The development of Ukrainian cultural policy in the context of Russian hybrid aggression against Ukraine

ABSTRACT

The goal of this study is to understand how Ukrainian cultural policy has developed in the context of Russian aggression against Ukraine. It examines new conceptualizations of cultural policy that appeared in Ukrainian public discourse after 2014 and the new legal solutions introduced under their influence. Reformers associated with the ‘independent cultural scene’ attempted to introduce a cultural policy model for managing cultural institutions based on liberal values and transparent, inclusive, and competitive principles. However, those in power, who were operating in the face of both an internal crisis and external threat, began to implement a cultural policy that was based on conservative values and subordinated to ensuring national security. The study’s principal thesis is that the resulting hybrid model facilitated dismantling of the Soviet cultural management model, strengthening local cultural industries and communities and actively countering hostile Russian activities in the field of culture. The activities of the the newly created and radically reformed institutions, such as the National State Film Agency, Ukrainian Institute, and Ukrainian Cultural Foundation have facilitated forming a greater self-awareness of Ukrainians as a political community, and mobilized them to fight for the integrity of the Ukrainian state. They have also had a tangible impact on international recognition of Ukrainian culture as independent of Russian culture, which was crucial in gaining international support in the conditions of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

KEYWORDS:

• Cultural policy
• Ukraine
• hybrid war
• Russian-Ukrainian war

Introduction

When Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the brutality of the Russian troops’ attacks on civilians and destruction of schools, hospitals, railway stations, museums, and places of worship was a shock for the international community. Still, few expected such strong resistance from the Ukrainians, who are fighting against an overwhelmingly stronger opponent. However, Russia’s war against Ukraine did not really start in 2022, but eight years earlier with the Russian invasion of Crimea in March 2014 (see Kuzio 2020; Yekelchyk 2015). Russia’s actions had a hybrid character, as they combined conventional and unconventional instruments of power and tools of subversion (Bilal 2021). The Russian government skillfully used its cultural and media industries to conduct disinformation campaigns and shape local and international public opinion. As a result, the Russian narrative that there was a civil war in Ukraine was widely accepted (Kuzio 2020). The Ukrainian state, ruled since 2014¹ by dangerous and radical nationalists, was on one side; on the other side were the separatists who sought to protect the Russian-speaking population and were fighting for its survival. In the Russian-centric narrative, which was also promoted in the West, Ukraine was portrayed as an ‘artificial state’ and Ukrainians as ‘brothers of the Russians’—‘one nation,’ united by a common religion, culture, and language (Lutsevych 2016; Klymenko 2020).

To successfully resist Russia’s hybrid attacks, the Ukrainians not only significantly modernized and reconstructed their military, thanks to the support of their NATO partners, but also created a networked ‘information and cultural front.’ At stake was the extent to which they could shape how people perceived and evaluated events, the stability and legitimacy of the Ukrainian government, the unity of Ukrainian society, and the state’s ability to mobilize public support for the war effort. Ukraine’s creation of a networked information and cultural front would not have been possible without the outbreak of creative and civic activity that characterized the Euromaidan revolution and the months after it. The combination of this wave of creativity with the practical policy of state protectionism in the field of culture resulted in an authentic cultural revival that encompasses cinema, visual and performing arts, music, literature, and theater.

Under pressure from civil society, the post-Soviet cultural management system began to be dismantled; until 2014, its existence had deepened the distrust between state official institutions and independent cultural actors (Botanova 2016). The need to reform cultural policy to be more consistent with European standards was a part of the ‘Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine 2020”,’² a document signed in 2015 by the new president of the country, Petro Poroshenko, that defined the key and priority vectors of the country’s development. Consequently, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine,³ which acts as a central executive body that formulates and implements state policy in the sphere of culture, started to be reconstructed. The most significant achievements of the cultural reforms after Euromaidan include the decentralization and regionalization of cultural life, integration into the European cultural context through participation in European programs, introduction of a transparent and open way of spending state funds, and competitive selection of state cultural managers (for more, see Pesenti 2020). At the same time, in response to Russia’s military interventions, the growing conflict with pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, and the divisive effects of the Russian cultural influence, the Ukrainian authorities recognized cultural policy as one of the strategic areas related to state security.

The Ukrainian cultural revival, the roles of civil society and cultural activists in political changes, and Europe-oriented cultural management reforms have become a subject of increasing interest for researchers, as exemplified by Botanova’s (2015, 2016, 2019) analysis and Pesenti’s (2020) excellent report. Less attention has been paid to the conservative shift in Ukrainian authorities’ understanding of cultural policy and its links with Ukraine’s national security policy (Zhurzhenko 2021; Pecheranskyi 2017; Karikh 2017; Yemelianenko 2015). Thus, this article presents the development of Ukrainian cultural policy primarily in the context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. It discusses new conceptualizations of cultural policy that appeared in Ukrainian public discourse after 2014 and the new legal solutions introduced under their influence.

I am particularly interested in state interventions ‘in the production, distribution, and consumption of cultural products, services, and experiences’ (Kristóf 2021, 193), subordinated to maintaining national security. As I will show, the Ukrainian elites’ perception of cultural policy as a key tool in a hybrid war legitimized taking steps that strengthened the national cultural industries and Ukrainian-speaking artists, but limited pluralism and freedom in the Ukrainian cultural space. This study is based on a textual analysis that covers both legal acts, mainly introduced between 2014 and 2019, and the discursive field formed around them by various stakeholders, including those responsible for implementing the policy, academics, and experts. Therefore, I focus on the period of Petro Poroshenko’s presidency, during which the concept of a post-Maidan cultural policy was shaped and key institutional and legislative changes were introduced. In the article’s final section, which discusses the effects of these changes and their importance for maintaining the Ukrainian society’s resilience in the face of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I also refer to the period after 2019.

Ukraine’s case can provide interesting insights regarding cultural policy under the conditions of a hybrid war. The developing debate about the instrumentalization of cultural policy covers the analysis of cases when culture became ‘simply an instrument that serves a noncultural political end’ (Kristóf 2021, 193; see also Hadley and Gray 2017). However, the ongoing weaponization of Ukrainian culture, which is a particular instance of its political instrumentalization, goes beyond the examples of militarizing cultural industries or using culture as soft power that have been studied in the framework of cultural policy theory (for example, Zamorano 2016; Mkhoyan 2017; Mirrlees 2017).

In presenting and explaining contemporary Ukrainian cultural policy, it is also necessary to refer to the concept of ‘securitization’ as developed by the Copenhagen School of security studies and understood as a discursive process of framing a particular issue or entity as being under an existential threat (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998). Successful securitization requires extraordinary measures to neutralize threats, including the state’s use of force and violence. In the case of hybrid aggression, both state and non-state actors can securitize historical memory, cultural heritage, language, and national identity (Mälksoo 2015; Maksimovtsova 2020; Russo and Giusti 2019). Ukraine’s case provides exceptional data in an extreme emergency mode related to the conflict on its own territory and a real threat to the state’s integrity and functioning.

Additionally, the analysis of the Ukrainian struggles related to restructuring the post-Soviet model of cultural policy and attempts to adapt it to European principles and values may be an interesting case for researchers following the transformation of cultural policy in post-socialist states (for example, Kristóf 2017, 2021; Kurennoy 2021).

Cultural policy in independent Ukraine: from the Soviet model to European principles

During the first twenty years of Ukrainian independence, the country’s cultural policy existed primarily on paper (Botanova 2016; Hrytsenko 2019; Kuchyn 2013; Zlenko 2020). Subsequently approved documents⁴ stated that reforming the sphere of cultural management and developing the Ukrainian nation’s culture was one of the state’s main priorities. However, these words were not followed either by providing funding for this development or actual actions supporting reforms.

An essential factor hindering change was the paternalistic Soviet state cultural management model, which had become deeply entrenched over the decades. It was characterized by state ownership of cultural institutions, central management, and networks of state cultural institutions, so-called ‘national artistic unions,’ for most sectors. In addition, the state financed all cultural production. At the time of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Ukrainian state assumed control of the entire cultural infrastructure. However, cultural institutions quickly fell into disrepair without proper state support or well-thought-out marketing. The situation was not helped by the economic crisis, hyperinflation, and legal chaos that accompanied the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. As a result, cultural production in Ukraine dropped drastically, and ‘cultural goods became inaccessible for millions of Ukrainians, especially in small towns and villages’ (Pesenti 2020, 7). In addition, official Ukrainian culture, operating under the protection of the bureaucratic and corrupt Ministry of Culture, was unattractive and unable to compete in the free market for the attention of the Ukrainian public (Botanova 2019).

Greater emphasis was placed on reforming the state cultural policy with regard to developing the national culture after the Orange Revolution (2004/2005), when Victor Yushchenko, who promoted the Ukrainianization policy, became president. The law, ‘About State Cultural Policy for 2005–2007,’ was introduced in 2005 and declared that the state’s cultural policy was to help ‘the creation of a coherent Ukrainian-language information and culture space.’ However, reformers with little experience in conducting cultural politics in post-Soviet socio-economic conditions were too focused on the idealized vision of the culture and not on solving its real problems (Zlenko 2020, 53). For example, the lack of public-private partnerships, copyrights, or legislation related to tax issues hindered the development of local cultural industries and empowerment of Ukrainian artists. Similarly, the centralized culture management system was maintained, and no attempts were made to reform the ossified Ministry of Culture. Hence, the absence of political consensus, a shared vision of changes, and the will to finance costly reforms meant that most of the declared provisions were not supported by legal actions and institutional development (Hrytsenko 2019; Botanova 2015).

In addition to the official, state-supported cultural sector, Ukraine’s independent, critical and innovative scene has been strengthening significantly since the second decade of the 21st century. It comprises a network of small initiatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) run by volunteers, as well as large, privately funded projects such as the Mystetskyi Arsenal (Kyiv), Izoliatsiia (Donets’k), Pinchuk Art Center (Kyiv), and the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation, which launched the country’s first cultural support grant program (Botanova 2019). This independent cultural scene developed without state support, and despite the strength of its innovation and freshness, it remained fragmented, starved of funding, and unnoticed at a mass level (Pesenti 2020; Botanova 2016). ‘For years, the two cultures – official and informal – successfully ignored each other, and the gap between them deepened with every passing year. If there was any cultural policy before Maidan, this was it,’ Botanova (2016) stated.

Only the Revolution of Dignity enabled a profound shift in Ukrainians’ attitudes towards state power and governance and, accordingly, a revolution in cultural policy (Zlenko 2020, 51). In 2014, new people became involved in public administration and tried to make it more open and flexible. The Platform for Strategic Initiatives ‘Culture-2025,’ a grassroots alliance of cultural activists operating during Euromaidan, began to develop a modern, Europe-oriented concept of cultural policy. Experts who were part of the ‘Culture-2025’ Platform advocated the final dismantling of the Soviet cultural policy model and replacing it with liberal, progressive principles. In the document defining the ‘vectors of development’ of the ‘National Cultural Strategy 2015–2025,’⁵ it was assumed that culture is an inclusive, accessible space for human and social development and expressing diversity, dialogue, and communication and can be used as a tool to empower minority groups. Culture should also be a sphere of continuous self-education, in which knowledge and values are acquired, and civic competencies such as critical thinking, empathy, and a creative approach to solving tasks are developed.

Although the Ministry of Culture has not officially approved the ‘Culture-2025’ strategy for implementation, it has become an essential point of reference not only for activists, but also for officials. Pesenti’s (2020, 2) noted in her report,

Under pressure from civil society, the Ukrainian state has adopted a more consistent and comprehensive approach towards cultural policy, overcoming decades of official distrust towards cultural activists and the creative community.

A significant decision made by the new government in January 2016 was introducing the principle of competitive appointment of institutional cultural managers. According to the law, ‘On changes to legislative acts regarding introduction of contract-based employment in culture and competitive hiring procedure for the positions of the state and municipal cultural organizations,’⁶ an expert commission should select directors of theaters, museums, and libraries based on open competition and professional requirements. A contract system was also introduced, limiting the director’s term of office to two contracts. As Botanova (2019) emphasized, this law was revolutionary as it marked ‘the beginning of the end of the voluntary appointment (or dismissal) of heads of cultural institutions at the state and municipal levels.’ Consequently, new and mainly young people, took managerial positions, creating new teams and reforming the institutions they managed. The new law also revealed the scale of unlawful practices previously sanctioned by the authorities – city councils, regional councils, and the ministry – who reluctantly adopted the new solution, depriving them of the possibility of implementing a policy based on nepotism and corruption (Botanova 2019).

The strong support of several Western donors and partners was also crucial for introducing cultural policy reforms. ‘The EU proved to be the main driver of this process, coordinating its efforts with national cultural institutes such as – most prominently – the UK’s British Council and Germany’s Goethe-Institute,’ Pesenti’s (2020, 11) explained. Although the European Union opened the possibility of cooperation with and financing for Ukraine under the Eastern Partnership Cultural Program as early as 2011, in the first years of the program’s operation, all attempts to establish a dialogue with the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture failed (Botanova 2019). However, after 2014, Ukraine opened up to European cooperation, and Ukrainian cultural institutions gained access to the EU grant system for the first time. In November 2015, Ukraine joined the European Union’s ‘Creative Europe’ program, which gave Ukrainian cultural organizations a chance to obtain significant funding and develop creative cooperation with partners from all over Europe. In addition, participating in the competitive selection procedure, transparent settlement of funds, and reporting to European public opinion was a precious experience for Ukrainian cultural professionals, influencing their management of cultural institutions and the direction of any further change.

European principles have been, as Pesenti’s (2020, 15) emphasized, ‘firmly embedded in the public discourse in Ukraine and eventually institutionalized.’ The willingness and need to integrate with European values in creating a civic, inclusive, transparent, and diverse public sphere have become essential elements of state documents that define the principles of the state’s cultural policy.

At the beginning of February 2016, the Ukraine Cabinet approved ‘The long-term strategy for the development of Ukrainian culture – the strategy of reforms.’⁷ The strategy was based on four basic principles: (1) democracy, which was understood as including society in decision-making; transparent political decisions and funding rules; access to visual, technical, and communication resources free from discrimination and other constraints; and creating horizontal network connections; (2) decentralizing cultural management, which was understood as delegating greater power and responsibility to local communities; (3) the principle of subsidiarity, giving greater powers to the regions; and (4) intercultural dialogue.

In contrast to previous years when many reforms remained only on paper, post-Maidan authorities implemented a reform that decentralized the financing and management of culture (see more in Pesenti 2020). Another revolutionary step was creating new institutions and radically restructuring the old ones, such as the Ukrainian State Film Agency (Olzacka 2022). The Ukrainian Book Institute was established in 2016, followed one year later by the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation and Ukrainian Institute. These institutions aimed to reflect the new management and governance principles based on open access, transparency, and competitiveness. They adopted a system of open competitions for state funding of cultural projects, together with transparent evaluation procedures. It was a significant novelty that supported the fight against feudal-style management practices.

Cultural policy as an element of national security policy

At the same time, in the context of Russia’s hybrid aggression and the developing armed conflict in the eastern part of the country, the concept of cultural security became an essential element of Ukrainian security discourse. This concept was promoted by, among others, the National Institute for Strategic Studies⁸ (for example, Stepyko 2015; Valevs’kyǐ 2016a; Zdioruk 2015), and by academic circles (for example, Andriǐchuk 2019; Karikh 2017; Manuǐlov and Prudnykova 2017). It was related to a ‘new understanding of Russian culture as a weapon of hybrid aggression and a threat to national security’ (Zhurzhenko 2021, 12).

After 2014, voices pointing to Russian mass media and mass culture’s roles in spreading effective propaganda and shaping perceptions and emotional assessments of ongoing events became louder and louder in the Ukrainian public space. They were accompanied by campaigns carried out by activists that involved monitoring Ukrainian radio and television stations, which showed how much the Ukrainian media and cultural space was dominated by Russian content (Slipchenko 2014). The growing awareness that Ukrainians ‘look at each other through the eyes of the metropolis’ (Hrabovskyi and Losiev 2014) contributed to the fact that, after 2014, the discourse of decolonization began to percolate from the inner intellectual circles (see, for example, Chernetsky 2003; Riabchuk 2011) into the public mainstream.

As Ukrainian experts noted, Russian ‘cultural products,’⁹ which were widely distributed in the Ukrainian market, promoted narratives harmful to Ukrainian national security (Hrabovskyi and Losiev 2014). For example, they were related to the Russian-promoted ‘Russkiy Mir’ (Russian World) and narratives about the ‘unity’ of the Russian and Ukrainian people, the hierarchy of Ukrainian culture as parochial and Russian as universal, and the association of Ukrainian nationalism with German fascism (see also Shulimov and Lytvyn 2019; Zhurzhenko 2021).

According to analysts at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the disregard for cultural security’s role and the lack of a modern Ukrainian cultural policy has led to a ‘cultural void’ filled with Russian films, books, series, TV programs, and music. This situation facilitated the formation of a political, pro-Russian separatist movement, especially since Russia consciously used its cultural policy against Ukrainian statehood (Astafiev 2015; Valevs′kyǐ 2015; Stepyko 2015; Horbulin 2016). This conceptualization was reflected in state documents, as evidenced by the ‘National Security Strategy of Ukraine’¹⁰ adopted in 2015. It identifies threats to Ukraine’s national security such as the Russian ‘information and psychological war,’ which seeks to downplay the importance of the Ukrainian language and culture, falsify Ukrainian history, and through the Russian media, create a distorted world image.

At the same time, strengthening national identity and culture has become seen increasingly clearly as a critical national security issue. This was the result of combining the conviction that ‘a strong identity was vital for a state to survive in the age of information warfare’ (Zhurzhenko 2021, 11), which prevailed among the Ukrainian elite, with Russia’s threat of hybrid aggression. Therefore, the idea of ‘securitization’ or even ‘weaponization’ of culture has become an essential vector of thinking about the state’s cultural policy. In a speech on the occasion of the presentation of the Taras Shevchenko Awards in 2015, President Petro Poroshenko explicitly stated,

In order to fight the aggressor and win independence, we must develop an effective model of cultural policy. It is the culture that is to become the first guarantee of the unity of Ukraine and a weapon in resisting attempts to destroy our cultural identity.’ Therefore, ‘modern cultural policy must become a weapon to defeat the aggressor (Vystup 2015).

Moreover, the successive ministers of culture, Yevhen Nyshchuk and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, shared the idea that ‘culture is now important from the point of view of national security,’ (Glavcom 2014; Kyrylenko 2018). This is the main reason it has become the subject of special attention for the authorities.

This concept of cultural policy, shaped and implemented by the new authorities, was based on conservative values and principles related to the idea of national and cultural revival and preserving and protecting the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture (Pecheranskyi 2017). President Petro Poroshenko, who took power in 2014, combined the pro-Western orientation with some elements of conservative ideology. His policy of democratic and liberal reforms, which brought Ukraine closer to the EU and NATO structures, was accompanied by support for the Ukrainization policy in the sphere of language and culture and a historical policy promoting a ‘national/nationalist narrative’ (Kulyk 2019). The presidential Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, ‘Solidarity,’ which formed the ruling majority in 2014, also emphasized its attachment to conservative values in its program:

National culture, historical traditions, and family values are the basis of society’s values. (…) We share responsibility for preserving and fostering cultural traditions and passing them on to future generations. Our task is to preserve the historical memory, our own identity, our national identity.’ (cited in Bohuslavs′ka and Briukhovets′ka 2020, 50)

The idea that, under the conditions of a political and socio-economic crisis and external aggression, culture would become the basis for consolidating society, was promoted by National Institute for Strategic Studies analysts (Valevs’kyǐ 2016a, 2016b; Stepyko 2015). Researchers associated with this institution have also drawn attention to the urgent need to develop cultural diplomacy in connection with the challenges of Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine (Rozumna 2016; Zubchenko 2019).¹¹

These beliefs related to the need to instrumentalize cultural policy were reflected in the documents produced by the new government. Shaping the ‘united cultural space of Ukraine’ was considered one of the state policy’s strategic goals in the sphere of culture, both in the ‘The long-term strategy for the development of Ukrainian culture – the strategy of reforms’ and in the amended law ‘On Culture.’ Both documents also emphasize the need to create and popularize a Ukrainian cultural product in the country and abroad that is aimed at ‘establishing modern Ukrainian identity and recognizing it in the world.’

Recognition of the relationship between culture and security policy is also evidenced by the ‘Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine,’¹² adopted in February 2017. Among the ‘vital interests of society and the state,’ the document lists the ‘preservation and multiplication of spiritual, cultural and moral values of the Ukrainian people,’ ‘formation of a positive image of Ukraine in the world,’ and ‘delivery of operational, reliable and objective information about events in Ukraine to the international community.’ The Doctrine clearly defines the tasks assigned to the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the Ukrainian State Film Agency, and the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine. On the one hand, they are related to limiting an ‘aggressor’s audiovisual and printed propaganda products’ in the Ukrainian information space. On the other hand, these institutions were required to develop priorities and stimuli for developing Ukrainian cinema, television, and book printing and especially to create cultural content about the ‘heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people to Russian aggression.’

The policy of protecting cultural space

Along with the political recognition of culture as a weapon in a hybrid war, legal steps have been taken to protect Ukrainian cultural space from cultural products deemed dangerous and harmful. Although the war between Russia and Ukraine has never been officially declared, and Russia has consistently denied that it participates in any hostile actions against Ukraine, in January 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine declared Russia ‘the aggressor country,’ which facilitated the introduction of new legislation. As a result, many Russian books, movies, series, music, and state television channels were considered tools of hostile propaganda and banned (see more in Zhurzhenko 2021).

The new law, ‘On amendments to some legal acts of Ukraine concerning the protection of the information television and radio space of Ukraine,’¹³ was signed in February 2015. The law prohibits use of any audiovisual products that harm Ukraine’s national security. In particular, the act applies to films that are considered dangerous to state security when they contain at least one of the following features: (1) the positive characters of the film include present or former employees of the aggressor state’s authorities or Soviet security agencies; (2) the plot of the film is directly or indirectly related to the activities of the organs of the aggressor state, the Soviet security authorities, and this activity is presented in the film as positive; (3) the plot of the film directly or indirectly denies or questions the territorial integrity of Ukraine, justifies or positively presents occupation of the territory of Ukraine and acts of aggression by other countries, and (4) the film promotes the exclusivity, superiority, or inferiority of individuals due to their religious beliefs, affiliation with a specific nation or race, gender, property status, or social origin. Additionally, all films made by the aggressor state after 1 January 2014, were prohibited from being distributed and screened in Ukraine. To ensure effective implementation of the law, the Ukrainian State Film Agency was obliged to issue state certificates of the right to distribute and screen films in the territory of Ukraine and to provide administrative and financial sanctions for non-compliance with these rules.

Less than two years later, in January 2017, the law ‘On amendments to some legal acts of Ukraine concerning the restriction of access of foreign printed products with anti-Ukrainian content to the Ukrainian market’¹⁴ became effective. It introduced an official procedure for obtaining permission to import books from Russia and the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. As with audiovisual materials, books, and printed materials that justify ‘the occupation of the Ukrainian territory,’ ‘acts of aggression and war,’ ‘promote Russian imperial geopolitical doctrines,’ and ‘propagandize communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes’ were forbidden. According to the law, the Ministry of Information Policy was obliged to issue permits to import publishing products from the aggressor state or the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. The permits required the approval of a special council composed of representatives of state authorities, publishers, leading figures in culture, art, science and education, social psychologists, and media experts.

As for music, although no new law was introduced, a strict provision remained in the existing law ‘On Culture.’ The provision forbids publicly playing phonograms and music clips that include participation by a singer who is a citizen of an aggressor country and/or has been created by an entity that is in any way connected with the aggressor country. Additionally, consistent with the new legislation and based on information from the Council of National Security and Defense, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting, the Ministry of Culture has created a special list of people who pose a threat to national security.¹⁵ The list includes people who publicly support Vladimir Putin’s policy, annexation and occupation of Crimea by the Russians, and the actions of the separatist authorities in Donbas. As a result, cultural products, including films, series, TV programs, music, and videos produced by people on this list have been banned for distribution and display in Ukraine. In addition, following the law, ‘About the peculiarities of organizing and holding tour events in Ukraine with the participation of citizens of the aggressor country,’¹⁶ which took effect in October 2017, people on the list have been prevented from entering Ukraine and promoting their productions.

A (national) cultural product as a tool of hybrid war

Simultaneously, the cultural policy pursued by the new Ukrainian authorities has become an effective and efficient tool for a counteroffensive against Russia. The emphasis was placed on (re)building national cultural industries and supporting cultural products containing Ukrainian-centric narratives. Particular attention was paid to reforming the cinema, which became the pride and joy of the state cultural policy reformers. The dynamic legal, organizational, and financial steps the new government took made it possible to lead the Ukrainian film industry out of a profound collapse in just two years. At the same time, despite the launch of a system open to all competitions, combined with transparent evaluation, the solutions introduced primarily promote films that fall in line with the authorities’ ideological vision.

In 2014, the Ukrainian State Film Agency was headed by Pylyp Illienko, the film director and producer, who was an active participant in Euromaidan and politically associated with the nationalist party ‘Svoboda.’ Illienko did not hide that he considered cinema a powerful ideological weapon, facilitating formation of a national consciousness: ‘Cinema must become our powerful artistic weapon’ because it is ‘a weapon more effective than the Kalashnikov’ (Shtohrin 2016). In March 2017, the law ‘On the State Support for the Cinema in Ukraine’¹⁷ went into effect. It precisely defines the scope of and mechanisms for implementing state support for film production, distribution, and promotion. According to the law, only films that meet specific requirements can count on the generous support of being able to claim 100 percent of film production costs. For this purpose, the law introduced the definition of a ‘national film’ as ‘wholly or partially made in Ukraine, the main language version of which was written in Ukrainian or Crimean Tatar, and which simultaneously scored the required number of points following the scoring system provided for in the law.’ In addition, in an appendix to the law, a particular ‘Cultural Test’ was prepared for evaluating films.

Fifteen criteria, divided into cultural and production criteria, are distinguished in the test. Points are awarded for a story based on artistic works, events, or biographies of people associated with Ukrainian or European culture, history, mythology, or religion. References in the film to the Ukrainian or European architectural and cultural environment, including popularization of national identity, traditions, and customs, also receive points. In addition, it is considered desirable for the film to reflect important Ukrainian and (or) European values, including solidarity, equality, human rights protection, tolerance, environmental protection, respect for cultural and family traditions, critical thinking, and the rule of law. Touching on contemporary problems of Ukrainian or European society and referring to critical contemporary events are also advantageous. The production criteria are scored when the filmmakers are citizens of Ukraine or European Union member states and filming, editing, and post-production take place in the territory of Ukraine.

The law ‘On the State Support for the Cinema in Ukraine’ uses and develops the concept of a ‘national cultural product,’ which first appeared in the 2008 Ukrainian legislation during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency. The concept of a national product supported by the state was designed as a tool of the Ukrainization policy. According to the 2012 project ‘On National Cultural Product,’ the individual and collective works of art (painting, sculpture), films, music, and books should meet certain conditions to be considered ‘national’ and receive state support. Before the Euromaidan, implementing this idea in legislation was impossible due to the lack of a political consensus. The idea returned in 2014 when one of its authors, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, became the minister of culture. This term appeared in the governmental strategy, ‘The long-term strategy for the development of Ukrainian culture – the strategy of reforms,’ as well as in the law ‘On Culture.’

The new minister of culture also referred to the concept of quotas for radio and television content with a mandatory proportion of programming and songs in Ukrainian. This also saw the light of day in Ukrainian legislation for the first time during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency (see Zakusylo 2016). The law ‘On amendments to some legal acts of Ukraine concerning the share of musical works in the state language in the programs of television and radio,’¹⁸ which was adopted in 2016, obliges radio stations to comply with language quotas, requiring that 35% of songs and 60% of all broadcasting (such as news and entertainment) be in the Ukrainian language (see more in Clube 2019). According to the law, this decision protects both ‘the interests of the state by counteracting information aggression’ and ‘the interests of the creators of the national audiovisual product.’

Thanks to the new regulations, the Ukrainian language is definitely more present in public spaces than it used to be. According to the monitoring conducted in 2020 by the National Television and Radio Broadcasting Council, which covered content broadcast by 15 national broadcasters and 198 regional and local broadcasters, on average, every second song and almost all programs broadcast by Ukrainian radio stations were in the Ukrainian language (Moskvychova 2020). The introduction of quotas, despite initial skepticism, encouraged production of music in the Ukrainian language. As a result, it became possible to promote emerging Ukrainian artists whose work previously had no chance of being broadcast by national radio stations. Additionally, many well-established Ukrainian artists who previously sang in Russian or English have also chosen to produce songs in Ukrainian (Moskvychova 2020). A similar effect is found in the case of cinema. The limitation of state support to only productions that meet certain conditions and the introduction of requirements for using ‘national screen time’¹⁹ have caused profound changes in the Ukrainian film industry. For example, related to the current president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Kvartal 95 Studio, which had previously only made films in Russian, made the first film with Ukrainian dubbing in 2018 (see more in Olzacka 2022).

Additionally, the state encourages authors to deal with specific topics and content. Since 2014, the Ministry of Culture has been selecting the topics of special competitions organized by the Ukrainian State Film Agency for film productions related to national history and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. In 2018, the ministry also launched its own program, ‘Creation and distribution of patriotic films.’ However, the program caused great controversy, which was compounded by its enormous budget.²⁰ The ministry was also accused of not having a legal definition of a ‘patriotic film’ and of the fact that the ministry, unlike the Ukrainian State Film Agency, had no experience conducting open and transparent competition procedures (Savchenko 2018); nevertheless, the program continues. In addition, a supplementary program supporting patriotic television series was established in 2020. The special decree²¹ defines a project as having a ‘patriotic orientation’ when its content meets at least one of the requirements. These include, among others,

consolidation of Ukrainian society around the idea of a common future, development of national awareness, patriotic feelings, strengthening the sense of pride in one’s own state, … popularization of Ukrainian history, culture, science, and sport by emphasizing important events and phenomena … (and) heroization of the images of eminent figures in modern Ukrainian history.

The Ukrainian Cultural Foundation also supports cultural products aimed at consolidating Ukrainian society and shaping assessments and perceptions of events related to Russian aggression. The institution, apart from promoting an ‘innovative cultural product,’ implementing modern digital technologies, and supporting cultural diversity, also listed among the priority activity areas

promoting the preservation, protection and popularization of the cultural heritage, cultural values and national memory of the Ukrainian nation in order to strengthen the contemporary Ukrainian identity and shape common values of civil society, … supporting the development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life in Ukraine, as well as abroad, … (and) supporting projects aimed at counteracting the information component of Russian military aggression, understanding the role of Ukrainian soldiers in ensuring the security of Ukraine and Europe during the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, creating a positive image of Ukraine’s defenders.²²

In 2018 and 2019, the Foundation sustained several dozen projects related to creating and promoting cultural products devoted to the subject of the Russian-Ukrainian war (see more in Shkola Politychnoi Analityky NaUKMA 2021). These include films, documentaries, theatrical plays, performances, museum exhibitions, and literary publications. The Foundation also runs the program ‘Culture and Veterans,’ supporting artistic and cultural projects aimed at socially reintegrating people who took part in the fighting in eastern Ukraine and their family members.

In turn, the Ukrainian Institute, established to ‘improve understanding and perception of Ukraine and Ukrainians in the world’ and ‘to create a positive image of the state abroad,’²³ undertook several activities in this direction in its first years of operation. Special programs were launched to promote Ukrainian cultural products, such as the ‘proMOTION’ program, which supports the popularization of Ukrainian cinema, and the ‘Visualise’ program, which helps organize international exhibitions of Ukrainian artists. Care was also taken with projects directly aimed at shaping the holistic image of Ukraine in the international arena, offering Ukrainian-centric narratives, and highlighting the differences between Ukraine and Russia. These included, for example, the English-language online course about Ukraine ‘Ukraine: History, Culture, and Identities,’ which familiarizes foreign audiences with Ukraine’s history and culture from Kievan Rus to the declaration of independence and refutes stereotypes about Ukraine, and the information campaign ‘Ukraine Everywhere in Wikipedia,’ to fill Wikipedia with articles about Ukraine and Ukrainian culture in Ukrainian and 43 other languages.²⁴

Conclusions

In summary, cultural policy reforms in post-Maidan Ukraine were based on two conceptualizations that seem to be contradictory. The first was expressed by a community of independent artists and cultural activists who saw themselves as liberal and European. This group, which gained more importance and strength due to Euromaidan, tried to implement a new cultural policy model based on understanding culture as a tool for human development and social contributions. Their reforms were intended to integrate Ukrainian culture and society into a progressive European and global context and introduce the cultural management principles used in the European Union’s institutions. The determination of cultural activists seeking to introduce European cultural management principles made it possible to combat the bureaucracy, bribery, and nepotism that have characterized Ukrainian government institutions, including the Ministry of Culture.

The second conceptualization was based on the recognition that Russia was using its culture as a weapon in a hybrid war and the related idea of securitizing Ukrainian culture. Furthermore, it was accompanied by the conservative belief shared by the politicians and officials who came to power after Euromaidan that a strong national culture is needed to consolidate society and define a national community. Hence, the cultural policy implemented by the Ukrainian authorities was subordinated to preserving and protecting the national identity, the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture, and creating a coherent Ukrainian language information and cultural space. Conservative ideas of reviving national culture were accompanied by specific activities to strengthen the Ukrainian film, music, and publishing industries and support the production, distribution, and popularization of cultural products that meet specific language and content requirements.

In fact, despite fundamental differences, at a deeper level, both groups of reformers advocated a common goal – a complete break with the Soviet model of cultural management, rejecting the neocolonial Russian narrative, creating a modern and attractive Ukrainian culture, and strengthening local industries and cultural communities. After 2014, voices calling to decolonize Ukrainian culture and reject Russian culture as threatening and hostile became increasingly heard, both among progressively more politicized cultural activists (cf. Ridnyi 2014) and among politicians creating new, post-Maidan authorities (Törnquist-Plewa and Yurchuk 2019). Thus, the desire for revolutionary changes, rejecting the ballast of the past, and building a new, postcolonial culture allowed for difficult agreement in the environment of artists, cultural activists, and new authorities, especially in the first years after Euromaidan, and for cooperation in creating new legislation, which formed the basis of cultural policy.

In fact, it is the newly created and radically reformed institutions, such as the National State Film Agency, Ukrainian Institute, and Ukrainian Cultural Foundation, that have become a real space of ‘postcolonial hybridity’ (cf. Törnquist-Plewa and Yurchuk 2019), creating the possibility of negotiating new meanings between the conservative vision of national culture and its European and global context. These institutions have successfully implemented a system of open competitions and grants, project evaluation by independent professional committees, and transparent activities vis-à-vis the public. The principle of long-term planning has also been introduced here, allowing for horizontal cooperation networks and combined project development. In addition, precise requirements related to promoting a culture exploring ‘Ukrainian themes’ has allowed support for artists who had been disregarded in the ossified system of nepotic ‘artistic unions.’ It has facilitated forming a greater self-awareness of Ukrainians as a political community, strengthened their civic identity, and mobilized them to fight for the integrity of the Ukrainian state. It has also had a tangible impact on international recognition of Ukrainian culture as independent of Russian culture.

Of course, such rapid and profound reforms encountered obstacles because the legal, financial, and tax system reforms did not keep up with the institutional changes (Pesenti 2020, 17). New institutions also inherited some ‘old problems’ and have remained vulnerable to political pressures. The beginning of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation’s activity is associated with controversy and accusations of nepotism, as Maryna Poroshenko, Ukraine’s first lady, was appointed Foundation chair. Despite her lack of appropriate education and experience, Poroshenko was accepted in this position by a large part of the environment, as her personal and political connections guaranteed the institution’s functioning and its financing stability (Badǐor 2018a; Pesenti 2020, 11). The issue of the Ministry of Culture’s ‘unfinished reforms’ also remained a big problem (Pesenti 2020, 21). This institution became resistant to changes and deeply immersed in post-Soviet practices, as exemplified by the controversies related to the organization of the Ukrainian pavilion at the Venice Biennale or the manual allocation of funding for festivals related to people in power (Badǐor 2017, 2018b).

Tensions between the conservative and liberal pro-European agendas responsible for shaping the new cultural policy remain a particular problem. Criticism of the cultural activist community concerns not only irregularities in granting funding to new institutions but also state interventions in the shape of their projects (Badǐor 2018b). Restrictions on Russian mass culture and limiting state support primarily to ‘cultural products’ that meet specific requirements raised concerns about the democratic nature of the reforms and reducing pluralism and cultural diversity in Ukraine. As Botanova (2019), summing up the first years of post-Maidan cultural policy, put it, ‘security prevailed over freedom.’ However, these nationalizing interventions were simultaneously seen as tools for the decolonization struggle and ‘a firewall against Russia’s coercive narratives,’ which mitigated the cultural activist community’s criticism (Botanova 2019; Pesenti 2020, 39).

In addition, in post-Maidan Ukraine, the cultural war between liberals and conservatives took on a new dimension, manifesting itself in, among other things, discussions about LGBT+ rights, gender roles, domestic violence, and the church’s role in public life. As Zhurzhenko (2021, 8) noted, ‘the “values of the Euromaidan”—dignity, freedom, human rights – came into conflict with the “patriotic values” of a nation under hybrid aggression, a nation seeking to defend its historical memory and identity.’ Cooperation between different environments in developing new cultural projects has highlighted these frictions; a telling example is the TYU art platform operating in Mariupol since 2016. The activists’ progressive agenda, supporting LGBT+ and liberal changes, brought them into conflict with the Azov Battalion, the Ukrainian nationalist volunteer militia stationed in the area, which initially supported them (Pesenti 2020, 31).

Failures introducing liberal, Europe-oriented reforms and restrictions on pluralism and freedom of expression related to security issues (e.g. the issue of criticizing the military policy of the authorities and the army) caused disappointment among some activists who accused the authorities of ‘betraying the ideals of the Maidan’ (Badǐor 2017, 2018b). The situation was not made more accessible by the COVID pandemic crisis, which led to a significant cut in funding for projects related to culture (Pesenti 2020, 19). Moreover, a change in political leadership in 2019, when Volodymyr Zelenskyy replaced Petro Poroshenko as Ukraine’s president, further removed cultural activists from influencing government decisions and inhibited the transformative and democratizing efforts in the field of cultural policy reform (Badǐor 2018b; Botanova 2021; Pesenti 2020).

The new authorities were accused of introducing ‘their people’ not only to the Ministry of Culture but also to new institutions and disregarding the transparent procedures for selecting new supervisory board chairs and members. The gradual weakening of the role of independent expert councils operating in competition and grant committees also undermined the trust of the state’s grassroots artistic and cultural community (Tyzhden 2021). Finally, the ‘reorganization’ of cultural institutions aimed at their ‘market optimization’ aroused great controversy, as exemplified by the scandal surrounding the Dovzhenko Centre, which has been struggling since 2020 with a lack of funding and with the current management (Pesenti 2020, 23; Yakovenko 2022).

Despite these limitations and failures, which hindered the implementation of cultural policy, the post-Maidan reformers managed to create a solid legal, financial, and institutional foundation, enabling rapid development of cultural industries and a vision of culture supporting the empowerment of the Ukrainian state and society. Moreover, the flexible management method, focus on cooperation, implementation of innovative digital solutions, and direct contacts with foreign partners, characteristic of the new, leading Ukrainian cultural institutions, paid off in the tragic circumstances of war.

It was the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation that started to lead the ‘cultural front’ after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Thanks to its experience using modern and digital tools and horizontal cooperation networks, the institution has successfully documented cultural losses and crimes committed by Russians.²⁵ In addition, the Foundation organizes and promotes intra-Ukrainian and international campaigns to mobilize support for Ukraine and obtain material support for heritage protection. It also coordinates a network of projects aimed at counteracting Russian disinformation.²⁶

The Ukrainian Institute in wartime continues its impressive activity, which strengthens the positive image of Ukraine and Ukrainians worldwide and also plays a unique role in informing the global public about the ongoing war and Russian crimes. The participatory project ‘Postcards from Ukraine,’ ²⁷ aims to record and demonstrate the damage caused to the Ukrainian culture by the Russian troops. The involvement in the Institute’s activities of many foreign cultural institutions and famous people from the world of culture, such as the British actor Hugh Bonneville or the American director Martin Scorsese, proves the institution’s ability to mobilize not only the domestic but also the international cultural front.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for carefully reading my paper and their valuable feedback that helped me improve the manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The publication was supported by the Jagiellonian University: a grant funded by the Strategic Program Excellence Initiative at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow and the Priority Research Area ‘Society of the Future’ under the program ‘Excellence Initiative - Research University’.

Notes on contributors

Elżbieta Olzacka

Elżbieta Olzacka Graduated from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków: MA in Sociology and Russian Studies; Ph.D. in Sociology. Assistant professor in the Center for Comparative Studies of Civilisations, Jagiellonian University. Her current research includes Ukrainian cultural mobilization and cultural policy in the context of the Russian–Ukrainian war.

Notes

1. In 2014, due to the massive Euromaidan revolution (known also as the Revolution of Dignity) the then-pro-Russian president of the country was forced to flee (see more, e.g. Portnov 2014). In Ukraine, a new, revolutionary government took power, combining the policy of democratic reform bringing Ukraine closer to the EU and NATO with the Ukrainization policy (Kulyk 2019).

2. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5/2015#Text.

3. The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture changed its name to Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports in 2019. Since March 2020, it has been known as the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy.

4. Hrytsenko (2019) presents the list and detailed discussion of subsequent legal acts that define the state policy in the sphere of culture. As calculated by Kuchyn (2013), from 1991 to 2013, over 300 legal acts related to culture were drafted in Ukraine, many of which contradicted themselves. The Law ‘On Culture,’ (available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2778–17#Text) which is the primary document that defines the state policy principles in the sphere of culture, was passed only in 2011, after twelve years of work by the working group. See also: Zlenko (2020).

5. Available at: https://undiasd.archives.gov.ua/doc/news/2015_07_15/2015_07_15_02.pdf.

6. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/955–19#Text.

7. Available at: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/248862610.

8. The Institute, which was subordinated to the President of Ukraine from 2002, performs a research and advisory role for the President of Ukraine and the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine in the field of Ukraine’s national security.

9. The term ‘cultural product’ is widely used in the Ukrainian cultural policy discourse and in legislation. It can be defined as goods and services produced by cultural actors in the fields of visual and performing arts, literature, national heritage, and creative industries (Pesenti 2020, 7).

10. Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2872015–19070.

11. In the article, due to its limited size, the issue of the dynamically developing cultural diplomacy in post-Maidan Ukraine was not developed. For English on the subject, see Tereshchuk (2019).

12. Available at: https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/472017–21374.

13. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/159–19#Text.

14. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1780–19#Text.

15. For the current list, see: https://mkip.gov.ua/content/perelik-osib-yaki-stvoryuyut-zagrozu-nacbezpeci.html.

16. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2165–19#Text.

17. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1977–19#Text.

18. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1421–19%20#%20Text.

19. According to the Law ‘On the State Support for the Cinema in Ukraine,’ until January 1, 2022, at least 15 percent and, after January 1, 2022, at least 30 percent of the total monthly time of film screenings should be used to screen national films, other films produced by Ukrainian filmmakers and works of national cinematographic heritage.

20. In 2019, the first year of the program’s operation, UAH 500 million was allocated to it. For comparison, in the same year, the Ukrainian State Film Agency, the central institution established to support Ukrainian cinema’s production, distribution, and popularization, received a similar sum of UAH 505 million for all its activities.

21. Available at: https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z0940–20#top.

22. Available at: https://ucf.in.ua/p/about.

23. Statute of the Ukrainian Institute available at: https://ui.org.ua/en/statutory-documents/.

24. For more about the activities of the Ukrainian Institute, see: https://ui.org.ua.

25. Map of Cultural Losses, prepared by the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation based on data from the population and organizations, available at: https://uaculture.org/culture-loss-en.

26. See more: https://uaculture.org/en/digests/.

27. Available at: https://ui.org.ua/en/postcards-from-ukraine/.