 38.

35 Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Staniland, Networks of Rebellion.

36 Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma, 114-117.

37 Roland Strausz, “Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship,” The Review of Economic Studies 64, no. 3 (1997): 337-357.

38 Shapiro, The Terrorist’s Dilemma, 61.

39 Carl Anthony Wege, “Hizballah’s Counterintelligence Apparatus,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25, no. 4 (2012): 771-785, 773.

40 Mobley, Terrorism and Counterintelligence, 53-54.

41 Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” International Organization 64, no. 1 (2010): 33-64.

42 Frank Wiengarten, Di Fan, Chris K.Y. Lo, and Park Pagell, “The Differing Impacts of Operational and Financial Slack on Occupational Safety in Varying Market Conditions,” Journal of Operations Management 52, (2017): 30-45.

43 Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell, “Employing ISR SOF Best Practices,” Joint Force Quarterly 50, no. 3 (2008): 56-61.

44 David Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Works: The Jihadist Group’s Evolving Organizational Design,” Hudson Institute, June 1, 2018.

45 Assaf Moghadam, “How al Qaeda Innovates,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 466-497.

46 Lahoud, the Bin Laden Papers, 130-145,

47 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 1 March 2006, PDF-018260, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/F1/F1C827017C6F0D4B7D77335A5F864A44_لمولوي_زمراي.pdf; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 17 February 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023804, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/34/34107427DAC7382457F9D58F4307081C_lمن_عثمان_لأزمراي_ربيع_أول.pdf; and Author Unknown, “Accounts for the Months of Shaban and Ramadan,” Undated, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023977, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/A6/A61E1592B32953F47B9BD90CDDCD2C1E_حسابات_لشهرين_شعبان_ورمضان.xlsx.pdf.

48 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 1 March 2006; and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin 8 March 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023804, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/34/34107427DAC7382457F9D58F4307081C_lمن_عثمان_لأزمراي_ربيع_أول.pdf.

49 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Identifying and Preventing Terrorist Financing, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 21-22.

50 Greg Bruno, “Al-Qaeda’s Financial Pressures,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaedas-financial-pressures and Juan Carlos Zuarte, Treasury’s War, (New York: Public Affairs, 2015), 82, 90, 104-113.

51 Paul Staniland, Asfandyar Mir, and Sameer Lalwani, “Politics and Threat Perception: Explaining Pakistani Military Strategy on the North West Frontier,” Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018): 535-574; Fawaz Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Lahoud, The Bin Laden Papers, 106, 174, 288-289.

52 Mir and Moore, “Drones, Surveillance, and Violence.”

53 Jack S. Levy, “Counterfactuals, Causal Inference, and Historical Analysis,” Security Studies 24, no. 3 (2015): 378-402.

54 John R. Lindsay, Information Technology and Military Power, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 307-309; and Don Rassler, “Drone, Counter Drone: Observations on the Contest Between the United States and Jihadis, CTC Sentinel 10, no. 1 (January 2017), 23-28.

55 The CIA disclosed approximately 470,000 files recovered in the raid. After the CIA removed copyrighted material, material that would “damage efforts to keep the nation secure,” as well as “pornography; malware; blank, corrupted, and duplicate files,” the collection consists of just over 130,000 files. See: CIA, “November 2017 Release of Abbottabad Compound Material,” Undated, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/index.html.

56 My sampling procedure is detailed in Section 1 of the Supplementary Appendix. The roughly 25,000 written documents have been well-established as having the greatest evidentiary value. See: Jacopo Bellasio et. al, Insights from the Bin Laden Archive: Inventory of Research and Knowledge and Initial Assessment and Characterization of the Bin Laden Archive,” (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2021), iv; and Lahoud, The Bin Laden Papers, 10-14.

57 Christopher Darnton, “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate Over U.S. Entry into World War II,” International Security 24, no. 3 (Winter 2017/2018): 102–04.

58 Senders and Recipients are those written on correspondence involving al-Qaeda operatives.

59 Author Unknown, “The Security Rules for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” July/August 2008, Abbottabad Files, PDF-004585, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/C9/C90D559541C92D70B11BD6D37C592438_اللأئحة_الأمنية.pdf; Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-002875, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/26/2611DDA302C332F7964EEA7CD309BF1B_الرسالة_الأمنية.pdf; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, First File,” June/July 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-004345, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/A6/A6E660CF73212E48D3861BFDBE1627C5_مكافحة_الطيران_الجاسوسي_ـ_ملف_أول.pdf; and Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, Detailed File,” June/July 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-004884, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/EA/EAB62B21E7DA730E8BDE34B0127547D7_مكافحة_الطيران_الجاسوسي_ـ_ملف_تفصيلي.pdf.

60 The Abbottabad Files reflect numerous sensitive topics. See: Nelly Lahoud, al-Qaeda’s Contested Relationship with Iran, (Washington, D.C.: New American Foundation, 2018). Moreover, The titles of some of the censored Abbottabad Files suggests that they are not documents discussing drone strikes. See: Author Unknown, “Chlotares From Bleach and Salt,” Undated, Abottabad Files, PDF-016407, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/B5/B50405BDFC42315649C3DAAA9059CB93_Chlotares_From_bleach_and_salt.pdf.

61 Alexander Lee, “The Library of Babel: How (and How Not) to Use Archival Sources in Political Science,” Journal of Historical Political Economy 2, no. 3 (2022): 499-526; and Sidney Rosen and Abraham Tesser, “On Reluctance to Communicate Undesirable Information: The MUM Effect,” Sociometry 33, no. 3 (1970): 253-263.

62 Lee, “The Library of Babel.”

63 Combating Terrorism Center, “Harmony Program,” Undated, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program.

64 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines Second Edition, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2019), 212.

65 Michael Silber, The al-Qaeda Factor: Plots Against the West, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 204; and ‘Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 1 March 2006. On Ghamdi, see: Author Unknown, “Complete Survey,” late 2005 Abbottabad Files, PDF-017736, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/8D/8DEF3F9894FD7D7DE1287C150A11AC70_استبيان_كامل.pdf.

66 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 1 March 2006.

67 CTC Harmony Files, “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi,” July 9, 2005, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf.

68 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 1 March 2006.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid.

71 Author Unknown, “The Security Rules for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” July/August 2008.

72 Ibid.

73 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-004402, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/AD/ADA6EB8284E8D75733F93503C3CB7BDA_التقرير_المطلوب.pdf.

74 Vickers, By All Means Available, 228-236.

75 Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 348.

76 Vickers, By All Means Available, 228.

77 Vickers, By All Means Available, 232-234; Panetta, Worthy Fights, 242; and Hayden, Playing to the Edge, 334-348.

78 Peritz, Find Fix and Finish, 156-157; and Imtiaz Ali and Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda Commander Moved Freely in Pakistan,” Washington Post, February 4, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/03/AR2008020303147.html.

79 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 16 April 2008, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023513, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/C6/C6090F43E081E2DCCDFF5363C762417B_من_عثمان_لمولوى_زمراي_ربيع.pdf.

80 Brian Glyn Williams, Predators: The CIA’s Drone War on al Qaeda (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013), 66.

81 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

82 Dan Gettinger, “al-Qaeda Central Senior Leadership Casualties from Drone Strikes,” Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, Undated, https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2015/04/AQ-C-Outline-2.pdf.

83 Gettinger, “al-Qaeda Central Senior Leadership Casualties from Drone Strikes.”

84 Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010.

85 Bill Roggio, “Senior al-Qaeda Leader Thought Killed in North Waziristan,” Long War Journal, November 1, 2008, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/senior_al_qaeda_lead_2.php.

86 Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010.

87 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, First File,” June-July 2010.

88 For background on al-Wafa, see Treasury Department, “Treasury Designates al-Qa’ida Leaders in Syria,” May 14, 2014, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2396.aspx.

89 “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

90 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “Hearing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment,” February 7, 2008, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20080207_transcript.pdf.

91 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, March-April 2008, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023447, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/50/503F3CF4EDDF4EC13F103E6552FB41AC_من_عطية_إلى_أزمراي_ـ_ربيع_الأول_1429هـ.pdf; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 16 April 2008; and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 24 August 2009, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023853,

https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/14/144347D6CD5DE28229D6944E94D151F1_لأزمراي_أول_رمضان.pdf.

92 Department of Treasury, “Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing David S. Cohen Remarks to the ABA/AA Money Laundering Enforcement Conference,” October 12, 2009, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg317; and Juan Miguel del Cid Gomez, “A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 4 (October 2010): 3-27.

93 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

94 Zia Ur Rehman, “The Khurasan Mujahideen Seek to Eliminate Espionage in Waziristan,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 9, no. 13 (2011); Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 17 February 2010; and Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010.

95 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

96 Bauer, Reese, and Ruby, “Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration?” For details on the extension I performed of this analysis, see section 2 of the Supplementary Appendix.

97 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 8 March 2010.

98 Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010.

99 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Vintage, 2013), 133; Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?”; Panetta, Worthy Fights, 251-252; and Vickers, By All Means Available, 238.

100 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 8 March 2010.

101 Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010.

102 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

103 Dan Gettinger, “al-Qaeda Central Senior Leadership Casualties from Drone Strikes.”

104 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

105 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 17 February 2010.

106 Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, “The Security Message,” Spring 2010.

107 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

108 Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness?” 71-72.

109 Loidolt, “Were Drone Strikes Effective?” 66.

110 Ibid., 67.

111 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 14 April 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023765, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/E8/E88A28E21B9D074C4828E9115F5E80CC_من_ح_عثمان.pdf.

112 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid and Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 26 January 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023935, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/CB/CB09C06FF85363335A038AF3D83736FE_جواب_لأزمراي_ـ_10صفر1431.pdf.

113 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 8 March 2010.

114 Ibid.; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 14 April 2010.

115 Usama bin Ladin to Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahman, 6 July 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-004384, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/AB/ABACDA95C757D68EC50382E62563571B_الشيخ_محمود.pdf.

116 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 14 April 2010.

117 As an apparent act of desperation, al-Qaeda explored shooting down or disabling UAVs. See: Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, First File,” June/July 2010; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, Detailed File,” June/July 2010; and Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 19 June 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-003128, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/36/3663EBB50528F58783EB34F9F7ACBDD2_من_محمود_ـ_رجب1431.pdf.

118 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, Detailed File,” June/July 2010.

119 Ibid.; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman, “Combating Spy Planes, First File,” June/July 2010; Usama bin Ladin to Ayman al-Zawahiri, 17 October 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-003157, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/3C/3C85571A1C09D85153917A3B5670A6AF_إلى_الشيخ_أبي_محمد.pdf"; and Usama bin Ladin to Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahman, 17 October 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-003159, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/3C/3CADE28F8CD5468054BFE960634205AA_إلى_محمود.pdf.

120 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 19 June 2010. See also: Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

121 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 24 January 2011, PDF-023953, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/99/99D9514748A90A2A378B40503C2B0219_من_محمود_ـ_20صفر1432.pdf; and Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010.

122 Abu al-Wafa, “Report of the Security Committee,” 17 May 2010; and Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 24 January 2011.

123 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 6 October 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-004555, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/C5/C51E8BA4CE8263C5115D6EB74FB8757D_من_محمود_27_شوال1431هـــ.pdf.

124 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 23 November 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-010238, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/23/23A7EDEA91B69647F9C47A4D73602620_من%20محمود%20ــ%20عيد%20الأضحى1431.pdf.

125 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 21 January 2011, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023939, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/00/00B25759B9EBA0171E9D8D5E5BC659D9_من_محمود_ـ_ردود_سريعة_ـ_20صفر1432.pdf.

126 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 19 June 2010; Usama bin Ladin to Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahman, 7 August 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023992, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/9F/9F50AE5D07263B5AE13D7EA8501B050B_إلى_الشيخ_محمود.pdf.

127 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 23 November 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-011116, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/F3/F3BDEABF016ED14442E5F77E2E391930_أجوبة%20سريعة%20من%20محمود%20ــ%20عيد%20الأضحى1431.pdf.

128 Usama bin Ladin to Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahman, 7 January 2011, Abbottabad Files, PDF-002746, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/0E/0EB79CFC51DA5F229D6B5565C374322B_إلى_الشيخ_محمود.pdf.

129 Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “How Al-Qaeda Works.”

130 Lahoud, the Bin Laden Papers, 130-145, and Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 19 July 2010, PDF-004221, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/96/960C49AFFB077F2F2E3CBCD74F83258D_من_محمود_ـ_5شعبان1431.pdf.

131 See, e.g.: Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 16 April 2008; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 24 August 2009; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 17 February 2010; and Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 19 June 2010.

132 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Zubayr, 27 March 2011, Abbottabad Files, PDF-003636, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/57/5709A194C55BD93BF14D7849014BBCEA_إلى_الصومال.pdf.

133 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 16 April 2008; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 24 August 2009; and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 14 April 2010.

134 Zuarte, Treasury’s War, 82, 90, 104-113. See also: National Commission, Identifying and Preventing Terrorist Financing, 6-10.

135 Giovanni Cappocia and Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59, (April 2007): 341-369.

136 Martin Bunzl, “Counterfactual History: A User’s Guide,” The American Historical Review109, no. 3 (2004): 845-858, 857.

137 Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 16 April 2008.

138 Carlotta Gall, “Afghan Tells of Ordeal at the ‘Center of al-Qaeda,’” New York Times, March 2, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/asia/03kidnap.html.

139 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 19 June 2010.

140 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 24 January 2011.

141 Bauer, Reese, and Ruby, “Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration?”

142 For details on the extension I performed of this analysis, see: Supplementary Appendix, Section 2.

143 United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program,” December 9, 2014, 5, 358, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf; and Department of Justice, “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom,” July 7, 2010, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/charges-unsealed-against-five-alleged-members-al-qaeda-plot-attack-united-states-and-united.

144 On Al-Shukrijumah”s security precautions, see: Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 28 December 2009, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023838, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/FE/FED9C56C134B0704EDEFDA9D3F8FE07C_من_ح_عثمان_محرم_31.pdf; and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 17 February 2010. On his death, see: Ismail Khan, “Pakistani Military Kills al-Qaida Leader,” New York Times, December 6, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/world/pakistan-kills-senior-qaeda-leader-wanted-by-fbi.html.

145 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 6 October 2010; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 23 November 2010, PDF-011116; and Dan Gettinger, “al-Qaeda Central Senior Leadership Casualties from Drone Strikes.”

146 On the activities of al-Maghrebi, see: Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 6 October 2010; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 23 November 2010, PDF-011116; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 23 November 2010, PDF-010238; and Rohan Gunaratna, and Anders Nielsen, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 9 (2008): 775-807, 794.

147 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 6 October 2010; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 24 January 2011; and Dan Gettinger, “al-Qaeda Central Senior Leadership Casualties from Drone Strikes.”

148 Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 6 October 2010.

149 Usama bin Ladin to Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Fall 2009, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023840,

https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/E0/E05FA88F3B10901837CD08FE72A1ACB5_الحاج_عثمان_شوال.pdf; Mustafa Abu al-Yazid to Usama bin Ladin, 18 October 2009, Abbottabad Files, PDF-023750, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/85/8557A8E5293A612418A6758882D189B9_من_ح_عثمان.pdf; Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman to Usama bin Ladin, 23 November 2010, PDF-010238; and Usama bin Ladin to Attiya ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahman, 3 December 2010, Abbottabad Files, PDF-010335, https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/4D/4D24394961B76FF76C8A8F559FEBD17B_إلى_الشيخ_محمود.pdf.

150 Mir, “What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness,” 55, 82-83; and Andrew Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints,” Security Studies 25, no. 1 (2016): 50-84.

151 Becca Wasser et al., The Air War Against the Islamic State: The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2021); and R. Kim Cragin, “Tactical Partnerships for Strategic Effects: Recent Experiences of US Forces Working by, with, and through Surrogates in Syria and Libya,” Defence Studies 20, no. 4 (2020): 318-335.

152 For overviews, see, e.g.: Jackson et al, Aptitude for Destruction, 35-47; and Mary M Crossan and Marina Apaydin, “A Multi-Dimensional Framework of Organizational Innovation: A Systematic Review of the Literature,” Journal of Management Studies 47, no. 6 (2010): 1154-1191.

153 Michael Kenney, From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation, (University Park, Pennsylvania, Penn State University Press, 2008).

154 Kristen A. Harkness, “Review of Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War,” H-Diplo ISSF Roundtable 12, no. 11 (2021).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bryce Loidolt

Bryce Loidolt is a Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. I thank Mark Berlin, Kim Cragin, Frank Hoffman, Kendrick Kuo, Tom Lynch, Asfandyar Mir, and Mitt Regan, as well as the journal editors and reviewers, for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors and omissions herein are mine alone.