Semi-consociationalism in Burundi

ABSTRACT

This article reclassifies the power-sharing arrangement in Burundi and argues that it is a semi-consociational system rather than a full-consociation. The authors discuss the characteristics of semi-consociational democracy and show how the current political system in Burundi falls under this classification. This is an article that challenges the mainstream argument that power sharing in Burundi has failed; the article instead identifies the semi-consociational arrangement that relies on presidential hegemony in executive and security matters as the source of failure. In addition, there has been institutionalisation of the policy whereby the CNDD party is equated with the government – referred to as CNDDification – to the extent that the political system has become a regime under the full control of the party. The article concludes with recommended steps to restore more effective power sharing in Burundi.

KEYWORDS:

• Semi-consociationalism
• consociationalism
• power-sharing
• Burundi
• ethnicity

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Lucas Schmidt, ‘The Dire State of Rural Poverty in Burundi,’ The Borgen Project, December 26, 2019, https://borgenproject.org/rural-poverty-in-burundi/#:~:text=Burundi's%20poverty%20rate%20remains%20at,1.77%20million%20are%20food%20insecure., (accessed February 18, 2021).

2 A grand coalition is an arrangement in a multi-party parliamentary system in which major political parties of opposing political ideologies unite in a coalition government.

3 Arend Lijphart, ‘Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,’ Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (2004): 107.

4 That is to say we cannot talk about a cultural distinction between the Hutu or Tutsi communities in the way we can discuss such distinctions in culture among the Flemish and Walloon communities in Belgium, for instance.

5 René Lemarchand, Burundi, Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 58–64; See also Alison Desforges, ‘Burundi: Failed Coup or Creeping Coup,’ Current History 93, no. 583 (1994): 203.

6 René Lemarchand and David Martin, Selective Genocide in Burundi (London: Minority Rights Group, 1973), 30–4.

7 Jean-Pierre Chrétien, ‘Église et État au Burundi: les Enjeux Politiques,’ Afrique Contemporaine 26, no. 142 (1987): 63–8.

8 Christian Thibon, ‘Les Origines Historiques de la Violence Politique au Burundi,’ Studia Africana 5, no. 5 (1994): 58–60; See also Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnocide as Discourse and Practice, 178–87.

9 Gaëtan Sebudandi and Pierre-Olivier Richard, Le Drame Burundais: Hantise du Pouvoir ou Tentation Suicidaire (Paris: Karthala, 1996), 122–6.

10 A Burundian court in 2020 convicted Buyoyo, in abstentia, of complicity in the death of Ndadaye. ‘Ex-Burundi president gets prison term for 1993 killing of victorious election opponent,’ Reuters, October 21, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2752OX/

11 ‘Human Rights Watch World Report 1997,’ https://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/AFRICA-02.htm#P126_61234 (accessed February 18, 2022); see also Donald G. McNeil, ‘Leader of Coup in Burundi Hints at Tribal Reconciliation,’ New York Times, July 27, 1997.

12 Barbara Crossette, ‘Rwanda Joins Effort to Isolate Burundi,’ New York Times, August 9, 1996.

13 FRODEBU, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA), the Party for Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU), the CNDD and 12 other small parties participated in the negotiations.

14 Timofey Agarin and Henry Jarret, ‘Cross-Segmental Parties in Consociational Systems: Downplaying Prowess to Access Power in Northern Ireland,’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations (2021): 3.

15 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 3–4.

16 See for instance John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘The Political Regulation of National and Ethnic Conflict,’ Parliamentary Affairs 47, no. 1 (1994); John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Five Fallacies: Northern Ireland and the Liabilities of Liberalism,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 18 (1995).

17 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Iraq’s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription,’ International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, no. 4 (2007).

18 John Nagle, ‘What are the Consequences of Consociationalism for Sexual Minorities? An analysis of Liberal and Corporate Consociationalism and Sexual Minorities in Northern Ireland and Lebanon,’ Political Studies 64, no. 4 (2016).

19 Timofey Agarin, Allison McCulloch and Cera Murtagh, ‘Other in Deeply Divided Societies: A Research Agenda,’ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 24, no. 3 (2018).

20 Stef Wolff, ‘Complex Power Sharing as Conflict Resolution: South Tyrol in Comparative Perspective,’ in Tolerance Through Law: Self Governance and Group Rights in South Tyrol, ed. Jens Woelk, Joseph Marko, and Francesco Palermo (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 340.

21 Matthijs Bogaards, Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes?,’Swiss Political Science Review 24, no. 4 (2019): 520.

22 Joanne McEvoy, ‘We Forbid! The Mutual Veto and Power-Sharing Democracy,’ in Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, ed. Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013); Allison McCulloch and Stef Vandeginste, ‘Veto Power and Power-Sharing: Insights from Burundi (2000–2018),’ Democratization 26, no. 7 (2019).

23 See for instance Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, ‘Revisiting the Semi-Consociational Model: Democratic Failure in Prewar Lebanon and Post-Invasion Iraq,’ International Political Science Review 41, no. 1 (2020).

24 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 129–30.

25 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 131.

26 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 131.

27 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 132.

28 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 125–26.

29 Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, ‘Revisiting the Semi-Consociational Model: Democratic Failure in prewar Lebanon and post-invasion Iraq,’ International Political Science Review 41, no. 1 (2019): 112.

30 Constitution of Burundi 2005, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf (accessed February 18, 2022).

31 ‘Burundi Approves Constitutional Reform Extending Presidential Term Limit,’ France 24, 21 May 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180521-burundi-approves-constitutional-reform-extending-presidential-term-limit (accessed March 16, 2024).

32 Art. 169, Constitution of Burundi 2018, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2018.pdf?lang=en (accessed February 18, 2022).

33 According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, organic laws are ‘the body of laws (as in a constitution or charter) that form the original foundation of a government.’ See https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/organic%20law (accessed March 16, 2024).

34 Constitution of Burundi 2005.

35 Constitution of Burundi 2018.

36 Constitution 2018.

37 Constitution of Burundi 2018, art. 191(1).

38 McCulloch and Vanddeginste, ‘Veto Power and Power-Sharing: Insights from Burundi,’ 1188.

39 McCulloch and Vanddeginste, ‘Veto Power,’ 1184.

40 Alexandre W. Raffoul, ‘The Politics of Association: Power-Sharing and the Depoliticization of Ethnicity in Post-War Burundi,’ Ethnopolitics 19, no. 1 (2020): 12.

41 Åshild Falch and Megan Becker, ‘Power-Sharing in Peacebuilding in Burundi: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes,’ Center for the Study of Civil War (2008): 26.

42 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Institutional Engineering, Management of Ethnicity, and Democratic Failure in Burundi,’ Africa Spectrum 51, no. 2 (2016): 75.

43 Art. 196, Constitution2018.

44 Art. 208, Constitution 2018.

45 Art. 287, Constitution 2018.

46 Reyntjens, ‘Institutional Engineering, Management of Ethnicity, and Democratic Failure in Burundi,’ 73.

47 Stef Vandeginste, ‘Arusha at 15: Reflections on Power-Sharing, Peace and Transition in Burundi,’ Institute of Development Policy and Management (2015): 11.

48 Yolande Bouka, ‘Burundi: Between War and Negative Peace,’ in War and Peace in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, ed. Gilbert M. Khadiagala (New York: Springer, 2017), 21.

49 Bouka, ‘Burundi,’ 22.

50 Bouka, ‘Burundi,’ 22.

51 Bouka, ‘Burundi,’ 22.

52 Articles 96, 111 and 93 of the Constitution of Burundi 2018, respectively.

53 Art. 96, Constitution2018.

54 Article 110, 111, 116, 136, Constitution 2018.

55 McCulloch and Vandeginste, ‘Veto Power and Power-Sharing: Insights from Burundi,’ 1183.

56 Jamila El Abdellaoui, ‘Burundi: Overview of the 2010 Elections and Observations on the Way Forward,’ Institute for Security Studies, October 14, 2010, 8–9, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/46ED8AA120D7696C852577CE00632841-Full_Report.pdf (accessed February 18, 2022); For instance, in the first Nkurunziza’s government, FRODEBU was supposed to receive five ministerial posts and UPRONA two. (See Falch and Becker, ‘Power-Sharing in Peacebuilding in Burundi: Power-Sharing Agreements, Negotiations and Peace Processes,’ 23). Instead, CNDD-FDD gave FRODEBU two posts and UPRONA one, and allocated seats to new satellite parties like MSP-Ikinzo, MRC and PARENA even though they did not fulfil the legal requirement to be in the government (the 5% threshold of the popular vote). (See Gervais Rufyikiri, ‘Failure or Rebel Movement-to-Political Party Transformation of the CNDD-FDD in Burundi: An Issue of Balance Between Change and Continuity,’ Institute of Development Policy and Management (2016): 23); Devon Curtis, ‘The International Peacebuilding Paradox: Power Sharing and Postconflict Governance in Burundi,’ African Affairs 112, no. 446 (2013): 86.

57 Art. 108, Constitution 2018.

58 Articles 111, 255, 256, Constitution 2018.

59 Articles 10 and 92 of law no. 1/022 of 31 December 2004, Burundi.

60 Art. 60 of Organic law no. 1/04 of 20 February 2017, Burundi.

61 Art. 21, organic law no.1/17 of 11 July 2019, Burundi.

62 Art. 248, 252, 255, 256, 260, Constitution of Burundi.

63 Art. 135, Constitution 2018.

64 Ministere de la Defense Nationale et des Anciens Combatants, http://mdnac.bi/?q=content/mission (accessed January 21, 2021).

65 Art. 4 and 21 of Organic Law no. 1/17 of 11 July 2019; art. 192 of the Constitution of Burundi 2018.

66 Art. 36 of Organic Law no. 1/17 of 11 July 2019, Burundi.

67 ‘We Flee When We See them,’ Human Rights Watch 19, no. 9(2006), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/burundi1006/ (accessed February 20, 2022).

68 Art. 17–18, Organic Law no. 1/17 of 11 July 2019, Burundi.

69 ‘We Flee When We See them,’ Human Rights Watch, 10–11.

70 We Flee When We See them, 11.

71 We Flee When We See them, 10.

72 We Flee When We See them, 11.

73 Burundi on the Brink: Looking Back on Two Years of Terror, International Federation of Human Rights, 2017, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/burundi_jointreport_june2017_eng_final.pdf (accessed January 21, 2021).

74 ‘Burundi MPs Debate on the Re-Organization of the National Intelligence Body,’ Region Week, May 29, 2019, https://regionweek.com/burundi-mps-debate-on-the-re-organization-of-the-national-intelligence-body/ (accessed January 22, 2021).

75 Burundi MPs Debate on the Re-Organization of the National Intelligence Body.

76 ‘Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk,’ International Crisis Group - Africa Report, no. 120, November 30, 2006, 7–8, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/120-burundi-democracy-and-peace-at-risk_0.pdf (accessed February 18, 2022).

77 Rufyikiri, ‘Failure of Rebel Movement-to-Political Party Transformation of the CNDD-FDD in Burundi: An Issue of Balance Between Change and Continuity,’ 20.

78 Rufyikiri, ‘Failure of Rebel Movement,’ 20–1.

79 Guðrún Sif Friðriksdóttir, ‘Performing Neutrality in ‘Post’-conflict Burundi: The Political Dimension of Reintegration of ex-Combatants,’ Nordic Journal of African Studies 29, no. 4 (2020): 4–6.

80 Reyntjens, ‘Institutional Engineering, Management of Ethnicity, and Democratic Failure in Burundi,’ 71–2.

81 Stef Vandeginste, ‘Legal Loopholes and the Politics of Executive Term Limits: Insights from Burundi,’ Africa Spectrum 51, no. 2 (2016): 52.

82 Vandeginste, ‘Legal Loopholes,’ 52.

83 Yolande Bouka and Stephanie Wolters, The Battle for Burundi: is there a Viable Solution? (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2016), 18.

84 Examples are Leonidas Hatungimana and Jeremie Ngendakumana, both of whom went into exile, See Ntagahoraho Z. Burihabwa and Devon E.A. Curtis, ‘Postwar Statebuilding in Burundi: Ruling Party Elites and Illiberal Peace,’ International Affairs 97, no. 4 (2021): 1232.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif

Eduardo Wassim Aboultaif, PhD in Politics. Higher Institute of Political and Administrative Sciences, Holy Spirit University of Kaslik, Lebanon.

Talal Hachem

Fr. Talal Hachem, PhD in Canon Law. Department of Law, President of the Holy Spirit University of Kaslik, Lebanon.