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Abstract
What is the nature and impact of Sino-Russian alignment? What are the conditions under which each is likely to support the other militarily and with what type of support? To answer these questions, this article presents a novel alignment framework that best captures war fighting capabilities and how great powers align and determines the values of each indicator based on English, Chinese and Russian sources. I argue that China and Russia are significantly aligned and trending towards an even more extensive alignment relationship. However, the scope of their military alignment is limited to facilitating China’s challenge of US hegemony in Asia. Additionally, Russian support comes in the form of enhancing China’s independent combat capacity and potentially providing support functions in wartime but does not extend to direct involvement. These findings have implications for the literature on alignment, deterrence calculations and ourunderstanding of Russian and Chinese strategic thinking.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Alex Korolev, Thomas Christensen, Roger Haydon, Dani Reiter, Morgan Kaplan, and several anonymous reviewers for their feedback on previous drafts, as well as Thomas Causey, Emily Carr, Chengyang Zhang, and Janpal LaChapelle for their expert research assistance.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Data availability statement
The data and materials that support the findings of this study are available in the Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZSR0LK.
Notes
1 Emily Feng and Charles Maynes, “The Leaders of China and Russia have Finished Talks. Here Are Some Takeaways,” NPR, March 22, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/03/22/1165066688/xi-jinping-putin-talks-china-russia-ukraine.
2 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong. 4 (2019) (statement of Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence).
3 Testimony on United States European Command and United States Transportation Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2022 and the Future Years Defense Program, Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 117th Cong. 49 (2021) (statement of Tod D. Wolters, Commander of the United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization).
4 For example, see Leon Aron, “Are Russia and China Really Forming an Alliance?” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/are-russia-and-china-really-forming-alliance.
5 Yan Xuetong, “Weishenme Zhongguo yingdui E Wu zhanzheng xuyao pingheng celue? [China’s Ukraine Conundrum: Why the War Necessitates a Balancing Act],” Tsinghua University Center for International Security and Strategy, accessed January 20, 2024, https://ciss.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/zlyaq/4830.
6 Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly, “Why Russian Military Expenditure Is Much Higher than Commonly Understood (As Is China’s),” War on the Rocks, December 16, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/why-russian-military-expenditure-is-much-higher-than-commonly-understood-as-is-chinas/.
7 Darrell West and Christian Lansang, “Global Manufacturing Scorecard: How the US Compares to 18 other Nations,” Brookings Institution, July 10, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-manufacturing-scorecard-how-the-us-compares-to-18-other-nations/; “Petroleum and other Liquids,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed July 27, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/.
8 Caitlin Talmadge, “Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era,” in The Fragile Balance of Terror, ed. Vipin Narang and Scott D. Sagan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023), 13–39.
9 James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
10 For example, see Cui Hongjian, “Ba taiwan yu wukelan xiang lianxi shige xianjing [Considering Taiwan Alongside Ukraine Is a Trap],” Global Times, February 15, 2022, https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/46oqkfxYSLP; Aleksei Nikolski, Andrei Kotov, and Sergei Smirnov, “Армии США не хватит на две войны сразу [The US’s Armies Are Insufficient for a Simultaneous Dual Front War],” Vedomosti, February 2, 2010, https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2010/02/02/armii-ssha-ne-hvatit-na-dve-vojny-srazu.
11 These are based on existing studies and expert interviews. IRB Protocol approval #64869.
12 For an excellent resource on Chinese-language sourcing, see Joel Wuthnow, Elliot Shuwei Ji, and Maj. Oscar Gilro, “A Methodology for Evaluating Chinese Academic Publications,” Institute for National Strategic Studies, August 4, 2021, https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/Documents/research-memos/Research-Memo-for-Evaluating-Chinese-Academic-Pubs.pdf?ver=ZuCHV5WKYDA9o_ihKWK6Bw%3d%3d.
13 Paul Poast, Arguing About Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019); Joshua Fjetsul and Dan Reiter, “Explaining Incompleteness and Conditionality in Alliance Agreements,” International Interactions 45, no. 6 (2019): 976–1002.
14 Marina E. Henke, “Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building,” International Security 43, no. 4 (Spring 2019): 128–62; Adam Scharpf, “Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad: Evidence from Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 3 (September 2020): 734–47.
15 Adam P. Liff, “Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset,” Security Studies 25, no. 3 (2016): 420–59; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies 24, no. 4 (2015): 696–727. One notable exception, though a bit out of date, is Randall L. Schweller and Pu Xiaoyu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72.
16 Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944,” International Interactions 28 (2002): 237–60.
17 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1979), 118.
18 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
19 For example, see Morrow 1993; Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95; Emerson Niou & Peter Ordeshook, “Alliances in Anarchic International Systems,” International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 167–91.
20 Walt, The Origins of Alliances; Snyder, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics; Thomas Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, not ‘Alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy Of Alignment,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 53–76.
21 For example, see Curtis Signorino and Jeffrey Ritter, “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring Similarity in Foreign Policy Preferences,” International Studies Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1999): 115–44; Michael Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, “Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (August 2015): 430–56.
22 Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).
23 “China Trade: Trade Summary for China 2019,” World Integrated Trade Solution, accessed August 2022, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/CHN; Kenneth Allen, Philip Saunders, and John Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003-2016: Trends and Implications,” China Strategic Perspectives 11, July 17, 2017, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/ChinaPerspectives-11.pdf?ver=2017-07-17-153301-093.
24 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).
25 Total arms sales from Russia to China has decreased largely due to China’s own military modernization.
26 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese Military.”
27 Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 420–59.
28 For example, see Liff, “Whither the Balancers?,” 436; Lim and Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging,” 13; Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally? The Patron’s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,” Quarterly Journal: International Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 90–139; Roseanne W. McManus and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Logic of ‘Offstage’ Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations,” International Organization 71, no. 4 (2017): 701–33; Zachary Selden, “Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the Endurance of American Hegemony” Security Studies 22, no. 2 (May 2013): 330–64.
29 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 5.
30 Brett Leeds et al., “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944,” 237–60.
31 Michael Kofman, “The Emperors League: Understanding Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, August 6, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/the-emperors-league-understanding-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/.
32 Historical cases of great power alignment support this analysis. In 1958, the Soviet Union sought to acquire naval facilities in China, but China refused. In the 1970s, when the US wanted to build a facility in China to gather intelligence on Soviet missile launches, Deng made it very clear that China was willing to accept only American equipment in a facility.
33 Hou Qiang and Xie Yan, “Zhong E Guanxi Zheme Hao Weisha Bu Jiemeng” [China-Russia Relations are so Great, Why is There No Alliance], Xinhua News, March 22, 2023, http://www.news.cn/world/2023-03/22/c_1211740381.htm.
34 Jonathan D. Pollack, The Lessons of Coalition Politics (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1984), 50–1.
35 Tucker argues that the degree of capabilities disparity determines the degree to which states are willing to cooperate on defense technology given tech transfer. See Jonathan B. Tucker, “Partners and Rivals: A Model of International Collaboration in Advanced Technology,” International Organization 45, no.1 (Winter 1991): 101.
36 Timothy R. Heath, “US-China Rivalry: Great Power Competition in the Post-Industrial Age,” in New Asian Disorder: Rivalries Embroiling the Pacific Century, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2022), 142–4.
37 Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally?.”
38 David Erkomaishvili, “Alliance Index: Measuring Alignments in International Relations,” International Studies 56, no. 1 (2019): 28–45.
39 Selden, “Balancing against or Balancing With?.”
40 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Mearsheimer largely looks at the strategic behavior of great powers in the nineteenth and twentieth century that was influenced by the evolving balance of power in Europe.
41 For skepticism about alignment between revisionist great powers, see Alexander Lanoszka, Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 203–4.
42 Oriana Skylar Mastro, Upstart: How China Became a Great Power (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024), 16–17.
43 Sara Bjerg Moller, “Fighting Friends: Institutional Cooperation and Military Effectiveness in Multinational War” (Doctoral thes., Columbia University, 2016).
44 “Standardization,” NATO Standardization Office, last modified October 14, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69269.htm.
45 Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States, report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806, US Department of Defense, September 2018.
46 Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” International Security 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 190.
47 Mark A. Lorell and Julia F. Lowell, Pros and Cons of International Weapons Procurement Collaboration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994), 2.
48 States will share technology depending on their assessment of how likely the recipient is to become a threat in the future. See Erik Sand, “Sharing Vulcan’s Secrets: Why States Disclose Details of Advanced Military Technology to Other States” (Doctoral thes., MIT, 2021), 13.
49 “Multinational Operations,” US Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2013.
50 Liaisons serve as a point of contact between two sides, while embeds operate under the mandate of the foreign force they are within. See “Multinational Operations,” US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
51 Ralph Clem, “Military Exercises as Geopolitical Messaging in the NATO-Russia Dynamic,” Texas National Security Review 2, no. 1 (November 2018): 130–43. For similar reasons, I include in my analysis only exercises with a field component—command post, computer simulation, and tabletop exercises are excluded.
52 I do not include in the analysis exercises that involve only internal security forces (Russia’s National Guards and China’s police units), as they are not relevant for interstate conflict.
53 Jen Pearce, “HADR and US-China Military Cooperation,” The Diplomat, July 18, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/07/hadr-and-us-china-military-cooperation/.
54 Brian Blankenship and Raymond Kuo, “Do Military Exercises Escalate Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, no. 1 (July 2021): 3–31.
55 For this reason, the US Department of Defense needs special permission from State to exercise in contested or politically sensitive areas.
56 E. B. Montgomery, “Signals of Strength: Capability Demonstrations and Perceptions of Military Power,” Journal of Strategic Studies 43 (2020): 4.
57 Liff, “Whither the Balancers?.”
58 Christopher G. Pernin, Angela O’Mahony, Gene Germanovich, and Matthew Lane, Chasing Multinational Interoperability: Benefits, Objectives, and Strategies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), 10.
59 Richard Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (2015).
60 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research, 5th ed. (New York: Sage Publications, 2011), 221.
61 There is the possibility of joint intervention in Central Asia, but this would not involve fighting the United States.
62 Paul N. Schwartz, Russia’s Contribution to China’s Surface Warfare Capabilities (Washington, DC: Rowman & Littlefield and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015).
63 Richard Weitz, “Why China Snubs Russia Arms,” The Diplomat, April 5, 2010, https://thediplomat.com/2010/04/why-china-snubs-russian-arms/.
64 “Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
65 Timothy R. Heath, “How China’s New Russian Air Defense System Could Change Asia,” War on the Rocks, January 21, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/how-chinas-new-russian-air-defense-system-could-change-asia/.
66 Pieter D. Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (March 2019): 9.
67 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 290.
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75 Paul Schwartz, “The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 21, 2021.
76 Umesh Ellichipuram, “Construction Begins on Chinese Nuclear Power Plant Units,” Power Technology, May 20, 2021, https://www.power-technology.com/news/rosatom-nuclear-china/.
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78 Vasily Kashin, “Необъявленный союз. Как Россия и Китай выходят на новый уровень военного партнерства” [“Undeclared union. How Russia and China are reaching a new level of military partnership”], Carnegie Moscow Center, October 18, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80096.
79 “Заседание дискуссионного клуба «Валдай»” [“Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club”].
80 “Valdai Discussion Club Session,” Kremlin, October 3, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719; Nurlan Aliyev, “Military Cooperation Between Russia and China: The Military Alliance Without an Agreement,” International Center for Defence and Security, July 1, 2020. Other sources note this project has been moving forward, with the General Staff of Armed Forces of Russia and the Joint Staff of the PLA being the primary actors. For example, see Andrey A. Kokoshin, “Стратегическая стабильность в условиях ухудшения международной обстановки” [“Strategic Stability in a Deteriorating International Situation”], Polis Political Studies, no. 4 (May 2018): 7–21.
81 “Meiguo zuohe ganxiang? Pujing: Zhong E zai lianhe kaifa gaokeji wuqi” [“What Is America Thinking Now? Putin Says China and Russia Are Developing High Technology Weapons”], Huanqiu.com [Global Times], December 24, 2021, https://mil.sina.cn/zgjq/2021-12-24/detail-ikyamrmz0919403.d.html.
82 Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev, “The Ice Age: Russia and China’s Energy Cooperation in the Arctic,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 31, 2021, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/86100.
83 Alexander Gabuev, “As Russia and China Draw Closer, Europe Watches with Foreboding,” Carnegie Moscow Center, March 19, 2021, https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/84135.
84 Hearing on An Emerging China-Russia Axis: Implications for the United States in an Era of Strategic Competition, Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019) (statement of Erica Downs, Senior Research Scientist, China Studies Program, Center for Naval Analyses and Nonresident Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University).
85 Shuang Mawei Banzhang, “Zhe San Yang Dongxi, Jin Pujing Neng Gei” [“Only Putin Can Give These Three Things”], March 23, 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1761156949475142490&wfr=spider&for=pc.
86 “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the PRC and the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 16, 2001, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/200107/t20010724_679026.html.
87 Martin Chorzempa, “Export Controls against Russia Are Working—with the Help of China,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 27, 2022, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/export-controls-against-russia-are-working-help-china.
88 I do not include professional military education, but I note that China has only long-term educational programs with Russia. For more on these programs, see Alexander Korolev, “On the Verge of an Alliance: Contemporary China-Russia Military Cooperation,” Asian Security 15, no. 3 (2019): 12.
89 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he eluosi lianbang guanyu fazhan xinshidai quanmian zhanlue xiezuo huoban guanxi de lianhe shengming (quanwen)” [“Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation on the Development of a Comprehensive and Coordinated Strategic Partnership for a New Era (full text)”], Xinhua [New China], June 6, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2019-06/06/c_1124588552.htm.
90 Daryl Kimball, “Hotline Agreements,” Arms Control Association, May 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Hotlines.
91 Downs, “Emerging.”
92 “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the PRC and the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, July 16, 2001, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/200107/t20010724_679026.html.
93 Hu Jing, “Zhong E juxing haishang lianyan zhuanjia: youliyu diqu he shijie heping wending” [“China and Russia Held Maritime Joint Exercise. Expert: This Benefits Regional Peace and Stability”], Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, May 1, 2019, http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/2019-05/01/content_4840960.htm; Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Zapad/Interaction Military Exercise 2021: Growing China-Russia Bonhomie?” The Diplomat, August 6, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/zapad-interaction-military-exercise-2021-growing-china-russia-bonhomie/.
94 “China, Russia Sign Border Agreement,” CCTV, July 22, 2008. In Putin’s words, the two sides had “closed all major political issues in relations…including the main one—the border one.” Vladimir Putin, “Россия и меняющийся мир” [“Russia and the changing world”], Российская Газета [Russian Newspaper], February 27, 2012.
95 Fo E. Lizhi, “Zhong E bianjingjingwu qingbao xinxi jiaoliu yu hezuo cunzai wenti ji duice” [“The Existing Problems and Solutions to China-Russia Border Policing Intelligence Communication and Cooperation”], Yun’nan Jingguan Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of Yun’nan Police College] 1 (2016): 41–6; P. A. Menakir, “Россия—Китай на дальнем востоке: Мнимые страхи и реальные угрозы” [“Russia—China in the Far East: imaginary fears and real threats”], Пространственная экономика [Dimensional Economics], 2009, 18, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/rossiya-kitay-na-dalnem-vostoke-mnimye-strahi-i-realnye-ugrozy/viewer; Vitaly Yakovlevich Vorobyov, “Россия и Китай – дружеское партнёрство” [“Russia and China – Friendly Partnership”], Московский Государственный Институт Международных Отношений [Moscow State Institute of International Relations], 2017, 33.
96 Liu Ying, “Kelimiya zai ru E lushang ‘baozou’” [“Crimea Running Wild on the Path to Becoming Part of Russia”], Workers’ Daily, March 13, 2014, 8; Li Ruijing, “Kelimiya, Eluosi de tongyu meng” [“Crimea, Russia’s Pain, and Dream”], PLA Daily, March 28, 2013, 7.
97 “Xi Jinping: President Putin is my best intimate friend [习近平: 普京总统是我最好的知心朋友],” Sina [新浪], June 5, 2019, https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2019-06-05/doc-ihvhiqay3626437.shtml; “Press statements by President of Russia and President of China,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, March 21, 2023, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70750.
98 “China values Russia’s Support on Taiwan—Foreign Ministry,” TASS, May 20, 2016, https://tass.com/world/877014; “China Welcomes Russia’s Support over Hong Kong Issues,” CGTN, May 27, 2020, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-05-27/China-welcomes-Russia-s-support-over-Hong-Kong-issues-QPMsgLjjvq/index.html; “Russia Among 37 States Backing China’s Policy in Xinjiang” Moscow Times, July 13, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/13/russia-among-37-states-backing-chinas-policy-in-xinjiang-a66401.
99 Results obtained using natural language processing and analytical tools provided by Vannevar Labs, https://www.vannevarlabs.com/.
100 Zhang Lihua, “Explaining China’s Position on the Crimea Referendum,” Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, April 1, 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/01/explaining-china-s-position-on-crimea-referendum-pub-59600.
101 Qin Gang, “Waijiaobu Fayanren Qingang jiu Wukelan Wenti deng da Jizhe wen” [“Foreign ministry spokesperson Qin Gang’s regular press conference on March 3, 2014”], March 4, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-03/04/content_2628742.htm.
102 “Xi Jinping yu Moke’er jiu Tongguo Waijiao Tujing Jiejue Wukelan Weiji Dacheng Gongshi” [“Xi Jinping and Angela Merkel reached a consensus on resolving the Ukraine crisis via diplomatic means”], Xinlang Caijing [Sina], March 10, 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/forex/20140310/131718460312.shtml.
103 Emil Avdaliani, “A Chill in Georgia-China Relations,” Center for European Policy Analysis, October 21, 2020, https://cepa.org/a-chill-in-georgia-china-relations/; Susan Turner, “China and Russia after the Russian-Georgian War,” Comparative Strategy 30, no. 1 (2011): 50–9.
104 “Southern Kuril Islands Dispute Is Russian-Japanese Issue, Says Chinese Diplomat,” TASS, July 27, 2021, https://tass.com/politics/1318207.
105 “President Xi Jinping Meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, September 15, 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202209/t20220915_10766678.html; “Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping,” Office of the President of Russia, September 15, 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69356.
106 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on April 24, 2023,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202304/t20230424_11064804.html.
107 “Xi Jinping Warned Vladimir Putin against Nuclear Attack in Ukraine,” Financial Times, July 4, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/c5ce76df-9b1b-4dfc-a619-07da1d40cbd3.
108 Fu Ying, “Zhong E Guanxi: Shi Mengyou Haishi Huoban? [Sino-Russian Relations: Allies or Partners?],” Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 4 (2016): 1–63.
109 Richard Weitz, “Assessing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises: Past Progress and Future Trends,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 9, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-chinese-russian-military-exercises-past-progress-and-future-trends.
110 Liu Huadi and Chen Guoquan, “Zhong E ‘Haishang lianhe – 2017’ Lianyan dier jieduan yanxi chegnxian sanda tedian” [“Three Features of the Second Phase ‘Joint Sea 2017’ Exercise”], PLA Daily, September 21, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2017-09/21/content_7764099.htm; Sha Yangbo and An Xiaomeng, “Zhong E ‘haishang lianhe – 2017’ junshi yanxi diyi jieduan luoxia weimu” [“First Phase of Joint Sea 2017 Ended with Success”], Xinhua News, July 27, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-07/27/c_1121391917.htm.
111 Guo Yuandan, “Zhong E haishang junyan chuang ‘liangge shouci’ yanlian lianhe jiuyuan qianting” [“Two Firsts Achieved by Chinese and Russian Navy Conducting Exercise on Submarine Rescue)”], Global Times, April 30, 2019, https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKka9o.
112 Li Wei, “China-Russia Naval Exercise Enters Stage of Joint Anti-Submarine Drills,” China Military, October 18, 2021, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2021-10/18/content_10100409.htm.
113 Pavan Raghavendra, “Zapad-Interaction 2021: A New Milestone in China-Russia Joint Military Exercises,” Institute of China Studies, August 25, 2021, https://icsin.org/blogs/2021/08/25/zapad-interaction-2021-a-new-milestone-in-china-russia-joint-military-exercises/.
114 Joint Sea 2015 and 2017 took place in the Mediterranean and the Baltic Seas respectively; Aerospace Security 2016 was held in Moscow.
115 Guo Yuandan and Liu Yupeng, “Zhongguo shouci canjia E dongfang yanxi guimo kongqian shifang sanda xinhao” [“China’s First Participation in Russian Large-Scale Vostok Exercise, Releasing Three Signals”], Global Times, August 21, 2018, https://mil.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKbCTq.
116 Fan Yongqiang, “Zhuanjia jiedu ‘Dongfang – 2018’ zhanlue yanxi wuda kandian” [“Expert Explaining the Five Features of Vostok-2018”], Xinhua News, September 11, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-09/11/c_1123412395.htm.
117 Kathrin Hille and Henry Foy, “Joint Russian and Chinese military exercise stirs US unease,” Financial Times, August 9, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/8ba51d96-f4f9-402f-8721-c32c68f8cc7c.
118 Tom O’Connor, “Russia to Hold Back-to-Back East and West Military Drills with China, Belarus,” Newsweek, August 5, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-hold-back-back-east-west-military-drills-china-belarus-1616629. Russia participated in multilateral SCO drills in China, but this was the first national exercise.
119 Zhang Guangzheng et al., “Zhong E lianhe junyan zhengshi kaishi! Meiguo qian zhu E dashi: Meiguo xiang jiang Eluosi cong Zhongguo shenbian qiaozou shi baifei liqi” [“Sino-Russian joint exercises begin officially! Former US Ambassador to Russia: Trying to pry Russia away from China’s side is futile”], Global Times, August 10, 2021, https://world.huanqiu.com/article/44IB1v9ioQb; “Минобороны КНР: учения «Запад/Взаимодействиеь2021» завершились успехом” [“PRC Ministry of Defense: “West/Interaction-2021” ended in success”], RIA News, August 27, 2021, https://ria.ru/20210827/ucheniya-1747495782.html.
120 Richard Weitz, “Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises,” 51.
121 Though the actual exercise area was far from disputed areas. Yu Bin, “The Dawn of a Brave Trump World,” Comparative Connections 18, no. 3 (December 2016): 103–16.
122 James D. J. Brown, “China-Russia Naval Cooperation: Implications for Japan,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, March 26, 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/china-russia-naval-cooperation-in-east-asia-implications-for-japan/.
123 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China Go Sailing: Superpower on Display in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Foreign Affairs, May 26, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-05-26/russia-and-china-go-sailing; Andrew Higgins, “China and Russia Hold First Joint Naval Drill in the Baltic Sea” The New York Times, July 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/world/europe/china-russia-baltic-navy-exercises.html. One analysis disagrees with this assessment, interpreting the 2015 and 2017 exercises as a Chinese message to the West about its growing naval partnership with Russia. Dmitry Goreburg et al., “Russian-Chinese Military Partnership: An Increasingly Unequal Partnership,” Center for Naval Analyses, March 2023, 54, https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/russian-chinese-military-cooperation#:∼:text=Russian%2DChinese%20military%20cooperation%20has,joint%20military%20activities%20since%202020.
124 Vasily Kashin, Ma Bin, Yuki Tatsumi, and Zhang Jian, “Sino-Russian Relations: Perspectives from Russia, China, and Japan,” NBR Special Report no. 79 (May 30, 2019), 20.
125 Stephen Blank, “The Russo-Chinese Alliance: What Are Its Limits?” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 21, 2019, 15, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Blank_Testimony.pdf.
126 Online Supplemental Appendix 2 on joint exercises.
127 “New breakthrough! China-Russia joint air strategic patrol carried out in stages” [新突破！中俄联合空中战略巡航分阶段进行],” Xinhua News [新华网], June 8, 2023, http://www.news.cn/mil/2023-06/08/c_1212196812.htm.
128 “Дружба на расстоянии руки: Как Москва и Пекин определили границы допустимого” [“Friendship at arm’s length: How Moscow and Beijing defined the boundaries of what is acceptable”], Коммерссанть [The Businessman], May 31, 2019, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3984186.
129 Emily Young Carr, “China and Russia Cooperate on Rival to GPS,” The Diplomat, November 18, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/china-and-russia-cooperate-on-rival-to-gps/.
130 For one discussion of intel sharing during an exercise, see “Zhonge nanhai junyan qiyong haishang lianhe zhuanyong zhihui xinxi xitong, hexin yiyi hezai?” [“Chinese and Russian Military Employed a New Joint Command System During Maritime Joint Exercise. What’s its Significance?”], Pengpai [The Paper], September 18, 2016, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1530101.
131 Bill Gertz, “China shared US intelligence on Ukraine crisis with Russia,” Washington Times, February 25, 2022, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/feb/25/china-shared-us-intelligence-ukraine-crisis-russia/.
132 “China, Russia apparently agree to boost surveillance around Japan,” Kyodo News, July 7, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/07/f850ea64ee07-china-russia-apparently-agree-to-boost-surveillance-around-japan.html.
133 C4ISR stands for Command, Control, Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
134 Huang Yingying, “Zhong E fandao yanxi, neirong you tupo, Shijian didian you xuanji” [“China-Russia Anti-Ballistic Missile Exercise, New Content, Meaningful Time and Location”], Reference News, December 18, 2017, http://column.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2017/1218/2248215.shtml.
135 E. Meick, “China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017), 12.
136 Yu Bin, “Light at the End of the Tunnel?” Comparative Connections 22, no. 3 (September 2020): 141–50.
137 In Joint Sea 2016, the two sides set up a new joint naval command system, which includes the sharing of sensitive radar and sonar data. Yao Jianing, “Submarine Radar Info Sharing Showcases Mutual Trust Between China and Russia” China Defense Organization, September 21, 2016, https://www.chinadefenseobservation.com/?p=3447. In Aerospace Security 2017 there was some joint planning. Kashin et al., “Sino-Russian Relations,” 20.
138 Kashin et al., “Sino-Russian Relations,” 20.
139 Zhang Hong, “Junshi hezuo tuxian Zhong E guanxi qinmi” [“Military Cooperate Demonstrates Close Relationship between China and Russia”], People’s Daily Overseas Edition, September 17, 2018.
140 Meick, “China-Russia,” 22.
141 Yu Bin, “China-Russia Relations: The Story of Two Pivots,” Comparative Connections 21, no. 1 (May 2019): 117.
142 China Power Team. “What Are the Weaknesses of the China-Russia Relationship?” China Power, June 29, 2022, Updated November 9, 2023, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-relationship-weaknesses-mistrust/.
143 Ann M. Simmons, “Russia Charges Scientist With Passing Information to China,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-charges-scientist-with-passing-information-to-china-11592246286.
144 Schwartz, “Changing,” 5.
145 Fan Lingzhi, Xia Wenxin, and Liu Yupeng, “Meiguo shi ruhe yin Wukelan ‘ruju’ de? Meiguo jieru de kaiduan shi…” [“How did America ‘lure’ Ukraine into its ‘trap’? The beginnings of American intervention…”], Global Times, February 26, 2022, https://world.huanqiu.com/article/46y0yxZ0fly; “China’s Position on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 8, 2022, https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-position-russias-invasion-ukraine.
146 Yang Sheng and Xu Yelu, “China Clarifies Neutral Stance as Russia, Ukraine Posed for Talks,” Global Times, February 27, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202202/1253364.shtml; “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html.
147 Thomas Plümper and Eric Neumayer. “Free-Riding in Alliances: Testing an Old Theory with a New Method.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 32, no. 3 (2015): 247–68.
148 “Большая игра Китая: Россия впадает в опасную зависимость” [“China’s Great Game: Russia Falls into a Dangerous Addiction”], MKRU, March 14, 2022, https://www.mk.ru/economics/2022/03/14/bolshaya-igra-kitaya-rossiya-vpadaet-v-opasnuyu-zavisimost.html.
149 Russian sources present a more symmetrical picture in which Russia supports China in the South and East China seas, while China supports Russia in joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic region. Andrey A. Kokoshin, “Стратегическая стабильность в условиях ухудшения международной обстановки” [“Strategic Stability in a Deteriorating International Situation”], Российсский Совет по Международным Делам [Russian Council on International Affairs], August 7, 2018, https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/comments/strategicheskaya-stabilnost-v-usloviyakh-kriticheskogo-obostreniya-mezhdunarodnoy-obstanovki/.
150 Hans Joachim Spanger, “Поворот России на Восток, поворот Китая на Запад: взаимодействие и конфликты на Шелковом пути” [“Russia’s pivot to the East, China’s pivot to the West: synergy and conflict along the Silk Road”], Россия в Глобальном Политики [Russia in Global Affairs], June 14, 2016, https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/povorot-rossii-na-vostok-povorot-kitaya-na-zapad-vzaimodejstvie-i-konflikty-na-shyolkovom-puti/.
151 Michael Schuman, “China’s Russia Risk,” The Atlantic, March 9, 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/03/xi-putin-friendship-russia-ukraine/626973/.
152 The author thanks Alex Korolev for this point.
153 Hans Joachim Spanger, “Поворот России на Восток” [“Russia’s pivot to the East”].
154 Most articles along this line argue that the US should align with Russia against China. For example, Charles A. Kupchan, “The Right Way to Split China and Russia: Washington Should Help Moscow Leave a Bad Marriage,” Foreign Affairs, August 4, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-04/right-way-split-china-and-russia.
155 “India to be great power, not simply US ally: White House,” The Tribune, December 9, 2022, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/india-to-be-great-power-not-simply-us-ally-wh-459383.
156 Schwartz, “Russia’s Contribution.”
157 Owen R. Cote, Jr., “The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines,” Naval War College Newport Papers, 2003, 71–78 https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=newport-papers; “Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends,” China Maritime Studies Institute, May 5, 2023, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2023/05/quick-look-summary-cmsis-11-13-april-2023-conference-chinese-undersea-warfare-development-capabilities-trends/.
158 Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese Military to Build New-Type Training System Amid External Threats,” Global Times, February 21, 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202102/1216079.shtml.
159 Downs, “An Emerging China-Russia Axis?,” 90; “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo he Eluosi lianbang guanyu ‘Zhong E muling youhao hezuo tiaoyue’ qianshu 20 zhounian de lianhe shengming” [“Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the 20th anniversary of the ‘Treaty of Friendship’”], Xinhua.net, June 28, 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2021-06/28/c_1127606620.htm.
160 Rumer and Sokolsky, “Chinese Russian.”
161 “Soglasheniye mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiyei, Respublikoi Kazakhstan, Kirgizskoi Respublikoi, Respublikoi Tadzhikistan i Kitaisko Narodnoi Respublikoi ob ukreplenii doveriya v voyennoy oblasti v rayone granitsy” [“Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People’s Republic of China on confidence-building in the military field in the border area”], N 87-F3, May 26, 1997, docs.cntd.ru/document/901763237.
162 Shuang Mawei Banzhang, “Zhe San Yang Dongxi, Jin Pujing Neng Gei” [“Only Putin Can Give These Three Things”], March 23, 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1761156949475142490&wfr=spider&for=pc.
163 M. Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity” International Security 42, no. 3 (Winter 2017/18), 51.
164 Ailing Tan, “China’s Russian Energy Imports Balloon to $88 Billion Since War,” Bloomberg, March 20, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-21/china-s-russian-energy-imports-balloon-to-88-billion-since-war#xj4y7vzkg.
165 Maia Nkoladze, Phillip Meng, and Jessie Yin, “How Is China Mitigating the Effects of Sanctions on Russia?” Atlantic Council, June 14, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/how-is-china-mitigating-the-effects-of-sanctions-on-russia/.
166 Lorell and Lowell, Pros and Cons of International Weapons Procurement Collaboration.
167 “Worldometer: Russia Oil,” Worldometers.info, 2016, https://www.worldometers.info/oil/russia-oil/#oil-reserves; “China Oil Consumption,” CEICData, December 1, 2020, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/china/oil-consumption.
168 Laura Zhou, “Russia Relationship Better than an Alliance, Chinese Foreign Minister Says,” South China Morning Post, July 12, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3140798/russia-relationship-better-alliance-chinese-foreign-minister.
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Oriana Skylar Mastro
Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Courtesy Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stanford University. Her research can be found at www.orianaskylarmastro.com.