Escaping Paralysis: Strategies for Countering Asymmetric Nuclear Escalation

Abstract

States armed with nuclear weapons are often hesitant to engage in low levels of conflict against rivals armed with nuclear weapons for fear of provoking a nuclear response. I refer to this condition as “substrategic paralysis.” I provide a typology of the options for nuclear weapon states trying to escape this paralysis. A countervalue punishment strategy deters through countervalue nuclear retaliation. A conventional pause strategy deters by shifting the burden of further escalation back onto the adversary with a conventional response. A damage limitation strategy deters through the ability to limit damage in a nuclear war. Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy discourages through a war-winning capability at all conflict levels. To escape substrategic paralysis, the Soviet Union and India initially relied on countervalue punishment before moving toward a conventional pause strategy. India’s failure to escape paralysis triggered a search for a damage limitation strategy. In contrast, the United States pursues a tit-for-tat strategy to neutralize substrategic paralysis.

Introduction

When a nuclear weapon state (NWS) threatens a nuclear response to non-nuclear aggression, the state is trying to use the fear of nuclear escalation to deter an adversary from engaging in lower levels of conflict. The conundrum of how to escape this (potential) inability to maneuver below the strategic nuclear level exists in many nuclear dyads today. This paralysis is highlighted as an ever more pressing concern in the two latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs).¹ More specifically, the West has arguably been restrained in its response to Russia’s war in Ukraine precisely because it fears Russian nuclear escalation at the nonstrategic level.² Similarly, North Korea seeks to constrain American responses through the threat of immediate nuclear first use.³ In South Asia, Pakistan’s threat of a nuclear response to conventional Indian aggression has paralyzed India from effectively responding to Pakistan’s support of terrorist groups.⁴ Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that China seeks to alter its nuclear strategy precisely because it is trying to nullify what it perceives as an increasing American reliance on early and limited nuclear first use in East Asia.⁵ This paper identifies a condition of substrategic paralysis, occurring when a nuclear-armed state is dissuaded from engaging in low levels of conflict with another NWS because it fears the repercussion of a limited nuclear response. Furthermore, it constructs a typology of strategies a nuclear weapons state can employ to escape this paralysis.

Nuclear rivals are in a constant action-reaction cycle, where they compete for a strategic advantage based on their competitor’s strategic choices.⁶ The dominant work on (regional) nuclear strategies explains strategy choices by focusing on the availability of a patron, the conventional balance of power, civil-military arrangements, and resource constraints.⁷ Thus, this literature fails to account for how the adversary’s nuclear strategy influences an NWS’s strategy choice. This paper illustrates the importance of incorporating this reactive aspect into our understanding of nuclear strategy.

Existing scholarship uncovers the relevance and logic behind threatening a nuclear response to conventual aggression, referred to here as an asymmetric escalation threat.⁸ Although Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang examine how India may pursue a counterforce strategy to escape such paralysis, no attempt has been made to develop a coherent typology of the strategies available for an NWS seeking to escape substrategic paralysis.⁹

Accordingly, existing categorizations of nuclear strategies, which usually focus on the mechanism through which nuclear weapons deter general nuclear war, are insufficient to uncover the distinctive mechanisms through which an NWS may seek to escape substrategic paralysis.¹⁰ For example, although an assured retaliation strategy aims to deter massive nuclear strikes through the promise of inflicting unacceptable damage in retaliation, the mechanism through which it can contribute to escaping substrategic paralysis is underspecified in the literature.¹¹ Similarly, although existing characterizations of a strategic counterforce strategy stipulate how the ability to limit damage in an all-out war may be an effective deterrence at the strategic level, the literature does not focus on how this ability can also provide an escape route from substrategic paralysis.¹² Moreover, theories of nuclear strategy rarely consider how the conventional and nuclear levels are intertwined, and when they do, the focus is on how nuclear weapons can compensate for conventional deficits, not on how conventional forces may improve leverage in a nuclear standoff.¹³ By focusing on a narrower, albeit important, puzzle in most nuclear dyads, this article adds to the literature by developing a coherent typology that uncovers four distinct pathways through which an NWS can try to escape substrategic paralysis.

The typology I develop in this article separates strategies based on their nuclear deterrence logic—deterrence by punishment or denial—and whether the strategy encompasses escalation control. Together, these two dimensions produce four strategies available for an NWS trying to escape substrategic paralysis. First, a countervalue punishment strategy tries to escape paralysis by convincing the adversary that it is impossible to control escalation and that unlimited countervalue retaliation is inevitable if the adversary escalates beyond certain limits. A conventional pause strategy employs conventional force to shift the onus of further escalation back onto the adversary under the increasing danger of countervalue retaliation. Thus, the conventional response seeks to diminish the adversary’s confidence to escalate further without receiving a countervalue strike in return. The damage limitation strategy relies on the ability to escape annihilation in an all-out war, seeking to escape paralysis by the threat of a massive counterforce response to even limited nuclear use. Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy tries to dissuade escalation to any conflict level by developing the ability to win at all levels.

The existing literature codes the following NWS as having a strategy based on an asymmetric escalation threat: NATO/U.S. during the Cold War, France from 1960 to 1990, Pakistan since 1998, post-Cold War Russia, North Korea, and finally both China and the United States are presumably concerned that the other is leaning in this direction.¹⁴ Any NWS’s strategy choice intended to neutralize these asymmetric escalation threats falls within the scope conditions of the typology developed in this article. Accordingly, the universe of cases includes the majority of the most tense and important nuclear dyads in history. Table 1 identifies the universe of cases.

Table 1. List of the universe of cases.

Soviet Union during the Cold War (vs. NATO/US) Soviet Union during the Cold War (vs. France) China during the Cold War (vs. US) India 1998-2023 (vs. Pakistan) US/NATO 1990s-2023 (vs. Russia) US 2017-2023 (vs. North Korea) US 2020s (vs. China) China 2020s (vs. US)

It is beyond the scope of this article to examine all relevant cases. I demonstrate the utility of the typology by exploring three cases: The Soviet Union’s reaction to NATO’s flexible response strategy in the 1960s and early 1970s; India’s approach toward Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation strategy from 1998 until 2023; and the United States’ strategy toward Russia’s asymmetric escalation threat and a potential future Chinese attempt to purse a similar strategy. Together, these three cases demonstrate the relevance of strategies for escaping substrategic paralysis across time—the Cold War and post-Cold War period—and across different types of nuclear dyads—regional nuclear dyads and superpower dyads.

By examining developments in military capabilities, declassified documents, military strategic writings, interviews with former officials, official statements and documents regarding nuclear doctrine and existing literature, this article argues that both the Soviet Union and India initially relied on a threat of countervalue retaliation to deter asymmetric escalation. Toward the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to rely more on conventional forces backed up by the lurking shadow of an unacceptable countervalue response. Similarly, India tried to repurpose its conventional forces to escape substrategic paralysis. Nonetheless, over the past two decades, several indicators have suggested an aspiring Indian damage limitation approach to deter Pakistan revisionism. Finally, investment in limited nuclear options and official documents about US nuclear strategy suggest an American pursuit of a tit-for-tat strategy to respond to its rivals’ (future) asymmetric escalation threats.

Identifying the reactive strategies available to an asymmetric escalation threat is a required precursor for evaluating and addressing the risk factors for nuclear use in these dyads. Only by identifying pairs of strategies is it possible to make sound assessments about potential nuclear use pathways and risk reduction measures. Similarly, categorizing the available strategy options is a necessary building block for determining why an NWS opts for one response or the other.¹⁵ It is beyond the scope of this article to examine nuclear risk factors and why states choose one strategy over another. However, this article’s typology and empirical coding are a required first step before future research can investigate these important and related questions.

The article proceeds in four parts. First, I define the strategic conundrum that I call substrategic paralysis. Second, I present the typology. Third, I use the typology to examine three cases. Fourth, I offer conclusions and avenues for future research.

Asymmetric Escalation and Substrategic Paralysis

An asymmetric escalation threat seeks to deter non-nuclear attacks by the threat of the rapid escalation of the first use of nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear aggression.¹⁶ The threshold for such asymmetric escalation will vary according to the type of non-nuclear aggression an NWS tries to deter, ranging from massive conventional attacks to subconventional hostility (terrorist attacks, support for rebel/terrorist groups, etc.). An NWS with this strategy needs to develop limited and flexible nuclear use options and, ideally, a survivable second-strike capability.¹⁷

The limited first use of nuclear weapons, which the asymmetric escalation threat entails, seeks to improve a state’s chances of winning or ending a conflict more quickly and/or seeks to reduce the enemy’s incentive to attack or retaliate by bolstering or reestablishing deterrence.¹⁸ Either way, the NWS seeks to compel the adversary to back down by turning the onus of further escalation back to the adversary after a state has crossed the nuclear threshold, which comes with an implicit or explicit threat of more damage to come.¹⁹ Thus, the logic of asymmetric escalation assumes that the limited employment of nuclear weapons will not automatically lead to an all-out war. Instead, the NWS seeks to take advantage of the possibility that the adversary might be coerced into submission—an assumption that the adversary will seek to counter with its own strategy.

The asymmetric escalation threat pursues two related objectives. First, by threatening a nuclear response at lower levels of conflict, the NWS increases the spectrum of aggression that nuclear weapons deter beyond the nuclear level. Second, in theory, the strategy enables the NWS to engage in lower levels of aggression without fearing a large-scale response from its adversary because its asymmetric escalation threat deters the adversary from escalating beyond a certain point.²⁰ Accordingly, the threat of asymmetric escalation seeks to produce what I call a substrategic paralysis, which is a situation where the opponent is deterred from operating at the substrategic level because it fears a nuclear response. Suppose the asymmetric escalation threat is effective in eliminating the adversary’s willingness to operate below the (strategic) nuclear threshold. In that case, it will not only deter conventional and other types of substrategic aggression, but it may also embolden the threatening state to engage in aggressive behavior below this threshold because it assumes that the adversary is deterred from responding forcefully. For example, Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation threat has enabled it to support terrorist groups and carry out subconventional aggression without fearing massive Indian retaliation.²¹ This paper identifies the options available for an NWS trying to escape substrategic paralysis. By attempting to escape this conundrum, the NWS does not simply seek to avoid asymmetric escalation by the adversary but also to restore its ability to operate at lower levels of conflict.

Escaping Substrategic Paralysis: A Typology

The typology lays out four strategies available to an NWS trying to escape the paralysis described above. Each strategy seeks to influence the opponent’s incentives such that asymmetric escalation no longer seems beneficial or credible and thus enables the NWS to escape substrategic paralysis. I differentiate the four strategies according to their nuclear deterrence logic and whether the strategy seeks to control escalation. These two dimensions capture the fundamental variations among the strategies at the broadest level of abstraction possible. Combined, they account for the unique mechanism intended to deter asymmetric escalation, the specific function nuclear weapons play, and the type of initial nuclear employment envisioned in each of the four strategies. In addition, they have significant implications for the kind of capabilities and operational planning needed for each strategy.

Nuclear Deterrence Logic

The first differentiating characteristic is how nuclear-armed states intend for nuclear weapons to contribute to the deterrence objective. A state’s nuclear weapons can contribute to the objective of deterring asymmetric escalation through nuclear punishment or denial. The punishment approach seeks to outweigh the potential benefit of asymmetric escalation through the threat of countervalue nuclear punishment. The denial approach seeks to deny the adversary the benefits of aggression by making it infeasible or unlikely for the adversary to succeed with its objective.²² This differentiation represents the classic debate between the nuclear revolution position, where nuclear escalation is (relatively easily) deterred by the risk of countervalue nuclear punishment, and the more demanding position, which argues that war-winning capabilities are needed to deter aggression.²³ Although an NWS may draw on a combination of both punishment and denial logics—either by design or because of a transitional phase—the deterrence logics are distinct, and this paper codes strategies according to the dominant nuclear deterrence logic.

The governing nuclear deterrence logic strongly influences the types of nuclear capabilities needed. On the punishment side, an NWS is content with developing a (survivable) nuclear arsenal that is capable of retaliating against countervalue targets (cities, etc.) to maximize the cost inflicted. Furthermore, because countervalue targets are large and easy to destroy, the delivery vehicle does not need to be accurate. Similarly, the speed of retaliation is a secondary concern; thus, forces do not need to be responsive or on high alert. The requirements for survivability and reliability will vary according to the adversary’s ability to disarm the state’s nuclear force and the degree to which retaliation only needs to be possible or assured.²⁴ Thus, a nuclear force meant for punishment can vary from only a handful of unreliable weapons to a sophisticated survivable force that can assure retaliation. Nevertheless, punishment strategies are similar in that they do not demand very large nuclear arsenals, complex employment doctrines, sophisticated delivery, or command-and-control systems. The only requirement is the ability to retaliate against countervalue targets.

A denial strategy focuses on military targets and the ability to respond effectively at all conflict levels and/or limit damage in a nuclear war. Here, deterrence is achieved by convincing the adversary that it cannot achieve its objective in a nuclear war, thus dissuading any nuclear escalation in the first place.²⁵ The underlying logic is that because only usable options are credible and only credible nuclear threats can deter, an NWS must develop usable and resilient warfighting options to deter aggression.²⁶ An NWS pursuing a denial-based strategy should develop responsive and accurate delivery systems able to hit and neutralize military targets, as well as supporting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities—for targeting and damage assessments—and ideally ballistic missile defense to intercept any remaining adversary missiles. Thus, if it is economically and technologically capable of doing so, an NWS should develop a flexible, usable, and sophisticated nuclear arsenal that is suitable for winning a nuclear war.

Escalation Control

The second characterizing feature is whether the strategy relies on escalation control, which refers to an attempt to dictate and take advantage of the pace and scope of the conflict. This typology distinguishes between two approaches toward escalation. The first is characterized by the acknowledgment that escalation is something happening outside of the belligerents’ control and that war will (inevitably) explode into an all-out war. The second approach builds on the perception that escalation is a controlled and opportunistic action designed to compel the adversary into compliance by placing the onus of further escalation back on the opponent.²⁷ Here, limited escalation, in anticipation that the adversary will back down—because of the intolerable risk of further escalation or one’s dominance at higher levels of conflict—is the key to escaping substrategic paralysis.

A strategy discounting the potential for escalation control tries to achieve deterrence by convincing the adversary that no meaningful distinction between a limited and an all-out nuclear war exists. Accordingly, such a strategy threatens with an immediate unlimited response to asymmetric escalation; that is, a response that is unrestricted in the objectives sought and military means employed.²⁸ The objective is to convince the adversary that a limited nuclear war—as envisioned by the asymmetric escalation threat—is impossible. As a result, only countervalue nuclear options are needed, but the requirements for these unlimited options are decided by the nuclear deterrence logic. Limited, flexible, and discriminating nuclear options are not required and are, to some extent, counterproductive because they undermine the credibility of the immediate unlimited response.²⁹

On the other hand, a strategy designed to control and take advantage of escalatory dynamics relies on a limited response to escape substrategic paralysis. The response is characterized by limited objectives and the withholding of some military capabilities, most notably strategic nuclear forces. The ability to escalate a conflict in a limited way is an important coercive tool because it shifts the onus of further escalation back onto the adversary. The governing nuclear deterrence logic decides what type of limited escalatory ability is required. The limited response(s) should emphasize discrimination between operational plans for different levels of conflict. By developing clearly distinguishable military options, the NWS seeks to avoid any confusion about the level of conflict in play at any time—thus minimizing the risk of inadvertent escalation.³⁰ Accordingly, the NWS is expected to develop a range of options while emphasizing clear thresholds between different plans.³¹ One important example of such threshold thinking is not targeting capabilities connected to the adversary’s (strategic) nuclear forces.³²

Table 2 shows how these dimensions produce four distinctive strategies for escaping substrategic paralysis. I will go on to discuss how these categories interplay and the characteristics of these strategies.

Table 2. A typology of strategies for escaping substrategic paralysis.

		Nuclear deterrence logic
		Punishment	Denial
Escalation control	Yes	Conventional pause strategy	Tit-for-tat strategy
	No	Countervalue punishment strategy	Damage limitation strategy

Four Strategies for Escaping Substrategic Paralysis

The four strategies presented below each have a unique logic through which they seek to escape substrategic paralysis. There are different benefits and risks associated with each. In general, the military sophistication an NWS needs to pursue these strategies and the envisioned effectiveness of the threat to deter asymmetric escalation increases in the order in which the strategies are presented.

Similar to a general strategy of assured retaliation, the countervalue punishment strategy relies on the threat of countervalue nuclear retaliation. However, through its disregard for escalation control, it explicitly seeks to deter asymmetric escalation by the threat of immediate nuclear countervalue retaliation—in a way that is underspecified in existing characterizations of nuclear retaliation-oriented strategies.³³ The level of conflict by which an NWS’s nuclear countervalue response is threatened may vary; however, at a minimum, the response is threatened in reaction to any first use of nuclear weapons by the adversary. This strategy seeks to undermine the adversary’s asymmetric escalation incentive by making any potential gain appear minor compared with the punishment inflicted ex-post.

In terms of the capabilities needed, this escape route is the least demanding of the four options. An NWS with this strategy only needs the ability to deliver relatively few nuclear weapons in retaliation against countervalue targets, putting few demands on delivery systems’ accuracy and responsiveness and on the ability to locate targets. However, the drawback is that the threat of countervalue punishment in response to limited nuclear first use—as envisioned by the asymmetric escalation threat—suffers from a credibility problem because of the adversary’s ability to counter-retaliate with nuclear weapons. Still, because this strategy is the least demanding route to an escape strategy, this is often the initial response adopted by an NWS trying to escape substrategic paralysis.

One way to address the credibility problem is to rely on a more limited—and, thus, more credible—response to escape substrategic paralysis. The conventional pause strategy relies on countervalue punishment to deter nuclear escalation beyond limited nuclear use from the adversary. However, contrary to the countervalue punishment strategy and other existing nuclear strategy categorizations, conventional forces address the asymmetric escalation challenge by placing the burden of further escalation back onto the adversary either right before or immediately after the adversary’s limited nuclear first use. Thus, an NWS state can seek to escape substrategic paralysis by threatening a conventional response in two different ways:

1. The first rationale is that a quick conventional escalation up to the nuclear threshold of the adversary solves the problem by shifting the onus of escalation under increasing risk of uncontrolled nuclear escalation. Here, the NWS needs a conventional force that can mobilize and respond quickly. This follows from Thomas Schelling’s logic of “threats that leave something to chance,” where a deliberate limited escalatory action can increase the credibility of an inherently incredible option because the uncertainty surrounding the escalation process creates a genuine risk of uncontrolled escalation into an all-out war.³⁴ Thus, because immediate conventional escalation increases the shared risk of escalation to an all-out war—which, in turn, increases the credibility of the threat of countervalue punishment—this response can undermine the adversary’s asymmetric escalation incentive. Furthermore, rapid conventional aggression immediately neutralizes the adversary’s more limited escalatory options, forcing the adversary to pursue its (increasingly) risky asymmetric escalation threat or submit.

2. Alternatively, conventional forces can address the challenge more directly. An NWS can threaten with a conventional response to initially limited nuclear employment. Here, the NWS needs a conventional force that can fight and ideally win in a nuclear environment. The conventional response turns the burden of further escalation back onto the adversary after its asymmetric escalation has failed to produce the opponent’s surrender. Accordingly, the adversary must decide whether it is prepared to escalate even further, knowing that the shadow of countervalue punishment lurks ever closer.

Although the initial conventional response might be more credible than the immediate countervalue response, it is not obvious that an initial conventional response would increase the credibility of the nuclear response. If the adversary possesses an advantage in limited nuclear arms and the state trying to escape paralysis does not have the ability to limit damage in a nuclear war, any nuclear response may still appear disadvantageous. Simultaneously, the escaping state’s conventional response encompasses the risk of triggering the nuclear response one seeks to deter in the first place because the response might (inadvertently) cross the nuclear threshold of the adversary.

Similar to the general characterizations of a counterforce strategy, the damage limitation strategy presented here deters through the capacity to reduce the cost of a nuclear war to an acceptable level.³⁵ However, contrary to existing deliberations, the strategy unpacked here explicitly threatens a massive counterforce attack in response to even limited nuclear first use to escape substrategic paralysis. This strategy can ameliorate the credibility problem of strategies based on countervalue punishment. By reducing the expected cost of a nuclear war, an immediate and massive counterforce response can be credible, even against limited nuclear first use, hence generating a potential escape from substrategic paralysis. Contingent on the survivability of the adversary’s nuclear force, an NWS seeking this escape route must invest in accurate delivery systems, the capabilities to track and locate counterforce targets (satellites, hydrophones for antisubmarine warfare, etc.), surveillance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), and missile defenses to intercept the residual retaliation from the adversary.³⁶

However, disarming an adversary with certainty is an extremely challenging endeavor, and even a few surviving enemy nukes can deter such an attack in the first place. Also, this strategy creates an environment where the NWS incentivizes the adversary to preemptively launch an attack to ensure its ability to inflict damage; thus, this strategy increases the risk of inadvertent escalation because of misperception.³⁷ Moreover, although the counterforce option is arguably more credible than a countervalue punishment option, the adversary might still feel emboldened by its dominance at the level of limited nuclear war. Therefore, a lack of limited nuclear options can still produce paralysis.

Finally, an NWS can pursue dominance at all levels to escape substrategic paralysis. Similar to existing conceptualizations of full-spectrum deterrence strategies, the tit-for-tat strategy assumes that only by matching—or ideally defeating—the adversary at every level of conflict can a state deter all types of conflict, including limited nuclear war.³⁸ This strategy demands a credible, proportionate, and calibrated response to the limited nuclear attack that is anticipated from the asymmetric escalation strategy.³⁹ The objective is to escape the dilemma of choosing between surrender and an all-out nuclear war when faced with a limited nuclear threat.⁴⁰ This strategy seeks to deny the adversary the escalation dominance in a limited nuclear war, thereby deterring asymmetric escalation in the first place. We expect a state with this strategy to invest in a wide variety of different nuclear options, ranging from tactical nuclear weapons appropriate for battlefield use to strategic counterforce capabilities. In addition, we expect states pursuing this strategy to emphasize differentiating between different operational plans to avoid inadvertent escalation.

Although the tit-for-tat strategy arguably nullifies the adversary’s perceived advantage at the limited nuclear level, it has certain drawbacks. First, because it demands investments in a variety of systems that are able to respond to all potential contingencies, it is the most demanding escape route in terms of the capabilities needed. Moreover, the belief that underpins this strategy—that a limited nuclear war can be contained—may increase the risk of such a war happening in the first place. When an NWS possesses the capabilities and adopts a strategy designed for a limited and controllable nuclear war, the nuclear threshold may decrease, as uncontrolled escalation to an all-out nuclear war may appear less likely. However, limited nuclear first use might also spiral into an all-out war, for example, through the difficulties of recognition mutual limits for further escalation after the nuclear threshold is crossed.⁴¹ Moreover, if the NWS seeking to escape substrategic paralysis is blinded by its military dominance at all levels of conflict and fails to take into consideration the possibility that the balance of resolve favors the adversary, its confidence may result in a response which inadvertently triggers a nuclear retaliation caused by the adversary’s high resolve.⁴²

Empirical Coding

This section explores three NWS’s attempts to escape substrategic paralysis. The last row in Table 3 summarizes this empirical coding.

Table 3. Characteristics of the four strategies for escaping substrategic paralysis.

	Countervalue punishment strategy	Conventional pause strategy	Damage limitation strategy	Tit-for-tat strategy
Deterrence logic	Countervalue punishment deters nuclear escalation	Conventional forces deter limited nuclear escalation by their warfighting ability and/or manipulation of risk. Countervalue punishment deters escalation beyond limited nuclear use	The capability to reduce/eliminate expected cost in a nuclear war deters nuclear escalation	Dominance at every conflict level is required to deter all types of escalation
Capabilities	Relatively few (survivable and not accurate) nuclear weapons	Relatively few (survivable and not accurate) nuclear weapons and a conventional force able to respond quickly and/or fight effectively in a nuclear environment	A damage limitation capability (accurate delivery systems, missile defenses, ability to identify counterforce targets)	A wide range of military capabilities, including limited nuclear use capabilities
Planning	Countervalue options	Clearly distinguishable conventional-only options and countervalue options	Continuously targeting counterforce targets and keeping nuclear forces on a high state of readiness	A range of clearly distinguishable operational plans, including limited nuclear war plans
Empirical coding	Soviet Union (early 1960s) India (1998–2003)	Soviet Union (mid 1960s–early 1970s) India (2004–2008)	Indian aspiration (late 2000s–2023)	United States (late 2010s–2023)

The Soviet Union’s Response to NATO’s Flexible Response Strategy in the 1960s and Early 1970s

Faced with a conventionally superior Soviet force, NATO adopted a flexible response strategy in the 1960s. Five years after US Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s landmark speech in 1962, where the flexible strategy was presented, NATO endorsed the strategy in document MC 14/3.⁴³ A cornerstone in the strategy set out in MC 14/3 was the threat of asymmetric escalation: if NATO forces could not withstand a Soviet conventional attack, NATO would deliberately escalate to the nuclear level by raising—and to the extent possible controlling—the scope and intensity of the conflict, with the aim of making the cost and risk of further Soviet advances disproportionate to Soviet objectives.⁴⁴ Despite Western failure to fully implement the operational planning objectives in the 1960s, the Soviet Union should have started to consider adjustments to its own nuclear posture in response because new strategic thinking often reflects the anticipated future direction of the adversary’s strategy.⁴⁵ Furthermore, operational doctrine, as outlined in the U.S. Army and NATO Field Manuals, and U.S. deployment and budgetary priorities began to reflect an emphasis on the new strategic concept.⁴⁶ In addition, post-Cold War testimonies suggest that the Soviet leadership believed that their conventional superiority would enable them to win a strictly conventional war in Europe but that they were conscious of the West’s significant advantages in strategic aviation and tactical nuclear weapons.⁴⁷ A Warsaw Pact intelligence report from 1965 reflected this awareness by emphasizing that, over the previous few years, NATO had started to adopt a limited nuclear war strategy, envisioning the possibility of a controlled limited nuclear war without escalation to an all-out war, to compensate for lack of conventional options in Europe.⁴⁸ Thus, the 1960s and early 1970s illustrate the initial Soviet reaction to the novel strategic concept of asymmetric escalation.

Deterrence through a Massive Response: The Western Illusion of Escalation Control

In the early 1960s, Soviet military officers were preoccupied with Khrushchev’s ideas about nuclear doctrine, focusing solely on the Strategic Rocket Forces.⁴⁹ There was, therefore, relatively little interest in the new Western concept until Khrushchev left office.⁵⁰ However, when the reaction to the flexible response strategy came, the Soviet Union sought to deter asymmetric escalation with a massive countervalue response.

In interviews after the Cold War, former Soviet officials described how the Soviet Union sought to enhance deterrence by convincing the United States that they would retaliate massively to any U.S. employment of nuclear arms.⁵¹ This logic was also reflected in Soviet military writing in the 1960s, in which analysts categorically insisted that any attempt to control escalation was simply unthinkable and that any war with NATO would inevitably explode into an all-out war.⁵² Moreover, the Soviet military writing of the period shows no interest in intrawar bargaining or crisis management during a conflict.⁵³ For example, there was little sympathy for concepts such as “threats that leave something to chance” and nuclear use as a demonstration of resolve. The idea of nuclear demonstration strikes was seen as strategic foolishness because it would only increase the risk of a massive response in return.⁵⁴ Similarly, the party leaders stressed that an NWS could not conduct a nuclear war in a limited or controlled manner.⁵⁵ Thus, the reaction to the Western strategy of limited nuclear war was basically to term it an artificial limitation and that a limited nuclear war was an illusion.⁵⁶

Declassified documents suggest that U.S. intelligence assessments leaned toward believing this disregard for escalation control was an accurate representation of Soviet doctrine. A CIA report looking at Soviet reactions to U.S. nuclear employment policies in the 1960s and early 1970s concluded that the Soviet doctrine emphasized a massive nuclear exchange and that, throughout the 1960s, Soviet declaratory policy and military writing was explicitly hostile to any notion of limited nuclear warfare.⁵⁷ Moreover, a National Security Council report from 1972 acknowledged that the Soviet Union had long maintained an official view that any superpower conflict would quickly escalate to a general war, even if it started as a conventional one. The report continues by stating that, even though Soviet leaders would not need to follow this doctrine of military theorists in a real crisis, they had no evidence of a recent shift in Soviet views on the inability to control escalation.⁵⁸ Furthermore, former Secretary of Defense (1973–1975), James R. Schlesinger, has reiterated that the U.S. impression at the time was that Soviet leaders had great doubts about the possibility of limiting a nuclear war.⁵⁹

Soviet command-and-control systems in this period were not equipped to support a controlled denial strategy. Rather, it was weakest in the capabilities needed for controlled and limited nuclear warfighting, such as targeting flexibility, timely intelligence, and attack and damage assessments.⁶⁰ Instead, since the 1950s, the Soviet Union focused on building a survivable and centralized command-and-control system, prioritizing the protection of the political and military leadership, such that the United States could not paralyze its strategic force or political control.⁶¹ Thus, as alluded to by former Soviet officials, the Soviet command-and-control system in the 1960s was arguably designed for a massive response to any Western aggression, regardless of the nature of the initial attack, not a controlled escalation scenario.⁶²

The targeting plans of the Soviet Union at the time also indicate an emphasis on a massive nuclear response to Western aggression. If the Soviet Union was planning for a controlled escalation scenario, it should have been reluctant to target certain types of targets—such as command-and-control systems, nuclear targets. On the contrary, and as testified by Major General Van C. Doubleday in 1970, Soviet targeting policy had few such restraints; rather, Soviet policy emphasized that command-and-control systems should be attacked at the outset of the conflict to gain an advantage, and it deployed forces designed precisely for operations against a command-and-control apparatus.⁶³ While the Soviet Union exercised some selectivity in prioritizing targets for a nuclear war, this did not reflect a limited approach. It was rather an acknowledgment that their arsenal was inadequate to cover all possible targets in the West and that some targets were more urgent to destroy than others—which is something different than suggesting that the Soviet Union accepted any notion of controlled and selective options.⁶⁴ Furthermore, interviews with former Soviet officials reaffirm that the party and military leadership never accepted limited or selective nuclear employment as a viable response to a Western limited nuclear attack, even at the tactical level.⁶⁵

In sum, the Soviet Union rejected targeting restraints and refused to contemplate them as a valid strategic concept. In a conflict with the West, the envisaged scenario was that their full strategic power would be mobilized against military and economic resources to force the US/NATO to surrender.⁶⁶

Tolerance of an All-out War and Countervalue Punishment

In the 1960s, the Soviet Union did not possess any limited nuclear capabilities; accordingly, its force was only suitable for a strategy based on a massive nuclear response.⁶⁷ Moreover, the nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union was not accurate enough, nor was it capable of conducting sophisticated targeting concepts associated with a counterforce mission. In the 1970s, the U.S. intelligence community estimated that the Soviet Union would not attain the missile accuracy needed for a significant counterforce capability until the mid-to-late 1980s.⁶⁸ This capability constraint meant that the Soviet Union probably believed that a strategy targeting “U.S. value resources represented the only credible option for deterrence available to them.”⁶⁹ This left the Soviet Union with the option of escaping substrategic paralysis through a countervalue punishment strategy. Which, as discussed above, is the least demanding escape strategy in terms of the capabilities needed.

Although Soviet military writing stressed the importance of seizing the initiative, the general Soviet view did not contemplate a strategic counterforce logic.⁷⁰ As Desmond Ball writes, it stressed that “deterrence of nuclear attack is best achieved not by the ability to wreak assured destruction but rather by the ability to wage a nuclear war—the better the Soviet forces are equipped and trained to fight a nuclear war, the more effective they will be as a deterrent to a nuclear attack on the USSR.”⁷¹ This means that the Soviet Union sought to diminish the enemy’s ability to sustain an all-out nuclear war by targeting both military and countervalue targets. Notably, a prevailing assumption in this period was that the Soviet Union’s vast territory and higher concentration population of industry in the United States would enable the Soviet Union to be victorious in an all-out war.⁷² Thus, the Soviet Union’s strategy stressed the ability to endure an all-out war, not a damage limitation mission.

Acceptance of a Conventional War Phase: Shift toward a Conventional Pause Strategy

As the Soviet Union developed a more survivable nuclear force, Soviet military writings moved away from their very rigid insistence on the impossibility of a limited war between the two superpowers.⁷³ This behavior is consistent with the stability–instability paradox, which suggests that a more stable strategic balance of power would allow for more maneuverability at lower levels of conflict.⁷⁴ This evolved into a strategy trying to draw on the Soviet advantage in conventional arms before the unleashing of a massive countervalue response. According to Schlesinger, the Soviet Union slowly started to think about the possibility of a conventional phase in a major war after the Berlin Crisis in 1961.⁷⁵ However, this shift in strategic thinking first became apparent toward the mid-1960s when Soviet strategic writing became more open to the idea that limited conflicts were not destined to escalate to the nuclear level. Simultaneously, strategists started to encourage Soviet forces to prepare for a conventional scenario under the threat of the enemy using nuclear weapons.⁷⁶

On the military side, the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces, Mashal Chuikov, acknowledged in December 1963 that NATO’s buildup of ground forces in Europe implied that any war would also need mass ground forces.⁷⁷ Furthermore, military exercises started to incorporate a conventional phase. In the summer of 1964, the Warsaw Pact conducted a major joint exercise, in which the early phases of the war were envisaged without nuclear weapons—something that had not happened since the mid-1950s.⁷⁸ Similarly, in September 1967, the Soviet Armed Forces exercised its capacity for non-nuclear operations in the western part of the country.⁷⁹ Additionally, by the late 1960s, the General Staff Academy had conducted war games in which non-nuclear responses, even after the first use of nuclear weapons by the adversary, were explored.⁸⁰ During the 1960s, the length of this conventional phase was expected to be relatively short.⁸¹ However, former Chief of the General Staff, General Danilevich, explains that the duration of this conventional phase increased gradually throughout the 1970s and that, by the 1980s, the General Staff expected that the entire war might remain conventional.⁸² Moreover, Danilevich explains that plans for a purely conventional offensive phase in Europe became increasingly more extensive and were implemented in Soviet strategy during the 1970s.⁸³

Despite this trend toward threshold thinking, the Warsaw Pact only recognized the existence of a threshold between nuclear and conventional war.⁸⁴ Still, the acceptance that a conventional phase was within the realm of possibility was a major innovation in Soviet military doctrine and thinking.⁸⁵ This doctrinal innovation was also gradually reflected in the Soviet force posture. By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union had developed a dual-capable military presence in Europe. Moreover, in 1969, a new ministry was formed to oversee conventional munition development and production.⁸⁶ Such a buildup indicates a serious interest in conventional fighting in Europe. All this indicates, at the very least, an adjustment toward a conventional pause strategy in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s.

The officers advocating a conventional response did so based on both types of conventional pause logic. Some argued that Soviet forces could destroy NATO’s ability to launch nuclear strikes with a conventional counterforce attack on NATO’s nuclear delivery systems in Europe.⁸⁷ Thus, they focused on denying NATO the opportunity for asymmetric escalation through conventional counterforce strikes, a logic drawing on the second type of conventional pause reasoning described above. Others argued that NATO would not use its nuclear weapons in a conventional scenario, at least early on, because of stigmatization and the potential for strategic nuclear escalation.⁸⁸ Thus, as in the first rationale for the conventional pause strategy, the argument was that the risk of uncontrolled nuclear escalation deterred asymmetric escalation in the first place.

American intelligence assessments reiterate this growing acceptance of a conventional phase in the Soviet Union. A CIA report from 1974 states, “During the mid-1960s, Soviet doctrine accommodated to the concept of a conventional phase in a European conflict both in response to NATO’s policy of ‘flexible response’ and to exploit growing military confidence in the ability of their conventional force.”⁸⁹ All of this signified an adjustment away from the single-minded focus on an immediate massive nuclear response toward relying more on conventional options in response to the flexible response strategy.⁹⁰

In sum, the Soviet Union initially relied solely on the threat of an immediate countervalue response to counteract NATO’s flexible response strategy, but toward the mid-1960s, it moved toward a conventional pause strategy to escape substrategic paralysis. The Soviet Union’s alignment with the two punishment-oriented strategies was likely influenced by capability constraints. As discussed above, both of these strategies are less demanding because they only require a countervalue nuclear retaliatory capability, and at the time, the Soviet Union did not possess sufficiently accurate or responsive systems, nor appropriate support systems, to implement the denial-oriented escape strategies. While we do not have the evidentiary basis to draw definitive conclusions, the Soviet transition to leveraging more of its conventional superiority to escape paralysis could have been driven by an increasing confidence in the survivability of its nuclear arsenal and ability to sustain an effective conventional operation in a nuclear environment. Both of these developments would diminish the credibility of NATO’s asymmetric escalation threat. First, advances in the Soviet Union’s ability to assure unacceptable damage in a spiraling nuclear conflict means that initiation of even a limited nuclear war becomes less attractive. Second, a more effective conventional option provided the Soviet Union with an initial response that both might attain meaningful advances in the conflict, and also increase the risk, and thus credibility, of their countervalue option as discussed under the conventional pause strategy above. This transition toward greater reliance on initial conventional options, would, at least in theory, ameliorate the inherent credibility problem of immediate countervalue retaliation.

India’s Response to Pakistan’s Asymmetric Escalation Threat

Pakistan faces a conventionally superior and nuclear-armed adversary in India.⁹¹ Therefore, Pakistan has developed a nuclear force and strategy seeking to threaten limited nuclear strikes in a tactical environment to counter or stalemate a conventional war with India.⁹² This asymmetric escalation strategy, combined with India’s longstanding assured retaliation strategy, produces a scenario in which Pakistan can carry out subconventional attacks against India without fearing retaliation because asymmetric escalation deters India from retaliating.⁹³

The conventional wisdom is that India retains a no-first-use (NFU) policy and a centralized nuclear force intended for countervalue retaliation.⁹⁴ Analysts have argued that nuclear weapons play no role in India’s attempt to address Pakistan’s subconventional aggression (support for militias/terrorist groups, etc.) and the constant tension along the border.⁹⁵ To the contrary, this section demonstrates how India has tried to draw on its nuclear capabilities in different ways to address this issue, which are distinctions previous typologies of nuclear strategy have ignored.

From a Countervalue Punishment Strategy to Cold Start—A Conventional Pause Strategy

Immediately after the nuclear acquisition, India relied on a countervalue punishment strategy. After their first nuclear test in May 1998, the Indian leadership expressed a belief that the risk of countervalue nuclear retaliation would deter all aggression from Pakistan.⁹⁶

The shortcomings of the countervalue punishment strategy were already uncovered in the Kargil war of 1999, with the Pakistani incursion across the line of control (LoC) into Indian-controlled Kashmir.⁹⁷ The Kargil war demonstrated India’s inability to deter a conventional attack.⁹⁸ Moreover, even though the Indian response was successful enough to thwart the Pakistani incursion, India consciously sought to moderate its response by instructing its forces not to cross the LoC.⁹⁹ Although analysts debate the degree to which Indian moderation was driven by a fear of Pakistani nuclear response or a desire for international support, Indian inability to respond forcefully became a recurring challenge.¹⁰⁰

Only a month after Pakistani troops withdrew from the Kargil Heights, India published a draft nuclear doctrine stating that India “will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.”¹⁰¹ Four years later, India published its first and only official nuclear doctrine document on January 4, 2003, outlining an NFU policy and emphasizing that “Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.”¹⁰² All of this resembles an official countervalue punishment strategy.

Continued Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and Indian inability to respond forcefully led India to search for alternative ways to escape substrategic paralysis. In trying to signal to Pakistan that it was willing to go to war to end Pakistani support for militants in Kashmir—despite the nuclear risks—India mobilized its force in Operations Parakram after the attack of the Parliament building in New Delhi in December 2001.¹⁰³ However, India’s slow mobilization enabled Pakistan to rally international pressure and counter-mobilize—thus increasing the risk of a full-scale war in case of an Indian limited response—which neutralized the potential for a conventional response from India.¹⁰⁴ In the aftermath, the Indian defense establishment acknowledged that it needed more flexible military options and the ability to respond more promptly to deal with Pakistani terrorist support, and escape substrategic paralysis.¹⁰⁵

This led to the development of the Cold Start concept, which was unveiled in April 2004. The strategic objective was to escalate with conventional forces before the international community could intercede while pursuing narrow enough objectives such that Islamabad would not escalate to the nuclear level.¹⁰⁶ This concept envisioned that, in response to Pakistani subconventional aggression (terrorist support, etc.), the Indian military was to carry out a quick conventional offensive operation without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear redline. Therefore, the operational objective would be limited to dismantling terrorists’ infrastructure and potentially carving out some territory for negotiation purposes.¹⁰⁷ Importantly, the operation would not be able to deliver a decisive blow, thus denying Islamabad justification for employing nuclear weapons.¹⁰⁸ Accordingly, the Cold Start concept signifies a shift toward a conventional pause strategy. The concept sought to escape substrategic paralysis by shifting the onus of further escalation with a swift conventional escalation up to the Pakistani nuclear threshold, whereby the adversary, in theory, should be compelled into submission by the increasing risk of an all-out nuclear war.¹⁰⁹ Drawing on the benefits of a conventional pause strategy, this suggests that India sought to increase the credibility, and thus deterrent effectiveness of its nuclear countervalue options by streamlining a conventional option to compel Pakistan to back down under an increasing risk of an all-out war.

The terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 provided an opportunity to test the new strategy. However, again, Indian inaction arose from the fear that any conventional retaliation sufficient to compel Pakistan would risk a nuclear response.¹¹⁰ This illustrates an important above-mentioned shortcoming of the conventional pause strategy: the inherent difficulty of inflicting a conventional response sufficiently forceful to compel the adversary to back down, that would at the same time avoid triggering the nuclear response that the escaping state seeks to deter. This dilemma undermined India’s attempt to escape substrategic paralysis with its conventional pause strategy and may have triggered a search for an alternative escape route.

Since then, Pakistan has matched their threat of asymmetric escalation with a dedicated capability for this mission: the Nasr missile (first tested in 2011), which is kept in garrisons near the Indian border.¹¹¹ Despite the development of the Nasr missile, India Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, conveyed a continued reliance on a massive nuclear response in July 2011, by emphasizing that “tactical or strategic, [Nasr] is a nuclear weapon. Our response would be absolutely violent, if it is used, as per our existing policy.”¹¹² Moreover, India has continued to modernize and streamline its army toward quick conventional incursions below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold,¹¹³ an approach that India reemphasized in the Indian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine from 2018.¹¹⁴ Although the official doctrine stands firm, and these developments may represent a reemphasis on a conventional pause strategy, recent trends may suggest that India is moving toward a damage limitation strategy.

Toward a Damage Limitation Strategy?

Analysts have long concluded that India has no appetite for a damage limitation strategy.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, Clary and Narang argue that Indian developments over the past two decades are pointing toward an aspiring damage limitation strategy.¹¹⁶ Logically, a credible ability to disarm Pakistan’s strategic nuclear weapons can help India escape substrategic paralysis. Massive nuclear employment by India, here in response to a limited nuclear attack, is not credible as long as Pakistan can assure unacceptable destruction in return. Therefore, a counterforce attack makes for a more credible response to limited nuclear use than the countervalue option because it enables India to potentially escape nuclear annihilation.¹¹⁷

A counterforce strike should ideally target all nuclear assets. India’s primary concern, however, is probably to disarm Pakistan’s longer-range strategic nuclear systems, which only number in the tens.¹¹⁸ Accordingly, Pakistan’s strategic nuclear force is at the level in which India might believe that it can develop an effective strategic damage limitation capability.¹¹⁹

Serving and retired Indian officials have hinted at an existing or aspiring preemptive damage limitation strategy.¹²⁰ For example, Shivshankar Menon, India’s National Security Advisor from 2011 to 2014, argues that “India would hardly risk giving Pakistan the chance to carry out a massive nuclear strike after the Indian response to Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons. In other words, Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan.”¹²¹ This seems to suggest an ambition to deprive Pakistan of its ability to inflict unacceptable damage after nuclear first use. This mission is only possible with a damage limitation strategy.

For a damage limitation strategy to be feasible, India needs accurate and responsive delivery systems, the ability to locate Pakistani strategic nuclear forces, and missile defenses able to intercept a small residual force.¹²² India is making progress and investing in all these areas.

India is investing in various new missiles, with an emphasis on accuracy and promptness. An important development is the new solid fuel medium-range ballistic missile: the Agni-P missile. Analysts argue that, considering the system’s range, accuracy, canisterization, and mobility, the missile is likely being developed for a counterforce mission against Pakistan.¹²³ The development of other prompt strike systems like the BrahMos cruise missile and hypersonic Shaurya missile have augmented this trend.¹²⁴ High-accuracy and responsive missiles are unnecessary for retaliatory countervalue targeting; they are, on the other hand, ideal for a counterforce mission against Pakistan.¹²⁵

India’s ability to identify and locate counterforce targets is increasing. The growing availability of space-based imagery from commercial providers increases the accessibility and frequency of cover. In addition, India has improved its own satellite picture quality, including radar imagery, which can be used at night and with cloud cover.¹²⁶ India will only be able to locate a large fraction of Pakistan’s long-range nuclear systems in the near-to-medium term.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, this potential aspiration is important, and India’s recent technology investments indicate an interest in tracking counterforce targets in real-time.¹²⁸

Although a small number of surviving Pakistani strategic missiles can deter a counterforce attack, simultaneous investments in missile defense technology could tip the balance. In 2018, India completed a deal with Russia to acquire five regiments of the Russian missile defense system S-400. The three first regiments of S-400 are reportedly already deployed on the northern, eastern and western borders to defend the Pakistani and Chinese broader.¹²⁹ Together with the development of the Prithvi Air Defense terminal defense system and Ashwin Advanced Air Defense theater defense system, India may pursue a layered missile defense system able to intercept a small residual Pakistani force.¹³⁰ Thus, over time, Delhi might develop the capability to intercept the remaining force with a sufficient probability to pursue a damage limitation strategy.

Finally, to support a counterforce mission, India needs a more responsive command-and-control system than has previously been associated with the Indian nuclear posture—where the force was presumably disassembled, demated, and in control of civilian agencies. However, this narrative may also be exaggerated, and during his time as National Security Advisor, Menon was charged with streamlining and making the nuclear force more responsive to crisis.¹³¹ Moreover, civilian security officials and former Strategic Forces Command officers have repeatedly claimed that parts of India’s nuclear forces are now kept at a high state of readiness, especially those systems designed for use against Pakistan.¹³² Furthermore, the ongoing development in solid fuel ballistic missiles and canisterized systems is an important step toward a more responsive force.¹³³ Such improvements in readiness go beyond the need for a force meant solely for nuclear countervalue retaliation.

This counterforce aspiration may also have fueled an increasing Indian willingness to respond forcefully across the LoC against Pakistani terrorist support in recent crises.¹³⁴ First, following a terrorist attack within Indian Kashmir in 2016, India responded with surgical strikes inside Pakistani Kashmir.¹³⁵ Three years later, in response to a terrorist attack in Pulwama, for the first time since 1971, India conducted airstrikes across the LoC and into undisputed Pakistani territory.¹³⁶ Although these attacks were limited in scale, they stand in stark contrast to India’s unwillingness to conduct strikes across LoC in previous crises.¹³⁷ Analysts even argue that the 2019 Indian response represents “the first practical manifestation of India’s doctrinal evolution toward counterforce response through the Indian Air Force” and that the “airstrikes were primarily aimed at establishing a ‘new normal’, which, once successful, could be replicated at other places against Pakistan at will.”¹³⁸ Accordingly, this may reflect that Indian decision makers feel more secure in maneuvering within the conventional conflict space—by, for example, deliberately striking Pakistani proper without fearing nuclear escalation—because their emerging counterforce capability is perceived as more effective in deterring asymmetric escalation from Pakistan in return.

In sum, Pakistan’s continued substrategic aggression (terrorist support, conventional attacks, etc.) against India may have triggered a search for an alternative to their nuclear punishment strategy. However, India does not seek to match Pakistani tactical nuclear options by investing in limited nuclear capabilities.¹³⁹ They appear to pursue a damage limitation strategy, where deterrence is achieved through domination at the strategic nuclear level, by which they try to convince Pakistan that any nuclear escalation will immediately or preemptively be met with a strategic counterforce strike. Although this approach may deal with the credibility problem inherent in India’s previous punishment-oriented approaches, it still has shortcomings. Pakistan’s advantage at the limited nuclear level can still encourage Islamabad to seek revisionist objectives in situations that is difficult to couple with a massive counterforce strike; either because the ability to limit damage is questionable and/or because Pakistan believes that nuclear escalation can be contained at the limited nuclear level such that Indian submission should be preferable compared to gambling on a risky counterforce attack.¹⁴⁰ An additional risk factor is that the damage limitation approach may increase first-strike instability because in a crisis Pakistan will face pressure to use its nuclear forces before an Indian counterforce attack neutralizes them.

The United States Pursues a Tit-for-Tat Strategy

For decades, the United States’ nuclear strategy has focused on military targeting and war-winning capabilities, not on purposely threatening civilian population.¹⁴¹ In other words, the American nuclear deterrence strategy is characterized by a denial logic, not a punishment approach. The United States possesses the world’s most sophisticated damage limitation capability.¹⁴² However, the logic presented in recent official documents about nuclear doctrine and investments in nonstrategic nuclear systems indicates an aspiration to move beyond a pure counterforce strategy toward a tit-for-tat approach. Moreover, the need for investment in nonstrategic nuclear weapons is explicitly justified to discourage asymmetric escalation from Russia and China.¹⁴³

Escaping Substrategic Paralysis with Limited Nuclear Options

American official documents about nuclear doctrine highlight the problem of substrategic paralysis and argue that limited nuclear options are necessary to address this problem. For example, a Department of Defense (DoD) report from 2020 entitled “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United Sates” starts out by declaring that the United States must deploy a range of nuclear and non-nuclear options to ensure deterrence in situations where an all-out response is not credible.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, the 2018 NPR underlines that effective deterrence across the emerging range of threats depends on “nuclear-armed potential adversaries must recognize that their threats of nuclear escalation do not give them freedom to pursue non-nuclear aggression.”¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the 2022 NPR emphasizes that the ability to deter limited nuclear use is also “key to deterring non-nuclear aggression. If we [the US] are not confident we can deter escalation, it will be more difficult for our leaders to make the decision to project conventional military power to protect vital national security interests—and far more dangerous to do so should that decision be made.”¹⁴⁶ Note that the challenge highlighted here is not just the need to deter limited nuclear use, but also to neutralize the adversary’s emboldenment in conventional fighting—introduced by its asymmetric escalation threat. Thus, the ability to deter limited nuclear attacks is also desirable because it enables the United States to project conventional military power when needed. As such, this description mirrors the substrategic paralysis conundrum.

U.S. official documents underline that, for nuclear deterrence to be effective, flexibility and the ability to respond and engage a broad spectrum of enemy threats are essential. In 2019, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a document providing the fundamental principles and guidance for nuclear operations. This document clearly describes that the effectiveness of the nuclear force depends on possessing a flexible and diverse nuclear force capable of achieving both strategic and nonstrategic objectives to avoid any potential miscalculation from the adversary of the consequences of nuclear first use, no matter the scale of this use.¹⁴⁷ Flexibility and a broader range of options are highlighted as an important feature enabling the United States to employ—and signal a willingness to employ—nuclear weapons in response to a variety of scenarios.¹⁴⁸ Highlighting this flexibility, Gen. John Hyten, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command at the time, explained that the United States has “a series of very flexible options from conventional all the way up to large-scale nuke that I can advise the president on to give him options on what he would want to do.”¹⁴⁹

The Joint Chiefs publication from 2019, titled “Nuclear Operations” describes the need for flexible and diverse nuclear options:

Flexibility enables engaging the enemy at an appropriate level or place with the capability of escalating or de-escalating the level of conflict. Flexibility is important because deterrent credibility hinges on having a convincing capability to execute a variety of nuclear or nonnuclear options. U.S. forces have the flexibility to provide nuclear and nonnuclear options that allow the United States to maintain deterrence and, if necessary, successfully execute a broad array of missions against the full spectrum of potential targets. Flexible responses tailored to the provocation and what the threat values most afford greater control over the possible escalation of conflict.¹⁵⁰

This passage draws on an obvious tit-for-tat logic. First, it emphasizes the need for an appropriate—and, thus, credible—response against a full spectrum of threats. In addition, it claims that this flexibility provides the ability to dictate and take advantage of escalation dynamics.

Drawing on the same logic, the 2020 DoD report on U.S. nuclear employment strategy highlights that, to deter asymmetric escalation, the United States will field a range of tailored response options, both nuclear and non-nuclear, such that no adversary will ever contemplate successful nuclear employment.¹⁵¹ The report suggests that the limited options already fielded and the ones under development enable the president to escape the dilemma between inaction and a large-scale response. The report argues that these limited response options are an appropriate and more credible response to limited nuclear attacks and, thus, a more effective deterrent against limited nuclear escalation than a massive response.¹⁵² The rationale presented is that limited and flexible nuclear response options demonstrate that the United States can effectively respond to any nuclear scenario, such that the adversary cannot hope to secure the advantage envisaged by asymmetric escalation.¹⁵³ Furthermore, the report explicitly explains that the new low-yield nuclear options are essential for filling a perceived gap in the U.S. escalation ladder, thus deterring adversaries from exploiting this perceived gap in a limited conflict scenario.¹⁵⁴

The Nuclear Employment Report also underlines that a range of options enable the United States to demonstrate restraint as part of its deterrence strategy.¹⁵⁵ The differentiated options and ability to show restraint are important features of a tit-for-tat strategy because it adds to the state’s ability to signal to the adversary that the state can escalate further, if necessary. Another important objective of the tit-for-tat strategy is to control escalation and restore deterrence if conflict breaks out. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the report explains that these flexible and graduated options are tools meant to enable the United States to restore deterrence, control escalation, and end a conflict at the lowest levels of damage and/or best possible terms for the United States.¹⁵⁶

Addressing Adversaries’ Asymmetric Escalation Threat: Russia and China

The policy papers also include several direct references to why this type of tit-for-tat strategy is necessary to counter Russian and Chinese challenges.

The United States accuses Russia of relying on its large nonstrategic nuclear force to paralyze the United States at the substrategic level.¹⁵⁷ The 2018 NPR argues that Moscow’s quantitative advantage in nonstrategic nuclear weapons seems to have produced “a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.”¹⁵⁸ To address this challenge, the document suggests that the United States needs to enhance flexibility and the range of different deterrence options. Although the 2018 NPR does not suggest quantitatively matching Russia in nonstrategic nuclear capabilities, it argues that the United States needs a spectrum of capabilities and a posture “to ensure that no adversary under any circumstances can perceive an advantage through limited nuclear escalation or other strategic attack.”¹⁵⁹ Thus, to deter limited nuclear use, the argument is that low-yield options are needed to neutralize any perceived advantage in a limited nuclear war.¹⁶⁰ Even more concretely, the 2022 NPR describes how capabilities such as the F-35A dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) equipped with the B61-12 bomb; the new low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) W76-2 warhead; and the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon “are key to ensuring that Russia’s leadership does not miscalculate regarding the consequences of nuclear use on any scale, thereby reducing their confidence in both initiating conventional war against NATO and considering the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in such a conflict.”¹⁶¹ In accordance with tit-for-tat logic, this suggests that American investments in limited nuclear options are intended to signal to Russia that asymmetric escalation will not succeed because the United States possesses credible responses to the entire spectrum of aggression, including limited nuclear employment.

Similarly, the United States is concerned about the rapid expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal, including “its exploration of low-yield nuclear warheads.”¹⁶² The last two NPRs indicate that a tit-for-tat strategy is needed to discourage China from believing that it could secure an advantage from limited nuclear use.¹⁶³ For example, the 2018 NPR explains that investments in limited nuclear options are important “to prevent Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear weapons, however limited, is acceptable.”¹⁶⁴ Likewise, the 2022 NPR emphasizes that the W76-2 SLBM warhead, globally deployable bombers, DCA, and air-launched cruise missiles provides a flexible deterrence strategy needed to convey to China that the United States will not be deterred or coerced into compliance. It continues by stating, “Our intent is to prevent the [People’s Republic of China] PRC from mistakenly concluding that it could gain advantage through any employment of nuclear weapons, however limited.”¹⁶⁵ This suggests that the development of limited nuclear options is partly intended to neutralize the possibility of future U.S. substrategic paralysis in the Asian theater.

Investments in Limited Nuclear Capabilities and Chances in War Plans

Recent investments and modernizations of limited nuclear capabilities and alleged adjustments in war plans may represent concrete steps toward a tit-for-tat strategy.

The United States has modernized and invested in new limited nuclear options appropriate for a tit-for-tat strategy. Until recently, the B61 gravity bomb was the only nonstrategic nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal. Approximately 200 B61 bombs remain in the stockpile. Around 100 of these are deployed at six bases in Europe. The remaining 100 B61s are stored in the United States.¹⁶⁶ As a part of its nuclear modernization program, the United States has started to deploy a new version of the B61, the B61-12, which is equipped with a guided tail kit that increases accuracy.¹⁶⁷ This improvement increases its ability to hit military targets as part of a calibrated tit-for-tat approach.

Furthermore, the 2018 NPR announced that, in the near term, the United States would develop a low-yield version of the W76-1 SLBM, the W76-2, and, in the long term, pursue a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).¹⁶⁸ The W76-2 produces a yield of about 8 kilotons and was already deployed by the U.S. Navy in late 2019.¹⁶⁹ The exact number of produced and deployed W76-2 warheads is unknown, but analysts estimate that only 25 were produced and that one or two of the 20 missiles on each ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is armed with one or two W76-2 warheads.¹⁷⁰ The Nuclear Employment Report states that the W76-2 warhead is explicitly “meant to counter an adversary’s perception of a gap in U.S. capabilities that can be exploited in a regional scenario.”¹⁷¹ The Biden Administration announced its intention of canceling the SLCM program because it believed it was redundant given the deterrence contribution of the already deployed W76-2, which, according to the 2022 NPR, “provide an important means to deter limited nuclear use.”¹⁷² Thus, the W76-2 was seemingly perceived as an important and sufficiently effective capability to deter limited nuclear use.

According to Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, the adjustments toward a full-spectrum deterrence strategy presented in the 2018 NPR—later codified in the Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States—was sufficient to trigger modifications in the strategic war plan known as OPLAN 2012-12, which is the nuclear employment section of what was previously known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan.¹⁷³ This indicates that the tit-for-tat approach has influenced the actual nuclear war plans of the U.S., not just policy papers about nuclear doctrine. Moreover, modernizations at RAF Lakenheath airbase and U.S. Air Force budgetary documents suggest that U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons may be redeployed to the UK, augmenting the increasing emphasis on limited nuclear options.¹⁷⁴

In sum, U.S. investments in limited nuclear options and changing war plans, combined with official documents arguing that limited nuclear options are necessary to escaping substrategic paralysis, indicate an American search for a tit-for-tat strategy. Although the United States’ orientation toward a tit-for-tat strategy may persuade adversaries that the United States will and can respond forcefully at any conflict level and thus contribute to deterring adversary aggression in the first place, it can also imply high confidence in the ability to control escalation. This assumption may allow for more aggressive responses to, for example, a Russian or Chinese threat of asymmetric escalation in a deteriorating Ukraine or Taiwan contingency. This increasing willingness to escalate forcefully may lead to uncontrolled escalation because of difficulties of recognition mutual limits for further escalation, as discussed above.

Moreover, escalation dominance may lead to inadvertent nuclear escalation if the balance of resolve favors the adversary. Despite U.S. equality, or even dominance, at all levels of conflict, an adversary may believe that it can achieve its objectives protected by an asymmetric escalation threat because it has greater resolve. Thus, blinded by capability dominance at all levels, the United States could fail to take into consideration the balance of resolve, which may lead Washington to stumble inadvertently into a nuclear war.

Conclusion

This article has provided a typology of the strategies available for an NWS trying to escape substrategic paralysis, a situation where an NWS refrains from engaging in lower levels of violence because of an adversary’s asymmetric escalation threat. The strategies fall along two dimensions. The first is whether the strategy focuses on nuclear deterrence by punishment or denial. The second dimension refers to whether the strategy incorporates escalation control or not. These two dimensions produce four different approaches to escape substrategic paralysis. A countervalue strategy seeks to escape paralysis through the threat of countervalue punishment. A conventional pause strategy draws on conventional forces to shift the onus of further escalation back onto the adversary, here under the rising shadow of countervalue punishment. A damage limitation strategy relies on dominance at the strategic level to deter all types of nuclear escalation. Finally, a tit-for-tat strategy seeks to dissuade escalation to any conflict level with a war-winning ability at all levels.

This article has examined three cases: how the Soviet Union responded to NATO’s flexible response strategy, India’s response to Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation strategy, and the U.S.’s strategy to neutralize its adversaries’ asymmetric escalation temptation today. The Soviet Union sought to deter any aggression with the threat of an immediate countervalue response. However, toward the mid-1960s, an emerging focus on taking advantage of an initial conventional phase suggests an adjustment toward a conventional pause strategy. This modification would theoretically ameliorate the inherent credibility problem of immediate countervalue retaliation, and thus enhance the effectiveness of Moscow’s escape strategy. After realizing that nuclear acquisition did not automatically deter Pakistani revisionism, India tried to develop a conventional pause strategy at the start of the 2000s. Then, after this strategy failed to improve the situation, Indian investments in military capabilities appropriate for a counterforce mission, along with statements and writings, indicate an aspiring Indian damage limitation strategy. Logically this trajectory would provide Delhi with a more credible escape strategy. However, it also risks increasing first strike instability in South Asia through incentivizing Islamabad to launch its nuclear force before it is neutralized in a counterforce strike. Finally, U.S. investments in limited nuclear options and official documents about nuclear strategy suggest an American aspiration for a tit-for-tat strategy. The official reasoning for this development resonates with the core benefit associated with the tit-for-tat strategy, that the ability to respond effectively at all conflict levels neutralizes any adversary perception that the threat of limited nuclear first use may compel Washington to back down. On the other hand, this may lead to overconfidence in the ability to control escalation, which may inadvertently lead to nuclear escalation, for example, through difficulties in recognition of mutual limits for further escalation, or if an NWS ignores the balance of resolve. All three cases illustrate NWS transitions from less credible to more credible, and thus more effective, escape strategies. Future research should investigate the drivers of these changes and strategy choices in more detail.

Existing typologies fail to uncover the distinct mechanism through which an NWS may seek to counteract an asymmetric escalation threat. This article contributes to the literature on nuclear strategy by creating a novel typology of strategies available for an NWS trying to escape substrategic paralysis. It also establishes the relevance of this conundrum by demonstrating how both regional and major nuclear powers have been, and still are, struggling to address this type of paralysis. The deterrence challenge posed by threats of asymmetric nuclear escalation is arguably growing. Russian conventional losses in Ukraine suggest that Moscow may increase its reliance on the threat of asymmetric escalation in the future. North Korean improvements in both nuclear survivability and tactical nuclear options improve their ability to leverage asymmetric escalation threats. Furthermore, simultaneous concerns about China’s nuclear modernization and how Beijing will respond to an increasing U.S. focus on limited nuclear options make substrategic paralysis a more pressing concern.

This article has important implications for how policymakers and scholars should think about deterrence in these dyads. By identifying several novel deterrence mechanisms through which an NWS can address the problem of substrategic paralysis, the article demonstrates that understanding strategic stability as the product of simply assured retaliation and counterforce is an insufficient basis for comprehending and designing nuclear deterrence strategies. By mapping out the distinct deterrence mechanisms, benefits, and shortcomings of the different strategy options, this article not only serves as an important reference for NWS policymakers trying to escape substrategic paralysis but also serves as a baseline for officials and analysts assessing nuclear escalation risk and designing risk reduction measures in nearly all nuclear dyads today.

Nuclear escalation is a product of pairs of strategies. The typology developed in this article serves as an important baseline for identifying pairs of strategies. Identifying and pairing these strategies is important because it enables future research and policymakers to explore the escalation risks and advantages of different strategy options in more detail. Uncovering these risk factors may enable us to mitigate risks associated with the strategy chosen. Moreover, assessment of these risks would provide a basis for considering whether some level of substrategic paralysis may be acceptable in comparison to the escalation risk associated with a specific strategy. An NWS may select a strategy that is theoretically a less effective escape route, not necessarily because of capability constraints, but because it decides that a potentially less effective strategy option that is safer regarding escalation risk is more desirable.

Furthermore, future research should explore how the NWS threatening with asymmetric escalation can counter the adversary’s escape strategy and explore the potential for stable equilibria along this action-reaction cycle.

In conclusion, both the academic literature and policymakers must be cognizant of how nuclear strategy choices are influenced by the adversary’s nuclear strategy and a continued search for strategic advantages, and more importantly how different strategies build on distinct deterrence mechanisms that entail diverse success and risk factors. If nuclear-armed states ignore more subtle strategy variations, attempts to deter nuclear aggression will be misguided, potentially amplifying the risk of nuclear war.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful for the constructive and helpful feedback from James Cameron, Scott Gates, Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Henrik Stålhane Hiim and Do Young Lee. The author is also grateful for the very constructive advice from the anonymous reviewers and from Security Studies’ editors. The manuscript benefited from being workshopped in the Oslo Nuclear Project Reading Group at the University of Oslo and Oslo Nuclear Project Graduate Conference 2023 at the University of Oslo.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Even Hellan Larsen

Even Hellan Larsen is doctoral research fellow in the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.

Notes

1 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 21, https://dod.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx; US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 7, https://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.fas.org/2022/10/27113658/2022-Nuclear-Posture-Review.pdf.

2 Janice Gross Stein, “Escalation Management in Ukraine: ‘Learning by Doing’ in Response to the ‘Threat That Leaves Something to Chance,’” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 3 (Summer 2023): 29–50, https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/47414; Alexander Vershbow, “How the United States and NATO Can Deal with Russian Nuclear Coercion in Ukraine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 23, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/06/how-the-united-states-and-nato-can-deal-with-russian-nuclear-coercion-in-ukraine/.

3 Ankit Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (London: Hurst & Company, 2020), 80; Nick Kodama, “Threatening the Unthinkable: Strategic Stability and the Credibility of North Korea’s Nuclear Threats,” Journal of Global Security Studies 6, no. 1 (March 2021): 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa004; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020), 115–16.

4 Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (January 2010): 64, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38.

5 Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” International Security 47, no. 4 (January 2023): 147–87, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00457.

6 Brendan R. Green, The Revolution That Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age.

7 Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 2014), 27–42.

8 Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority,” Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 1 (January 2021): 3–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070; Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, chap. 4.

9 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security 43, no. 3 (February 2019): 7–52, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00340.

10 See, Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict.

11 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 17–19.

12 Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, “Victory Is Possible,” Foreign Policy, no. 39 (Summer 1980): 14–27, https://doi.org/10.2307/1148409; Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered,” Daedalus 109, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 135–54; Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 141–71; Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 50–52.

13 Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority”; Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”; Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, chap. 4.

14 On NATO/U.S. during the Cold War, see, Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 110–12. Although the United States maintained the capability for asymmetric escalation after the Cold war, their incentive to paralysis an adversary at the substrategic level with the threat of limited nuclear first faded with the collapse of the Soviet Union; On France, see, Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, chap. 6; On Pakistan, see, Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability”; On post-Cold War Russia, see, Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority”; Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, and Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts,” CNA, 2020; Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 112–13; On North Korea, see, Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea, 80; Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 115–16; However, because North Korea is so opaque, or even deliberately ambiguous, it is difficult to code its nuclear strategy with high confidence; thus, we do not know if these concerns are founded. See, Hyun-Binn Cho and Ariel Petrovics, “North Korea’s Strategically Ambiguous Nuclear Posture,” The Washington Quarterly 45, no. 2 (April 2022): 39–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091874; On China, see, Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma”; U.S. Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 11; Experts contest the question of China’s nuclear trajectory. Thus, it is difficult to code China’s nuclear aspiration with high confidence. See, e.g., James Cameron, “China’s Silos: New Intelligence, Old Problems,” War on the Rocks, August 12, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/beijings-silos-new-intelligence-old-problems/; Fiona S. Cunningham, “The Unknowns About China’s Nuclear Modernization Program,” Arms Control Today 53, no. 5 (June 2023): 6–14.

15 The determinants of a nuclear strategy choice could include the availability of a patron, security environment, domestic pressure, and resource constraints. See, e.g., Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, chap. 2.

16 Ibid., 19; See also, Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 102–6.

17 Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 104–6.

18 Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 24; R. Harrison Wagner, “Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First,” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 3 (September 1991): 743, https://doi.org/10.2307/1963848; Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority,” 9.

19 Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (Winter 1979): 628, https://doi.org/10.2307/2149629; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 105.

20 For more on nuclear emboldenment, see, Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” International Security 40, no. 1 (July 2015): 87–119, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00204.

21 Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” 64.

22 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 8–13.

23 For arguments supporting the nuclear revolution theory, see, See, Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon; Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter”; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), 3–40; For arguments supporting the need for war-winning capabilities, see, Colin S. Gray, “Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory,” International Security 4, no. 1 (Summer 1979): 54–87, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626784; Gray and Payne, “Victory Is Possible”; Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018); Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes.”

24 Robert Jervis argued for retaliation needs to be assured to create a robust deterrent Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter”; Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy; On the other hand, Kenneth Waltz and McGeorge Bundy believed that deterrence was achieved by just a small possibility of retaliation. McGeorge Bundy, “Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has Changed?,” The Adelphi Papers 20, no. 160 (September 1980): 5–12, https://doi.org/10.1080/05679328008457363; Waltz, “More May Be Better,” 20–21.

25 Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century, 1st ed. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 14–18; Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 101.

26 Lieber and Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age, 100.

27 For more on these different views of escalation, see Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 21–23; Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: Wiley, 1963), 3.

28 For a discussion about the distinction between a limited and unlimited war, see Robert E. Osgood, Limited War : The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 1–3.

29 On the benefits of tying one’s hands, see, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960).

30 Barry R Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991).

31 This type of threshold thinking was famously presented in Herman Kahn’s escalation ladder. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Pall Mall, 1965).

32 Entanglement of nuclear and conventional forces makes this challenging. See, James M Acton, “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War,” International Security 43, no. 1 (August 2018): 56–99.

33 See, Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 17–19; Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 52–54.

34 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 199–201; Schelling, Arms and Influence, 99–109.

35 See, e.g., Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 50–52.

36 Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992): 179; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 9–49; Austin Long and Brendan R. Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (January 2015): 38–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.858150.

37 Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41, no. 1 (July 2016): 49–98, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00248.

38 See, e.g., Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios; Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 54–55.

39 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 14.

40 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 7–12, 158.

41 Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” 629–30; Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security 2, no. 4 (Spring 1978): 80–82, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538458; See, Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, chap. 3.

42 Schelling, Arms and Influence, chap. 3.

43 J. Michael Legge, “Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response” (RAND Corporation, January 1, 1983), 9, https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2964.html.

44 North Atlantic Military Committee, “Final Decision on MC 14/3: Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” January 16, 1968, https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf See especially section 17 and 22.

45 Francis J Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” The International History Review 23, no. 4 (December 2001): 847–75.

46 Kimberly Marten Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 55.

47 Andrian A. Danilevich, “Interview with Danilevich—December 18, 1990,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 24; A. S. Kalashnikov, “Interview with Kalashnikov—April 1993,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 90.

48 Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?: An inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991, National Security Archive Cold War Readers (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), 170–71.

49 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 58–59.

50 Ibid., 62–69.

51 Andrian A. Danilevich, “Interview with Danilevich—March 5, 1990,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, ed. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 19; Vitalii Lenidovich Kataev, “Interview with Kataev—June 23, 1993,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, ed. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 101.

52 Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy” (RAND Corporation, September 1975), 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P5506.html; Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 59.

53 Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 11; Fritz W. Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Though,” International Security 3, no. 2 (1978): 149, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626687.

54 Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 20.

55 David Holloway, Soviet Union and Arms Race, 1st ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 72.

56 Stanley Sienkiewicz, “SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine,” International Security 2, no. 4 (Spring 1978): 88, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538459; Desmond Ball, “Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 10, no. 1 (1983): 208, https://doi.org/10.1163/187633283X00090.

57 Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet and PRC Reactions to US Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” August 1, 1974, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/SIOP-26.pdf.

58 National Security Council, Defense Program Review Committee, “U.S. Strategic Objectives and Force Posture Executive Summary,” January 3, 1972, 50, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/SIOP-4.pdf.

59 James R. Schelsinger, “Interview with Schlesinger—October 29, 1991,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (BDM Federal, 1995), 129.

60 Ball, “Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War,” 217.

61 Ibid., 212; 216.

62 Makhmut A. Gareev, “Interview with Gareev—April 30, 1993,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, ed. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 72.

63 Cited in Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?, Adelphi Papers 169 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981), 32.

64 Ibid., 33.

65 Kataev, “Interview with Kataev—June 23, 1993,” 101; Varfolomei Vladinirovich Korobushin, “Interview with Korobushin—December 19, 1992,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 107.

66 Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 7.

67 James M. McConnell, “Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development,” World Politics 37, no. 3 (1985): 321, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010246.

68 Pavel Podvig, “The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note,” International Security 33, no. 1 (July 2008): 125, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.118.

69 Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 8.

70 Ball, “Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War,” 203; David Holloway, “Racing toward Armageddon? Soviet Views of Strategic Nuclear War, 1955–1972,” in The Age of Hiroshima, ed. Michael D. Gordin and John D. Ikenberry (Princeton University Press, 2020), 77.

71 Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?, 31.

72 Holloway, “Racing toward Armageddon? Soviet Views of Strategic Nuclear War, 1955–1972,” 78.

73 Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 9.

74 Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 184–201.

75 Schelsinger, “Interview with Schlesinger—October 29, 1991,” 129.

76 Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 10; Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 61–62.

77 Holloway, Soviet Union and Arms Race, 41.

78 Parallel history project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), “Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day? The 1964 Warsaw Pact Plan for a Nuclear War in Europe and Related Documents,” May 2000, 11–12.

79 Holloway, Soviet Union and Arms Race, 41; Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 74.

80 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 74.

81 Disagreements about the potential length of this phase existed, see Ibid., 71–72.

82 Danilevich, “Interview with Danilevich—December 18, 1990,” 24.

83 Andrian A. Danilevich, “Interview with Danilevich—December 13, 1992,” in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985 Volume II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, ed. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, and John F. Shull (McLean: BDM Federal, 1995), 56.

84 Parallel history project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), “Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day? The 1964 Warsaw Pact Plan for a Nuclear War in Europe and Related Documents,” 11–12.

85 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 75; Lambeth, “Selective Nuclear Operations and Soviet Strategy,” 10.

86 Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 75.

87 Ibid., 73–74.

88 Ibid.

89 Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet and PRC Reactions to US Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” xi.

90 McConnell, “Shifts in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development,” 341.

91 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 91.

92 Paul I. Bernstein, “The Emerging Nuclear Landscape,” in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 107–8; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 78; Happymon Jacob, “The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad: Strategic Stability,” in The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivals, ed. Lawrence Rubin and Adam M. Stulberg, 2018, 219.

93 Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” 64.

94 Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 94–120.

95 Jacob, “The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad: Strategic Stability,” 210.

96 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 11; Indian intelligence assessments reveals a more pessimistic view, in which it was concluded that Pakistani nuclear weapons would allow it to continue sub-conventional aggression in Kashmir. Cited in ibid., 12.

97 S. Paul Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian Security,” Security Studies 13, no. 1 (October 2003): 79–105, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410490493868; Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” International Security 33, no. 2 (October 2008): 45–70, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.45.

98 S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Standford, CA: Standford University Press, 2007), 124; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 270.

99 T. Negeen Pegahi, “From Kargil to Pulwama: How Nuclear Crises Have Changed Over 20 Years,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 2 (April 2019): 154, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626690; Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2005), 154; Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North Korea and the Lessons from Pakistan,” War on the Rocks, November 20, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/nuclear-stability-conventional-instability-north-korea-lessons-pakistan/; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, 273.

100 Timothy D. Hoyt, “Kargil: The Nuclear Dimension,” in Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 144–70, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511691805.007; T. Negeen Pegahi, “Nuclear Weapons Did Not Embolden Pakistan: Drawing the Right Lessons for North Korea,” War on the Rocks, January 22, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/nuclear-weapons-not-embolden-pakistan-drawing-right-lessons-north-korea/.

101 National Security Advisory Board, “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine,” August 17, 1999, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/70efe4/pdf/.

102 Prime Minister’s Office of India, “Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,” January 4, 2003, https://archive.pib.gov.in/archive/releases98/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html.

103 Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (January 2008): 161, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158.

104 Ibid., 161–63; Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 13.

105 Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,” 162–63.

106 Ibid., 164.

107 Ibid., 166–67; Jacob, “The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad: Strategic Stability,” 218.

108 Ladwig, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,” 166.

109 For examples of such views, see ibid., 167–68.

110 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 14; See also, Sandeep Unnithan, “Why India Didn’t Strike Pakistan after 26/11,” India Today, October 26, 2015, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20151026-why-india-didnt-strike-pakistan-after-26-11-820634-2015-10-14.

111 Hans M. Kristensen, “Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure,” Federation Of American Scientists (blog), November 16, 2016, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/11/pakistan-nuclear-infrastructure/.

112 Cited in, Antoine Levesques, Desmond Bowen, and John H. Gill, “Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities” (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2021), 20.

113 Masood Ur Rehman Khattak, “Indian Military Modernisation: Implications for Pakistan,” Strategic Studies 39, no. 1 (2019): 22.

114 Indian Army, “Land Warfare Doctrine—2018,” 2018, https://www.ssri-j.com/MediaReport/Document/IndianArmyLandWarfareDoctrine2018.pdf.

115 V. R. Raghavan, “Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review 8, no. 3 (September 2001): 94, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700108436865; Jacob, “The India-Pakistan Nuclear Dyad: Strategic Stability,” 213.

116 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations”; These claims are disputed, see Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence,” ORF Occasional Paper (Observer Research Foundation, May 2020), https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-counterforce-a-question-of-evidence-66126/; Ashley J. Tellis, “Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022), 84–96, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/07/18/striking-asymmetries-nuclear-transitions-in-southern-asia-pub-87394; Abhijnan Rej, “India Is Not Changing Its Policy on No First Use of Nuclear Weapons,” War on the Rocks, March 29, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/india-is-not-changing-its-policy-on-no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons/.

117 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 15; See also, Rabia Akhtar, “India’s Strategic Paralysis & Counterforce Temptations,” Pakistan Politico (blog), November 28, 2020, https://pakistanpolitico.com/cf/.

118 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Pakistani Nuclear Weapons, 2021,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77, no. 5 (September 2021): 265–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2021.1964258.

119 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 15.

120 See, Ibid., 16–24.

121 Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 117.

122 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 25.

123 Timothy Wrigth and Joseph Dempsey, “India Tests New Agni-P Missile,” IISS, July 29, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis//2021/07/mdi-india-tests-agni-p-missile

124 Army Tecnology, “BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile,” Army Technology (blog), April 24, 2013, https://www.army-technology.com/projects/brahmossupersoniccru/; The Economic Times, “India Successfully Test-Fires New Version of Nuclear-Capable Shaurya Missile,” The Economic Times, October 4, 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-successfully-test-fires-new-version-of-nuclear-capable-shaurya-missile/articleshow/78460487.cms?from=mdr.

125 Sidharth Kaushal et al., “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Agni-P and the Stability–Instability Paradox,” July 8, 2021, https://www.rusi.orghttps://www.rusi.org.

126 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 31–33.

127 Ibid., 34–35.

128 Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland, “The Debate over Indian Nuclear Strategy Is Heating Up,” War on the Rocks, April 5, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/the-debate-over-indian-nuclear-strategy-is-heating-up/; See also, Khattak, “Indian Military Modernisation,” 33–36.

129 The Hindu, “Pentagon Says India May Deploy Russian S-400 Missile System by next Month to Defend Itself from Pakistan, China,” The Hindu, May 18, 2022, sec. World, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pentagon-says-india-may-deploy-russian-s-400-missile-system-by-next-month-to-defend-itself-from-pakistan-china/article65425531.ece; Dinakar Peri, “Five S-400 Regiments Expected to Be Delivered by Early-2024,” The Hindu, March 1, 2023, sec. India, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/five-s-400-regiments-expected-to-be-delivered-by-early-2024/article66568964.ece.

130 Army Tecnology, “DRDO Ballistic Missile Defence System,” Army Technology (blog), accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.army-technology.com/projects/drdo-bmd/; Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 35.

131 Clary and Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations,” 36.

132 Ibid., 37.

133 M. V. Ramana and Lauren J. Borja, “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India,” NAPSNet Special Reports, August 1, 2019, 5–6, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/command-and-control-of-nuclear-weapons-in-india/.

134 Pegahi, “From Kargil to Pulwama,” 153.

135 Moeed W. Yusuf, “The Pulwama Crisis: Flirting With War in a Nuclear Environment | Arms Control Association,” May 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-05/features/pulwama-crisis-flirting-war-nuclear-environment; Pegahi, “From Kargil to Pulwama.”

136 BBC News, “Balakot: Indian Air Strikes Target Militants in Pakistan,” BBC News, February 26, 2019, sec. Asia, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47366718.

137 Pegahi, “From Kargil to Pulwama.”

138 Maimuna Ashraf Mansoor Ahmed, “India and Pakistan’s Crisis Means a New Arms Race,” Text, The National Interest (The Center for the National Interest, April 2, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/india-and-pakistans-crisis-means-new-arms-race-50467.

139 Levesques, Bowen, and Gill, “Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: Perceptions and Realities,” 32.

140 Even Hellan Larsen, “Deliberate Nuclear First Use in an Era of Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Online First (June 2023), https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231185154.

141 US Defense Department, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States—2020,” November 30, 2020, 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.

142 See, Lieber and Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence”; Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7–44, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2006.30.4.7; Long and Green, “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy.”

143 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 53–54, 32; US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 5, 11.

144 US Defense Department, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States—2020,” 1.

145 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 21.

146 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 7.

147 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), “Joint Publication 3-72: Nuclear Operations,” June 11, 2019, II-1-II–2, https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp3_72.pdf.

148 Ibid., II–2.

149 John Hyten, “Military Reporters and Editors Association Conference—Keynote Speech,” U.S. Strategic Command, March 31, 2017, https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/1153029/military-reporters-and-editors-association-conference-keynote-speech/https%3A//www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/1153029/military-reporters-and-editors-association-conference-keynote-speech/.

150 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), “Joint Publication 3-72: Nuclear Operations,” II–1.

151 US Defense Department, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States—2020,” 4.

152 Ibid., 4; 7.

153 Ibid., 5.

154 Ibid., 9.

155 Ibid., 7.

156 Ibid., 2.

157 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 5; US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 53–54.

158 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 30; See also, Ibid., 50; These claims are contested, see, Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, “The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian ‘De-Escalation:’ A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem,” War on the Rocks, February 20, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/.

159 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 54.

160 Ibid., 31; 54.

161 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 11.

162 US Defense Department, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States—2020,” 3; US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 11; These claims are contested, see, e.g., Hiim, Fravel, and Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma”; Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2023,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79, no. 2 (March 2023): 108–33, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713.

163 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 32; US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 11.

164 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 32.

165 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 11.

166 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78, no. 3 (May 2022): 176, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2062943.

167 Ibid., 178; Bryan Brender, Paul Mcleary, and Erin Banco, “U.S. Speeds up Plans to Store Upgraded Nukes in Europe,” Politico, October 26, 2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/26/u-s-plans-upgraded-nukes-europe-00063675.

168 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, 54–55.

169 Kristensen and Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” 172.

170 William M. Akrin and Hans M. Kristensen, “US Deploys New Low-Yield Nuclear Submarine Warhead,” Federation Of American Scientists (blog), January 29, 2020, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/w76-2deployed/.

171 US Defense Department, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States—2020,” 9.

172 US Defense Department, “Nuclear Posture Review,” October 2022, 20.

173 Kristensen and Korda, “United States Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” 166.

174 Matt Korda and Hans M. Kristensen, “Increasing Evidence That the US Air Force’s Nuclear Mission May Be Returning to UK Soil,” Federation of American Scientists (blog), August 28, 2023, https://fas.org/publication/increasing-evidence-that-the-us-air-forces-nuclear-mission-may-be-returning-to-uk-soil/.