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ABSTRACT
In the early 2000s, the George W. Bush administration condemned Iran’s use of nuclear-fuel-cycle technologies while endorsing sensitive nuclear activities in South Korea. The politics behind this difference may appear self-evident, but maintaining this policy was premised on a complex interaction between technology and politics. This paper examines both US and international definitions of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing and finds an incoherence between technical definitions and policy implementation. Definitions of enrichment are narrow, as they refer to a very specific set of material processes. But the Bush administration applied a capacious standard when debating what it meant for Iran to “suspend” enrichment-related activities. On the other hand, definitions of reprocessing are capacious, implicating many different processes that can be interpreted as reprocessing. And yet the Bush administration applied a narrow standard as it sought to assist South Korea’s pyroprocessing efforts. By positing a reciprocal relationship between technology and politics, this article challenges both the position that technical solutions can solve entrenched political conflicts, and also the simplified narrative that great-power politics trumps shared technical and legal standards. Interpretive conflicts over technical standards are shaped by politics, and yet technical contestation also limits and bounds political manipulation.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Gabrielle Hecht, Jeff Knopf, Daniel Horner, and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.
Notes
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6 Fuhrmann and Tkach, “Almost Nuclear,” p. 444.
7 James Acton, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nuclear Restraint,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 4 (August–September 2009), pp. 101–26.
8 Busch and Pilat, The Politics of Weapons Inspections, p. 13.
9 Seung Min Woo, Sunil Chirayath, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: Can Pyro-Processing Reduce Nuclear Proliferation Risk?” Energy Policy, Vol. 144 (September 2020), <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111601>.
10 Robert Rosner, “Preface,” in Elisa D. Harris, ed., Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2016), p. 1.
11 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace Speech: Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,” December 8, 1953, <https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>.
12 Sonja Schmid, “From ‘Inherently Safe’ to ‘Proliferation Resistant’: New Perspectives on Reactor Design,” Nuclear Technology, Vol. 207, No. 9 (2021), p. 1312.
13 Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), p. 31.
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15 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France, p. 16.
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17 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 68–9.
18 Nancy Gallagher, The Politics of Verification (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1999), p. 30.
19 Christopher Woolf and Carol Hills, “Iran Deal Not Based on Trust, Rather Verification, Says Obama,” Public Radio International, July 14, 2015, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-07-14/iran-deal-not-based-trust-rather-verification-says-obama>.
20 George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “What’s Next?,” in George Perkovich and James M. Acton, eds., Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), p. 324.
21 Mohamed ElBaradei, The Age of Deception, p. 140.
22 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Safeguards Glossary, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 3 (2001), p. 33, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf>.
23 IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, p. 41.
24 IAEA, p. 41.
25 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Uranium Enrichment,” last reviewed/updated March 9, 2021, <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/uranium-enrichment.html>.
26 US NRC, “Fuel Reprocessing (Recycling),” last reviewed/updated March 9, 2021, <https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/fuel-reprocessing-recycling.html>.
27 US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” n.d., <https://www.energy.gov/ne/fuel-cycle-technologies/uranium-management-and-policy/nuclear-fuel-cycle>.
28 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and Radioactive Waste Management (included as attachment in IAEA, INFCIRC/546, December 24, 1997), Art. 2, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc546.pdf>.
29 Nuclear Suppliers Group, “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers,” June 2018, p. 20 <http://nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/NSG-Part-1-Website-clean-2018.pdf>.
30 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Glossary,” n.d., <https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/nuclear-glossary.aspx>.
31 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Glossary,” n.d., <https://www.nti.org/learn/glossary/#R>.
32 State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, “Nuclear fuel cycle,” n.d., <rosatom.ru/en/rosatom-group/nuclear-fuel-cycle>.
33 Urenco, “Enrichment process,” n.d., <urenco.com/about/nuclear-fuel-supply-chain/enrichment-process>.
34 Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, “The Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” n.d., <enec.gov.ae/discover/fueling-the-barakah-plant/the-nuclear-fuel-cycle/>.
35 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75, November 10, 2003, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-75.pdf>, p. 5.
36 Christopher Hobbs and Matthew Harries, “South Korea and Spent Fuel Reprocessing: Sovereignty, Security, and Policy Options for the New Nuclear Age,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 5 (October 2009), p. 92.
37 ElBaradei, The Age of Deception, p. 128.
38 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-40.pdf, p. 2.
39 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75.
40 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75, p. 2.
41 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75.
42 The Additional Protocol provides additional tools for verification to the IAEA that go beyond the comprehensive safeguards agreement with the country in question. IAEA, “Additional Protocol,” n.d., <https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol>.
43 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/69, September 12, 2003, < https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-69.pdf>.
44 Mousavian, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis, p. 74.
45 IAEA, “Iran to Sign Additional Protocol and Suspend Uranium Enrichment and Reprocessing,” November 10, 2003, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iran-sign-additional-protocol-and-suspend-uranium-enrichment-and-reprocessing>.
46 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75.
47 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” GOV/2003/75.
48 ElBaradei, The Age of Deception, p. 119.
49 Asli Bâli, “The US and the Iranian Nuclear Impasse,” Middle East Report, No. 241 (Winter 2006) <https://merip.org/2006/12/the-us-and-the-iranian-nuclear-impasse/>.
50 ElBaradei, The Age of Deception, pp. 126–8.
51 ElBaradei, p. 136.
52 IAEA, “Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004,” INFCIRC/637, November 26, 2004, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf>.
53 US Department of State, “Statement to the Board of Governors: Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament,” November 29, 2004, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2004/39491.htm>.
54 ElBaradei, The Age of Deception, p. 144.
55 ElBaradei, p. 144.
56 Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), p. 28. However, Chubin is careful to note that in Iran, there is a spectrum of views on the nuclear program.
57 The historical record contains differing accounts on this point. ElBaradei’s book says that the Europeans did not have time to respond, whereas other sources say that this proposal was rejected. In any case, it does not affect our ultimate argument that the tension between narrow and capacious definitions resulted in the failure of diplomacy.
58 ElBaradei, The Age of Deception, p. 144.
59 ElBaradei, p. 196.
60 Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, “An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and its Foes,” New York Times, September 17, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/17/world/middleeast/17elbaradei.html>.
61 Peter Beinart, “Iran Hawks Are the New Iraq Hawks,” The Atlantic, May 8, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/05/iraq-war-iran-deal/559844/>.
62 Deb Weinstein, “Video: ElBaradei’s a ‘Dilettante,’ Says John Bolton,” The Atlantic, February 1, 2011, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/video-elbaradei-s-a-dilettante-says-john-bolton/342411/>.
63 Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions, p. 90.
64 Michal Onderco, Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Global South (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
65 Winston Lord and Martin Packman, “Second Alert Report” (briefing memorandum for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), November 20, 1974, National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=3513493-Document-04-Winston-Lord-director-Policy>.
66 Fred McGoldrick, “The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Between South Korea and the United States: From Dependency to Parity,” Korea Economic Institute of America, Special Studies Series 6 (September 2015), p. 4, <http://keia.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/KEI_Special-Studies-2015-FINAL.pdf>.
67 McGoldrick, “The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” p. 7.
68 US nuclear-cooperation agreements now must include “a guaranty by the cooperating party that no material transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use of any material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent in the isotope 235, or other nuclear materials which have been irradiated) otherwise altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United States.” Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended), Public Law No. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. §2153 et seq. The 1974 US-South Korean agreement included some language on US consent rights for South Korean reprocessing, but the new agreement updated it. See McGoldrick, “The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” pp. 5–6. See also Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and Mark Holt, “Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress R41910, Congressional Research Service, December 8, 2014, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R41910.pdf; and Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer,” CRS Report for Congress RS22937, Congressional Research Service, January 4, 2010, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA514094.pdf>.
69 Eunjung Lim, “South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2009), p. 308, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2019.1585585>.
70 United States National Energy Policy Development (NEPD) Group, “Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future,” May 2001, <http://wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf>.
71 A. David Rossin, “US Policy on Spent Fuel Reprocessing: The Issues,” Frontline, PBS, n.d., <pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/rossin.html>.
72 NEPD Group, “Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy.
73 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,” GOV/2004/84, November 11, 2004 < https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2004-84.pdf>.
74 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors,” September 13, 2004 <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/introductory-statement-board-governors-5>.
75 IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,” GOV/2004/84.
76 Lim, “South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas,” p. 308.
77 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Technical Integration Office, “The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Technology Development Plan,” GNEP-TECH-TR-PP-2007-00020, Rev 0, July 25, 2007 <https://inldigitallibrary.inl.gov/sites/sti/sti/3738885.pdf>.
78 World Nuclear News, “South Korea wins some GNEP research,” November 21, 2007, <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/South-Korea-wins-some-GNEP-research>; World Nuclear News, “South Korea joins GNEP,” December 11, 2007, <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/nuclearPolicies/South_Korea_joins_GNEP-111207>.
79 Miles A. Pomper, “Concerns Raised as South Korea Joins GNEP,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2008, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-01/concerns-raised-south-korea-joins-gnep>.
80 For an articulation of this norm by President Jimmy Carter, see, “Statement by the President on his decisions following a review of U.S. Policy,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents: Semiannual Index, Vol. 13, No. 15 (1977), p. 15, <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1209/ML120960615.pdf>.
81 Edwin Lyman and Frank N. von Hippel, “Reprocessing Revisited: The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership,” Arms Control Today, April 2008, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-04/features/reprocessing-revisitedthe-international-dimensions-global-nuclear-energy>. Lyman and von Hippel argue that “although pyroprocessing does produce a mixture that is more radioactive than the pure plutonium produced by PUREX, the difference is not great enough to justify claims that it is significantly more proliferation resistant and certainly not great enough to justify assertions by some U.S. officials that ‘pyroprocessing is not reprocessing.’”
82 James Acton, “The Myth of Proliferation Resistant Technology,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 6 (2009), p. 49.
83 Daniel Horner, “Pyroprocessing is Reprocessing: U.S. Official,” Arms Control Today, April 2011, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-04/pyroprocessing-reprocessing-us-official>
84 Lim, “South Korea’s Nuclear Dilemmas,” p. 313.
85 Toby Dalton and Alexandra Francis, “South Korea’s Search for Nuclear Sovereignty,” Asia Policy, No. 19 (2015), p. 117, <https://www.nbr.org/publication/south-koreas-search-for-nuclear-sovereignty/>.
86 Sung Chull Kim, “Endangering Alliance or Risking Proliferation? US-Japan and US-Korea Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreements,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 30, No. 5 (2017), p. 693.
87 Busch and Pilat, The Politics of Weapons Inspections, p. 13.
88 Acton, “The Myth of Proliferation Resistant Technology,” p. 56.
89 Pyroprocessing itself has been theorized as a potential technology that can minimize the risk of proliferation. See Woo, Chirayath, and Fuhrmann, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing: Can Pyro-Processing Reduce Nuclear Proliferation Risk?”
90 Monica Hakimi, “Constructing an International Community,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 111, No. 2 (2017), p. 317.
91 Busch and Pilat, The Politics of Weapons Inspections, p. 20.
92 Hakimi, “Constructing an International Community,” p. 319.
93 Hakimi, p. 325.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Sidra Hamidi
Sidra Hamidi is an assistant professor of political science at Eckerd College and was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Her research is in nuclear diplomacy, international law, and nuclear status and recognition. Her scholarship has been published in European Journal of International Relations and International Affairs. She is currently working on a book that explores the politics of recognition in the nuclear programs of Israel, India, and Iran.
Chantell Murphy
Chantell Murphy is a nuclear nonproliferation expert with over 12 years of experience working in the nuclear field. As a program manager at Y-12 National Security Complex, she specializes in nuclear verification, international nuclear safeguards, the ethical uses of emerging technologies, and finding sustainable diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility solutions. She recently founded an environmental company called Atomsphere, which uses art and storytelling to build a bridge between outdoor adventurers and the nuclear community.