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ABSTRACT
Announcing a ‘no limits friendship’ on the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, Russia and China pledged to establish a close partnership and far-reaching cooperation on the international stage. However, despite these rhetorical commitments, the growing presence of China and Russia in Africa reveals competition rather than robust collaboration. As Russia and China seek to increase their influence on the continent, their partnership is hampered by their respective interests and objectives. Furthermore, their inherently opposing approach to engagement with Africa produces an antagonistic dynamic in which the actions of each undermine the goals pursued by the other. The African scene thus highlights the limits of the Sino-Russian partnership as well as the realities of their national priorities.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
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106 RIA Novosti, ‘Zimbabwe Wants to Work with Russia on Diamond and Lithium Mining [Зимбабве хочет работать с Россией по добыче алмазов и лития],’ RIA Novosti, March 15, 2023, https://ria.ru/20230315/zimbabve-1857930153.html.
107 Yaroslav Dymchuk, ‘China Relegates Russia to Secondary Positions in Africa [Китай отодвигает Россию на второстепенные позиции в Африке],’ Репортёр, 2023, https://topcor.ru/42403-kitaja-otodvigaet-rossiju-na-vtorostepennye-pozicii-v-afrike.html.
108 R. Mberi, ‘As Zimbabwe Elections Near, China is the Dragon in the Room,’ Coda Story, 2023, ‘https://www.codastory.com/disinformation/disinformation-soft-power-zimbabwe-china-lithium/.
109 F. Vidal, ‘La stratégie minière russe : ambitions géopolitiques et défis industriels,’ Institut Français Des Relations Internationales, 2023, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/strategie-miniere-russe-ambitions-geopolitiques-defis.
110 Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United Republic of Tanzania, Russia’s Policy in Africa, n.d., https://tanzania.mid.ru/en/countries/problemy_afriki_vzglyad_iz_rossii/.
111 Lusaka Times, ‘Zambia : Russian Delegation Seek Investment in Zambia,’ Lusaka Times, December 16, 2020, https://www.lusakatimes.com/2020/12/16/russian-delegation-seek-investment-in-zambia/; St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Russia and South Africa discuss creation of information and cultural centres, St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, n.d., https://www.forumspb.com/en/news/news/rossiya-i-yuar-mogut-sozdat-informatsionno-kulturnye-tsentry/
112 T. Kumon, ‘Russia and China Throw Weight Behind Africa’s Nuclear Power Drive,’ Nikkei Asia, July 22, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Russia-and-China-throw-weight-behind-Africa-s-nuclear-power-drive.
113 World Nuclear Association, Emerging nuclear Energy Countries, 2023, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx.
114 World Nuclear Association, Emerging nuclear Energy Countries, 2023.
115 D. Yellen, ‘The Trade War We Want China to Win: China’s Nuclear Exports Can Challenge Russian Dominance,’ Atlantic Council, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/the-trade-war-we-want-china-to-win-chinas-nuclear-exports-can-challenge-russian-dominance/.
116 M. Kepe, E. Treyger, C. Curriden, R. Cohen, K. Klein, A. Rhoades, E. Schuh, and N. Vest, ‘Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Africa,’ RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA969-2.html.
117 Russia Briefing News, ‘Russia – Africa 2023 Summit: Progress & Joint Declaration,’ Russia Briefing News, 2023, https://www.russia-briefing.com/news/russia-africa-2023-summit-progress-joint-declaration.html/; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024), 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202112/t20211202_10461183.html.
118 Daniel Fig, ‘Court Ruling on Zuma’s Nuclear Deal is a Marker of South Africa’s Political Health,’ The Conversation, April 28, 2017, https://theconversation.com/court-ruling-on-zumas-nuclear-deal-is-a-marker-of-south-africas-political-health-76870.
119 P. Medina Uribe, C. Méndez Valencia, S. Lanza, and J. Cardoza, ‘Rosatom, Russia’s Nuclear Agency, and its Information Strategy to Win Bids in Latin America,’ El Centro Latinoamericano De Investigación Periodística, August 11, 2023, https://www.elclip.org/rosatom-rusia-elecciones-bolivia-nicaragua/?lang=en.
120 P. Mukherjee, ‘South Africa, China Sign Power Deals During BRICS Summit,’ Reuters, August 23, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/south-africa-china-sign-power-deals-during-brics-summit-2023-08-23/.
121 T. Danilova, ‘Nuclear Power in Africa? [Атомная Энергетика в Африке?],’ Atomic Expert, 2020, https://atomicexpert.com/nuclear_power_in_africa.
122 World Nuclear Association, Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries, 2023, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx.
123 Nuclear Energy 2.0 [Атомная Энергия 2.0], See Country Theme section, https://www.atomic-energy.ru/Ethiopia.
124 T. Danilova, ‘Nuclear Power in Africa? [Атомная Энергетика в Африке?],’ Atomic Expert, 2020, https://atomicexpert.com/nuclear_power_in_africa
125 Rosatom, ‘Main Construction Phase for Unit 3 of El-Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant Commences in Egypt,’ Rosatom 2023, https://rosatom.ru/en/press-centre/news/main-construction-phase-for-unit-3-of-el-dabaa-nuclear-power-plant-commences-in-egypt/.
126 Burc Eruygur, ‘Moscow Wrote off More than $20B in Debts from African States, Russian President Says.’ Anadolu Ajansı, March 20, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/moscow-wrote-off-more-than-20b-in-debts-from-african-states-russian-president-says/2851027.
127 TASS, ‘Moscow Forgave More than $20 Bln of Africa’s Debt to Russia, Says Putin,’ TASS, October 23, 2019, https://tass.com/politics/1084724.
128 President of Russia, Meeting of BRICS Leaders with Delegation Heads from Invited States, President of Russia, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55532.
129 President of Russia, Speech at Meeting with Heads of African States, 2013, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/17759. The threshold of $20 billion for the cancellation of African debt had already been reached in 2011 through the Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. See P. Troilo, L. Piccio, and E. Villarino, ‘For Russian Foreign Aid, a Second Act,’ Devex, March 19, 2012, https://www.devex.com/news/for-russian-foreign-aid-a-second-act-77769.
130 M. Seleznev, ‘They Will Pay It Back in Kind Why Russia Forgives Debts to Other Countries Even in Times of Crisis [Отдадут Натурой Почему Россия Прощает Долги Другим Странам Даже в Условиях Кризиса],’ Lenta.Ru, April 9, 2015, https://lenta.ru/articles/2015/04/09/freedebt/.
131 E. Teslova, ‘Putin Says Russia Wrote off $23B in African Debt,’ Anadolu Ajansı, July 28, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/putin-says-russia-wrote-off-23b-in-african-debt/2956814.
132 K. Bartlett, ‘China Cancels 23 Loans to Africa Amid ‘Debt Trap’ Debate,’ Voice of America, August 25, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-cancels-23-loans-to-africa-amid-debt-trap-debate-/6716397.html.
133 T. Beard, ‘China and Africa’s Long Road to Debt Recovery – Economist Intelligence Unit,’ Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023, https://www.eiu.com/n/china-and-africas-long-road-to-debt-recovery/.
134 H. Sibiri, ‘The Emerging Phenomenon of Anti-Chinese Populism in Africa: Evidence from Zambia, Zimbabwe and Ghana,’ Insight on Africa 13, no. 1 (2020): 7–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0975087820971443.
135 R. Basliu, ‘Why Russia Finds Friends in Africa,’ Green European Journal, 2022, https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/why-russia-finds-friends-in-africa/.
136 D. Kohnert, ‘The Impact of Russian Presence in Africa,’ Social Science Research Network, 2022, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4067193.
137 A. Kortunov, O. Kulkova, N. Zaiser, L. Chkoniya, T. Bogdasarova, G. Guihai, L. Haifang, L. Shaohua, and X. Liang, ‘China – Russia Bilateral Cooperation in Africa,’ Russian International Affairs Council, 2021, https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-China-Africa-Report66en.pdf.
138 F. Lemaître, ‘China Remains Cautious After Coups in Africa,’ Le Monde, September 1, 2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/01/china-remains-cautious-after-coups-in-africa_6119409_4.html.
139 L. Zaobao, ‘Guinea Coup: Why Did Non-Interventionist China Speak Up?’ ThinkChina, September 10, 2021, https://www.thinkchina.sg/guinea-coup-why-did-non-interventionist-china-speak.
140 S. Ramani, ‘Russia and China in Africa: Prospective Partners or Asymmetric Rivals?’ South African Institute of International Affairs, 2021, https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Policy-Insights-120-ramani.pdf.
141 C. Weinbaum, M. Shostak, C. Sachs, and J. Parachini, ‘Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa,’ RAND Corporation, 2022. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/tools/TLA2000/TLA2045-3/RAND_TLA2045-3.pdf.
142 N. Kapoor, ‘Russian Foreign Policy in Africa: Lessons from the 2023 Summit,’ Observer Research Foundation, 2023, http://20.244.136.131/expert-speak/russian-foreign-policy-in-africa.
143 T. Neethling, ‘Russian Para-Military Operations in Africa: The Wagner Group as a De Facto Foreign Policy Instrument,’ Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 51, no. 1 (2023), https://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1403
144 K. Bartlett, ‘China and Wagner in Africa: Friends or Foes?’ Voice of America, August 10, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/china-and-wagner-in-africa-friends-or-foes-/7219827.html.
145 Reuters, ‘Construction of China Gezhouaba Group’s Kandadji dam in Niger Suspended Due to Coup – Company,’ Reuters, August 10, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/construction-china-gezhouaba-groups-kandadji-dam-niger-suspended-due-coup-2023-08-10/.
146 S. Alkoutami, and F. Wehrey, ‘China’s Balancing Act in Libya,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/10/china-s-balancing-act-in-libya-pub-81757.
147 T. Kozłowski, ‘Wagner Group Activities in Libya and the Sahel Region after the Failed ‘Putsch’ in Russia – Business as Usual,’ Casimir Pulaski Foundation, 2023, https://pulaski.pl/en/wagner-group-activities-in-libya-and-the-sahel-region-after-the-failed-putsch-in-russia-business-as-usual/.
148 C. Faulkner, ‘Undermining Democracy and Exploiting Clients: The Wagner Group’s Nefarious Activities in Africa,’ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/undermining-democracy-and-exploiting-clients-the-wagner-groups-nefarious-activities-in-africa/.
149 F. Vidal, ‘La stratégie minière russe : ambitions géopolitiques et défis industriels,’ Institut Français Des Relations Internationales, 2023, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/russieneireports/strategie-miniere-russe-ambitions-geopolitiques-defis.
150 O. Alexeeva, ‘L’émergence du partenariat stratégique Chine-Russie en Afrique,’ Diplomatie 108 (2021): 70–73. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27009489.
151 M. Peter, and M. Plichta, ‘China and Russia in Sudan: Surveying Data on Economic and Military Engagement,’ PeaceRep, 2022, https://peacerep.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Peter-Plichta-2023-China-Russia-Sudan-GT-Report.pdf.
152 A. Arduino, ‘Sudan Conflict: China and Russia Have Different Interests,’ ThinkChina, 2023, https://www.thinkchina.sg/sudan-conflict-china-and-russia-have-different-interests.
153 Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey and Vladimir Antwi-Danso, ‘Selling Security to Africa: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the Fate of African Intrastate Security,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies (2024): 1–29. doi:10.1080/09592318.2024.2344489.
154 C. Hudson, ‘Great Power Competition Implications in Africa: The Russian Federation and its Proxies,’ CSIS, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/great-power-competition-implications-africa-russian-federation-and-its-proxies.
155 B. Coraglia, ‘Russie/Chine en Afrique,’ Diplomatie 123 (2023): 21–25, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48743581.
156 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2022.
157 W. Nasr, ‘How the Wagner Group Is Aggravating the Jihadi Threat in the Sahel,’ Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2022, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi-threat-in-the-sahel/.
158 E. Vincent, ‘After Ten Years, France to End Military Operation Barkhane in Sahel,’ Le Monde, November 9, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/11/09/after-ten-years-france-to-end-military-operation-barkhane-in-sahel_6003575_4.html.
159 C. Clarke, ‘How Russia’s Wagner Group is Fueling Terrorism in Africa,’ Foreign Policy, January 25, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/25/russia-wagner-group-africa-terrorism-mali-sudan-central-african-republic-prigozhin/
160 Clarke, ‘How Russia’s Wagner Group is Fueling Terrorism in Africa.’
161 C. Weinbaum, M. Shostak, C. Sachs, and J. Parachini, ‘Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa,’ RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/tools/TLA2000/TLA2045-3/RAND_TLA2045-3.pdf.
162 P. Nantulya, ‘Chinese Security Firms Spread along the African Belt and Road – Africa Center for Strategic Studies,’ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2023, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinese-security-firms-spread-african-belt-road/.
163 V. Fabbri, ‘Chinese Private Security Companies in Africa: A Tool of Interference,’ Geopolitica.info, 2022, https://www.geopolitica.info/chinese-private-security-companies-africa/.
164 J. Malobisky, ‘Prigozhin is Gone, but Wagner’s Power in Africa is Only Growing,’ New Lines Institute, 2023, https://newlinesinstitute.org/state-resilience-fragility/prigozhin-is-gone-but-wagners-power-in-africa-is-only-growing/.
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Benjamin Kurylo
Benjamin Kurylo is pursuing his undergraduate studies in international relations at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. Specialising in strategic studies, his research interests include great power competition, military strategy, international security issues, and irregular warfare.