Managing investigative interviews with vulnerable suspects in the UK: do specialist interview managers (IM’s) understand vulnerability?

ABSTRACT

An Interview Manager (IM) is required to provide strategic advice to both a Senior Investigating Officer and the interview team on matters relating to suspect management in high stake investigations. This paper explored the perceptions of the IM with regard to what vulnerability is and the functionality of their role during their deployment with vulnerable suspects. A self-report questionnaire was completed by 53 IMs from 16 separate UK Police Forces together with IMs from 2 UK Counter Terrorism Units and a National Crime Unit. Overall, the responses indicated that there was lack of, (i) understanding of what constituted vulnerability in the context of the criminal justice system, (ii) understanding of the AA role and (iii) training regarding specific vulnerabilities and their impact on the investigative interview. These combined issues leave the vulnerable suspect as risk of the failure to receive a fair trial and a potential miscarriage of justice. More training and support should be provided at a national level and with their respective organisations.

KEYWORDS:

• Investigative interviewing
• interview management
• vulnerability
• training
• policing

Introduction

One of the biggest problems that vulnerable suspects face at the early stages of criminal proceedings is the failure of the authorities to recognise the vulnerabilities of those suspected or accused of a criminal offence. Whilst some vulnerabilities are hard to identify, it is important that procedures are in place to identify any issues that may affect the suspect’s ability to participate effectively in the key elements of the trial process, including during police interviews. (Fair Trials International Advisory Panel, Nov 2012)

The above quote is now ten years old. However, identifying vulnerabilities especially following an arrest and during the subsequent interviews remain a significant problem within the criminal justice process (Bath & Dehaghani, 2020; Dehaghani, 2019).

The arrest of a suspect and subsequent detention is for many individuals their first interaction with the Criminal Justice System (Roberts & Herrington, 2012). The responsibility for ensuring that safeguards are implemented for vulnerable suspects lies with the custody officer or the investigating officer (Dehaghani, 2022). The custody system therefore plays a vital role in identifying the vulnerability of a suspect (Bath et al., 2015; Dehaghani, 2019). However, a wealth of research has shown that the custody system often fails to correctly identify vulnerability (Bath & Dehaghani, 2020; Irving & Mckenzie, 1989; Jacobson, 2008; Oxburgh et al., 2016) especially in respect of mental health (Farrugia, 2021). When vulnerability is not identified early enough, the risk of a miscarriage of justice is heightened (Bartkowiak- Théron et al., 2017; Bath & Dehaghani, 2020). Vulnerability and the failure to identify vulnerability have been a consistent theme across miscarriage of justice cases (Gudjonsson, 2018; Poyser & Grieve, 2018). For example, the ‘Confait’ murder in 1972, (prior to the Police and Criminal Evidence: Poyser & Milne, 2021; Price & Caplan, 1977) the Cardiff Three following the murder of Lynette White in February 1988 (post PACE: Pearce & Gudjonsson, 1999; Sekar, 2012), and R v Jones ([2018] EWCA Crim 2816), a rape investigation with a vulnerable suspect who spent 10 years in prison for a crime that he did not commit, typify the devastating outcomes that can occur if vulnerability is not catered for at all stages of the process.

The disquiet surrounding the ‘Confait’ murder investigation and in particular the way the three suspects, who were all youths, each with their own vulnerability, coupled with poor investigation and interviewing techniques, led to a public enquiry (Fisher, 1977) and a Royal Commission on Criminal Procedures (RCCP) to investigate and root out lessons to be learn (Philips, 1981). Following the RCCP recommendations the government of the day introduced the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which came into effect in 1986. The Act aimed to take into account vulnerability in order to create a system that was fair and open to all. As a result, PACE and the associated Codes of Practice included safeguards that catered for the special needs of those deemed vulnerable, including, the right to have the assistance of an Appropriate Adult (AA). The role of the AA within the investigative interview context is to support, advise and assist the vulnerable suspect (Dehaghani, 2016; Mattison et al., 2022). The AA is expected to observe whether or not the interview process is delivered in a proper and fair way, whilst facilitating communication with the vulnerable suspect if necessary (Annex E, , Codes of Practice, Home Office, 2019). The role of the AA can be performed by a relative, guardian, or other person responsible for their care or custody, but the AA must be over 18 years of age. The AA must also be independent from the investigation, and they cannot be a police officer, or someone who is employed or engaged in police work (Dehaghani, 2016).

PACE Code of Practice, Code C, (2019) outlined that a person is vulnerable by reason of their age (e.g. under 18 years of age) and to any person who appears to have a mental health condition or a mental disorder. Further, it introduced a functional test (see Dehaghani & Bath, 2019; Dehaghani, 2021) which provided further clarification on the terms mentally vulnerable and mentally disordered. It applies the term vulnerable in situations where the suspect appears to have difficulty understanding or communicating effectively about the full implications for them of any procedures and processes connected with their arrest and detention (p. 9). Additionally, it includes aspects of how the suspect receives information from questions put to them and the significance of answers they provide. Suspects are deemed vulnerable if they show the following; (i) become confused and unclear about their position; (ii) provide unreliable, misleading or incriminating information without knowing or wishing to do so; (iii) accept or act on suggestions from others without consciously knowing or wishing to do so; or (iv) readily agreeing to suggestions or proposals without any protest or question (p. 9).

Thus, legally, vulnerability is an umbrella term incorporating a multitude of conditions (Mattison et al., 2022). Mental ill health can include conditions that are severe and enduring, for example, psychotic disorders, schizophrenia, personality disorders, and bipolar affective disorders or manic depression. Vulnerability can also include anxiety, depression, phobias, obsessive-compulsive and panic disorders, and post-natal depression (para.1.13d and 1GB, PACE Code C, 2019 and para 2.5 Codes of Practice Mental Health Act 1983, Department of Health, 2015). Farrugia (2021), suggests that there is a deficiency in research regarding how custody officers make sense of information presented to them at point of entry into custody which therefore contributes to the failure of implementation of Appropriate Adult safeguards (also see, Dehaghani, 2016). The sheer scale and complexities of these vulnerabilities have the potential to overwhelm an interviewer especially with the absence of guidance on how to identify and interview vulnerable suspects (Smith & O’Mahony, 2018). Additionally, the way each suspect reacts to their period of time in custody and the pressure of investigative interviewing have the potential to create further vulnerabilities (Gudjonsson, 2003, 2018).

The challenges faced by vulnerable suspects, in any country (see the Mendez Principles, 2021), during their period in custody are demonstrated by their ability to participate effectively within an interview (Gudjonsson & Joyce, 2011) and has led to the term ‘psychological vulnerability’ being used to describe a range of risk factors that have the potential for the suspect to provide inaccurate and unreliable accounts (Herrington & Roberts, 2012). ‘Psychological vulnerability’ has been defined as psychological characteristics or mental state which renders the interviewee prone, in certain circumstances to providing information, which is inaccurate, unreliable or misleading (Gudjonsson & Young, 2006, p. 68). The associated risk factors fall mainly into two categories, ‘situational’ and ‘personal’ (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004) and these form part of the National Vulnerability Action Plan for UK Policing (NPCC, 2020). The action plan aims to identify and manage risk, improve support for vulnerable individuals, and ensure that investigators’ have the appropriate knowledge and skills to perform their task. Planning for an investigative interview is even more important if interviewing someone deemed vulnerable (Smith & Milne, 2011; 2018).

Nevertheless, for vulnerable suspects to be supported they need to be identified in the first place. However, research suggests that this is not happening in part due to the lack of accurate understanding of, for example, learning disabilities, on the part of custody officer (Hellenbach, 2012). Data collected in England for 2017/18 found that of those adult suspects identified as having a learning disability, 34% did not receive the assistance of an AA (Bath, 2019). Moreover, of those adults identified as having a mental health diagnosis, the majority (73%) did not receive the assistance of an AA (Bath, 2019). Research has also shown failures in identifying vulnerabilities including the identification of those with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Gudjonsson & Young, 2006), failures in the questioning of those with a range of mental disorders (Farrugia & Gabbert, 2019), failures in communicating with those suspects who display characteristics of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; Richards & Milne, 2020), dissociative identity disorder (DID; O’Mahony et al., 2018) and failures in communicating with those with a learning disability (Griego et al., 2019; Jacobson, 2008; Perske, 2008).

Furthermore, those who are easier to identify (e.g. those under the age of 18) were still not treated appropriately. For example, research examining police interviews with juveniles were reported as poor, with evidence of oppressive attitudes and behaviours, little support being provided for the juvenile by those present and who are supposedly acting in their best interests (Evans, 1993). Thus, it appears that the legislation is clearly not enough for a complete step-change and miscarriages are unfortunately still occurring (Poyser & Milne, 2021). Applying more sensitive questioning strategies tailored to the individual (i.e. in a vulnerable informed approach) should minimise unwanted outcomes and potential miscarriages (O’Mahony et al., 2012). For this to happen investigators must become more adept at identifying specific vulnerabilities and how they impact the investigative interview.

Similarly, unreliable witness testimony has been highlighted as one of the four major factors of miscarriages over the past 50 years in the UK in an analysis of over 250 such cases (Helm, 2021), along with false or unreliable confessions, inadequate disclosure and false or misleading forensic science. Thus, legislation, policy and procedures in relation to witnesses/victims have been instigated in response. One such safeguard for witnesses/victims who are deemed vulnerable, is the Registered Intermediary (RI). In England and Wales, section 29 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act (YJCE Act, 1999) is the statutory provision for RI as one of a number of special measures for vulnerable witnesses. There is currently no legislative framework in England and Wales for the use of RIs in a suspect interview. However, legislation in Northern Ireland permits the use of both a Registered Intermediary and an AA in a suspect interview (see PACE Code C, Department of Justice, Northern Ireland, 2015) . Registered intermediaries, come from a variety of professional backgrounds, for example, qualified speech and language therapists, teaching, social work and who are trained and accredited on behalf of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and are independent officers of the court (MoJ, 2020). The function of the RI differs from that of the AA in that the intermediary assesses communication needs specific to the police interview and any subsequent potential court appearance. The intermediary provides a verbal or written report to the police outlining the assessment findings and making suggestions in order to enable effective communication during the investigative interview. For example, the intermediary could suggest specific communication aids based on individual needs (O’Mahony et al., 2016). The intermediary could also advise on how the environment could be adapted to enable more effective communication. For example, removing distractions from the walls in a room if the interviewee is easily distracted. This detailed information is crucial for planning and preparation prior to the interview (Mattison et al., 2022). The more vulnerable the individual the more planning and preparation is required and the more adaptable and flexible an interviewer needs to be within the interview process.

There is no published research, at this time, on how the AA and the RI manage their separate roles in the planning stages for interviews and during the interview in Northern Ireland. The use of intermediaries in suspect interviews is still relatively rare in England and Wales and there are no formal statistics to illustrate its frequency (Mattison et al., 2022). Thus, the IM needs to have full cognisance of the functionality of the intermediary when considering their use within a suspect interview.

To combat poor interviewing standards in the UK, a National initiative was embarked upon in 1992, and an Investigative Interviewing framework was developed known as ‘PEACE’ (see Clarke & Milne, 2016; Milne & Bull, 1999), and a training regime implemented (Clarke et al., 2011). In 2001, the Home Office commissioned a national review of these interventions that aimed to identify good practice for the management and supervision of investigative interviewing and evaluate the extent to which PEACE interviewing techniques for suspect, witness and victim interviews had been incorporated into workplace practice (Clarke & Milne, 2001). In July 2003, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Investigative Interview Strategy (ACPO, 2003) was formally proposed and agreed upon by the ACPO Cabinet to include all of Clarke and Milne’s (2001), recommendations. This led to the implementation of a National Tiered approach to investigative interviewing training throughout the UK. The approach led to the introduction of a new role, that of a Specialist Interview Manager (IM).

The IM should be someone who is highly trained and experienced in investigations and can provide advice during an investigation (Williamson, 2006). Managing, developing strategies and planning and preparing interviews of vulnerable suspects and witnesses in high stakes cases¹ is a complex task, requiring well-trained and knowledgeable staff (Cook, 2019). Furthermore, Senior Investigating Officers (SIO) working with their IM should choose the most appropriate interviewer based on their skills, experience and suitability (Cook, 2019). Due to being at the apex of the tiered approach of interviewing, IMs are generally called to the most complex cases involving the most vulnerable interviewees. Thus, an in-depth knowledge about vulnerability and its impact on the investigative interview process is central and imperative to an IMs role. The IMs role within the interview process is to: (i) provide strategic advice; (ii) co-ordinate the interview; (iii) monitor the interview; and (iv) evaluate the interview. These four areas are supported by guidance contained in the National Occupational Standards (NOS) (Skills for Justice, UK, 2008). The IM in essence assists a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) by managing the interview process, including liaising with custody management teams and medical assessments. The IM also evaluates information from material, statements and interviews; determines the appropriate location and resource requirements for interviews; and selects who is the most appropriate interviewer based on their skills, experience and suitability (e.g. WISCI, Smith & Milne, 2018). Finally, the IM must be able to debrief the interview; provide accurate feedback to interview teams; and provide a final overview to the SIO, documenting decisions and updating relevant others on the condition of the vulnerable suspect (ACPO, 2009).

Whilst the role of the IM is now well established in UK policing, the role of IM when dealing with vulnerable suspects, remains unexamined within psychological literature (Oxburgh et al., 2016). Perception research allows us to understand the reality and experiences of an individual based on their lived experiences through their role deployment. Thus, the aim of the current exploratory study was to examine, through the use of a questionnaire, the IMs own perceptions of the following research questions: (i) what their understanding of vulnerability is; (ii) how, as IMs, they manage their investigations with those who are deemed vulnerable; and (iii) what training they received regarding vulnerability.

Method

Design

A questionnaire² comprising 72 test items, was designed to examine (i) IMs views of their role and (ii) their understanding of vulnerability within the interview context. The current paper examines the second part of the questionnaire (understanding vulnerability) and therefore consists of 29 of the 72 test items. Seven of the test items were open-ended questions. Twenty test items consisted of Likert scale questions, and two test items were closed questions.

Open-ended questions were used to generate qualitative data allowing participants to voice their opinions and develop their thoughts. They were used to explore their (i) understanding of the term ‘vulnerability’ and (ii) what training they had received regarding vulnerability. Likert scale questions (N = 20) were used to reflect the opinions of the IM whilst obtaining an understanding of their specific role as an IM once deployed with a vulnerable suspect (n = 11) and secondly to obtain an understanding of their perceptions regarding the term ‘vulnerability’ (n = 9). The closed questions were designed to obtain numerical data centred on the percentage of suspects they managed during the interview process that required the services of an Appropriate Adult in suspect interviews and the percentage of witnesses that they managed that required the services of an Intermediary in a witness interview (Intermediary data were considered useful in understanding perceptions of that role should the IM consider their use in a suspect interview scenario). As there was no available research identified into the role of the IM, questions were designed to establish sufficient data to generate future exploration of the role.

Participants

The current study was aimed at police officers and policing staff trained to Tier 5/PIP 2 Specialist IM level. Police officers from urban, rural and national policing areas across the UK were included utilising a purposing sampling methodology. Data were collected from 53 Participants (83%, n = 44 males; 17%, n = 9 females) representing 16 (of 45) UK Police Forces³ plus participants from UK Counter Terrorism Units (n = 4) and the National Crime Unit (n = 1). Length of police service ranged from 12 to 42 years (M = 21.6; SD = 6.99). Length of time as an IM ranged from 3 months to 18 years (M = 5.20, SD = 4.32). Of the 53 participants, 24 were Detective Constables (45.3%), 20 were Detective Sergeants (37.7%), three were Detective Inspectors (5.7%), four were retired police officers now employed as police staff (7.5%), one was a Detective Chief Inspectors (1.9%) and one was a Uniformed Police Constable (1.9%). In respect of investigative interview training, the majority of the participants (n = 44, 83%) reported attending a Tier 3/PIP Level 2 Advanced Suspect investigative interviewing course, whilst four participants reported completing a specialist witness interview course only (see Griffiths & Milne, 2006). A further 9% (n = 5) reported that they had received no training at advanced or specialist level for either interviewing witnesses or suspects.

Procedure

Access to IM’s was gained following an introduction email that outlined the proposed research which was sent to all UK Police forces and addressed specifically to Force leads for Interview Management. A copy of the questionnaire together with an Invitation Letter was contained within the email. The invitation letter set out the purpose of the research and requested that a nominated ‘gatekeeper’ should be appointed by each participating police force. The gatekeeper would then be responsible for communicating with the lead researcher. The subject of the research was considered to be of a sensitive nature. Social research investigations often involve a consideration of issues, data and perspectives that may impact on the feelings, views, attitudes and values held by people involved in the research process (McCosker et al., 2001). As this target group deal with highly sensitive investigations, confidentiality was of the utmost importance. Therefore, an anonymity guarantee was provided for those who agreed to participate.

Once the force agreed to take part in the research, the participants were approached by the ‘Gatekeeper’, who disseminated a copy of the questionnaire, participant information sheet, and a participant consent form. It was important to demonstrate that participation was completely voluntary, and participants were informed that they could withdraw from the research without reason and without consequences. However, once the questionnaire was submitted it could not be withdrawn from the research study due to its anonymity at the point of submission. Clarity regarding this aspect of their involvement was contained in a ‘Consent Form’ that the participant signed at the point of presentation of the questionnaire and prior to them completing it. Providing this level of information was designed to enable the participant to be fully informed as to the nature of the study, their rights to participate or not, and what would happen to their information following completion and submission. Documents were kept securely in line with the Data Protection Act 2018. Ethical approval was obtained from the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science at the main authors University. The research project was also registered with the College of Policing, UK.

Data analysis

Content analysis was conducted to code the qualitative data and identify themes (see Vaismoradi et al., 2013). The benefits of this approach include increasing the comprehensibility of analysis and providing sound interpretation of data (MacPhail et al., 2016). The manifest (observable) content was identified, and conceptual analysis was used to observe the frequency of concepts. For the purpose of this study inductive or conventional content analysis was used (see Kyngäs, 2020). This process of analysis is particularly useful when the phenomenon under study has not been covered in previous studies or when knowledge of the subject is fragmented (Kyngäs, 2020). The data were analysed and coded by one of the researchers and a second researcher then coded 10% (N = 5) of the data for inter-rater reliability providing a 95% agreement level between both researchers. Responses to closed questions were collated and listed under each question heading before being used to identify frequencies, ranges and mean scores. The responses to the Likert scale questions were collated and calculated producing mean scores and standard deviations.

Results

The results section will begin by exploring IMs understanding of the term ‘vulnerability’. Next, the results will examine the tasks performed by the IM throughout their deployment including exploring how satisfied they are with their understanding and working with ‘vulnerability’. IMs views on their training for vulnerable interviewees will be presented before finally exploring what further training IM believed they need to support vulnerable interviewees.

IM’s perceptions of vulnerability

IMs (N = 53) were asked whether they were satisfied with their own knowledge of what vulnerability means when dealing with a suspect. Almost 50% of IMs (n = 26) responded that they were satisfied with the knowledge, whereas 19% (n = 10) responded that they were not satisfied with their knowledge. IMs were then asked to define the term vulnerability. Content analysis was carried out on the responses to identify key themes. As can be seen from Table 1, of those who responded (N = 44), 19 included references to mental disorder within their definition followed by other personal vulnerabilities defined as physical (n = 15), learning disability (n = 6), and age, that being a person under 18 years old (n = 10). Lack of understanding of the situation the suspect finds themselves in (n = 7) was reported alongside other specific situational vulnerability such as drugs and alcohol, social pressure, financial matters and sexual matters (n = 6). In addition, IMs (n = 8) suggested that anyone could be classed as vulnerable, manipulated and/or harmed.

Table 1. Frequency of themed responses in respect of vulnerability definition content (N = 44).

Themed response	Frequency
Mental disorder	19
Physical	15
Age -U18	10
Lacks understanding of a situation	7
Learning disability	6
Requiring support	4
Anyone	4
Nature of offence	3
Drugs/alcohol	3
Harm	3
Performing below an average person	2
No clear definition	2
Social pressure	1
Financial	1
Sexual	1
Lifestyle	1
Easily manipulated	1

Participating IMs expressed views such as:

Anything that may have an effect on a person’s behaviour or ability to understand or be understood (P19)

“Any person who has mental disorder or other disorder of the mind, child, person with learning disability, physical disability. (P29)

Where a person’s mental health, disability, age, makes them vulnerable to understanding what is happening, going to happen or capable of understanding. (P36)

Next, the IMs were asked to identify the differences between AAs and Intermediaries in terms of their role within the interview process. As can be seen from Table 2, IM believed AA were individuals who were untrained (n = 12) who perform a range of functions within a suspect interview arena including facilitating communication (n = 9) whilst offering support (n = 9), ensuring the suspect is treated fairly (n = 4) and understands the process adopted whilst they are in custody (n = 7). Using a 5-point Likert scale (i.e. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 neither agree or disagree, 4 = agree somewhat, 5 = strongly agree) it should be noted that IMs agreed (M = 4.27, SD = 1.05) that an AA should be professionally trained, and their names maintained on a national register. With regard to intermediaries the IM (n = 29) were more likely to report that their primary function was to assist with communication within a witness interview process. In contrast to the AA, IMs (n = 16) acknowledged that intermediaries required specialist training and accreditation in order to be registered. The perception of the IMs indicated that the intermediary conducts assessments (n = 5) before providing specialist support through the interview process (n = 4).

Table 2. Perceived differences between an Appropriate Adult and an Intermediary (N = 48).

	Themed response	Frequency
Appropriate Adult	No training	12
	Facilitates communication	9
	Supports suspect	9
	Ensures legal compliance	8
	Ensures understanding	7
	Used in suspect interview	5
	Ensures fairness	4
	Not involved in the investigation	2
Intermediary	Assist communication	29
	Specially trained and accredited	16
	Assess level of understanding	5
	Provide specialist support	4
	Used in witness interviews	4
	Act as a mediator	1

Some IMs (n = 3) demonstrated a lack of understanding across the roles as shown from their responses displayed below:

An AA does not have the skills to act as an intermediary as a rule, and would be put in a difficult position if asked to do so (P4)

Intermediary: Trained and experienced – AA: Bored busy body (P25)

One is to assist suspect in delivering answers- professional. One is to protect welfare of suspect (P46)

Satisfaction of understanding of the term ‘Vulnerability’

In providing investigative interviewing strategic advice to both the SIO and the interview team it is incumbent upon the IM to be the most informed they can possibly be regarding issues of vulnerability and how they impact on the interview process. Participants were asked a series of Likert questions, (i.e. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 neither agree or disagree, 4 = agree somewhat, 5 = strongly agree) to test their perceptions of satisfaction regarding their understanding of the term vulnerability. IMs reported a degree of satisfaction (M = 3.06, SD = 1.15) with the measures in place within their organisations to identify the vulnerability of a suspect. However, they indicated that SIO’s did not fully understand ‘vulnerability’ and how it affects the interview process (M = 2.88, SD = 1.15).

IMs were asked whether they were expected to provide advice on specific vulnerabilities which were outside of their own expertise. IMs reported that they were sometimes asked to provide advice on vulnerabilities outside of their expertise (M = 3.02, SD = 1.17). There was a degree of satisfaction with regard to the IMs current knowledge of PACE Code C regarding AA procedures (M = 3.40, SD = 0.81) and their current knowledge of Annex E and Annex G of Codes of Practice C of PACE (M = 3.16, SD = 0.96). However, with regard to their current knowledge of the Mental Capacity Act, IMs reported that they were not fully satisfied with their knowledge base (M = 2.56, SD = 0.93).

Tasks performed by IM to safeguard the vulnerable suspect

General

In order to explore how vulnerability impacts upon the deployment of IMs during high stake investigations, IMs were asked to report how often they would utilise the services of an Appropriate Adult (in suspect interviews) and/or Registered Intermediaries (during witness interviews). As can be seen from Table 3, during suspect interviews 8 participants reported that services of an AA were not used during deployment. The majority of respondents (n = 32) had required the services of an AA during 50% or less of their deployments with the remainder (n = 9) reporting usage between 50% and 100% of their deployment. However, respondents indicated less use of an Intermediary during their deployment in witness interviewing with participants (n = 19) indicating that they had not used an Intermediary. Whilst the majority of participants (n = 29) stated they had used an Intermediary in less than 50% of their cases with the remaining participants (n = 13) indicating they had used the Intermediary during 50% or less of their cases and just 1 participant stating they required the services of an Intermediary during 95% of their cases.

Table 3. Percentage of cases requiring either an AA or an Intermediary during a 12-month period (N = 49).

	%	Frequency
Appropriate Adult	0	8
	1–25	21
	26–50	11
	51–75	4
	76–100	5
Intermediary	0	19
	1–25	24
	26–50	5
	51–75	0
	76–100	1

Prior to interview

Providing strategic advice to the SIO is a key element of the role of the IM and includes advising on the use of forensic psychologists and other agencies such as Forensic Mental Health Teams to ensure the quality and integrity of the investigative interview. To explore their understanding of this aspect of their role, IMs were asked a series of questions on Likert scales (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = mostly and 5 = always). In the UK to prove an offence of Murder/Homicide the Prosecution have to show the defendant was of ‘Sane’ mind at the point of killing. However, when dealing with a homicide investigation the IM’s (M = 3.65, SD = 1.31) reported that they did not routinely have a suspect examined by a Mental Health Team over and above the custody nurse assessment as the nurse may be unskilled and indeed not qualified to conduct such a detailed assessment. This was further evidenced by the reported failure (M = 3.35, SD = 1.04) to routinely engage the services of specialists from outside the normal custody assessment team in order to assist in the construction of an appropriate investigative interview strategy (e.g. use of forensic psychology services).

Where medical examination is required, the IM must fully brief and debrief the medical practitioner and inform them of any disclosure issues which would impact upon the interview process. IMs reported that they carried out this requirement (M = 4.35, SD = 0.96) illustrating good compliance with this mandatory task. Additionally, it was reported that when dealing with vulnerable suspects IM’s (M = 4.16, SD = 1.10) did read the Custody Officer Assessment on the custody record to inform their decision-making. Based on information obtained within the debrief, the IM is required to assess the information before carrying out a risk assessment which allows for the monitoring of the interview team’s involvement with the vulnerable suspect. However, IMs reported that this process was rarely adhered to (M = 2.74, SD = 1.45).

Prior to any interview the IM is also required to construct an interview strategy which should provide legal, ethical and practical advice to the SIO and the Interview Team on all issues pertinent to the conducting of an investigative interview. IMs reported that they did not always include within the strategy references to specific issues relating to the identified vulnerability and how it might impact on the interview (M = 3.96, SD = 1.13). IMs also reported that they rarely upskilled themselves as to current research specific to the identified vulnerability of the suspect prior to the construction of an interview strategy (M = 2.92, SD = 1.13).

During interview

The Codes of Practice Code C Annex G (2019) allows for an appropriate healthcare professional to be present during the interview, in addition to the AA. The appropriate healthcare professional is responsible for monitoring the interviewees condition and how it is being affected by the interview. This may operate by either having the appropriate health care professional actually in the interview room or by monitoring the interview alongside the IM from outside the room. However, the IM’s reported that this process was often not facilitated by them during their deployment (M = 1.98, SD = 1.19).

Post interview

If done incorrectly, the conducting of an interview could significantly harm the detainee’s physical or mental state. This is problematic because it would render anything the interviewee says in the interview as unreliable in subsequent court proceedings. Therefore, at the conclusion of each interview session the IM is required to analyse and evaluate the interview process fully to identify any necessary further action which includes assessing whether the suspect requires further medical examination. In the current study when IM were asked if they have the suspect medically examined post interview for signs of psychological stress, IMs indicated that this process was rarely conducted (M = 2.43, SD = 1.37).

What training does the IM receive regarding suspect vulnerability

Based on a Likert scale questions, (i.e. 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree somewhat, 3 neither agree or disagree, 4 = agree somewhat, 5 = strongly agree) IMs reported (M = 2.54, SD = 1.09) that participants organisations had failed to provide them the necessary training they require to enable them to identify vulnerability of a suspect. In a further question, all IMs (N = 48) reported that they were not required to provide information regarding their knowledge or training on vulnerability when they applied to become an IM.

As can be seen from Table 4, participants were asked a series of questions regarding the training they had received on dealing with vulnerable suspects since their appointment as an IM. The majority of respondents (n = 32) highlighted the fact that they had not received any form of training whilst only two participants had completed an academic based course.

Table 4. Training received on dealing with vulnerable suspects (N = 51).

Training	Count
No training provided	32
E learning packages	9
1 day refresher (CPD)	8
Academic course	2

IMs were then asked to suggest improvements that they felt would make the training for IMs more effective in respect of how they would approach and deal with vulnerable suspects. As can be seen from the responses in Table 5, almost 50% of IMs (n = 20) identified that refresher training was the most sought-after improvement to better understand vulnerability, with one respondent suggesting that due to the importance of the role it should be held annually (P4) and another suggesting it should be mandatory (P10). IMs also believed that partner agencies should be involved in this forum:

Training should involve mental health professionals (P46)

Ongoing CPD events within force and closer liaison with mental health services (P43)

More joint training with our partners (P30)

IMs also reported that improving the course material produced by the College of Policing (e.g. including issues on a range of vulnerabilities including case studies) would improve IMs understanding of vulnerability. Comments included:

Table 5. Suggested training improvements.

Themed Response	Frequency
Refresher Training (including partner agencies)	20
Improvement course material	12
Included on SIO course	4
Peer reviews	3
Online training	3
Briefing	2
Conferences	1
Legal updates	1
Mentoring	1
Self-study	1
Vulnerability checklist	1
Improved NOS	1

Review ‘college of policing’ curriculum for interview adviser re this topic and provide training materials, i.e. lesson plans and/or train the trainers. (P8)

Finally, IMs wanted training on vulnerability to be included on the SIO training course (n = 4) as a way to ensure a greater understanding of vulnerability by the management of serious case investigations. Comments included:

Include it in SIO training courses so that there is understanding of the necessity to consider this at management rank level. (P20)

SIOs should receive similar or same training (P23)

Discussion

Professionalising the investigative interviewing arena will serve to improve the trust and confidence in the criminal justice system (Williamson, 2006) and minimise the risk of miscarriages of justice. History has shown that the UK has been a world leader in improving its practices based on the lessons learnt from miscarriages of justice (Gudjonsson, 2018). This exploratory analysis of the role of the IM provides a platform for developing greater understanding of the complexities surrounding interviewing vulnerable suspects. The aim of the current study was to provide an insight into a number of areas including, the understanding of the term ‘vulnerability’, gaining knowledge surrounding the role of an AA, and understanding the tasks needed to safeguard the vulnerable suspect during the investigative interview process. In addition, the study provided an examination of the training provided to the IM in order to support the IM to identify and deal with ‘vulnerabilities’.

The IM plays a significant role during high stake investigations including providing strategic advice to the SIO on all interview matters based on their knowledge and experience. Identifying a suspect’s vulnerability is problematic (Dehaghani, 2019; Farrugia, 2021) and even more problematic when observing situational vulnerability (Dehaghani, 2021; Gudjonsson, 2006, 2018). Having been asked to define vulnerability from their perspective a wide range of responses indicated that there was a clear lack of full understanding of this complex area. This lack of understanding was further highlighted with just over half of IMs reporting that they were not satisfied or at best unsure of their understanding of the term vulnerability. This supports previous research on vulnerability which found that IMs believed that knowledge of typologies of vulnerability were not necessary to perform their role (Vaughan et al., 2022a ). It also supports the view that interviewing vulnerable suspects remains an underdeveloped area of policing (Bradley, 2009) and especially misunderstood in the context of mental health (Farrugia & Gabbert, 2019). Failure to identify a suspect’s vulnerability can lead to inadequate support for the individual which potentially renders the interview inadmissible during any subsequent court hearing. This is problematic and serves only to expose the police service, especially during high stake crime investigations to the potential for a miscarriage of justice (Bartkowiak-Théron et al., 2017; Bath & Dehaghani, 2020; Gudjonsson, 2018; Poyser & Grieve, 2018).

There remains within the criminal justice system serious concerns regarding the measures taken by the police to ensure that vulnerable suspects are afforded suitable assistance and safeguarding during their time in police custody (Bath et al., 2015; Bath & Dehaghani, 2020; Dehaghani, 2019; Gudjonsson, 2018). The IM performs an important role in safeguarding vulnerable suspects. Significantly, what was apparent during the current study was that no individual IM identified all of the elements of the role required to be an AA. Thus, IMs demonstrated a lack of full understanding of this role. From a witness perspective, the IM produced a more comprehensive understanding of the role of an Intermediary, identifying that they were specialists in their field with accredited training. According to IMs, this allowed Intermediaries to provide specialist support which facilitated appropriate communication based on individual assessments. However, not one IM was able to identify all of elements that the Intermediary role entailed. This would suggest that whilst IMs are aware of the need for AA and Intermediary assistance when dealing with vulnerability, they lack the overarching knowledge base to accurately ensure the facilitation of safeguarding of both suspect and witness. Overwhelmingly the IMs suggested that they felt the AA should be professionally trained and their names, like those of the Intermediary, maintained on a national register.

Ensuring interviews are legally compliant with PACE Act 1984 is one of the main objectives of an IM. The current study provided an insight into the IMs compliance with legal requirements contained in the Codes of Practice of PACE. The responses of the IMs indicated that the Mental Health Teams did not routinely carry out an examination of the suspect other than the basic custody nurse assessment. This suggests that IMs incorrectly assumed that custody nurses were qualified to determine the identification of specific vulnerability (even though a custody nurse has little or no forensic training; Ventress et al., 2008). This then becomes problematic when deciding on the requirement for an AA with incorrect decisions impacting on those who are vulnerable (Dehaghani, 2019). Other failures could include not applying the fitness for interview which is a requirement highlighted by the National Appropriate Adult Network (Bath et al., 2015). There were some positives, for example, IMs reported good practices surrounding briefing medical practitioners as part of the assessment of the suspect and also making themselves aware of custody officers’ assessment as contained on the custody record. An area for improvement and future development is ensuring that IMs carry out the necessary risk assessments so that suspects with vulnerabilities can be monitored throughout the interview process.

A concerning revelation reported by IMs is that they rarely upskilled themselves regarding issues relating to a suspects’ individual vulnerabilities and how these vulnerabilities might impact on the interview process. Moreover, and as worrying, was the reported lack of documenting the identifiable vulnerability within an interview strategy. If these vulnerabilities are not correctly documented in the interview strategy, then how can the SIO understand their relevance in the wider context of the investigation. By not identifying vulnerabilities, it allows for flawed decision making at best or no decision making at worst. This is easily rectified by IMs constructing a section in the strategy surrounding this issue and its implication, thereby creating a shared understanding for the entire investigation management team of the complexities being faced by the interview team (Vaughan, et al., 2022b).

The interview itself can create its own pressure on already vulnerable people (Dehaghani, 2019; Gudjonsson, 2018). This is why Annex G para 8 of Code C (2019) suggests that in addition to an AA, an appropriate health care professional can provide additional safeguards during an interview by monitoring the person’s condition. Despite this guidance, IMs overwhelming reported that they did not facilitate this process during their deployment with vulnerable suspects. This was followed up by further negative action in respect of having the suspect further medically examined post interview for signs of psychological vulnerabilities. This suggests that vulnerable suspects may be returned to the custody unit and into the care of the custody management team without updated safeguarding measures and without risk assessments in place to protect and support the vulnerable suspect.

Whilst IMs reported being satisfied with their understanding of PACE requirements surrounding vulnerability, there was a feeling that they were expected to provide advice on matters of vulnerability that they felt they were not qualified to do (e.g. providing advice on Mental Capacity). One explanation for this is that the person asking for advice, including the SIO, did not fully understand the role of the IM. From the IMs perspective there was a consensus that their organisations had failed to provide them with necessary training to understand and identify specific vulnerabilities. All participants in this study reported that they were not required to evidence previous training surrounding any aspect of vulnerability when they applied for the role of IM. Therefore, from an organisational perspective by not following evidence-based practice it calls into question whether IMs have the correct information to provide the strategic advice needed to support vulnerable interviewees during high-stakes investigations.

Training is fundamental to an organisation, ensuring staff are adequately trained by providing officers with the necessary skills and knowledge to effectively perform their role (HMIC, 2002). Skilled practitioners have the potential to influence others through their subject matter expertise (Griffiths & Milne, 2018). Unfortunately, the current study identified a lack of training in the area of vulnerability, with the majority of IMs reporting they had received no training from their respective organisations surrounding any aspect of vulnerability. Conceptually, this is easily resolved, as the IMs themselves identified, organisations need to implement training programmes that encourage scenario-based training both online and face-to-face. These need to be delivered by skilled trainers and mentors with practical experience in relevant aspects of vulnerability.

Limitations

This study is not without limitations. Approximately 1/3rd of UK police forces participated in the study with 53 representative IM’s, which is substantial, but it is acknowledged that greater participation would produce more in-depth analysis producing greater validity in the identifiable themes. This role has been adopted in number of other countries (e.g. Ireland Sweeney, 2016), Singapore (Misir, 2016), South Korea (Kim et al., 2020), Australia and New Zealand (Cain et al., 2016). It is therefore important to continue this line of research in order to investigate the effectiveness of the IM. Responses to questionnaires raise concerns as to the consistency and depth of the response (see Leedy & Ormrod, 2013). Therefore, more in-depth interviews to understand the context more fully could be undertaken in future endeavours.

Conclusion

Improving trust and confidence in the criminal justice system will occur when there is a greater level of professionalism in the core competency of investigative interviewing (Williamson, 2006, p. 163). There is simply no excuse for not providing relevant safeguards once a specific vulnerability has been identified whether prior to or during the interviewing process (Smith & O’Mahony, 2018). This study examined the perceptions of IMs, the most experienced interviewers within the UK interviewing structure, surrounding their management of vulnerable suspects. The aim of the study was to establish if they understood ‘vulnerability’. The findings identified serious shortcomings in respect of their training and compliance with established best practice procedures, but also identified some positive surrounding approaches to improve the management of vulnerable suspects. It should be a mandatory requirement that an IM has the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities surrounding suspect vulnerability legislation, practice guidance and characteristics to enable a person with a vulnerability to engage more appropriately with the criminal justice system. Further research will assist in better understanding the role of the IM whilst also developing service improvements (e.g. managing vulnerability, reducing potential for miscarriage of justice). This will not only serve to benefit the investigative interview but will also support the interviewee throughout their interview experience whilst averting the potential for a miscarriage of justice.

Acknowledgements

The author(s) wish to thank all those police officers and police staff who contributed to the study either by completing the questionnaire or by facilitating the research. Without their participation and support this research would not have been possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to restrictions e.g. their containing information that could compromise the privacy of research participants.

Notes

1 ‘High stakes crime’ types include crimes that involve significant risk or serious consequences for either the victim, witness or suspect and includes crime types such as, child or adult abuse, rape, complex investigations, substantial financial crime, homicide, terrorism and fatal road traffic incidents.

2 The questionnaire is available upon request from the author(s).

3 Policing in the UK is split into 3 regions (i) England & Wales – consisting of 43 separate forces, (ii) Police Scotland, and (iii) Police Service of Northern Ireland.