China in South China Sea: Evolving geopolitical interests and opportunism

ABSTRACT

China has been consistently staking claim to the entire South China Sea (SCS) citing historical linkages. The consistent nature of these claims point towards the long-term nature of China’s interests, from nationalism and reclaiming lost territories to commercial and geostrategic interests. The onset of COVID-19 in Wuhan in November 2019 and its transformation into a global pandemic witnessed a shift in China’s foreign policy. The article analyses China’s evolving geopolitical interests and recent geopolitical opportunism during COVID-19, by way of unilateral state-level administrative actions, completion of military infrastructure development, conduct of military exercises, aggressive military actions, and wolf warrior diplomacy, to gain operational advantage by changing the status quo in its favour in the SCS in order to subordinate other claimants and dominate the region.

KEYWORDS:

• South China Sea
• geopolitics
• wolf warrior diplomacy
• land reclamation
• opportunism
• geopolitical interests
• Taiwan
• the Philippines

Disclosure statement

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 Ma Zhiping, “Hainan's Sansha to Set Up Two Municipal Districts,” China Daily, April 18, 2020, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202004/18/WS5e9ac72fa3105d50a3d172b3.html (accessed April 22, 2022).

2 Teh-Kuang Chang, “China's Claim of Sovereignty Over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 23, no. 3 (1991): 400.

3 Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, “Securing China’s Core Interests: The State of the Debate in China,” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015): 259.

4 Lezsek Buzynski, “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 3 (2003): 345.

5 Jeff Smith, “UNCLOS: China, India and the United States Navigate an Unsettled Regime,” https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/unclos-china-india-and-the-united-states-navigate-unsettled-regime (accessed April 25, 2022).

6 Sarika Dubey, “South China Sea and the Chinese Game of Expansionism,” World Focus 39, no. 4 (2018): 56.

7 Ibid.

8 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 401.

9 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2011): 47.

10 Ibid., 48.

11 Ibid.

12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “The American Pivot to Asia,” December 21, 2011, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/ Asia (accessed June 25, 2022).

13 David K. Simpler, “Saigon Says Chinese Control Islands, but Refuses to Admit Complete Defeat,” The New York Times, January 21, 1974, https://www.nytimes.com/1974/01/21/archives/saigon-says-chinese-control-islands-but-refuses-to-admit-complete.html (accessed April 22, 2022).

14 Aileen S.P. Baviera, “Bilateral Confidence Building with China in Relation to the South China Seas Dispute: A Philippine Perspective,” Ottowa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, February 2001, p. 10.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, “Securing China’s Core Interests: The State of the Debate in China,” International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015): 259.

18 Ibid., p. 261.

19 Ibid., p. 260.

20 Patrick Mendis, Joey Wang, “China’s Art of Strategic Incrementalism in the South China Sea,” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-art-strategic-incrementalism-south-china-sea-166445 (accessed August 8, 2022).

21 M. Taylor Fravel, “How to Defuse South China Sea Conflicts,” June 26, 2012, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304870304577490332845083476 (accessed August 8, 2022).

22 Ibid.

23 Baviera, “Bilateral Confidence Building with China in Relation to the South China Seas Dispute,” p. 1.

24 Sébastien Colin, “China’s Policy in the China Seas: Sovereignty, Security, and Cooperation,” China Perspectives 3 (2016): 7.

25 Ibid.

26 Jason J. Blazevic, “Navigating the Security Dilemma: China, Vietnam, and the South China Sea,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 31, no. 4 (2012): 81.

27 “Offensive realism” is defined by John J. Mearshimer in his seminal work, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). According to Mearshimer, States pay close attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximise their share of world power. Specifically, they look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals. Because one state’s gain in power is another state’s loss, great powers tend to have a zero-sum mentality when dealing with each other. In short, great powers have aggressive intentions. Even when a great power achieves a distinct military advantage over its rivals, it continues looking for chances to gain more power. The pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved.

28 Ibid.

29 Hiroko Okuda, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Peaceful Development’: A Case Study of Media Frames of the Rise of China,” Global Media and China 1, nos. 1–2 (2016): 125.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Yoshihara and Holmes, “Can China Defend a ‘Core Interest’ in the South China Sea?,” p. 45.

33 Ibid.

34 Jabin T. Jacob, “China in Southeast Asia: The Search for a Chinese Model of International Relations,” China Report 48, no. 3 (2012): 317–26.

35 Sriparna Pathak, “The ‘Peace’ in China’s Peaceful Rise,” E-International Relations, October 15, 2015, 3, https://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/15/the-peace-in-chinas-peaceful-rise/ (accessed April 22, 2022).

36 Ibid.

37 Okuda, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise/Peaceful Development’,” p. 133.

38 Ibid., 128.

39 Ibid.

40 Bilahari Kausikan, Dealing with an Ambiguous World (Singapore: World Scientific Publishers, 2016), p. 69.

41 Chang, “China's Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective,” p. 400.

42 Zhiping, “Hainan's Sansha to Set Up Two Municipal Districts.”

43 Chang, “China's Claim of Sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective,” p. 400.

44 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly IslandsPublished,” May 9, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/ (accessed August 8, 2022).

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Steven Stashwick, “China Deploys Long-Range Anti-Ship and Anti-Air Missiles to Spratly Islands For First Time Missiles are Unambiguous ‘Militarization’ of Disputed Islands,” May 15, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/china-deploys-long-range-anti-ship-and-anti-air-missiles-to-spratly-islands-for-first-time/ (accessed August 8, 2022).

48 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “An accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly Islands Published,” May 9, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/ (accessed August 8, 2022).

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Meera Suresh, “South China Sea: China Sends Surveillance Ship, Early Warning Aircraft To Contested Reef,” https://www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-china-sends-surveillance-ship-early-warning-aircraft-contested-reef-3223619 (accessed August 9, 2022).

53 “China Lands First Bomber on South China Sea Island,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, May 18, 2018, https://amti.csis.org/china-lands-first-bomber-south-china-sea-island/ (accessed June 17, 2021).

54 “China Holds Simultaneous Military Drills in Four Seas: Report,” Aljazeera, September 28, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/28/china-holds-simultaneous-military-drills-in-four-seas-again (accessed June 17, 2021).

55 Khanh Vu, “Vietnam Protests to China over South China Sea Boat Sinking,” Reuters, March 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-southchinasea/vietnam-protests-to-china-over-south-china-sea-boat-sinking-idUSKCN1R307O (accessed July 22, 2021).

56 Ankit Panda, “Taiwan Coast Guard Reports Chinese Speed Boat Harassment Near Kinmen,” The Diplomat, March 23, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/taiwan-coast-guard-reports-chinese-speed-boat-harassment-near-kinmen/ (accessed July 22, 2021).

57 Willi Langley, “PLA Warplanes Made a Record 380 Incursions into Taiwan’s Airspace in 2020, Report Says,” South China Morning Post, January 6, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3116557/pla-warplanes-made-record-380-incursions-taiwans-airspace-2020 (accessed July 22, 2021).

58 Ibid.

59 James Pearson, Khanh Vu, “Vietnam, China Embroiled in South China Sea Standoff,” Reuters, July 16, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-china-southchinasea-idUSKCN1UC0MX (accessed August 8, 2022).

60 Rozanna Latiff, A. Ananthalakshmi, “Malaysian Oil Exploration Vessel Leaves South China Sea Waters after Standoff,” Reuters, May 12, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-malaysia-idUSKBN22O1M9 (accessed August 22, 2021).

61 Robert Manning and Patrick M. Croning, “Under Cover of Pandemic, China Steps Up Brinkmanship in South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/14/south-china-sea-dispute-accelerated-by-coronavirus/ (accessed July 22, 2021).

62 Khanh Vu, “Vietnam Protests Beijing's Sinking of South China Sea Boat,” Reuters, April 4, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-china-southchinasea-idUSKBN21M072 (accessed July 22, 2021).

63 Felix K. Chang, “China’s New Pressure on Taiwan in South Chin Sea,” Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 6, 2020, https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/11/chinas-new-pressure-on-taiwan-in-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed October 23, 2021).

64 Steven Lee Myers and Jason Gutierrez, “With Swarms of Ships, Beijing Tightens its Grip on South China Sea,” The New York Times, November 6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/03/world/asia/swarms-ships-south-china-sea.html (accessed October 23, 2021).

65 Zhiqun Zhu, “Understanding China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, May 15, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/interpreting-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/ (accessed August 8, 2022).

66 Ben Westcott and Steven Jiang, “China is Embracing a New Brand of Foreign Policy. Here's What Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Means,” CNN, May 29, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed October 23, 2021).

67 Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Fundamentals of US–China Relations,” The Washington Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2019): 106. (accessed October 23, 2021).

68 Mohan Malik, “Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims,” World Focus 39, no. 4 (2013): 83.

69 Medeiros, “The Changing Fundamentals of US–China Relations,” p. 97.

70 Ibid.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nishant Nair

Nishant Nair is a serving officer of Indian Armed Forces and the views expressed are his own.