The roots of the Turkish-Qatari-Ikhwani alliance and its activities in North Africa and the Middle East

ABSTRACT

The article considers the formation of the Turkish-Qatari-Ikhwani alliance, which attained international prominence and strengthened its leadership position in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) during the events of the Arab Spring. While some researchers posit the formation of this alliance just before the Arab Spring, this study argues that cooperation between Türkiye, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan) has deeper roots, going back to the 1960s. Further, the article argues that the most important factor in the rapprochement between Qatar and Türkiye was their cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational Islamist organisation. Despite the rise of the counterweight Saudi-Emerati alliance, Doha and Ankara continue to play an important role in the region, with the mediation role of Qatar in the context of the renewed conflict between Hamas and Israel a particular focus.

KEYWORDS:

• Qatar
• Türkiye
• Muslim Brotherhood
• Islamism
• Hamas
• North Africa
• Middle East

Introduction

The Qatari-Turkish alliance, working with the Muslim Brotherhood’s pan-Arab network and using its ideology as a tool to achieve regional hegemony, accomplished impressive successes during the Arab Spring of 2011–2012. While a number of these successes were later challenged by the rise of a counterweight in the region in the form of Saudi-Emerati cooperation, it is worth considering the extent of the reach of the Qatari-Turkish-Ikwhani (Muslim Brotherhood) alliance, the reasons for its successes, and also its provenance.

The aim of this study was to investigate the cooperation between Qatar, Türkiye and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is proposed that Türkiye's regional ambitions and Qatar's strong financial capabilities, together with the political experience of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood network, allowed the alliance to achieve significant successes during the Arab Spring. The authors used a comparative approach, identifying points of interaction between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood and those between Türkiye and the Muslim Brotherhood, and then looking historically at relations between these parties.

The article is organised as follows. The first section sets out the role of the Qatari-Turkish-Ikhwani alliance in the developments in the Middle East and North Africa in the period of the Arab Spring, noting the subsequent rise of the Saudi-Emerati counterweight in the region. Seeking to identify origins of the Qatari-Turkish-Ikwani alliance, the article then examines the history of interactions between the Muslim Brotherhood and Qatar, and then between the Muslim Brotherhood and Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), relationships which date back to the 1960s. The next section provides insights into how the development of Qatari-Turkish relations has been facilitated by each party’s cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood – starting in Egypt – noting the shared ideology of Islamism.¹ The article notes the influence of the Turkish-Qatari-Ikhwani alliance in several states in the region, analyses the impact of the counterweight alliance on the part of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and surmises on the future influence of this alliance in the MENA region, with discussion of the mediation role played by Qatar in the current conflict between Israel and Gaza.

Doha, Ankara and the Arab Spring

After the Egyptian revolution of January 25, 2011, Qatar and Türkiye succeeded in strengthening the position of the Muslim Brotherhood, which eventually came to power in Egypt’s elections of June 2012.² Doha and Ankara also voiced strong support for the uprising against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, which led to the strengthening of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood’s position and secured its dominance in the General National Congress after the July 2012 elections in Tripoli.³ Prior to that, in Tunisia where the Arab Spring began with protests sparked in December 2010, the Ennahda movement (ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood and supported by Qatar and Türkiye⁴) managed to win the October 2011 elections and form a government.⁵ On the Syrian front, Türkiye and Qatar assisted the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to secure a leading position in the Syrian National Council – which was formed in Istanbul in August 2011 and became the main focal point of the Syrian opposition outside of Syria – while the rebel groups backed by Türkiye and Qatar made significant territorial gains inside Syria.⁶ In Yemen, forces aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood gradually came to power following the resignation of Ali Abdullah Saleh in November 2011. In addition, the influence of Qatar and Türkiye appeared to increase dramatically in the occupied Palestinian territories in this period (to the detriment of Iranian influence).⁷ In Morocco, another recipient of Qatari support – Abdelil Benkirani, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘sister’ party – was appointed prime minister of the country in November 2011.⁸ In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood led protests in 2011 and was even invited by the king to join the Jordanian cabinet of ministers.⁹ In Sudan, Qatar and Türkiye provided significant financial, military, and diplomatic support to the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood-backed regime of Omar al-Bashir.¹⁰ Doha and Ankara also made efforts to influence the internal politics of Somalia, supporting particular candidates in the 2012 presidential elections. Representatives of the Al-Islah Movement (the Somali branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) acted as conduits for Qatari interests in Somalia during the presidential elections, promoting the candidacy of Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud with financial support from Qatar.¹¹ Türkiye also reportedly supported Hassan Sheikh, though in a more limited manner with support for an affiliated famine relief programme in Somalia in late 2011.¹²

The influence of Qatar also grew enormously through its Al-Jazeera television network in this period, with its broadcasts playing a major role in the spread of the Arab Spring’s political tsunami, according to several analysts – some even referring to the Arab uprisings as an ‘al-Jazeera revolution.’¹³ Also in 2011, Qatar nearly succeeded in promoting its foreign minister to the position of secretary-general of the League of Arab States. Last in the list – though not least due to the extreme popularity of football in the Middle East and North Africa – Qatar succeeded in its bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, an accolade considered another important asset in the Qatari-Turkish alliance's quest for regional leadership. By mid-2013, in the view of some analysts, this alliance had even convinced the United States and Western Europe of the acceptability of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.¹⁴

There were several good reasons for an alliance to develop between Qatar and Türkiye. Indeed, despite Türkiye’s enormous economic, demographic and military potential (comparable to that of Iran, Saudi Arabia or Egypt¹⁵), as a non-Arab state it had little real chance of achieving regional hegemony on its own in the predominantly Arab region. Qatar, on the other hand, despite its huge financial resources and Arab identity, was too small to make any serious attempts to achieve regional hegemony on its own. As seen in the account of their achievements above, Qatar and Türkiye were able to mount a fairly impressive challenge to regional hegemony in 2010–2012 after they joined forces and together worked to bolster the enormous political potential of the pan-Arab Muslim Brotherhood.

The rise of a regional counterweight in the Saudi-Emerati cooperation

In 2013, however, Saudi Arabia and its allies launched a successful counteroffensive. Its central element was the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, carried out in alliance with the Egyptian military and some other internal Egyptian and international forces.¹⁶ They succeeded in July of that year, and by November the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in Egypt.¹⁷ By January 2014, Ennahda in Tunisia was forced to resign from power under enormous pressure from various forces, including Saudi Arabia and local Salafist movements.¹⁸ In Libya, with the support of Saudi Arabia and its allies, Khalifa Haftar launched the vigorous ‘Operation Dignity’ in May 2014, which reduced the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood (and by extension Türkiye and Qatar) in the country.¹⁹ On the Syrian front, Saudi Arabia was able to significantly lessen the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (which replaced the Syrian National Council as the main focus of the Syrian opposition outside of Syria) and temporarily increase the influence of the pro-Saudi groups in Syria.²⁰ The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan declined sharply following Saudi Arabia's financial support for the Jordanian royal family to help stabilise the internal situation;²¹ this appears to have been an effort to counteract the financial aid which, according to Saudi sources, was received by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood from Qatar and Türkiye.²² In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and its allies thwarted attempts by the (Iran-backed) Houthis to seize control of the country from the Yemeni government – though the Houthis control land within Yemen even today.²³ As a result, Saudi Arabia has succeeded in reducing the influence of not only Iran but also of Qatar in the country. In effect, Saudi Arabia launched a fairly successful offensive against the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab world (including Saudi Arabia).

Starting in 2013, in Sudan, in order to weaken Turkish-Qatari-Sudanese relations, the Saudi-Emirati bloc provided financial and material support to Khartoum, which was in a difficult socio-economic situation after the secession of South Sudan in 2011. However, the efforts of Saudi Arabia and the UAE proved ineffective in protecting the regime of Al-Bashir, who was overthrown by the military in the spring of 2019. Subsequently, support to ease the socio-economic tensions in the country was provided by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Two views on the provenance of the Qatari-Turkish-Ikhwani alliance

This study reveals two different views regarding the tactical and strategic rapprochement between Qatar, Türkiye and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Several analysts believe that Qatar and Türkiye were among the new actors that emerged just before or during the Arab Spring, and thus that the Turkish-Qatari-Ikhwani alliance is a relatively recent phenomenon. In particular, Marwa Maziad believes that the Qatari-Turkish alliance was formed during the Arab Spring, relying on various Islamist movements to destabilise the situation in Libya and Syria in its favour.²⁴ Christopher Phillips, Nuri Yeşilyurt and Mustafa Yetim hold a similar point of view.²⁵ Nesibe Battaloglu also believes that the formation of the Qatari-Turkish alliance began during the Arab Spring, but that the real strengthening of relations occurred due to the diplomatic crisis faced by Qatar in 2017/2018 when Doha was ostracised within the Middle East for various reasons and especially shunned by the Gulf Co-operation Council.²⁶ During this crisis, against the background of increased exports and assistance from Iran,²⁷ Türkiye provided food, diplomatic and military-political assistance to Qatar to ease the isolation.²⁸

Turkish researcher Nur Harunoğlu notes that, while the real strengthening of relations between Qatar and Türkiye occurred following the Arab Spring, he believes that Türkiye’s interest in the Gulf grew dramatically in the aftermath of the United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. First, the general concern of both Türkiye and the Gulf States about the growing sectarian violence in Iraq and its impact on the entire region after the 2003 war led to the strengthening of relations between the parties. Later, however, a clear disagreement between Türkiye and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) emerged regarding the coup in Egypt in 2013 which toppled the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi. Türkiye harshly condemned the coup, while the GCC under the leadership of Saudi Arabia preferred to support the coup and immediately recognised the new leadership. This contributed to deepening relations between Türkiye and Qatar, since Doha's position was closer to Ankara’s than to that of the GCC.²⁹

Several other observers, however, note the emergence of the Turkish-Qatari alliance even before the beginning of the Arab Spring. Thus, as early as 2010, Kiliç Kanat wrote the following: ³⁰

[T]he rapprochement between Türkiye and Qatar has been one of the most significant events of recent years. Apart from the high-level exchanges, Türkiye and Qatar intensified their economic cooperation, which was subsequently extended to the field of energy, security and foreign policy. Apart from the agreement to increase trade and economic cooperation, the parties also agreed to establish a Committee on Energy Cooperation. In addition, Turkey and Qatar also played a significant role in resolving regional disputes, including the conflict between Syria and Israel.

Ali Bakir noted the following:³¹

[I]n 1971, the State of Qatar gained its independence. From this point onwards, modern Qatari–Turkish relations underwent three distinct phases. The first saw the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972, followed by the opening of a Turkish Embassy in Doha in 1980; yet a Qatari embassy in Ankara would not open until 1992 [sic]. In the second phase, in [the] 1980s, the two countries began to enter into legal treaties by signing several bilateral agreements in 1985. In the third phase, Doha and Ankara began to consolidate their relations after two main events paved the way for this: The rise of Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to power in Qatar in 1995, and the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in Turkey in 2002.

Furthermore, Mustafa Özsahin noted in 2021 that:³²

with the election of the Justice and Development Party … and Qatar’s leadership change in 1995, there is no doubt that interactions between Turkey and Qatar have gained pace.

This article, on the basis of the research, holds the view that the rapprochement between Qatar and Türkiye took place much earlier than the Arab Spring and that an important consolidating component in the relations between Doha and Ankara was the Muslim Brotherhood Association. Each of the parties had, it will be demonstrated, a long and strong relationship with this movement. By the point in history of the Arab Spring, Qatar and Türkiye worked together to support revolutionary forces through the local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood in many countries of the Arab world, but their common approach and many ties predate the Arab Spring.

Analysis now focuses on the relationship between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood, and then will move to a comparative analysis of the relationship between Türkiye and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood

The relationship between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood began to take shape in the 1950s and 1960s, when Egypt launched mass repressions against Islamists, forcing them to relocate to the Gulf states, including Qatar.³³ Since the development of education (especially Islamic education) was the main activity of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time, the group’s members were in demand in Qatar, which did not have enough human resources at that time to develop its educational system.³⁴

In general, Islamists did not exert much influence in the region at the time, as pan-Arab ideas and trends prevailed. Nevertheless, Qatar, which sought to pursue a foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia, found it profitable to involve Brotherhood members as educated employees to perform a range of tasks, from teaching Islamic studies to establishing and managing the bureaucratic system.³⁵ Qatar also recruited from Al-Azhar University (Cairo, Egypt), since it was known as holding a monopoly on the preparation of sought-after specialists in a wide range of Islamic disciplines.

Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Muslim cleric who left Egypt in 1961, played an important role in this.³⁶ He headed the renewed religious institute in Qatar and later founded the College of Sharia at Qatar University and became its dean.³⁷ Ahmed al-Assal, a close friend of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, had arrived in Qatar in 1960 and, in addition to teaching in schools and giving lectures in mosques, helped establish the local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood.³⁸ For many years, in addition to holding high-ranking positions in the education system, these two used their positions to invite prominent representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood to Qatar to give various lectures. Meanwhile, David Roberts notes, the invitation of eminent representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood helped Qatar to enhance its status in the region.³⁹

The establishment of friendly relations between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood was also largely determined by the existence of personal ties between some representatives of the Brotherhood and Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani (the Emir of Qatar (1995-2013)), who shared a particular interpretation of political Islam. This was despite the fact that the Saudi Salafist version of Islamism prevailed throughout the Gulf (including Qatar).⁴⁰

It should be noted that the Islamism variant offered by the Muslim Brotherhood allowed for the active presence of such elements as parties, elections and other aspects of modern political processes. At the same time, it was vehemently rejected by the conservative Salafi version of Islamism pursued by Saudi Arabia, which considered its own form of governance to be truly Islamic. The Muslim Brotherhood, for its part, believed that only a republican form of government was appropriate for an Islamic state.⁴¹

Meanwhile, Qatar limited the institutional ability of the Muslim Brotherhood’s religious scholars to project their influence within Qatar itself, while at the same time promoting the Brotherhood’s efforts to spread its ideas outside the state of Qatar.⁴² So, even as the Brotherhood used Qatar as a springboard for expansion into other countries in the Arab world from the early 1960s, the group was not allowed to recruit members or form a political party within Qatar.⁴³ The launching of the Qatar-sponsored television network Al Jazeera in 1996 offered a powerful platform for presenting alternative perspectives on developments in the Middle East and North Africa, creating an effective instrument for expansion of the Brotherhood in the region.

As Roberts notes, the results of the enhanced relations between Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood became particularly salient after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, ‘when the great deal of contacts that had been established by Qatar for several decades gave the emirate an opportunity to interfere with developments in different parts of the region’.⁴⁴

The Islamist AKP and the Muslim Brotherhood

The ideological affinities between the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideological predecessors to the Turkish Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/AKP) date back to the 1960s. Necmettin Erbakan, an important figure in Turkish Islamism, founded the Turkish branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1969, referred to as Milli Gerush, which developed into an influential religious and political movement.⁴⁵ A succession of Islamist parties were then formed on the basis of Milli Gerush and inspired by Erbakan, but were consistently banned for violating Türkiye's secularist laws.

For example, one of the first Islamist parties to emerge from this movement was the National Order Party, founded in 1970. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, later to found the AKP in 2001, was head of the youth branch of the National Order Party, and came into contact with the Muslim Brotherhood representative Kemal al-Kelbawi during a series of conferences organised by the World Assembly of Muslim Youth.⁴⁶ However, the Turkish authorities banned the party on May 20, 1971, for violating the secularist articles of the constitution.⁴⁷

On October 11, 1972, the Islamist National Salvation Party, again led by Necmettin Erbakan, was founded as the successor to the banned National Order Party. Despite its popularity and electoral success (it won 48 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1973 and 24 in 1977), the party was banned after the 1980 military coup.⁴⁸ It was replaced by the new Islamist Welfare Party, founded in 1983. In December 1995, the Welfare Party won enough seats in the parliamentary elections to form a government (headed by Erbakan). However, in February 1997 in what is termed Türkiye’s ‘postmodern coup’, Erbakan was removed from power by a memorandum of the Turkish military.⁴⁹ The Welfare Party was on the verge of being banned when, in December 1997, members of the former Islamist parties formed the Virtue Party, whose platform included a strengthened commitment to democracy. However, this party and its members were often accused of violating the ‘secularist’ articles of the Turkish Constitution. By June 2001, the Constitutional Court of Türkiye declared the party unconstitutional and banned it on the same grounds as the Welfare Party.⁵⁰ After the Virtue Party was banned, a deepening rift between members of the two parties led to two parties replacing it. The first was the Felicity Party, which represented Erbakan's old guard, and the second was the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/AKP), which was led by young and more pragmatic politicians who had coalesced around the leadership of Erdogan. Since its inception, the AKP has identified itself as part of the broad network of Islamist movements.

It should be noted that representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood participated in the Fourth Congress of the Welfare Party, in 1993.⁵¹ The Fifth Congress of the Welfare Party, held in 1996, was also attended by Muslim Brotherhood leaders from Egypt, Sudan and Yemen.⁵² Throughout their political careers, Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdogan maintained working relations with the global network of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1990s, Erbakan launched a series of Islamist conventions aimed at bringing together the association's leaders in the MENA region in order to resist European influence in the region.⁵³ During Erdogan's first term as prime minister, however, the AKP tried not to advertise its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. This situation changed after the general elections that were held in 2007, when the AKP strengthened its position in Türkiye. The party started to reinforce its relations with the Muslim Brotherhood from then, and increasingly fashioned Turkish foreign policy around the Arab world.

From the mid-2000s, according to close observers, the AKP intensified its contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood's pan-Arab network, and Türkiye became a new centre for the Muslim Brotherhood's transnational movement.⁵⁴ For example, the Brotherhood's ‘The Muslims of Europe Conference’ was held in Istanbul in early July 2006, organised with the support of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office.⁵⁵ The steering committee of this conference included the head of the German branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ibrahim El-Zayat; the head of the Muslim Brotherhood in France, Fuad Alaui; the Tunisian spiritual leader Rashid al-Ghannouchi; and also the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim.⁵⁶ Some of these conferences, namely the International Conference in Support of the Palestinian Intifada, were devoted exclusively to the issues of Palestine and the Gaza Strip.⁵⁷

The famous theologian and spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who lived in Qatar, actively participated in such conferences. In July 2006, he chaired the Second General Assembly of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, held in Istanbul.⁵⁸

The strengthening of relations between Türkiye and the Muslim Brotherhood has also been facilitated by the activities of the Qatari Al Jazeera television network, which provides a platform for Islamists to promote their views throughout the Arab world and beyond. Representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, led by al-Qaradawi, occupy a prominent place in the Qatari network. AKP-affiliated academics, journalists and intellectuals from Türkiye have repeatedly been given the opportunity to participate in Al Jazeera programmes. The network’s coverage of Türkiye has been perceived as positive; Hakan Albayrak, a columnist for the AKP, noted that ‘Al Jazeera has made a great contribution to making Türkiye shine like a star.’⁵⁹ The network has certainly contributed significantly to the popularity of the ruling AKP; its documentary on the life of Erdogan was widely viewed, and its coverage of Türkiye as a successful model of public administration underlined the view that this became possible only under the AKP.

Keeping in mind the historical links between the Muslim Brotherhood and these two states, analysis now turns to the rapprochement between Qatar and Türkiye.

The rapprochement between Qatar and Türkiye

It is argued here, and supported by the research, that the development of Qatari-Turkish relations was facilitated by each party's cooperation with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the fact that they shared similar approaches to the ideology of Islamism.⁶⁰ Joint Qatari and Turkish efforts to strengthen their leadership in the Arab world, especially through the Egyptian and Libyan crises, as well as in the context of the Syrian civil war, led to the fact that their relationship could be described as an alliance.⁶¹ However, the roots of the rapprochement between Qatar and Türkiye clearly run deep into the past. According to Qatar's ambassador to Türkiye in 2014, Salem Bin Mubarak Al-Shafi: ‘Qatar and Türkiye have historical relations based on brotherhood and mutual understanding, which were further developed in the 2000s and reached the level of harmonisation and coordination in 2011 due to the wisdom of the authorities of both countries.’⁶²

A year after Qatar gained independence in 1972, the State of Qatar and the Republic of Türkiye established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. Later, in 1979, the Qatari government established its embassy in Ankara and the Turkish government established its embassy in Doha in the same year.⁶³ Beginning in the 1980s, the two countries entered into several bilateral agreements; the first Qatari-Turkish technical and economic cooperation agreement was signed in 1985, for example.⁶⁴

The activities of the Muslim Brotherhood, which aimed to establish close contacts with both the Qatari administration and the Turkish Islamists – who in 2002 became the ruling party of Türkiye – played an important role in strengthening relations between the two countries, even to the point that, by the late 2000s it provided the ideological basis for the formation of a common foreign policy by the governments of Qatar and Türkiye.

Qatar's rapprochement attempts with Türkiye began in the 1990s, before the AKP and Erdogan came to power, mostly due to the deterioration of Saudi-Qatari relations in that period. As Mohammad Yaghi noted in 2018,⁶⁵ ‘The military clashes between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 1992 were caused by the border dispute between the two countries,’ in which (according to Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim al Thani, Qatar's former foreign minister), only American interference prevented the Saudis from invading Qatar. Yaghi records that Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim recalled these moments in a recorded telephone conversation with Muammar Gaddafi, then president of Libya, saying ‘My cousin … and I were at the border with our soldiers. We swore that we would either die or live to defend our country’, adding that Saudi Arabia's military intervention had ‘opened [Qatari] eyes to the fact that we can never trust the Saudis’.⁶⁶

In addition, according to Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim, evidence points to the Saudi monarchy and the UAE, with the support of Egypt, being behind a planned military coup that failed to achieve its goals because it was discovered one night before its scheduled start.⁶⁷ The Saudi attempt to invade Qatar in 1992 and the failed attempt to overthrow Sheikh Hamad in 1995 inflicted psychological wounds on the Qatari ruling family. From their point of view, Saudi Arabia had become the main threat to their security.⁶⁸ This forced Qatar to look outside the Gulf for allies in the MENA region.

The visit of Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani to Türkiye in late December 2001 paved the way for the establishment of a legal basis for military cooperation, as well as further economic ties, through the signing of a series of protocols. These protocols included an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation, an agreement on the promotion and mutual protection of investments, and an agreement on military cooperation.⁶⁹ In a step further, in July 2002, Qatar and Türkiye signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of military training and a memorandum of understanding on defence industries.⁷⁰

The strategic relationship between Qatar and Türkiye was further strengthened after the Islamist AKP, led by Erdogan, came to power in Türkiye in 2002. As noted above, the AKP minimised attention on its close connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and with Qatar (the major patron of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time), in order to appear as a centrist political force. This was especially important for sectors of the Turkish electorate and the secularist establishment, especially the judiciary and the military. During his first term as the head of the Turkish government, it was important for Erdogan to focus on Türkiye's accession to the EU, on straightening out relations with the US, and on further integration into the world economy.

Erdogan's activities encouraging the rapprochement with Qatar and engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood significantly intensified after the landslide victory of the AKP in the parliamentary elections of 2007; for instance in 2008, after Qatar’s Consulate opened in Istanbul, visits at the level of heads of state and ministers accelerated significantly.⁷¹ This included official visits to Qatar by Turkish President Abdullah Gul, who was accompanied by the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Energy, the Minister of Public Works and Settlement and a large group of businessmen, in February and April 2008.⁷²

Moreover, in April 2008, while visiting Qatar, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan also delivered a keynote address at the Doha Forum on Democracy, Development and Free Trade, and afterwards held talks with the Emir of Qatar, the Qatari Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on economic agreements.⁷³ Later in 2008, Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs made reciprocal visits to Türkiye, during which the first Turkish-Qatari business forum was held.⁷⁴

In the same year, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babakan visited Qatar to participate as a keynote speaker at the ‘American-Islamic World Forum’, organised by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US-based Brookings Institution, as well as to hold a bilateral meeting with his counterpart, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim al Thani.⁷⁵

Qatar and Türkiye have both supported Hamas, the Palestinian organisation associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, in its resistance against Israel. In 2007, Qatar and Türkiye were the only two countries that supported Hamas after the group had ousted Fatah from the Gaza Strip.⁷⁶ By 2014, Mirren Gidda wrote in Time Magazine:

Hamas has two clear allies, according to Middle East experts: Qatar and Turkey. Both have given Hamas their public support and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

Doha, throughout the 2000s, continued to receive various Hamas leaders. Qatar also invited Hamas leaders to international conferences held in Qatar. There were both private donations from Qataris,⁷⁷ and official financial assistance from Qatar to Hamas; for example, Qatar gave $50 million to the Hamas-led Palestinian government in January 2006.⁷⁸ Relations between Hamas and Qatar were strengthened when Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal was invited to attend the Doha summit following the Israeli strikes in the Gaza strip in 2008/2009. During the summit, Qatar announced that it would donate $250 million to redress the damage in Gaza caused by the Israeli strikes, and strongly condemned Israel’s siege of the Palestinians. In response, the Hamas Government in Gaza, including the former Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority Ismail Haniyeh, expressed its thanks for Qatar’s ‘unstinting’ support.⁷⁹ These actions demonstrated that Qatar was by then an important stakeholder in the ‘Palestinian question’. Subsequently, the Qatari government began to provide political, material, humanitarian and charitable assistance to Hamas on a regular basis.⁸⁰

Ankara, in response to the 2008/2009 Israeli bombing of the Gaza strip, also took a clear anti-Israeli position and became even closer to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Erdogan has since, it seems, sought to compensate for the relative inaction of secular authoritarian regimes in the region on the Palestinian issue. In 2010 Türkiye, in an effort to break the ongoing Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip, sent six ships with humanitarian aid, referred to as the ‘Freedom Flotilla’. However, on 31 May 2010, the flotilla was attacked in the international waters of the Mediterranean Sea by Israeli military forces, causing several deaths. This was followed by widespread international condemnation of the raid and support for the Turkish government’s demands that Israel lift its blockade. The blockade of Gaza was eased as a result.⁸¹

The Muslim Brotherhood network in Türkiye also played a significant role in providing support to the Freedom Flotilla for Gaza through statements and press conferences. One of the most important leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in Türkiye, Ahmet Unsal, was on board the Flotilla at that time. In addition, the Turkish ‘brothers’ were in constant contact with the leaders of Hamas, as well as with the famous theologian and spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qardawi, who was involved in fundraising for Hamas.⁸²

It must be noted, as well, that the policy of supporting the Palestinians in Gaza also served an important domestic purpose as a tool to boost the AKP's popularity in the run-up to Türkiye’s 2011 general elections. The party used the Palestinian issue to accuse the opposition of being pro-Israel, especially in the domestic debates over the ‘Freedom Flotilla’.⁸³

Continued influence of the Qatari-Turkish-Ikwani alliance in the MENA region

By now, despite the significant weakening of the positions of Qatar and Türkiye as a result of the Saudi-Emerati counteroffensive, Doha and Ankara remain among the leading players in the geopolitics of the region. The influence of Qatar and Türkiye in Libya, Syria, Sudan and Somalia continues to this day. The prominent role of Qatar, in particular, in mediation in the region is notable, particularly in the current efforts – still developing at the time of writing – to address the renewed conflict between Hamas and Israel.

Libya

During the second Libyan civil war, Türkiye and Qatar sided with the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) – and its predecessor in Tripoli – which since 2014 has been engaged in a civil war with Marshal Haftar’s self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA). Specifically, on 27 November 2019, Türkiye and the GNA signed two memoranda of understanding in Tripoli, the most important of which was a memorandum on military cooperation. It included the supply of weapons by Türkiye, as well as the military training of the GNA forces. This helped the Islamist government in Libya to contain the offensive of Haftar's army from the east, which began in April 2019 with the aim of capturing Tripoli.⁸⁴ In August 2020, Qatar and Türkiye signed an agreement to send military advisors and trainers to improve the capabilities of the GNA armed forces.⁸⁵ As a result, the GNA forces, with the support of Türkiye and Qatar, were able at that time to liberate most of western Libya, and the enemy was pushed back east to the city of Sirte.

Syria

In Syria, as noted earlier, from the beginning of the uprisings of 2011 which devolved into civil war, Türkiye had been involved in supporting various members of the opposition fighting against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. In particular, Ankara has carried out four military incursions aimed at expanding and strengthening its influence (and countering that of the Kurds) in northern Syria, where Ankara maintains effective control, and where several of the armed forces of the Syrian opposition (including Islamists) act as Turkish proxies.⁸⁶ Since 2019, when the US under President Donald Trump pulled troops out of Syria, Ankara continues to assert its control in that region, seeking a ‘buffer zone’ against Kurdish secessionist forces.⁸⁷ Moreover, Qatar, while maintaining its political support for the Syrian opposition, continues to obstruct the Syrian regime’s return to the Arab League.⁸⁸

Sudan

In Sudan, despite the ouster of al-Bashir in April 2019, Qatar and Türkiye have not lost hope of regaining their influence.⁸⁹ In 2020, Doha, together with Ankara, financed the supply of medical equipment and medicines to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.⁹⁰ In addition, Qatar and Türkiye were reportedly recruiting Sudanese into volunteer units for subsequent transfer to Libya to fight on the side of the Government of National Accord, on the offer of a monetary reward and also the possibility of obtaining a residence permit in Qatar.⁹¹

In April 2021, the new leadership in Sudan restored diplomatic relations with Qatar, despite pressure otherwise from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In late May 2021, Qatar's foreign minister arrived in Khartoum for talks with Sudanese officials on ways to strengthen bilateral relations. Qatar also expressed its willingness to assist Sudan in diplomatic matters, including those related to the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and further tensions on the border with Ethiopia.⁹²

In August 2021, the Chairman of the Sudanese Transitional Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (who is also the chief of the armed forces), paid a two-day official visit to Türkiye at the invitation of Erdogan. The two leaders signed six agreements in the fields of military affairs, international relations, energy resources, economy, agriculture and media. The strengthening of relations between Sudan and Türkiye was facilitated by a repeat visit of Fattah al-Burhan to Ankara in September 2023.⁹³

Somalia

In Somalia, thanks to the efforts of Ankara and Doha, the pro-Qatar candidate Mohammed Abdullahi ‘Farmajo’ won the presidential elections of 2017. At the request of the Qatari government, the Somali government then appointed the relatively inexperienced Fahad Yasin as head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency of Somalia (NISA),⁹⁴ and his brother-in-law as Somalia's ambassador to Qatar.⁹⁵ Under Yasin's leadership, NISA served as the focal point for Qatari intelligence operations in the Horn of Africa.⁹⁶ Qatar has advocated for the country's territorial integrity, funding campaigns aimed at reducing separatist tendencies in Somaliland and other areas of the country; however the UAE has in response accused Qatar of supporting Somali politicians sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood.⁹⁷

Türkiye, for its part, opened the largest foreign military base yet in Somalia, in September 2017. There, in Mogadishu, Ankara is training thousands of special military and police forces at the TURKSOM training centre. Somali special forces, known as the Gorgor Commando Brigade (‘Eagles’), receive their initial training at TURKOM and then enrol in commando training programmes in the city of Isparta in southwestern Türkiye.⁹⁸ These successes are the result of the efforts of Turkish and Qatari diplomats, who launched an initiative aimed at restoring Somalia's defence potential. In addition, in 2018, Türkiye appointed a special envoy to Somalia, instructing him to resume efforts to reconcile Somalia's federal government with the breakaway region of Somaliland. While success is unlikely in the short term, the fact of this appointment – the first in Turkish foreign policy – demonstrates the significance of the relationship.⁹⁹

Türkiye is also pumping direct investment into Somalia's economy. In November 2020, Türkiye provided nearly $3.4 million to repay Somalia's debt to the International Monetary Fund, and in 2021 announced a direct donation of $30 million to Somalia, to be paid in monthly instalments of $2.5 million.¹⁰⁰ In the same year, a Turkish company signed a 14-year contract for the management and modernisation of the Mogadishu port. Ankara's aid through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency has been cited as important to several of Somalia’s development and social projects.¹⁰¹

Mediation efforts in the MENA region

Qatar has long worked to build an international image as a mediator between states inside and outside the Middle East. Vassilis Fouskas notes that, since 2000:¹⁰²

[A] succession of deals have been brokered [by Qatar] … It hosted the talks between the US and the Taliban, which resulted in the US withdrawing from Afghanistan in 2021. But before that, the signing of peace deals in Lebanon (2008), Yemen (2010), Darfur (2011) and Gaza (2012) contributed significantly to Qatar’s rising reputation as a peace broker.

In Afghanistan, Qatar was particularly active in strengthening its position, having managed to finalise the negotiation process between the United States and the Taliban before the latter regained control over Kabul in 2021. It is notable that Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought the role of diplomatic mediator,¹⁰³ but it was Qatar's candidacy that was preferred. In addition, Qatari diplomats acted as key mediators in the evacuation of foreign citizens from Afghanistan. With regard to the alliance, Türkiye provided impressive humanitarian aid to the country and, together with Qatar, supported the restoration of an important infrastructure facility – the Kabul airport – another role unsuccessfully sought by the UAE.¹⁰⁴

In the Horn of Africa, Qatar mediated the resumption of diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia, sending its special envoy for counterterrorism and conflict mediation, Mutlaq al-Qahtani, after Somalia severed ties with Kenya in December 2020, accusing the latter of interfering in its internal affairs.¹⁰⁵

Qatar is now seen to have a critical role in the efforts to resolve the renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, following the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023 in which approximately 1200 Israeli citizens were killed and over 200 were taken hostage. Both Ankara and Doha have expressed strong support for the Palestinian cause over the years, providing financial support as well as a base for Hamas in Doha.¹⁰⁶ In response to Israel’s counter attack on Gaza in late 2023 – a bombardment which has been internationally condemned including a charge of genocide from South Africa before the International Court of Justice in January 2024¹⁰⁷ – Qatar has blamed Israel for the ongoing military escalation.¹⁰⁸ Türkiye has also condemned Israel's actions against civilians in the Gaza Strip, despite the improved relations it had developed with Tel Aviv in recent years,¹⁰⁹ and refuses to recognise Hamas as a terrorist group despite diplomatic pressure from Western partners,.¹¹⁰

The long record of successful mediations, and the fact that Qatar is host to both Hamas and a US military installation as well as several international business interests, is perhaps the reason that Doha was deemed ‘the Middle East’s indispensable mediator’ in the US-based journal Foreign Policy in late 2023.¹¹¹ Qatar played an important role in mediating the temporary ceasefire allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza and the release of several hostages on 23 October 2023.¹¹² Subsequently, there have been several set-backs in negotiations as either Israel or Hamas has rejected the terms on offer, however Qatar – alongside the US and Egypt – is central to ongoing talks.¹¹³ These talks focus, at the time of writing, on a renewed ceasefire, channels for humanitarian aid and the release of hostages, with hopes to lay a path for a new ‘grand bargain in the Middle East’ that would include the establishment of a Palestinian state, Saudi recognition of Israel, and an American defence treaty for Saudi Arabia that could help create a new security architecture in the region.¹¹⁴

Softened lines between alliances?

With new geopolitical dynamics in the region as the world focuses on the Middle East conflict, in addition to the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 and recent developments between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, the Qatari-Turkish alliance has seen a marked softening in the battle for regional leadership. The warming of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, for example, is reflected in the growth of Saudi investments in the Turkish economy. In April 2022, Erdogan paid an official visit to Riyadh, and in June of the same year, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Ankara. Another promising area is military-technical cooperation, including the establishment of drone production in Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁵

There has also been some improvement in Turkish-Emirati relations. For example, in November 2021 and February 2022, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohamed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, exchanged visits with Turkish President Erdogan, leading to the development of investment cooperation.¹¹⁶ Qatar's own relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, which resumed after the diplomatic crisis over Qatar in 2017, remain intact. For example, there has been an exchange of official visits and the signing of bilateral agreements between Riyadh and Doha¹¹⁷ For instance, there was a meeting at the level of foreign ministers in August 2021 during which a protocol was signed to establish the Qatar-Saudi Coordination Council, a mechanism to promote bilateral relations and implement the Qatar National Vision to 2030 and the Vision of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to 2030.¹¹⁸

The improvement in bilateral relations between the four states of the two alliances under discussion – Turkish-Saudi, Qatari-Saudi and Turkish-Emirati, Qatari-Emirati – marks a transition to a fundamentally new tenor in regional dynamics, with the shift from the fierce proxy wars that characterised the Arab Spring and its aftermath to new, milder forms of competition for regional leadership. At the same time, the Saudi-Emirati and Qatari-Turkish alliances remain in place. For example, in 2023 the Qatari-Turkish alliance was actively involved in addressing food insecurity consequences of the Russian-Ukraine conflict; it was expected that Türkiye would act as an organiser in the delivery of Russian grain to Africa, and Qatar would provide financial support.¹¹⁹

Thus, the struggle between the Qatari-Turkish and the Saudi-Emirati blocs for influence in various countries of the Arab world and beyond continues (although not in such an acute form as before). For example, while Qatar, along with its close ally Turkey, support the central government in Mogadishu, Saudi Arabia and the UAE support local governments in Somalia's federal member states of Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland, all of which seek independence or more autonomy from Somalia’s federal government. The UAE, for example, has been a major investor in both Somaliland and Puntland; DP World, a Dubai-based company, has invested more than $400 million in the Berber seaport and promised to expand the Berber airport. After Qatar recently announced that it signed an agreement for construction of a new seaport in the town of Hobyo, under control of the federal government, Saudi Arabia responded swiftly by recognising passports of autonomous Somaliland, adding fuel to the fire in an already fragile state.¹²⁰ On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an agreement granting Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea. In return, Ethiopia must recognise the independence of Somaliland. This provoked a strong reaction from the central government in Mogadishu.¹²¹ To prevent the implementation of the agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland, the President of Somalia enlisted the support of Qatar, which agreed to provide diplomatic support to resolve the crisis.¹²²

Conclusion

The article suggests that the alliance between Türkiye, Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan), which came into international prominence during the Arab Spring, in fact has deep roots dating back to the 1960s. Moreover, the development by Ankara and by Doha of relations with the Muslim Brotherhood had a decisive impact on the formation of their alliance; the Muslim Brotherhood acted as an important ‘cementing’ component. Türkiye's regional ambitions and Qatar's strong financial capabilities, together with the political experience of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood network, allowed the alliance to achieve significant success during the Arab Spring. An important element of this alliance was the fact that Türkiye and Qatar shared the Islamist views of the Muslim Brotherhood and supported their branches throughout the Arab world to strengthen their positions.

Despite the Saudi-Emerati alliance counterweight also vying for regional leadership after 2013 – a development that significantly challenged the position of the Turkish-Qatari-Ikhwani alliance – the political potential of the Qatari-Turkish-Ilwani alliance remains high. In addition to influencing events within various states in the MENA region such as Libya, Syria, Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan, the alliance has supported the mediation role of Qatar in inter alia Afghanistan in 2021, and in the current period, between Israel and Hamas in Gaza. There, the international community is currently facing a collective call to action, with Ankara and Doha serving as significant actors in the efforts to address urgent humanitarian and geopolitical issues in the region.

Acknowledgement

This paper is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the HSE University in Moscow in 2024.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Timur R Khayrullin

Timur Khayrullin is Senior Researcher of the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies at the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia.

Andrey V Korotayev

Andrey Korotayev is Director of the Center for Stability and Risks Analysis at the HSE University in Moscow, Russia. He is also Senior Research Professor at the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He received his PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Manchester and he received a habilitated doctorate from the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He has authored or co-authored over 650 scholarly publications, including such monographs as Ancient Yemen (Oxford University Press, 1995), World Religions and Social Evolution of the Old World Oikumene Civilizations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), Great Divergence and Great Convergence. A Global Perspective (Springer, 2015; with Leonid Grinin), Economic Cycles, Crises, and the Global Periphery (Springer, 2016; with Leonid Grinin), Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives (Springer, 2019; with Leonid Grinin and Arno Tausch), Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century: The New Waves of Revolutions, and the Causes and Effects of Disruptive Political Change (Springer, 2022; with Jack A. Goldstone and Leonid Grinin). He is a laureate of a Russian Science Support Foundation Award in ‘The Best Economists of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Nomination (2006); in 2012, he was awarded with the Gold Kondratieff Medal by the International N. D. Kondratieff Foundation.

Notes

1 In this article we rely on the following definitions of Islamism: (1) ‘A form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives … , a form that provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic traditions’ (Guilain Denoeux, ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,’ Middle East Policy 9, no. 2 (2002): 56–81. P. 61.; see also Dilshod Achilov, ‘Revisiting Political Islam: Explaining the Nexus between Political Islam and Contentious Politics in the Arab World,’ Social Science Quarterly 97, no. 2 (2016): 252–270. P. 253); (2) ‘A body of faith that has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion’ (Graham Fuller, The future of political Islam (New York: Macmillan, 2004). P. xi; ‘Islamism is a political trend and ideology, widespread in Muslim, especially Arab countries. Islamism is based on the idea of placing a high value (or even superiority) on the rules and traditions of Islam, on the need to build life (in varying degrees) in accordance with variously understood principles of Islam; it is oriented at the organizing politically around people who put some Islamic (or interpreted as Islamic) ideas and principles at the center of political life’ (Leonid Grinin, Andrey Korotayev and Arno Tausch, Islamism, Arab Spring, and the Future of Democracy. World System and World Values Perspectives [Cham: Springer Nature, 2019] P. 64).

2 Neil Ketchley, Egypt in a Time of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

3 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,’ Middle East Policy 21, no. 3 (2014): 84–94.

4 Kristina Kausch, ‘Foreign Funding’ in Post-Revolution Tunisia (Brussels: FRIDE, 2013).

5 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’.

6 Aykan Erdemir and Varsha Koduvayur, Brothers in Arms. The Consolidation of the Turkey-Qatar Axis. FDD. (2019). https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2019/12/11/brothers-in-arms/ (accessed April 4, 2023).

7 Almeida M. What Qatar’s role in Yemen tells about the Gulf crisis. Arab News. (2017). http://www.arabnews.com/node/1116206 (accessed April 14, 2023).

8 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’.

9 Aleksey Vasiliev, Timur Khairullin and Andrey Korotayev, ‘Qatari-Turkish Alliance Challenge for Regional Leadership,’ Aziya i Afrika Segodnya 11 (2019): 2–8.

10 Timur Khairullin and Andrey Korotayev, ‘Qatari-Turkish and Saudi-Emirati alliance: struggle for influence in Sudan’. Aziya i Afrika Segodnya 4 (2022): 29–36.

11 Laura Hammond, ‘Somalia Rising: Things are Starting to Change for the World’s Longest Failed State,’ Journal of Eastern African Studies 7 (2013): 187.

12 Brandon Cannon, ‘Deconstructing Turkey’s Efforts in Somalia,’ Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 16 (2016): 111.

13 Arno Tausch, ‘On the Global Political and Economic Environment of the Current Al Jazeera Revolution,’ Middle East Studies Online Journal 2, no. 5 (2011): 7–55.

14 See Aleksey Vasiliev et al., ‘Qatari-Turkish Alliance Challenge for Regional Leadership’. For opposing views see ‘US Response to Egypt Crisis’, 15 July 2013, Wilson Center, United States, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-response-to-egypt-crisis.

15 See World Bank, World Development Indicators online (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2024). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator (accessed February 12, 2024); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2023 – Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).

16 Andrey Korotayev, Leonid Issaev and Alisa Shishkina, ‘Egyptian Coup of 2013: An ‘Econometric’ Analysis,’ The Journal of North African Studies 21, no. 3 (2016): 341–356.

17 Eric Schewe, ‘Why Did Ousted Egyptian President Morsi Lose Power?’, 27 June 2019, The JSTOR Daily, https://daily.jstor.org/why-did-ousted-egyptian-president-morsi-lose-power/

18 Hanau Santini, Ruth Maria, Santini Ruth Maria, and Kevin Koehler, ‘Bankrolling containment: Saudi linkages with Egypt and Tunisia,’ POMEPS Studies Project on Middle East Political Science no. 21 (2016): 65–71. See also Timur Khairullin, Trends in Poltical Islam: Transition towards Liberalization,’ Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, no. 2 (2022): 100–4.

19 Stephen Chris, ‘War in Libya - the Guardian Briefing.’ The Guardian. (2014). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/-sp-briefing-war-in-libya (accessed September 09, 2018).

20 Mariya Khodynskaya-Golenischeva, ‘The Role of Global and Regional Powers in the Regulation of Regional Crises,’ Polycentric World Order in the Making. Singapore. (Springer Nature Singapore, 2023): 547–71.

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22 ‘Qatar’s History of Funding Terrorism and Extremism,’ The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, (2017). https://www.saudiembassy.net/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20%20Qatar%E2%80%99s%20History%20of%20Funding%20Terrorism%20and%20Extremism.pdf (accessed February 16, 2024).

23 Seyedmohammad Asl et al., ‘Yemen Crisis after 2015: The Attitudes of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,’ Cuestiones Políticas 39, no. 69 (2021): 717–34.

24 Marwa Maziad, ‘The Turkish Burden: The Cost of the Turkey–Qatar Alliance and Hard Power Projection into Qatar’s Foreign Policy’. The Arab Gulf States and the West. (Routledge: Taylor & Francis, 2018): 106–33.

25 Christopher Phillips, ‘Eyes Bigger than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria,’ Middle East Policy 24, no. 1 (2017): 36–47; Nuri Yeşilyurt and Mustafa Yetim, ‘Emergence of the Turkish/Qatari Alliance in the Middle East: Making of the Moderate Resistance Bloc,’ The Regional Order in the Gulf Region and the Middle East: Regional Rivalries and Security Alliances (2020): 131–64.

26 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Gulf crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

27 Sébastien Boussois, ‘Iran and Qatar: A Forced Rapprochement,’ Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (2019): 217–32.

28 Nesibe Battaloglu, ‘Ideational Factors in Turkey’s Alignment with Qatar and Their Impact on Regional Security,’ The International Spectator 56, no. 4 (2021): 101–18. P. 101.

29 Nur Harunoğlu, ‘Turkey's Intensifying Partnership with Qatar and its Implications for Turkish-American Relations,’ MERIA Journal 20, no. 3 (2016): 1–11. P. 3.

30 Kiliç Kanat, ‘AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?’ Insight Turkey 12, no. 1 (2010): 205–25. P. 211.

31 Ali Bakir, ‘The Evolution of Turkey—Qatar Relations Amid a Growing Gulf Divide,’ Divided Gulf: The Anatomy of a Crisis (2019): 197–215. P. 198.

32 Mustafa Özşahin, ‘Qatar–Turkey Rapprochement: Challenging the Regional Status Quo in the Gulf Security Sub-complex,’ The 2017 Gulf Crisis: An Interdisciplinary Approach (2021): 35–49. P. 35

33 Aleksey Vasiliev, ‘The Wahhabis and the Muslim Brothers: From Alliance to Alienation. Regional and Global Implications,’ Journal of Globalization Studies 11, no. 2 (2020): 55–62.

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36 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who was hired by Abdullah bin Turki al-Subaey (the head of the Islamic Science Department of the Ministry of Education, who in turn, went to al-Azhar to offer Islamic teachers and officials jobs in Qatar), was a key role player in these developments. See David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’ P. 86.

37 Al-Mahmud AA (2012) ‘Al-ikhwan al-muslimun’ fi Qatar … man hum?’

38 Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, ‘Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia,’ Arab Studies Quarterly 33, no. 2 (2011): 96–111.

39 Muhammad Qutb (Sayyid Qutb’s brother), Mohammed al-Ghazali and Abul Wafa al-Taftazani were among these prominent lecturers. See David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’ P. 89.

40 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’ P. 87.

41 Barbara De Poli, ‘“Arab Revolts” and “Civil State”: A New Term for Old Conflicts between Islamism and Secularism,’ Approaching Religion 4, no. 2 (2014): 95–104. See also Timur Khairullin, ‘Trends in Poltical Islam: Transition towards Liberalization,’ Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, no 2 (2022): 100–104.

42 Birol Baskan and Steven Wright, ‘Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia.’ P. 97.

43 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?,’ Middle East Policy 21, no. 3 (2014): P. 87.

44 David Roberts, ‘Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood: Pragmatism or Preference?’ P. 89.

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49 Aybuke Inal Kamaci, 24 February 2021, ‘Turkey’s “Disastrous” 1997 Coup, seen 24 Years Later,’ https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/turkeys-disastrous-1997-coup-seen-24-years-later/2155925#

50 Fulya Atacan, ‘Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP’. P. 188.

51 For example, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was represented at the congress by Mustafa Mashhour, Mamun Al-Hudaibi and Mohammed Mehdi Akef, who subsequently held senior positions in the association from 1996 to 2010

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58 Steven Merley, ‘Turkey, the Global Muslim Brotherhood, and the Gaza Flotilla’. P. 46.

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60 Timur Khairullin, ‘Trends in Political Islam: Transition towards Liberalization,’ Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, no. 2 (2022): 100–104.

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80 Adnan Amer, ‘Hamas Ties to Qatar Have Cost’. Al-Monitor. (2013). https://web.archive.org/web/20160616195431/http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/hamas-qatar-relationship-independence.html (accessed April 12, 2023).

81 Harriet Sherwood, ‘Israel Accused over ‘Cruel’ Gaza Blockade,’ The Guardian. (2010). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/israel-accused-over-gaza-blockade (accessed April 4, 2023).

82 Steven Merley, ‘Turkey, the Global Muslim Brotherhood, and the Gaza Flotilla’ (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2011). P. 9.

83 Meliha B. Altunişik and Lenore G. Martin, ‘Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP,’ Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (2011): 569–587.

84 Qatar and Turkey to deepen military co-operation in Libya. The Economist. (2020). http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1390029722&Country=Qatar&topic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International±relations&u=1&pid=1839910767&oid=859922869 (accessed April 16, 2023).

85 Libya unity govt signs military accord with Qatar, Turkey. France24. (2020). https://www.france24.com/en/20200818-libya-unity-govt-signs-military-accord-with-qatar-turkey (accessed April 12, 2023).

86 From 2015, a number of Sunni Islamist groups, including al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Muslim Brotherhood, launched joint operations against the Syrian regime, under the name of Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest). According to some reports, the Emir of Qatar acted as a mediator in the creation of Jaish al-Fatah with the support of Ankara. The Qatari side provided financial support for the operations. Aykan Erdemir and Varsha Koduvayur, ‘Brothers in Arms. The Consolidation of the Turkey-Qatar Axis’; on the Turkish involvement see also, e.g., William Hale, ‘Turkey, the US, Russia, and the Syrian Civil War,’ Insight Turkey 21, no. 4 (2019): 25–40.

87 Zachary Laub, ‘Syria’s Civil War: The Descent Into Horror,’ 14 February 2023, Council for Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war (accessed 8 February 2024).

88 Engin Yuksel and Hasim Tekines, Turkey’s love-in with Qatar. A marriage of convenience. CRU Report. (Wassenaar: Clingendael Institute, 2021).

89 Timur Khairullin and Andrey Korotayev, ‘Qatari-Turkish and Saudi-Emirati alliance: struggle for influence in Sudan,’ Aziya i Afrika Segodnya 4 (2022): 29–36.

90 Idris Abbas, ‘Turkey, Qatar aid Sudan's fight against COVID-19,’ Anadolu Agency. (2020). https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-qatar-aid-sudans-fight-against-covid-19/1966055 (accessed December 02, 2023).

91 Raul Redondo, ‘Qatar and Turkey may be Recruiting Over 5,000 Somalis to Fight in the Libyan War,’ Atalayar. (2020). https://atalayar.com/en/content/qatar-and-turkey-may-be-recruiting-over-5000-somalis-fight-libyan-war (accessed December 01, 2022).

92 Timur Khairullin and Andrey Korotayev, ‘Qatari-Turkish and Saudi-Emirati Alliance: Struggle for Influence in Sudan,’ Aziya i Afrika Segodnya 4 (2022): 29–36.

93 Al-Burhan was accompanied by acting Foreign Minister Ali Al-Sadiq, Director of the General Intelligence Service Ahmed Ibrahim Mufadel, and Director General of Defense Industries System Mirghani Idris Suleiman. See ‘Chairman of Sudan's sovereign council heads to Türkiye for official visit.’ Xinhua. (2023). https://english.news.cn/20230913/febb1ee635a14ac0bc11d9c1bfefce94/c.html (accessed December 01, 2022).

94 Mohamed Ali, ‘Somalia Must Save Itself from Qatar’. The National Interest. (2020). https://nationalinterest.org/feature/somalia-must-save-itself-qatar-163233 (accessed December 07, 2023).

95 Brendon Novel, ‘Somalia: A Country Up for Grabs?’ OrientXXI (2019). https://orientxxi.info/magazine/somalia-a-country-up-for-grabs,3344 (accessed December 07, 2023).

96 Mohamed Ali, ‘Somalia Must Save Itself from Qatar’. The National Interest. (2020).

97 Somalia and the Gulf Crisis. Report. International Crisis Group. (2018). https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis (accessed December 07, 2023).

98 Mucahid Durmaz. ‘A Decade of Turkey’s Rise in Somalia,’ TRTWorld. (2021). https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/a-decade-of-turkey-s-rise-in-somalia-49451 (accessed December 07, 2023).

99 Zach Vertin. ‘Turkey and the new scramble for Africa: Ottoman designs or unfounded fears?’ Brookings. (2019). https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-and-the-new-scramble-for-africa-ottoman-designs-or-unfounded-fears/ (accessed December 07, 2023).

100 Mucahid Durmaz. ‘A Decade of Turkey’s Rise in Somalia’. TRTWorld. (2021).

101 Isaak Mules, ‘Turkey Sets Its Sights on the Horn of Africa,’ Deutsche Welle. (2021). https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-sets-its-sights-on-the-horn-of-africa/a-52111261 (accessed December 07, 2023).

102 Vassilis K. Fouskas, ‘Gaza War: How Qatar used Its Business Connections to become a Leading Mediator in the Middle East,’ 29 November 2023, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/gaza-war-how-qatar-used-its-business-connections-to-become-a-leading-mediator-in-the-middle-east-218461

103 Al Jazeera, ‘Saudi Arabia and UAE ‘tried to host’ Taliban first’, Al Jazeera, 12 August, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/12/saudi-arabia-and-uae-tried-to-host-taliban-first (accessed February 12, 2024).

104 Timur Khairullin and Andrey Korotayev, ‘The Struggle between the Qatari-Turkish and Saudi-Emirati Bloc for the influence in Afganistan,’ Kontury globalnykh transformasczii: politika, economika, pravo. 2 (2022): 240–252.

105 Desiree Custers. ‘Qatar and Somalia-Kenya Relations: Projection of Mediation Power in the Horn of Africa,’ Stimson. (2021). https://www.stimson.org/2021/qatar-and-somalia-kenya-relations-projection-of-mediation-power-in-the-horn-of-africa/ (accessed December 07, 2023).

106 Simon Henderson, ‘The Emir of Qatar's Oval Office Meeting.’ The Washington Institute, (2013). http://www.washington-institute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-emir-of-qatars-oval-office-meeting (accessed May 27, 2017). See also Burak Bekdil, ‘Turkey’s Islamic Government Fully Backs Hamas – analyst,’ Ahval News. (2018). https://ahvalnews6. com/israel-turkey/turkeys-islamic-government-fully-backs-hamas-analyst (accessed September 09, 2018)

107 Roni Caryn Rabin, Hiba Yazbek and Thomas Fuller, ‘Israel Faces Accusation of Genocide as South Africa Brings Case to U.N. Court,’ The New York Times, January 11, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/11/world/middleeast/genocide-case-israel-south-africa.html (assessed February 12, 2024).

108 ‘Qatar holds Israel responsible for escalation in Gaza,’ Middle East Monitor. (2023). https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231007-qatar-holds-israel-responsible-for-escalation-in-gaza/ (accessed December 12, 2023).

109 Tuvan Gumrukcu and Burcu Karakas, ‘Turkey's Erdogan Calls on Israel to Stop Its Attacks on Gaza “Amounting to Genocide”’, Reuters. (2023). https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-calls-israel-stop-attacks-gaza-amounting-genocide-2023-10-20/ (accessed December 12, 2023).

110 Ugur Yilmaz, ‘Erdogan Defends Hamas Amid US Concerns Over Turkey’s Support’. Bloomberg. (2023). https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-02/erdogan-defends-hamas-amid-us-concerns-over-turkey-s-support (accessed December 12, 2023).

111 Anchal Vohra, ‘How Qatar Became the Middle East’s Indispensable Mediator: Doha’s critical role in the race to free the hostages trapped in Gaza’, 28 October 2023, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/28/qatar-middle-east-israel-hostages-hamas-gaza-mediator/

112 Released hostages arrive in Tel Aviv; Gaza health ministry says death toll tops 5,000. CNBC. (2023). https://www.cnbc.com/2023/10/23/israel-hamas-war-updates-and-latest-news-on-gaza-conflict.html (accessed November 11, 2023).

113 Qatar says Hamas response to truce proposal ‘generally positive’: On a visit to Qatar, top US diplomat Antony Blinken says Hamas’s response to a truce proposal has been shared with Israel, Al Jazeera, 6 February 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/6/qatar-says-hamas-response-to-truce-proposal-generally-positive

114 How to end the Middle East’s agony, The Economist, 1 February 2024, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2024/02/01/how-to-end-the-middle-easts-agony

115 Nikolay Surkov, ‘The Arab World in Search of Responses to the Challenges of 2022. New Regional Alignments and Alliances in a Changing World Order,’ Svobodnaya mysl’. 1 (2023): 116–128.

116 Turkey, UAE sign agreements on trade, industry during Erdogan visit. Reuters. (2022). https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkeys-erdogan-visits-uae-first-time-decade-2022-02-14/ (accessed September 10, 2023).

117 Thus, on 26 April 2021 Qatary Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani met on with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah Al Saud, who was visiting the country. Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed, during the meeting, the State of Qatar's full support for all measures taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to combat drug trafficking in all its forms. See ‘Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Meets Saudi Foreign Minister’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.News. (2021). https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/1442/09/14/deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-meets-saudi-foreign-minister (accessed February 10, 2024).

118 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Meets Saudi Minister of State, Cabinet Member Acting Foreign Minister. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.News. (2021). https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/1443/01/17/deputy-prime-minister-and-minister-of-foreign-affairs-meets-saudi-minister-of-state-cabinet-member-acting-foreign-minister (accessed February 10, 2024).

119 Russia: Turkey agrees in principle to handle 1 million tons of grain for Africa. Reuters. (2023). https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-turkey-agrees-principle-handle-1-mln-tons-grain-africa-2023-09-06/#:~:text=Reuters-,Russia%3A%20Turkey%20agrees%20in%20principle%20to%20handle%201,tons%20of%20grain%20for%20Africa&text=Sept%206%20(Reuters)%20-%20Russia,with%20financial%20support%20from%20Qatar. (accessed September 10, 2023).

120 Stasa Salacanin, Saudi Arabia and Qatar race to increase their influence in Somalia. The New Arab. (2019). https://www.newarab.com/analysis/saudi-arabia-qatar-rift-over-somalia (accessed February 10, 2024).

121 Ali Bakir, How Ethiopia's Red Sea deal could impact Israel, Egypt, and the UAE, The New Arab, (2024). https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-israel-egypt-and-uae-view-ethiopias-red-sea-deal (accessed February 10, 2024).

122 Beatrice Farhat, Somali president visits Qatar, Egypt amid row over Somaliland-Ethiopia deal. Al-Monitor. (2024). https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/01/somali-president-visits-qatar-egypt-amid-row-over-somaliland-ethiopia-deal (accessed February 10, 2024).