A climate report gone missing – power mechanisms in Swedish national transport planning

ABSTRACT

While the technological development of vehicles and fuels is not adequate to meet current climate mitigation targets, infrastructure development also plays an important role in transforming the transport system. Previous studies have argued that conventional infrastructure planning is incapable of implementing climate mitigation. The aim of the paper is to provide insights into power means and mechanisms that counteract integration of climate mitigation targets in infrastructure planning. This is done by an in-depth case study of current Swedish national transport planning. This case provides a rich illustration of a situation with high political ambitions regarding climate mitigation on the one hand, and power mechanisms and resistance with regard to climate goals during the planning process on the other. The case is analysed using the perspective of power circuits and shows how forecasting works as an obligatory passage point, sorting in and out which analyses will be part of the decision-making material. Analyses which do not fit the forecasting model are dismissed from planning. The conclusion is that as long as the transport infrastructure planning practice is dependent on forecasting as the only central analysis there will be difficulties in changing the scope of infrastructure planning and making climate goals central for transport planning.

KEYWORDS:

• Transport
• planning
• power circuits
• power
• Sweden
• climate mitigation

1. Introduction

Achieving climate mitigation targets is high on the political agenda in most countries. The transport sector is one of the key sectors which must be transformed to make it possible to reach ambitious climate targets. Much focus is on the development of vehicles and fuels, but the way transport infrastructure is planned on the strategic and operative levels is also in need of substantial change (Banister 2008; Curtis and Scheurer 2010; Lyons and Davidson 2016). Previous research highlights several types of difficulties connected to the ambition to integrate climate and sustainability concerns in long-term transport planning and decision-making. One common conclusion is that the problems relate to a strong regime of conventional transport planning, and that there is a need for a new sustainable transport planning paradigm (Banister 2008, 2011; Curtis 2020). One specific aspect regards the critical role of cost–benefit analysis (CBA) for the appraisal of economic efficiency as an indication of ‘good planning’ in several European countries (Hickman, Austin, and Banister 2014; Schwanen, Banister, and Anable 2011; cf. Pettersson 2014; Thoresson 2011). Several studies argue that it is not suitable to analyse climate transformation from the CBA perspective due to the essential complexity and wickedness of the issues at hand, which makes it difficult to assess and agree upon relevant quantitative figures which fit the CBA tools (Hickman, Austin, and Banister 2014; Lyons and Marsden 2019; Witzell 2021).

The demand for alternative methodological approaches for strategic transport planning has been discussed for more than a decade among researchers, but in contemporary planning processes not much seems to have changed. Research in this area indicates that in planning practice there is resistance towards introducing new approaches (Pettersson 2014; Witzell 2021). However, there has been little empirical analysis showing what such resistance consists of and how it is exercised. Therefore, there is a need for research that helps to understand power dynamics that permeate the practice of transport planning and decision-making (Flyvbjerg 1998; cf. Cashmore and Richardson 2013; Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002; Marsden and Reardon 2017), which is the focus of this paper.

The empirical focus of our work is Swedish long-term national transport infrastructure planning. The planning process is strategic and directional, outlining the transport system’s future expected development, with consideration of politically set objectives and current policy. Sweden has a national climate goal that prescribes that the country should be in the forefront of developing a fossil-free society. The explicit target is to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, a target that has been formalized through a climate law in 2017 (Climate Act 2017:720). For the transport sector, the task is expected to be especially challenging, as the transport sector accounts for more than 30% of domestic greenhouse gas emissions and is a sector that is known to be difficult to change. However, previous research has discussed and criticized the national transport infrastructure planning process for not considering environmental quality objectives properly (Finnveden and Åkerman 2014; see also Kloo et al. 2019; Pettersson-Löfstedt et al. 2020). Other studies note that even though there is in general a ‘strong normative commitment’ (Pettersson 2014) to sustainable development in Swedish transport policy and planning, this commitment has only had a very limited practical impact on the actual priorities in long-term transport planning – to a large extent because of a continued reliance on the expected potential of technical innovations and the possibility of shifting to renewable fuels. This means that the discussion is focused on additional investments or technical innovation rather than a more fundamental transformation of the transport system (Pettersson 2014; see also Witzell 2020; 2021). Other works illustrate the existence of parallel policy agendas, which means that ambitions that are clearly stated in certain strategic plans and policy documents are actively counteracted by the actual content of other plans and decisions (Isaksson, Antonsson, and Eriksson 2017; see also Hrelja, Hjerpe, and Storbjörk 2015).

The specific aim of the paper is to provide insights into power means and mechanisms which counteract integration of climate mitigation targets in infrastructure planning. This is done by an in-depth case study of current Swedish national transport infrastructure planning process and specifically the development of the Orientation Plan (which is the initial and strategic part of the long-term planning process) for the period 2018–2029. The case provides a rich illustration of a situation with high political ambitions regarding climate mitigation on the one hand, and power dynamics and resistance towards new planning approaches to consider climate mitigation targets during the planning process on the other hand. In the studied national transport infrastructure planning process, this led to a fascinating course of events, culminating in a decision not to publish a specific analysis of climate mitigation potentials from the formative stage of national planning.

1.1. Outline

The paper is organized into seven sections. In the following section, the Swedish governance model and national infrastructure planning process are described. In the third section, the method and material used in the study is outlined. The fourth section contains a description of the three circuits of power approach and how we apply it to the case of the missing climate analysis. Section five describes the results of our study as a story of the climate report. In the sixth section, the results are analysed from the power circuits approach to discuss the mechanisms of power in the planning process. The final section discusses the conclusions to be drawn from the extreme case of climate integration in transport planning.

2. Swedish national transport policy and planning

National transport planning in Sweden is based on a general transport political agenda which defines the overall policy direction through national transport policy goals, established by the Swedish parliament in 2008. The policy goals consist of one overall goal and two secondary goals regarding (1) the function of the transport system, and (2) consideration of environment, traffic safety and health. The overall goal is: ‘to ensure an economically efficient and long-term sustainable transport supply for citizens and businesses throughout the country’ (Government Bill 2008). This goal and the two secondary goals are intended to guide transport policy developments on all levels. In addition, the climate mitigation target of net zero emissions by 2045 is considered an integral part of this transport policy framework.

The Swedish governance model means a small government office with small ministries and larger professional national authorities. Due to their limited size, the ministries have limited capacity to investigate and review issues themselves as a basis for policy decisions. The public authorities are assigned to make those sorts of investigations based upon directives given by the government. They are however also supposed to work ‘independently’ from the government and are allowed to take initiatives to investigate and act upon issues that the government has not asked for, but which are motivated by the professional judgement of the agency and by law (Öberg and Wockelberg 2021). Regarding the transport sector, there are several public authorities with differing assignments. The largest in terms of staff and financial resources is the Swedish Transport Administration (STA). The STA is the agency responsible for national transport infrastructure planning, as well as construction and maintenance of national roads and railways.

2.1. The long-term infrastructure planning and decision-making process

The long-term transport infrastructure planning process is normally (since the last 20 years) carried out every four years and is initiated at the beginning of each term of office of the national government. The process sets the frame for how national transport infrastructure will develop during the coming 12 years. Even as the plan mainly concerns national transport infrastructure, it also carries significant direct and indirect influence over land-use and transport planning at the regional and local levels.

The national transport infrastructure planning and decision-making process is divided into key phases, which are visualized in Figure 1. The process starts with a directive from the national government to the STA to develop an ‘Orientation Plan’. The directive is grounded in government policy, including transport policy goals, and reflects political power relations and negotiations between parties and ministries within the government. The Orientation Plan is strategic and assesses the overall development direction and allocation of funding for maintenance and new investments on a general level. Based upon the recommendations in the Orientation Plan the national government prepares a ‘Government Bill’ to the parliament, the Swedish Riksdag. The Bill suggests the focus and priorities in national infrastructure politics (including spending frame) for the next 12 years. Based on that the parliament decides on the financial frame for the coming ‘Action Plan’. The strategic orientation is established by the government in a ‘directive’ for action planning to the STA. The STA then produces an Action Plan which specifies spending on infrastructure maintenance and new investment projects. The Action Plan and budget decision set the framework for the following step of ‘Operational Planning and Implementation’ (when and how each project should be realized). Our analysis focuses on the Orientation planning process carried out in 2015.

Figure 1. Key steps of the Swedish national transport infrastructure planning and decision-making process, and the timing of the climate analysis in 2015.

2.2. The ‘central forecast’ – essential for national planning

Central tools of analysis in Swedish national transport planning, just like in many other European countries, are the ‘central forecast’ of future travel demand and assessing benefits by standardized cost–benefit analysis (Hultén 2012; ITF 2021; Lundin 2008). In Sweden a parliamentary decision taken in 2012 prescribes that normally only one travel demand forecast should be prepared for each round of national transport infrastructure planning (Government Bill 2012). Nonetheless, the government may request broader analyses, which the case will illustrate, and which further points to the political dimension of long-term transport planning.

This ‘central forecast’ is based on freight transport and passenger traffic models that are based on current and previous transport and travel patterns. Data on current and future infrastructure, traffic and costs are required as input to the models. In addition, information is required on how other conditions such as population, economic development, fuel costs, etc. can be expected to develop. This information is collected from other authorities (STA 2023). Moreover, the ‘central forecast’ should consider decided national policies and policy instruments. Uncertainties should be analysed by carrying out sensitivity analyses, by which individual assumptions in the travel demand model are varied to assess how robust the forecast is, rather than preparing deviating forecasts or scenarios (Government Bill 2012). This single, central ‘business-as-usual’ forecast carries central influence over planning and dimensioning of measures in the transport system on all planning levels (national, regional and local), as well as prioritizations and assessments of environmental, social and economic consequences of investments (Johansson 2019). At the local level the central forecast must be used for local planning and assessments of changes in the infrastructure. The consequences can be that even if a local authority would like to limit and slow traffic down along a certain route due to environmental goals, it could be forced to skip such measures because of the predicted traffic demand of the central forecast. Thus, the central forecast is primarily developed in the national planning process but structures not only the national planning possibilities but also regional and local planning possibilities.

3. Materials and methods

The study is a qualitative single case-study of the first key phase of the Swedish national transport infrastructure planning process, i.e. the Orientation planning process performed in 2015. We consider this an extreme case (Flyvbjerg 2006) of implementation challenges of climate integration in strategic transport planning. The conditions of the case, however, are by themselves not extreme; ambitious climate goals are common in Europe and globally, and so are planning practices centred around forecasting and CBA (see e.g. ITF 2021). However, the Orientation planning process started with high climate ambitions, only to result in the removal of a specific climate analysis. Thereby, the case is a rich illustration and in-depth analysis of conflicts, resistance and expressions of power associated with established transport planning practices. The case adds to contemporary research by contributing a detailed understanding of existing difficulties to change how transport planning is performed and why a transformation of the transport sector to reach ambitious climate targets is impeded.

The case study builds on an analysis of written documents related to the planning process, ten qualitative semi-structured interviews, and a workshop on alternative approaches to long-term planning with a group of officials within the STA involved in preparing the next Orientation Plan. The written documents included government instructions and the transport bill, as well as news articles related to the missing climate report.

The interviews were performed with officials at the STA, other national authorities and the ministry as well as a politician in the national parliament, all involved in the Orientation planning process in 2015 (more details in Table 1). In the interviews, a semi-structured interview guide was used where the questions were ordered in themes and adjusted according to who was interviewed (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). The interviews lasted for about 90 min each and were recorded and transcribed in full. The interview respondents were identified through organizational position and snowballing (George and Bennett 2005; Grønmo and Winqvist 2006).

Table 1. List of interviews.

Interview	Position	Time of interview
1	STA (Swedish Transport Administration)	Spring 2019
2	STA	Spring 2019
3	STA	Spring 2019
4	STA	Autumn 2018
5	STA	Autumn 2018
6	STA	Autumn 2018
7	STA	Spring 2021
8	STA	Spring 2021
9	Member of Parliament	Autumn 2018
10	Ministry	Spring 2020
11	Ministry	Autumn 2018
12	Ministry	Autumn 2018
13	Ministry	Autumn 2018
14	SEPA (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency)	Autumn 2018
15	SEPA	Autumn 2019
16	SEPA	Autumn 2018
17	SEPA	Autumn 2018

The workshop was arranged by the researchers for the STA Orientation Plan group during spring 2019. The aim was to give the group input on alternative planning methods and jointly explore how the planning process could be developed to consider climate and sustainability goals to a larger extent. The workshop started with two short lectures which provided (1) a historical perspective on the former Swedish transport infrastructure planning processes and (2) experiences from alternative planning methods used in the U.K. Afterwards the participants discussed how their planning process, which was about to start, could use goals to guide the process through alternative methods and broader types of decision support than are normally used. During the workshop, some of the participants welcomed new ideas and expressed an openness to change, while others defended the traditional way of making the Orientation Plan. The researchers took as comprehensive notes as possible, including quotations, which were sent to the participants for comments and confirmation.

The material from the interviews and the workshop was analysed using content analysis (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009), where certain themes were drawn from the material and then discussed in the group of researchers. The themes were derived from the empirical context as well as theoretical frameworks of power in a dialectical and ongoing process of analysis. The empirical material gives us the possibility to provide a ‘thick’ description of the case (Flyvbjerg 2006; George and Bennett 2005), and allows an in-depth analysis of how power was manifested and influenced the process and its outcomes (Flyvbjerg 2006). Triangulation (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009) between different respondents’ statements, the workshop notes and documents have been used to validate the analysis.

4. Theoretical framework – three circuits of power

To make sense of the power processes of national transport infrastructure planning in Sweden we use the conceptualization of three circuits of power developed by Clegg (1989). Clegg’s point of departure is that power is relational, and the framework of circuits of power is developed to analyse and understand power within and between organizations. The focus is on relations on three different levels: the episodic, the social and the system levels. These levels correspond to three circuits of power (Silva and Backhouse 2003): causal, dispositional, and facilitative power.

The first level is episodic and describes the usual ongoing work within an organization. It corresponds to causal power (Silva and Backhouse 2003) according to which A has power over B if B is doing something that B otherwise would not have done. This episodic causal power remains hidden and is not reflected on as long as everyone plays by the ‘rules of the game’. However, as soon as there is resistance, the causal power becomes visible in the form of episodic interventions (Clegg 2014; Silva and Backhouse 2003). Hence, during the Orientation Planning process in 2015 there were acts of resistance towards the conventional planning process, which made visible episodic power expressions and how they connect to dispositional and facilitative power in the planning process.

The second level is that of social integration, a level of knowledge perspectives, ideas and discourses which form the rules of meaning and membership in social relations, as in this case within an organization (Clegg 2014; Lapsley et al. 2011; Silva and Backhouse 2003). These shared discourses, norms and rules which form meaning and membership provide certain actors the possibility to execute power in episodic interventions. This ‘possibility’ to execute episodic power is the dispositional power circuit. In other words, this circuit establishes the ‘rules of the game’ (Cashmore, Richardson, and Axelsson 2014), which everyone is expected to follow, but may resist, potentially resulting in acts of episodic power. The dispositional power concerns both the formal structure of an organization, as in the case of membership and formal position, and the informal structure of the organization, as in discourses that legitimize certain meanings (Silva and Backhouse 2003). In the studied case it is the dispositional power within the STA and its Orientation Planning process which is in focus. The main question to be asked is, what are the (formal and informal) rules of the Orientation Planning process?

The third level is that of system integration, a level of the material conditions for production and the technologies of producing something. This circuit considers power as facilitative, understood as an ability to produce and achieve collective goals (Silva and Backhouse 2003). The facilitative power circuit is not only about the techniques of production, but also techniques of discipline. Disciplinary techniques correspond to organizational means to control the physical and social environment of individuals. Furthermore, they should be understood as disciplinary in the Foucauldian sense, where the concept of governmentality is concerned with organized ways of doing things, regimes of practices, and its ambitions and outcomes (Dean 2010 with reference to Foucault 1991). Organizational compliance is ensured by disciplinary practices such as supervision, routinization, formalization, mechanization, and legislation (Clegg 1989), which not only govern others but also make us govern ourselves (Dean 2010). The concept of governmentality makes it clear that facilitative power is not only ‘imposed upon’ but also something that individuals themselves reproduce. To explore this, we will investigate the methods and practices used for analysis and decision-making in the transport planning process as the technologies of production which maintain discipline and order in the system of transport planning.

According to Clegg’s framework, the three circuits of power interact at certain junctions, conceptualized as obligatory passage points (OPP) (Clegg 1989). The OPP describes how systems of meaning become stabilized, or in other terms how certain meanings become institutionalized and thus stable over time (Cashmore, Richardson, and Axelsson 2014; Silva and Backhouse 2003). An institutionalized system of meaning which is integrated at all levels is thus an OPP, and in itself a source of power. Thereby, the OPP either disempowers or empowers certain forms of agency, hence episodic power expressions are channelled through these nodes if they carry meaning according to the facilitative and dispositional power (Cashmore, Richardson, and Axelsson 2014).

In this article, the OPP is the junction which stabilizes the planning process and sustains it as an institutionalized way of doing infrastructure planning. Furthermore, the OPP is a major expression of power as it works as a filter and a sorting mechanism for knowledge perspectives and discourses. In the case of the Orientation Planning process the analysis aims at identifying the OPP. To analyse the different circuits of power and identify the OPP, we have used a set of questions inspired by Silva and Backhouse (2003), but slightly modified. All questions are included in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Analytical questions (inspired by Silva and Backhouse 2003).

5. The story of the climate report

In this section, we consider the question: Which events led up to the episodic decision to exclude the climate report from the Orientation Plan, and how did the exclusion impact consideration of climate mitigation in the plan?

At the time of the Orientation Plan process in 2015, work related to climate mitigation scenarios had been going on for a few years among a small group of environmental and climate specialists within the STA (from now on called ‘the climate group’). The work aimed at interpreting and concretizing what the national policy goal of achieving a ‘vehicle fleet that is independent of fossil fuels’ (Government Bill 2008) would imply for the development of the transport system. Three assumptions were central to the scenario work:

• - The national policy goal was interpreted to imply a transport system with net zero GHG emissions in 2050 and an 80% decrease in fossil fuel use by road traffic in 2030

• - The STA’s forecasted travel demand should be accommodated, but within the boundaries of the climate goals

• - Biofuel consumption should be restricted to globally sustainable levels

To achieve this, a more ‘transport-efficient society’ was assumed needed in combination with improved vehicle technology and fuels, in which a substantial modal shift from road travel to walking, cycling and public transport would be required, as well as a shift of goods transports from road to rail and sea. According to the scenario, the accommodation of the forecasted future demand would imply a significant change of infrastructure investment strategy, with investments shifted from increased road capacity towards more sustainable travel modes.

The work of the climate group had been acknowledged in the previous Orientation Plan, published in 2012. The scenario had also been utilized and further elaborated in collaboration with other actors and policy processes at the national level (GOI 2013) and findings from the other processes had been incorporated in successive revisions of the scenario (Interview 2).

5.1. The outset of the orientation planning process in 2015

The government directive for the Orientation Planning process in 2015 was a result of negotiations within a Social Democrat and Green Party minority coalition government. The two parties’ views on the transport system have later been described as difficult to unite (several interviews). However, according to the directive, the STA should present three analyses of future travel demand and its implications for the development of transport infrastructure: one based on ‘already decided politics’ (e.g. a conventional ‘central forecast’ as described in section 2.2); one which differed marginally by considering a few additional politically announced but not yet decided measures; and one based on further ‘assumptions about additional policy measures and interventions to cost-efficiently decrease GHG emissions’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘climate scenario’) (Government Directive 2015). The directive also stated that additional relevant methods for environmental and social assessments, besides economic appraisal, should be used. The requested climate scenario was interpreted by the climate group within the STA and representatives from other public authorities as a window of opportunity to carry out an alternative infrastructure planning, taking departure in the climate goals (Interviews 2; 15).

The STA was given six months to prepare the Orientation Plan. The project management at the STA early on considered this too short a time frame to allow any substantial changes to the established analytical process, centred around the ‘central forecast’ of travel demand and the established model of cost–benefit analysis. The preparation of the Orientation Plan was organized in a main project group and several sub-projects responsible for specific aspects of the plan, such as economic appraisal, maintenance of infrastructure, identifying deficiencies and investment needs in infrastructure, etc. To provide the requested climate scenario, the climate group within the STA was asked to form an additional sub-project tasked with preparing such a scenario (Interviews 2; 4).

While the STA was instructed to prepare three scenarios, the main project group expected the eventual output of the planning process to be largely consistent with previous plans, mainly due to the rigidity of conventional modelling. Thus, the main project direction started out by writing the summary of the final report, revising it somewhat throughout the process, only to eventually find it consistent with the finalized plan (Interview 1):

It is not possible to sit down, look at the directive, which states something regarding forecasting, and then you get the forecasted result three or six months later. … Usually, one knows the answer, approximately. (Interview 1, STA official)

In the meantime, the climate group took the previous work on climate scenarios as point of departure. The group carried out workshops in line with a backcasting approach, where the interpretation of the climate mitigation targets in the climate scenario was used as frame for the discussion and the scenario itself was further elaborated in dialogue with other sub-projects, as well as with regional planning offices within the STA. Regionalized breakdowns were presented, which considered differing potentials for achieving a more transport-efficient society between different city sizes and geographies. According to the climate group, these workshops fuelled much discussion. Participants at some workshops (in some regions) rejected the scenarios as unrealistic, while other groups welcomed the initiative as a possibility to plan infrastructure more in line with environmental and climate mitigation targets. Regions provided lists of prioritized investments expected to accommodate a more transport-efficient society. Additional workshops with external actors with stakes in infrastructure planning, such as transport and freight operators and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, were also planned. The aim was to both gather input to the scenario process, and to spread knowledge on the climate scenario, potentials of a more transport-efficient society, and consequences for the development direction of transport infrastructure. A seminar at the Swedish Parliamentary Committee on Transport and Communications was also planned (Interviews 2; 3).

5.2. The exclusion and reappearance of the climate report

A few months into the work, tensions between the climate group and main project group became evident, as general formulations on climate mitigation were included in the draft of the main report which significantly deviated from the ongoing work with the climate scenario. The main project group argued that the forecasted travel demand in the ‘central forecast’ could meet climate mitigation targets, given a strongly increased biofuel use and electrification of the vehicle fleet, without changes in infrastructure. The assumed increase in biofuel use would imply heavy reliance on imported biofuels, something which the climate group, on the other hand, argued would not be globally sustainable. The climate group raised concerns and argued that changes to infrastructure would also be necessary, which fuelled irritation within the project management (Interview 2).

Following the summer vacation, the project management informed the climate group that they ‘were not sure that the climate group’s approach worked as part of the Orientation Plan’ (Interview 2). Planned workshops and seminars could still be carried out, but it should be announced that the work was not part of the Orientation planning process (Interview 2). When the Orientation Plan was submitted to the government later the same year the climate analysis was not included (STA 2015).

Central arguments in excluding the climate scenario were that the approach and its results ‘lacked in quality’ and were ‘unverified’ (Interview 1; 2; 4). According to one of the representatives of the main project group, too many assumed effects and impact relations remained unsorted. While shortcomings of the rigid and time-consuming forecasting models were acknowledged by respondents in the main project group – ‘You find yourself in a situation where you lack tools to span the room’ (Interview 1) of potential futures – future pathways deviating from the ‘central forecast’ were met with skepticism.

The climate analysis included policy measures which are not easily or distinctively quantifiable in established models, and a different approach to how assumed growth in travel demand should be accommodated. Thereby, it did not resonate with the established forecasting practice.

Even though the climate analysis was intended to inform the government in line with requests made in the planning directive, the climate group was informed that it would not be published at all. As the ongoing work had already been presented to politicians in parliament as well as officials at other agencies and organizations through seminars, the withdrawal of the report eventually reached news media (Interview 2). The news was framed as if the STA was trying to hide important facts about the transport system’s climate impact and a need for a revised development pathway (Swedish Radio 2015). In February 2016, the report was eventually published (STA 2015, 2016a). This was a couple of months after the Orientation Plan had been published, and only a few days before the official consultation round among other public agencies and NGOs ended, giving these organizations limited time to take the climate scenario into consideration in their responses on the Orientation Plan (Interview 15).

A few months later, the government provided the STA a renewed task to analyse how climate mitigation targets could be achieved in a set of scenarios. The renewed task may be interpreted as a sort of correction by the government, that it was not satisfied with what the STA delivered in the Orientation Plan. The previously excluded and now reemerged climate scenario, which focused on increased ‘transport efficiency’ to achieve an 80% GHG reduction, made up one of four presented scenarios in the renewed work, which was published in June 2016 (STA 2016b).

6. Power circuits in the exclusion of the climate report

6.1. Episodic power

Episodic power is related to key actors, and their strategies and resources (see Figure 2). The story of the climate report circulates around two main actors within the STA: the climate group and the project management for the Orientation Planning process. The government directive asked for a ‘central forecast’ as one of three analyses, which meant that the project management could hold on to conventional analytical practices. The stated objective of the project management group was to present an Orientation Plan following established practices. This is illustrated, for instance, by the way in which they started the process by writing a summary of the Orientation Plan proposal – a summary which eventually came to align very well with the final version of the full report. The third analysis that the government also had asked for, the climate analysis, was carried out as a sub-project in parallel with the main report. In practice, the division of different analyses and issues in sub-projects meant that a broadened discussion of possible development pathways, and thus potential changes to the conventional planning process, was avoided.

Another dimension of episodic power is related to standing conditions. The climate group carried out their work through a series of workshops grounded in the climate scenario. These workshops can be understood as not only applying a climate scenario to infrastructure planning through a backcasting approach, but also being of strategic value by networking and anchoring key features and possible implications of an infrastructure planning process more clearly oriented towards climate targets. Also previously, the work of the climate group had been anchored and acknowledged within some national transport policy processes, for example through contributions to national inquiries and climate mitigation roadmaps. The external networking strengthened their position outside the STA, while their position in relation to conventional transport analysis within the STA continued to be weak. That the climate analysis was detached from the conventional planning process made it possible for the project management team to dismiss it when its conclusions became too challenging. However, the external position was manifested in the pressure for publishing the report after the dismissal, and the government request for an additional climate analysis.

6.2. Dispositional power

Dispositional power is about organizational discursive ‘rules’ and norms that generate social integration, and which place A and B in their respective positions in the process (see Figure 2).

The discursive rules identified in this case regard a general requirement for ‘comparability’ assumed to be attained by standardized analyses and comparable analytical results. Comparability is both an explicit requirement from the government (Government Bill 2012; Government Directive 2015) and a quality marking practice stressed as essential by strategic planners at the STA. In practice, this implies a reliance on one central forecast against which investments and developments are assessed, and application of one standardized approach to cost–benefit analysis. A key rationale of cost–benefit analysis is the way in which it allows comparison and prioritization among measures. Without being able to make standardized comparisons, most of the planners within the STA who have been interviewed, consider that they would have nothing solid to base their planning on. In the Orientation Planning process, the ‘central forecast’ and CBA approach therefore provide a central analytical foundation to ensure comparability. In this sense, alternative analyses grounded in other assumptions, interpretations, and knowledge perspectives challenged (by not aligning with) the rule of comparability.

The rule of comparability is supported by two norms. The first norm of the central forecast is that it is a key decision support that should be respected and maintained, although the forecasting practice has acknowledged shortcomings and limitations. Several of our respondents reflect on shortcomings of conventional transport planning, for instance that it lacks tools to explore less trend-based, potential future development directions. However, most of them also motivate and defend the dismissal of broader scenarios, and measures, which cannot easily be modelled by the very same conventional tools. As one respondent states, when relating to difficulties associated with handling the climate scenario: ‘The problem emerged due to difficulties to combine it with the reasoning we get from the forecasts – it simply does not add up’ (Interview 1). In such situations, the conventional modelled representation gets a privileged position, whereas other perspectives are defined as deviating and effectively marginalized.

The second norm that supports the rule of comparability regards the separation of other analytical tools and outputs from the central forecast, and the treatment of them as complementary. Other analyses may be required in the planning, but should not question, challenge or interfere with the conventional approach to transport planning and its outcomes. The requested climate scenario was already from the outset organized as a detached analysis and thus considered a complement to the results from the central forecast. However, the climate analysis was carried out and communicated in a way which came to ‘concretize’ what a climate mitigation pathway might imply for the actual investment planning. Through the workshops, general assumptions on the necessity to decrease road travel and broadening the planning scope to consider ‘a transport-efficient society’ were translated into more detailed investment priorities, which deviated significantly from the plan direction grounded in the ‘central forecast’. This level of concretization posed a direct challenge to the conventional approach and techniques, as well as their underlying assumptions. By providing a deviating, concretized image of the future, the very existence of the climate analysis challenged the position of the conventional, forecast-based practice.

6.3. Facilitative power

Facilitative power regards the technologies used within an organization to discipline individuals in their work (see Figure 2). Through our analysis, we have seen how organizational meaning within the STA is strongly linked to the dominant forecasting practice. The technologies of the STA forecasting model and CBA establish the framework of the facilitative power circuit, both as technologies for planning production and as technologies to discipline the participating experts in the planning process.

Since the forecasting model constitutes a central meaning-creating practice linked to the rule of comparability, it exercises power by defining which types of knowledge and analysis are accepted in the planning process. Aspects that cannot be verified by the dominant technologies do not live up to the criterion of comparability and are dismissed as invalidated and irrelevant. The technologies themselves then become obstacles to the development of alternative policy alternatives.

One example is that in the forecasting model, driving cost is a central variable with an impact on travel demand, with established assumed price elasticity that is considered to capture the impact of driving cost on travel behaviour by car. Laboratory work with driving costs is a relatively simple matter in the model, while for example aspects related to a transport-efficient society (such as combined policy packages including for example various mobility management measures, digital substitutes to travel, etc.) are more difficult to manage in currently dominant modelling, and in addition are not (yet) considered to have sufficiently and distinctively quantified effects. Therefore, from a forecasting perspective, the climate scenario’s assumptions were not based on the type of specific, quantitative data that the forecasting models presuppose. Thereby, assumptions in the climate analysis could not be sufficiently analysed in the forecasting model and thus could not be ‘verified’ as realistic. This meant that already from the outset the climate analysis was deemed less relevant and less reasonable than the established modelling and forecasting approach.

From this it also follows that a proper CBA was not possible to perform, hence the CBA with the specific economic appraisal technique currently being dominant in STA planning needs to be based on a proper forecast with distinct, quantified effects on future travel demand. The technology of the CBA is thus dependent on the technology of forecasting. Thereby, the climate analysis lacked comparable economic appraisal results, and could not meet the rule of comparability.

6.4. Forecasting as an obligatory passage point

In the analysis of the Orientation Planning and the climate scenario, the forecasting (the model, the process, the technology and the community) stands out as a key point, around which the explanations for the exclusion of the climate analysis revolve. By being a requirement by the government, and a key expectation within the STA, the forecasting appears as a stable and institutionalized part of the process of national planning. In practice, forecasting worked as a filter to sort out what was considered to be valid and relevant knowledge. In other words, the forecasting was the junction where all three circuits of power interacted and thus the obligatory passage point (OPP) of the Orientation Planning process.

In that sense, the episodic power expressed through the decision to exclude the climate report was provided meaning by reference to forecasting practices as established ‘rules of the game’. The analytical approach behind the climate report, as well as its results, were criticized for not aligning with the technology of forecasting and the rule of comparability. The forecasting practice, in that sense, worked within the facilitative circuit of power as a technology of production and control (cf. Silva and Backhouse 2003) in the planning process, and was supported by associated ideas and discourses within the dispositional circuit of social integration. These expressions of facilitative and dispositional power provided meaning to the episodic decision to exclude the climate report.

Understanding the central forecast as an OPP means thinking of this practice as a power mechanism in itself. Through our work we have also seen that it carries a self-disciplinary influence over planners involved in the process. Respondents express a reluctance to discuss and analyse possible future planning directions which they see as potentially controversial from a political point of view (Interview 1). They express that the plan must be possible to manage in political decision-making and thus it cannot differ too much from previous plans. According to such underlying ideas and assumptions, the climate analysis differed significantly from the current planning direction, and it was suspected within the project management that it would pose problems at the political level (Interview 1; 2). This attitude can be understood as an expression of self-discipline (governmentality), as the planners anticipate and adapt to what they consider to be politically viable. Sticking to ‘business as usual’ is, in this sense, a rational approach.

Seen from this perspective, it was rational and consequential to dismiss the climate report, as it not only risked undermining the very systemic foundation and obligatory passage point of forecasting, but also called for a problematization of key assumptions regarding possible futures underpinning the forecasting models. Thereby, it risked putting the Orientation Plan in a politically inconvenient position.

7. Concluding discussion

The aim of this paper was to provide insights into means and mechanisms that counteract the integration of climate mitigation targets in infrastructure planning at the national level. The power circuits analysis of the events during the Orientation Planning process in 2015 has enabled an empirically grounded understanding of episodic, dispositional and facilitative power dynamics at play. It becomes clear that the climate analysis, which was based upon a backcasting approach, was dismissed from the Orientation Plan primarily since it did not resonate with and did not align with the established forecasting practice as an obligatory passage point in the Swedish national transport infrastructure planning.

The case of the missing climate report is an extreme case of challenges related to climate goal integration in transport planning. As such it provides possible answers to ‘why’ climate goals are not (fully) integrated in transport planning practice, an issue widely observed in previous transport research (Hickman, Austin, and Banister 2014; Lyons and Marsden 2019; Witzell 2021). The perspective of circuits of power has helped us identify the ways in which current difficulties to integrate climate mitigation targets in national infrastructure planning practice derive from discursive rules and norms, social relations and technologies applied in the planning organization. As an obligatory passage point for transport planning, forecasting has a powerful position by giving certain analyses and practices meaning as legitimate and ‘good planning’, qualified to be made public and presented to the government. At the same time, other types of analyses and practices, which fail to pass through the obligatory passage point of forecasting, are thereby not considered relevant or qualified, and therefore do not reach the public and decision-makers, nor the political assessment of alternatives or the subsequent policy-making processes. As stated previously, the forecasting practice also makes the planners discipline themselves by restricting themselves from considering alternative analyses that are considered politically controversial. The OPP of forecasting thus sustains practical resistance towards the introduction of alternative methods and analyses in strategic transport planning.

The government and the parliament thus had constrained possibilities to identify, discuss and decide upon planning directions reflecting a more ambitious agenda of climate mitigation. Furthermore, it became more difficult for the public, other authorities, and actors to validate to what extent the transport infrastructure decisions actually aligned with climate goals. In this respect, the power dynamics within the national transport planning organization have consequences not only for the implementation of climate mitigation, but also for legitimacy and accountability of national transport infrastructure planning.

Several calls have been made in previous research for a shift in planning focus from a conventional ‘predict and provide’ to a ‘decide and provide’ approach, as well as planning practices supporting such a shift (Banister 2008; Curtis 2020; Lyons and Davidson 2016). Our research shows that current institutional conditions might impede such change by sustaining conventional planning approaches and technologies, while filtering out alternative methods and analyses. This paper contributes an example of in-depth analysis of transport planning practice (cf. Marsden and Reardon 2017). By illuminating key constraints and power mechanisms in transport planning, it provides insights into some of the reasons behind the slow progress in transforming transport planning practice in line with climate policy goals and may serve as inspiration for further studies in other national contexts.

Previous research has shown a multitude of alternative methods, which are relevant when planning to achieve specific societal goals (Åkerman and Höjer 2006; Banister and Hickman 2013; Finnveden and Åkerman 2014; Russo and Rindone 2023). Given what we know now about power dynamics in transport planning we want to conclude the paper by asking: how can these alternative methods be implemented in ways which grant them recognition in the transport planning process? And how can aspects of validity and quality be supported in ways other than through an ideal of quantitative measures and comparability, in order to allow for more diverse analyses? Further addressing these issues would provide important insights for a further integration of climate mitigation goals in transport planning.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to everyone who participated in interviews and workshops, and to the two anonymous reviewers who provided valuable comments which contributed to the development of the paper. We would also like to thank Stig Westerdahl, Tim Richardson, Mattias Höjer, Emma Lund, Fredrik Pettersson-Löfstedt and Joanna Dickinson for valuable comments on earlier versions of the text.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency [grant number NV-06231-16].