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Abstract
Revolutionary politics is an environment characterized by pressures for adverse selection. It elevates the most radical, conflict-prone, risk happy types, who in addition are poorly educated and inexperienced in government. They are vulgar anti-materialists who think reality can be bent to their will with sufficient effort and perseverance. Revolutionaries are possessed with grandiose ideas and salvation projects, which typically do not tolerate compromise and bargaining. Nor any cost seems too high to them for the realization of such ideas. When revolutionaries take over in a country that has a conflict with another state, these propensities are likely to affect their management of the conflict as well with potentially catastrophic consequences. The argument is illustrated with the diplomacy of Armenia’s revolutionary government, which led to the Second Karabakh War of 2020 and the Armenian side’s catastrophic defeat.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Gerard Libaridian, Rajan Menon, Ani Minasyan, Kevin Narizny, Michael Reynolds, Jack Snyder, Stephen Walt, Hakan Yavuz, Levon Zourabyan, participants of seminars at Princeton University and the University of Miami for helpful comments and criticisms. Anna Davtyan-Gevorkyan served as a capable research assistant. Meline Toumani helped with editing the text. The author alone is responsible for any errors.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Joshua Kucera, “Pashinyan Calls for Unification between Armenia and Karabakh,” Eurasianet, August 6, 2019. https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh.
2 See Asbarez, April 1, 2020. https://news.am/arm/news/623131.html?fbclid=IwAR1TJKtvWbZAozI9KLvFyAjzluqSK5j3TwalaVU0rMenATaN_zUkuSHnu_Q#.X_23eVdX0Fs.facebook
3 See Kristine Khanumyan, “How Pashinyan in Effect Pulled Out of Negotiations on Live Television,” Ilur, August 18, 2022. https://www.ilur.am/ինÕ¹պես-փաÕ·ինյանը-ուղիղ-եթերում-փաստա/?fbclid = IwAR0beEsFg4rd_deUktobfFuEukh8qiS9Wnm3uCujfeHkGGyNNeVVxwfqh1U. See also Tatul Hakobyan, The Valley of Death: The Disaster of 44 Days (Yerevan, Armenia: Lusakn, 2001), 38–40.
4 On how informational asymmetries prevent peaceful resolutions to conflicts see James D. Fearon, “Rationalist explanations for war,” International Organization, 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 379–414.
5 See John Antal, 7 Seconds to Die: A Military Analysis of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Future of Warfighting (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate Publishers 2022), ch. 1.
6 Ibid., 14.
7 See https://www.primeminister.am/hy/statements-and-messages/item/2021/04/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/.
8 Interview with Arthur Vanetsyan, who was the head of the National Security Service in 2018–2019.
9 See Fearon, “Rationalist explanations for war,” for the consequences of disagreements about relative resolve.
10 Interview with Sergey Lavrov, Trud, August 20, 2020. https://www.trud.ru/article/20-08-2020/1393051_sergej_lavrov_pandemija_uskorila_myslitelnye_protsessy_v_evrosojuze.html
11 On how easy it was to evaluate the balance of power and the diplomatic environment see also Michael R. Reynolds, “Confidence and Catastrophe: Armenia and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War,” War on the Rocks, January 11, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/confidence-and-catastrophe-armenia-and-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war/?fbclid=IwAR3XjJovllfoSMWe8p51EwJ9-JbIyzOKQ83dPnyZDeTqXfcu8LghyYMXDwk.
12 “Onik Gasparyan Has Revealed Details about the Course of the War,” Gala, November 17, 2020. https://galatv.am/hy/2903900/?fbclid=IwAR21VI4XJ-rRv4yBi7ZcyCEWvvVnhNc_RlT3EkdxA5k8M7ZTJiSM4J_UXvs; See also “Onik Gasparyan Has Responded to Nikol Pashinyan,” Radar Armenia, June 28, 2023. https://radar.am/hy/news/politics-2575921047/?fbclid=IwAR2J9h9ngs4RmQaMlpyCMpqByqvIRXCk1yE0psWXFuH5kw1nddU_X0oUz9s
13 About warnings the political leadership received regarding the futility of continuing the fight and their failure to heed those warnings see the interview with Mikael Hambartsumyan, the head of the National Security Service during the war. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acf_IHRu1FM&ab_channel=ABnews.
14 See Ani Mejlumyan, “Putin Says Armenia Could Have Stopped the War and Kept Shusha,” Eurasianet, November 18, 2020. https://eurasianet.org/putin-says-armenia-could-have-stopped-the-war-and-kept-shusha. In another interview, Mikael Hambartsumyan claimed that Pashinyan failed to reveal Putin’s proposal to his national security team. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sg_JAnpQGtM&ab_channel=5TVChannel.
15 Ronald Rogowski, “The Role of Theory and Anomaly in Social-Scientific Inference,” The American Political Science Review, 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 467–470.
16 Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
17 Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5, 32–43.
18 Ibid., 10–12.
19 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 3.
20 For some examples see Ara Papyan, “Keeping Karabakh Will Be Impossible if the Five Districts are Ceded,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YkdAFzb0vQU; Norat Ter-Grigoryants, “What Kind of a Whore’s Question Is That, to Cede or not to Cede Territories? There is Nothing to Cede,” Arajin Lratvakan, December 21, 2016. https://www.1in.am/2066383.html; Samvel Babayan, “I Don’t See What Azerbaijan Is Conceding,” Civilnet, August 18, 2016. https://www.civilnet.am/news/168954/ես-ադրբեÕ»անական-կողմի-փոխզիÕ»ումը-Õ¹եմ-տեսնում%E2%80%A4-սամվեÕ¬-բաբայան/. The phrase “concessions are only going to whet Azerbaijan’s appetite” in Armenian generates 26,500 hits on google.
21 James D. Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 107–126; James D. Fearon, “Bargaining over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power,” Typescript, the University of Chicago, 1996.
22 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated edition (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2014), 30–36.
23 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
24 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), ch. 6.
25 Snyder, Myths of Empire, 5.
26 For a prominent example of this argument see Zory Balayan, “The Threat of Pan-Turanism,” in Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991).
27 “Hit them and you’ll see the positive reaction,” Lragir, July 6, 2017. https://www.lragir.am/2017/07/06/156734/
28 “Unless We Take a Couple More Districts, Azerbaijan Will not Capitulate,” Haykakan Zhamanak, July 15, 2020. Available at https://www.armtimes.com/hy/article/192651.
29 Hakobyan, The Valley of Death, 88.
30 Hrag-Khachig Demerjian, “Karabakh for You Is Just a Piece of Territory, for Us It Is a Sacred Homeland,” Azdak Daily, 29 April 2016. https://www.aztagdaily.com/archives/292593
31 On the problem of indivisibility in general see Fearon, “Rationalist explanations for war,” 381–382; Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), Ron E. Hassner, War on Sacred Grounds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
32 “Artsakh for us is not just a piece of territory, it is a sacred homeland,” Armenpress, 9 October, 2020. https://armenpress.am/arm/news/1030970.html
33 “Karabakh Is a Piece of Territory for You, but for Us It Is a Sacred Homeland,” Armenpress, October 2, 2013. https://armenpress.am/arm/news/735165
34 Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through War and Peace (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2003), 260.
35 “Any Territorial Concession Is Unacceptable,” Zhoghovurd, July 16, 2016. Available at armlur.am/556779/
36 Levon Zourabyan, “The Politics of Transition in Armenia and the Prospects for Peace with Azerbaijan,” Aravot, June 3, 2000; “What Negotiations Had Preceded Ter-Petrosyan’s Resignations: The Declassified Documents of the State Department,” Azatutyun, February 3, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0Q90dhTsdA&ab_channel=%D4%B1%D5%A6%D5%A1%D5%BF%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%A9%D5%B5%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%B6
37 See Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey, and the Karabakh Conflict, ed. Arman Grigoryan (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 35–59.
38 “Vazgen Sargsyan’s Letter to Levon Ter-Petrosyan” Aravot, 9 February 2008. https://www.aravot.am/2008/02/09/329965/
39 See, for example, Vazgen Manoukyan, The Armenian Dream in the Dead End of Survival: Collection of Speeches and Articles (Yerevan, Armenia: V I V Today and Tomorrow, 2002), 299; “The Armenian Intelligentsia and the Political Forces in Defense of Artsakh,” Azg Daily, October 28, 1997. Remarkably, this outlook has survived the catastrophe of 2020. For a representative example see Vahan Zanoyan, “Realism, Vision, and Defeatism: Right and Wrong Lessons from the War,” Armenian Mirror Spectator, February 3, 2021. https://mirrorspectator.com/2021/02/03/realism-vision-and-defeatism-right-and-wrong-lessons-from-the-war/
40 See Garegin Nzhdeh, Metz Gaghapar [Great Idea] (Yerevan, Armenia: The Republican Party of Armenia, 2003). For discussions of organic vs. civic conceptions of nationalism see Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 70; and Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13.
41 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica, Vol. 40, No. 2, (March, 1979), 263–292.
42 Gerd Gigerenzer and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, “Cassandra’s Regret: The Psychology of Not Wanting to Know,” Psychological Review, 124, no. 2 (March, 2017), 179–196.
43 For the psychological dynamics behind this problem, see Leslie K. Johns, Hayley Blunden, and Heidi Liu, “Shooting the Messenger,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 148, no. 4 (April, 2019), 644–666.
44 Snyder, Myths of Empire, 31–55.
45 Arman Grigoryan, “The Karabakh Conflict and Armenia’s Failed Transition,” Nationalities Papers, 46, no. 5 (April, 2018), 844–860.
46 See Gerard J. Libaridian, The Challenge of Statehood (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1999), 90–96.
47 Avetis Haroutyunyan, The Era of the Rifraff (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2005), 16. Avetis Haroutyunyan was a pseudonym Siradeghyan used in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
48 “Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s Resignation,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rYUYKxnirUs
49 Ashot Sargsyan, “The War and Who Bears Responsibility for it: Part 2” Ilur, April 23, 2022. https://www.ilur.am/աÕ·ոտ-սարգսյան-պատերազմը-եւ-դրա-պատասխ-2/.
50 “Corruption in Armenia,” Policy Forum Armenia, October 2013. https://www.pf-armenia.org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PFA_Corruption_Report.pdf
51 “The Data about Elections Violations Are Severely Exaggerated,” Azg Daily, February 27, 2003, 1.
52 “They Are Restraining Those Who Are Taking a Swing at the State,” Azg Daily, February 27, 2008, 5.
53 See Arsen Gasparyan, “Understanding the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Domestic Politics and Twenty-five Years of Fruitless Negotiations, 1994-2018,” Caucasus Survey, 7, no. 3 (October 2019), 235–250; Nzhdeh Hovsepyan, “The Armenian Architecture of the Status Quo: The New National Ideology,” Enlight Research Center, 19 May 2022. https://enlightngo.org/post/26292
54 To understand the paradox, see Ronald Grigor Suny, Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); and Arman Grigoryan, “Ethnofederalism, Separatism, and Conflict: What Have We Learned from the Soviet and Yugoslav Experiences?” International Political Science Review, 33, no. 5 (November 2012), 520–538. For the tacit bargain of the Soviet center with Armenian nationalism see Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), 186.
55 Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991); and Grigoryan, “The Karabakh Conflict and Armenia’s Failed Transition.”.
56 For the general argument about special interests fighting change that threatens their positions see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development,” American Economic Review, 90, no. 2 (May 2000), 126–130.
57 Hrant Margaryan, “I Fear that Azerbaijan May One Day Recognize Karabakh’s Independence.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxFW-Iz_A0o&t=3s
58 On how corruption was organized in Armenia see Christoph H. Stefes, Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions: Corruption, Collusion, and Clientelism (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmilllan, 2006).
59 “Shameful Statement: Nikol Pashinyan on Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s Statement.” https://www.youube.com/watch?v=MQ8dlQy8MAs
60 Snyder, Myths of Empire, 41, 107.
61 Krasner used the word stupidity, not irrationality, but that is a distinction without a difference. See Stephen Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, 28, no. 3 (April 1976), 319.
62 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), ch. 1.
63 For similar arguments see Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1971), 40–46; Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, third edition (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1974), 39–41; Jeff Colgan, “Domestic Revolutionaries and International Conflict,” World Politics, 65, no. 4 (October 2013), 656–690.
64 Justin Kruger and David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of it: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, no. 6 (December, 1999), 1121–1134.
65 See Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” World Politics, 44, no. 1 (October 1991), 7–48; Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91,” World Politics, 47, no. 1 (October, 1994), 42–101.
66 See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
67 “Nikol Pashinyan’s Address on the Occasion of the Centennial Anniversary of the First Republic.” https://www.primeminister.am/hy/statements-and-messages/item/2018/05/28/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyans-address/
68 “The Values of the Revolution Are Pan-Armenian Values.” https://www.primeminister.am/hy/statements-and-messages/item/2018/05/28/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyans-address/
69 “The Strategy of Transforming Armenia: 2050,” Office of the Prime Minister. https://www.primeminister.am/u_files/file/Haytararutyunner/Armenia2050_7_5.pdf
70 Edmond Y. Azadian, “Turkey’s Adventures in the Eastern Mediterranean,” The Armenian Mirror Spectator, August 20, 2020. https://mirrorspectator.com/2020/08/20/turkeys-adventures-in-the-eastern-mediterranean/
71 Nikol Pashinyan, “The Determination to Be Wrong as the Correct Path,” Hetq, September 18, 2020. https://hetq.am/hy/article/121690
72 “We Want to Do the Impossible.” https://www.primeminister.am/hy/statements-and-messages/item/2018/11/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Aragatsotn-Marz-21-11/
73 All three statements are cited in Mari Amirjanyan, “The Prehistory of Pashinyan’s Comparisons of Himself with Jesus,” Antifake, November 16 2022. antifake.am/am/news/1331
74 “In fact, Aliyev himself has asked me not to say anything about the domestic political situation in Azerbaijan,” Radio Liberty, Armenian Service, September 28, 2020. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/30862502.html?fbclid=IwAR3XZkMYV25z8e4xjTe52ENaPlSzPhg0rHu6jN4uP8JSzXb_WDi78bApvt8
75 “Pashinyan: Azerbaijani Aggression Is Not Just against Armenia, but against Democracy,” Radio Liberty, Armenian Service, July 12, 2018. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/29358788.html
76 On motivated bias and its consequences for decision-making see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128–155.
77 “The Problem of Karabagh Was in a Deadlock by 2018,” Radio Liberty, Armenian Service, November 29, 2020. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/30974472.html; “I Am Guilty for Refusing to Surrender the Territories,” 168.am, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7uZ1KPOFRA; “Interview with Lena Nazaryan.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mpmQehzA4AQ
78 For some examples see Georgi Derluguian, “World War with a Local Significance,” in Ruslan Pukhov, ed., Hurricane in the Caucasus (Moscow, Russia: Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technology, 2021), 8–24; “Russia Has Betrayed US,” Interview with Hovsep Khurshudyan. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSjMONTRokU; “It’s a Deceitful Propaganda Trick To Claim that Peace Depended on the Armenian People,” Podcast by Hrant Ter-Abrahamyan. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5efkPhONvWg&t=2s;
79 See Armen Mirzoyan, “The Armenian Authorities Have Not Agreed to Keep Kelbajar, Lachin, and Karabakh in Exchange for Returning the Other Territories,” Hetq, September 12, 2023. https://hetq.am/hy/article/159959?fbclid=IwAR37G3SYPe88QBsX5BkCqPT1gmbGWOvczUToXflSzCYmXgJaVoXV1HrIB6I
80 Kristine Khanumyan, “Tracing the Russian President’s Statement,” Ilur, November 15, 2022. https://www.ilur.am/Õ¼դ-նախագահի-հայտարարության-հետքերով/?fbclid = IwAR1H7MXSdWVB6wfIUnl0Qw7YrdPf9_1chKDl0QoyWRBZ-3OhZm9lw4FM-lo
81 “It Is You Who Have Been a Government of Traitors, It Is You Who Have Plundered the Army and the Country,” Araratnews, December 8, 2021. araratnews.am/show/45234; “Pashinyan’s Contradictory Statements about the Army and the Armaments,” 168 Zham. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNG3jLKUGvM
82 “We have had 11,000 deserters during the war: Anna Hakobyan,” Tert.am, April 1, 2023. https://www.tert.am/am/news/2023/04/01/anna-hakobyann/3916895
83 We lost the war because there was a 5th column inside the army.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=slEpyyIg_YQ&ab_channel=1inTV
84 “A Russian Military Expert Gave Detailed Analysis of the War,” Sputnik Armenia, 22 June, 2021. https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/20210614/Rossiyskiy-voennyy-ekspert-podrobno-razobral-itogi-voyny-v-Karabakhe-27917313.html
85 Walt, Revolution and War, 5.
86 Ibid., 10–12.
87 “The Interview of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Petros Ghazaryan,” December 19, 2023. https://www.primeminister.am/hy/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/12/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Petros-Ghazaryan/?fbclid=IwAR1N_aS1GLwvcX2KJz3XanGDawGnOhZKVTw06aCP4EJ7GLZ860y0E4FbHAc
88 “The Declaration of Independence Seemed to Be about a State Designed to Serve the Goal of Unification with Karabakh, not about the Republic of Armenia,” Interview with Gevorg Papoyan, Factor TV, January 24, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaH46oNaaXc&ab_channel=Factortv
89 “Putin Stated that Armenia Itself Recognized Karabakh as Part of Azerbaijan,” TASS, October 5, 2023. https://tass.ru/politika/18921533?fbclid=IwAR0daaOU1TRBpnqFhXez9DRS_Vqsu_DjcdcyRdlVbZ-UN9OnCLTwdWTEaz0
90 “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia Regarding the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sept. 20, 2023. https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1905169/. Among other things, Pashinyan is criticized in this statement for his unconditional recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty, which made it impossible for Russia to defend the status quo in Karabakh.
91 “Maria Zakharova Reacts to Alen Simonyan’s Remarks about Her and Criticizes the Armenian Media Criticizing Russia,” Caucasus Watch, September 8, 2023. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/maria-zakharova-reacts-to-alen-simonyans-remarks-about-her-and-complains-about-armenian-media-criticizing-russia.html
92 “Pashinyan Refuses to Sign CSTO Document on Joint Assistance Measures for Armenia,” Interfax, November 23, 2022. https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/85309/
93 Joshua Kucera, “Armania Refuses to Host CSTO Exercises,” Eurasianet, January 10, 2023. https://eurasianet.org/armenia-refuses-to-host-csto-exercises
94 “[Pashinyan] Refused to Stop the War when Azerbaijanis Had not Taken Shushi Yet,” 168 Zham, March 2, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4h4DaY2oLU&ab_channel=168.am
95 David Ignatius, “Azerbaijan Waited for Its Opening in Nagorno-Karabakh. This Week It Found It,” The Washington Post, September 22, 2023.
96 “Armenia Cast Adrift in a Tough Neighborhood,” The New York Times, September 28, 2023.
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Arman Grigoryan
Arman Grigoryan is Associate Professor in the International Relations Department at Lehigh University.