Twenty-five years safer? Assessing the IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol and its role in international politics

Abstract

In 1991, international inspectors discovered Iraq’s clandestine nuclear-weapons program. In seeking this capability, Iraq was violating its commitment to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. After this discovery, the international community and the International Atomic Energy Agency worked to improve nuclear safeguards so that secret nuclear-weapons activities would be more easily detected in the future. One of these improvements was the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. This article explores the value of the Additional Protocol and argues that it is the strongest signal available to states that they support the nuclear nonproliferation regime and have benign nuclear intentions. The article then assesses the reasons why several notable holdout states remain.

KEYWORDS:

• nuclear weapons
• nuclear proliferation
• nuclear safeguards
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
• treaties
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Model Additional Protocol

Notes

1 Elaine Sciolino, “Iraq's Nuclear Program Shows the Holes in U.S. Intelligence,” New York Times, October 20, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/weekinreview/the-world-iraq-s-nuclear-program-shows-the-holes-in-us-intelligence.html>.

2 IAEA, “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards,” INFCIRC/540, September 1997 (hereafter “IAEA, INFCIRC/540”), <https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/model-protocol-additional-agreements-between-states-and-international-atomic-energy-agency-application-safeguards>.

3 IAEA, “The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” INFCIRC/153/Corr., June 1972 (hereafter “IAEA, INFCIRC/153/Corr”), <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1972/infcirc153.pdf>.

4 For more on the Model AP and the history of safeguards, see John Carlson, Vladimir Kuchinov, and Thomas Shea, “The IAEA’s Safeguards System as the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Verification Mechanism,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2020, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/the-iaeas-safeguards-system-as-the-non-proliferation-treatys-verification-mechanism/; Theodore Hirsch, “The IAEA Additional Protocol: What It Is and Why It Matters,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2004), pp. 140–166, <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/113hirsch.pdf>.

5 Arms Control Association, “IAEA Safeguards Agreements at a Glance,” last reviewed February 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEASafeguards#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20IAEA%2C%20there,comprised%20of%20IAEA%20member%20states>.

6 IAEA, “Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols,” December 31, 2021, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/01/sg-agreements-comprehensive-status.pdf>.

7 Nuclear-weapon states have also concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA, in part to show they are willing to take on burdens similar to those of the non-nuclear-weapon states. These agreements, which are different from INFCIRC/153 agreements, have exceptions for military-related nuclear sites. For example, the United States and the IAEA concluded INFCIRC/288 in 1981(<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc288.pdf>) and the Soviet Union and the IAEA concluded INFCIRC/327 in 1985 (<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc327.pdf>).

8 IAEA, INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) p. 1, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1972/infcirc153.pdf>

9 David Kay, “Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators: Iraq and Beyond,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2005), pp. 85–105, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609509550134>.

10 The full name of the agreement is the “Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to a Safeguards Agreement.” For a brief description, see Arms Control Association, “IAEA Safeguards Agreements.”

11 Howard Diamond, “IAEA Approves ‘93+2’ Protocol; Awaits Adoption by Member-States,” Arms Control Today, May 1997, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_05/iaea>. For more on this negotiating history, see Rebecca Davis Gibbons, The Hegemon’s Tool Kit: US Leadership and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), chap. 5.

12 IAEA, “­Annual Report for 1997,” 1998, <https://www.iaea.org/publications/reports/annual-report-1997>.

13 IAEA, “Annual Report for 1997.”

14 IAEA, INFCIRC/540, p. 7.

15 John Carlson, “Is the Additional Protocol ‘Optional’?” Trust & Verify, No. 132 (2011), p. 6, <https://www.vertic.org/media/assets/TV/TV132.pdf>.

16 See, for example, statements made at the 2005 Group of Eight meeting and the 2010 NPT Review Conference: IAEA, “G8 Leaders Endorse IAEA’s Work for Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards,” July 15, 2005, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/g8-leaders-endorse-iaeas-work-nuclear-safety-security-safeguards>; 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Final Document, NPT/CONF.2010/50, Vol. 1, June 18, 2010 (hereafter “2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document”), p. 4, <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2010_fd_part_i.pdf>.

17 For more details on the tasks required for implementation of the AP, see IAEA, “Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” IAEA Services Series 21, May 2016, <https://www.iaea.org/publications/8842/guidance-for-states-implementing-comprehensive-safeguards-agreements-and-additional-protocols>.

18 See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Efforts in the Universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol,” May 2004, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/iaea/protocol.html>.

19 IAEA, “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Security: IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,” September 2001, <https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/33/068/33068727.pdf?r=1>.

20 Jill N. Cooley, “Integrated Safeguards—Current Status of Development and Plans for Implementation,” IAEA-SM-367/3/01, <https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%203/Paper%203-01.pdf>.

21 Laura Rockwood, “The IAEA’s State-Level Concept and the Law of Unintended Consequences,” Arms Control Today, August 2014, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-08/iaea’s-state-level-concept-law-unintended-consequences>.

22 Noah Mayhew, “A Lexical History of the State Level Concept and Issues for Today,” Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, November 2020, p. 11, <https://vcdnp.org/a-lexical-history-of-the-state-level-concept-and-issues-for-today/>.

23 IAEA safeguards expert (name withheld by request), email correspondence with author, August 17, 2016; former IAEA official (name withheld by request), video interview with author, October 18, 2016.

24 Olli Heinonen, former IAEA deputy director general for safeguards, email correspondence with author, October 14, 2016.

25 Mayhew, “Lexical History.”

26 Guido Renda, Lance Kyungwoo Kim, Rainer Jungwirth, Frank Pabian, Erik Wolfart, and Giacomo Cojazzi, “The potential of open source information in supporting Acquisition Pathway Analysis to Design IAEA State Level Approaches,” IAEA CN-220 No. 149, <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC90394>.

27 Theresa Renis, “Acquisition Path Analysis Methodology Session: Introduction,” <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/eproceedings/sg2014-slides/000390.pdf>.

28 Renda et al., “The Potential of Open Source Information.” For more on the state-level concept, including some of the controversy surrounding it, see Rockwood, “The IAEA’s State-Level Concept.”

29 Scientist at US DOE national laboratory (name withheld by request), telephone interview and email correspondence with author, August 17, 2016.

30 Interview with DOE national laboratory scientist.

31 Olli Heinonen, former IAEA deputy director general for safeguards, email correspondence with authors, November 7, 2016.

32 Heinonen interview, November 7, 2016.

33 The job posting was listed at <https://iaea.taleo.net/careersection/ex/jobdetail.ftl?job=2017/0276%20(020136)>.

34 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of South Korea,” GOV/2004-84, November 11, 2004, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-84.pdf>.

35 Interview with DOE national laboratory scientist.

36 Thomas Jonter, “To Make a National Based Historical Survey of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Experiences from the Example of Sweden,” 2001, <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ss-2001/PDF%20files/Session%206/Paper%206-05.pdf>.

37 It should be noted, however, that states are not required to do this by the IAEA.

38 Thomas Jonter, “The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1968: An Analysis of the Technical Preparations,” Science & Global Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2010), pp. 61–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2010.486722>.

39 IAEA, Record of the 1111th Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna, November 25, 2004, <http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/GOVOR1111.link.pdf>.

40 Paul Kerr, “IAEA: Egypt’s Reporting Failures ‘Matter of Concern,’” Arms Control Today, March 2005, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_03/Egypt>.

41 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2008,” p. 11, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/es2008.pdf>.

42 David S. Jonas, John Carlson, and Richard S. Goorevich, “The NSG Decision on Sensitive Nuclear Transfers: ABACC and the Additional Protocol,” Arms Control Today, November 2012, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012-11/nsg-decision-sensitive-nuclear-transfers-abacc-additional-protocol>.

43 Michael R. Gordon, “Korea Speeds Nuclear Fuel Removal, Impeding Inspection,” New York Times, May 28, 1994, <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/28/world/korea-speeds-nuclear-fuel-removal-impeding-inspection.html>.

44 Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

45 IAEA, “Safeguards Statement for 2008,” p. 10.

46 Jeffrey Kaplow, “Selective Enforcement and Revealed Preferences in International Security Organizations,”(paper presented at 9th annual conference of the Political Economy of International Organization, Salt Lake City, January 7–9, 2016, p. 23, <https://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/PEIO9/102_80_1443646409258_Kaplow30092015.pdf>.

47 Hirsch, “The IAEA additional protocol.”

48 Mark Hibbs, “The IAEA Additional Protocol after the 2010 NPT Review: Status and Prospects,” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2013, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/157257/pdf-1-92-9045-013-A-en.pdf>.

49 Hibbs, p. 2.

50 Gibbons, The Hegemon’s Tool Kit.

51 IAEA, “IAEA Director General’s Statement on Iran,” January 6, 2016, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-general%E2%80%99s-statement-iran>.

52 Susan F. Burk, “U.S.–IAEA Additional Protocol,” Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, January 29, 2004, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/29249.htm>.

53 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document.

54 Interview with US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) safeguards specialist (name withheld by request), interview, October 13, 2017.

55 IAEA, “Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols,” September 15, 2021, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/01/sg-agreements-comprehensive-status.pdf>.

56 Interview with NNSA safeguards specialist.

57 Tristan A. Volpe, “Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency,” Security Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2017), pp. 517–544, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306398>.

58 Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2002–3), pp. 59–88, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092114>.

59 Togzhan Kassenova, “Brazil, Argentina, and the Politics of Global Nonproliferation and Nuclear Safeguards,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 29, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/11/29/brazil-argentina-and-politics-of-global-nonproliferation-and-nuclear-safeguards-pub-66286>.

60 On Brazil, see Maria Rost Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2010), p. 51, <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/npr_17-1_rost_rublee.pdf>.

61 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Brazil,” updated October 2020, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/brazil.aspx>; World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Argentina,” updated August 2021, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/argentina.aspx>.

62 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Brazil”; World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Argentina.”

63 Togzhan Kassenova, “Brazil, Argentina.”

64 Eduardo Diez, “National Development and Argentina’s Nuclear Policy,” in Toby Dalton, Togzhan Kassenova, and Lauryn Williams, eds., Perspectives on the Evolving Nuclear Order (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), pp. 30–31.

65 Kassenova, “Brazil, Argentina.”

66 Leonardo Bandarra, “Brazilian Nuclear Policy under Bolsonaro: No Nuclear Weapons, but a Nuclear Submarine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 12, 2019, <https://thebulletin.org/2019/04/brazilian-nuclear-policy-under-bolsonaro/>.

67 Jonas et al., “The NSG Decision.”

68 Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii “Brazil’s New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Developments,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 29, 2009, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/brazils-new-defense-strategy/>.

69 Anthony Boadle, “Brazil Launches Program to Build Nuclear Submarine in a Decade” (Update 1), Reuters, March 1, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-defense-submarines/update-1-brazil-launches-program-to-build-nuclear-submarine-in-a-decade-idUSL1N0BT5WK20130301>.

70 Mark Hibbs, “Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Additional Protocol,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 18, 2010, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2010/08/18/nuclear-suppliers-group-and-iaea-additional-protocol-pub-41393>.

71 Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, “The Brazilian Way: Negotiation and Symmetry in Brazil’s Nuclear Policy,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (2010), p. 558, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2010.517003>.

72 Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States,” p. 55.

73 International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, “Brazil,” <https://www.icanw.org/brazil>.

74 Matias Spektor, Togzhan Kassenova, and Lucas Perez Florentino, “Brazil’s Nuclear Posture under Bolsonaro,” Arms Control Today, September 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/features/brazil%E2%80%99s-nuclear-posture-under-bolsonaro>.

75 John Carlson, “Nuclear Weapon Prohibition Treaty: A Safeguards Debacle,” Trust & Verify, No. 158 (2018), p. 2, <https://www.vertic.org/media/assets/TV/TV158.pdf>.

76 Spektor et al., “Brazil’s Nuclear Posture under Bolsonaro.”

77 Spektor et al.

78 Julia Masterson, “Saudi Arabia, IAEA Discuss Safeguards,” Arms Control Today, October 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-10/news-briefs/saudi-arabia-iaea-discuss-safeguards>.

79 Reuters, “Saudi Crown Prince Says Will Develop Nuclear Bomb if Iran Does: CBS TV,” March 15, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-iran-nuclear/saudi-crown-prince-says-will-develop-nuclear-bomb-if-iran-does-cbs-tv-idUSKCN1GR1MN>.

80 Reuters, “IAEA in Wide-Ranging Talks with Saudi Arabia on Tougher Nuclear Checks,” September 15, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-nuclear-iaea-idUKKBN2652OW>.

81 Sharon Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments,” Congressional Research Service, RS21592, updated January 14, 2005, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA477834.pdf>.

82 Squassoni, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” p. 2.

83 UN Security Council, Resolution 1835, S/RES/1835, September 27, 2008, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1835-2008.pdf>.

84 For a more detailed discussion of this, see Ariane Tabatabai, “Negotiating the ‘Iran Talks’ in Tehran: The Iranian Drivers that Shaped the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 24, Nos. 3–4 (2017), pp. 225–242, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1426180>.

85 JCPOA, “Annex V—Implementation Plan,” pp. 4–5, <http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_5_implementation_plan_en.pdf>.

86 Tehran Times, “Iran Will Execute Nuclear Law to Halt Additional Protocol on Feb. 23: Ambassador,” February 16, 2021, <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/458214/Iran-will-execute-nuclear-law-to-halt-Additional-Protocol-on>.

87 Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Nine Hurdles to Reviving the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 19, 2021, <https://thebulletin.org/2021/01/nine-hurdles-to-reviving-the-iran-nuclear-deal/>.

88 Tehran Times, “Iran Will Execute Nuclear Law.”

89 Tehran Times.

90 Jeffrey Kaplow and Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “The Days after a Deal with Iran: Implications for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” RAND Perspective, 2015, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE135.html>.

91 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Al-Kibar (Nuclear),” <https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/al-kibar-nuclear/>.

92 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Report by the Director General to the Board of Governors, GOV/2011/30, May 24, 2011, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-30.pdf>.

93 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

94 Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, “How to Strengthen International Safeguards: Moving Forward with the Additional Protocol,” paper presented at 52nd INMM Conference, Palm Desert, CA, July 17–21, 2011, p. 4.

95 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic.”

96 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Egypt,” January 2022, <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/egypt.aspx>.

97 Global Security Newswire, “Egypt Refuses to Sign Nonproliferation Protocol,” December 12, 2007.

98 Mark Hibbs, “The Unspectacular Future of the IAEA Additional Protocol,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 26, 2012, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/26/unspectacular-future-of-iaea-additional-protocol-pub-47964>.

99 Jim Walsh, “The Additional Protocol in the Middle East and North Africa,” in Jeffrey R. Fields, ed., State Behavior and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Vol. 19 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2014).

100 Ashley Theron, “Tunisia Signs with Russia for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,” ESI Africa, September 28, 2016, <https://www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/generation/tunisia-signs-with-russia-for-peaceful-uses-of-atomic-energy/>.

101 IAEA Board of Governors, General Conference, “Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East: Report by the Director General,” GOV/2020/38-GC(64)/11, July 24, 2020, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc64-11.pdf>.