Recasting the geopolitics of US–Russian commercial nuclear rivalry by embracing strategic complementarity

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Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Acknowledgments

The authors express deep gratitude to Murry Smith and Taylor Poole for assistance with collecting, translating, and analyzing the corpus of US and Russian bilateral nuclear-cooperation agreements and with devising a common coding scheme for them. Appreciation also extends to CENESS for assistance with collecting the Russian agreements. All analyses, interpretations, errors, and oversights are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Notes

1 Estimates of US nuclear-reactor closures vary widely and are highly dependent on assumptions about energy demand and the future prices of natural gas and other alternatives to nuclear energy. One estimate uses plant-level profitability analysis to estimate a 16–27 percent reduction in US nuclear capacity by 2030; see Steve Clemmer, Jeremy Richardson, Sandra Sattler, and Dave Lochbaum, “The Nuclear Power Dilemma: Declining Profits, Plant Closures, and the Threat of Rising Carbon Emissions,” Union of Concerned Scientists, November 2018, pp. 25–35, <www.ucsusa.org/nucleardilemma>. Another analysis estimates a 27–52 percent reduction in capacity based on alternative energy price scenarios; see US Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2020 with Projections to 2050,” January 29, 2020, pp. 85–86, <https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/AEO2020%20Full%20Report.pdf>.

2 Jane Nakano, “The Changing Geopolitics of Nuclear Energy: A Look at the United States, Russia, and China,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 2020, p. 12, <www.csis.org/analysis/changing-geopolitics-nuclear-energy-look-united-states-russia-and-china>.

3 Michael Wallace, Amy Roma, and Sachin Desai, “Back from the Brink: A Threatened Nuclear Energy Industry Compromises National Security,” CSIS, July 2018, pp. 1–4, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/back-brink-threatened-nuclear-energy-industry-compromises-national-security>.

4 Energy Futures Initiative, “The U.S. Nuclear Energy Enterprise: A Key National Security Enabler,” August 2017, pp. 13–19, <https://www.ourenergypolicy.org/resources/the-u-s-nuclear-energy-enterprise-a-key-national-security-enabler>.

5 CSIS Commission on Nuclear Energy Policy in the United States, Restoring U.S. Leadership in Nuclear Energy: A National Security Imperative (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, June 2013), p. 7.

6 US Department of State, “A New Approach to Civil Nuclear Cooperation Policy,” remarks by Christopher Ashley Ford, assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, to the Hudson Institute, Washington DC, February 26, 2019, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/a-new-approach-to-civil-nuclear-cooperation-policy/index.html>.

7 US Department of Energy, “Restoring America’s Competitive Nuclear Advantage: A Strategy to Assure U.S. National Security,” 2020, p. 7, <https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/04/f74/Restoring%20America%27s%20Competitive%20Nuclear%20Advantage-Blue%20version%5B1%5D.pdf>; and US Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Program to Create Pathways to Safe and Secure Nuclear Energy Included in Biden-Harris Administration’s Bold Plans to Address the Climate Crisis,” April 27, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/program-to-create-pathways-to-safe-and-secure-nuclear-energy-included-in-biden-harris-administrations-bold-plans-to-address-the-climate-crisis/>.

8 For complementary analysis of this dataset, see especially Adam N. Stulberg and Jonathan Darsey, “Moving Beyond Self-Restraint: Bilateral Commercial Nuclear Supply and US-Russian Tacit Understanding on Nuclear Security and International Safeguards,” in Sarah Bidgood and William C. Potter, eds., End of an Era: The United States, Russia, and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Monterey, CA: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2021), pp. 87–129, <https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/end-of-an-era-the-united-states-russia-and-nuclear-nonproliferation__potter_bidgood_book.pdf>.

9 The use of the term “race to the bottom” in this sense has been part of the debate about nuclear exports since at least the publication of William Walker and Måns Lönnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Export Controls (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983), pp. 141–143. For a more contemporary perspective, see Jessica R. Lovering, Ahmed Abdulla, and Granger Morgan, “Expert assessments of strategies to enhance global nuclear security,” Energy Policy, Vol. 139 (April 2020), pp. 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2020.111306>.

10 On supply-side links to nuclear-weapon proliferation, see especially Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); Matthew Fuhrmann, Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); and Robert L. Brown and Jeffrey M. Kaplow, “Talking Peace, Making Weapons: IAEA Technical Cooperation and Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2014), pp. 402–428, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713509052>. For trenchant critiques and counterclaims, see especially Mark S. Bell, “Examining Explanations for Nuclear Proliferation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (2016), pp. 520–529, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqv007>; Alexander H. Montgomery, “Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs,” in Adam N. Stulberg and Matthew Fuhrmann, eds., The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), pp. 177–202; Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Nicholas L. Miller, “Why Nuclear Energy Rarely Leads to Proliferation,” International Security, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2017), pp. 40–77, <https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00293>; and Rebecca Davis Gibbons, “Supply to Deny: The Benefits of Nuclear Assistance to Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April 2020), pp. 1­–17, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz059>. For an exception that attributes the propensity for international proliferation to the relationship between commercial nuclear-market concentration and the structure and intensity of great-power rivalry, see Eliza Gheorghe, “Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market,” International Security, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Spring 2019), pp. 88­–127, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00344>.

11 For examples of studies that do not distinguish between agreement types, see Jessica Jewell, Marta Vetier, and Daniel Garcia-Cabrera, “The international technological nuclear cooperation landscape: A new dataset and network analysis,” Energy Policy, Vol. 128 (May 2019), pp. 838–852, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2018.12.024>; and John F. Keeley, A List of Bilateral Civilian Nuclear Co-operation Agreements: Volumes 1–5 (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2009), <https://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/handle/1880/47373/Treaty_List_Volume_05.pdf?sequence=11>. Note that version 2.0 of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Dataset from Keeley corrects this problem; see Matthew Fuhrmann, “The Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Dataset: Codebook,” January 3, 2012, <http://www.matthewfuhrmann.com/uploads/2/5/8/2/25820564/nca_codebook.pdf>.

12 Bryan R. Early, “Acquiring Foreign Nuclear Assistance in the Middle East: Strategic Lessons from the United Arab Emirates,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2010), pp. 259–280, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2010.485427>. The United States has been the only major nuclear supplier willing to work with Taiwan, and the UAE adopted a legal ban on fuel-cycle activities prior to negotiating its 123 agreement with the United States.

13 On sovereign rights, see Nicholas L. Miller & Tristan A. Volpe, “Geostrategic Nuclear Exports: The Competition for Influence in Saudi Arabia,” War on the Rocks, February 7, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/geostrategic-nuclear-exports-competition-influence-saudi-arabia/>. On the impact of competition among suppliers, see Miles Pomper, “US-Vietnam Nuclear Pact Meets the ‘Silver Standard,’” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 9, 2014, <https://nonproliferation.org/us-vietnam-nuclear-pact-meets-the-silver-standard/>.

14 For an example of this assignment of malign intent to Russia’s actions based on other, non-nuclear Russian behavior, see Laura S.H. Holgate and Sagatom Saha, “America Must Lead on Nuclear Energy to Maintain National Security,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2018), pp. 7–25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1484223>.

15 The term “joint custodianship” comes from: Steve Weber, “Realism, détente, and nuclear weapons,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 1990), p. 55, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004641>.

16 On the multifaced dimensions of Soviet nuclear export restrictions, see especially: William C. Potter, “The Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation,” Slavic Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 468–488, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2498015>; and George Ginsburgs, “Soviet Atomic Energy Agreements,” International Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter 1961), pp. 49–65, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300024577>. On the related record of US–Soviet nonproliferation cooperation, see especially William C. Potter, “The Origins of the US-Soviet Nonproliferation Cooperation,” in William C. Potter and Sarah Bidgood, eds., Once and Future Partners: The United States, Russia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation (London: International Institute for Security Studies, 2018), pp. 23–54, <https://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi/2018/once-and-future-partners>.

17 Ya. S. Pappe and N. S. Antonenko, “Changing balance between private and public sectors in Russian big business in 2003–2013: the subjective approach,” Studies on Russian Economic Development, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2014), pp. 235–254, <https://doi.org/10.1134/S1075700714030083>; I. E. Frolov, “Nuclear industry in Russia: Results of reform, politics, and development problems,” Studies on Russian Economic Development, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2014), pp. 529–538, <https://doi.org/10.1134/S1075700714060045>.

18 Multiple analysts scored each agreement, which were then reviewed by issue area to reach a single consensus score that was comparable across source countries and specific agreements. To more easily compare scores in different restriction areas, we normalized raw scores to a standard 0–100 scale, which we then used to compare restrictions in each area and an overall quality score for each agreement. For each agreement, we calculated this overall score by averaging the normalized scores in the four major restriction areas that we examined.

19 Through an initiative by the George W. Bush administration and an act of Congress, India was granted an exception to this requirement for US agreements. (Under the terms of the NPT, India is a non-nuclear-weapon state because it did not test a nuclear weapon before January 1, 1967.)

20 “Nonproliferation quality” is a single variable that represents how well the terms of a given nuclear-cooperation agreement control for four areas of major proliferation risks associated with commercial nuclear assistance. To account for differences in the categorical scale used for each score, we normalize raw scores in each area to a 0–100 scale. An agreement’s nonproliferation-quality score is the average of the agreement’s normalized scores in the four proliferation risk areas. The portfolio strength scores are an average of the nonproliferation-quality score for each agreement that is in force for a given year for Russia or for the United States.

21 Névine Schepers, “Russia’s Nuclear Energy Exports: Status, Prospects and Implications,” Non-proliferation and Disarmament Papers, No. 61, EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, February 2019, p. 5, <www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/eunpdc_no_61_final.pdf>.

22 For an example of the lack of specificity, see Mark Hibbs, “A More Politicized Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2017, p. 8, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/more-geopoliticized-nuclear-suppliers-group-pub-75027>. For a thorough critique of the arguments linking the US nuclear industry’s strength to US influence over the nonproliferation regime, see Sharon Squassoni, “The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 27–30, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340213477997>.

23 Jewell, Vetier, and Garcia-Cabrera, “Nuclear cooperation landscape,” p. 844.

24 The dates on this chart are taken from the IAEA’s “Power Reactor Information System” (PRIS) database <https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/home.aspx>, selecting those reactors with construction start dates recorded between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 2019. The IAEA defines a reactor-construction start as occurring on the date that concrete is first poured for a reactor project. These reactor starts were coded to a single supplier country based on the location of the headquarters of the company identified as the nuclear steam supply system supplier, which is the primary supplier reported in the IAEA data. Russia has no non-domestic joint ventures that produce reactors. The US data includes US-headquartered companies regardless of the location of the company’s ownership, including joint ventures such as Hitachi GE Nuclear Energy and Westinghouse Electric/Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. For the purposes of estimating the international influence of Russia and the United States, the data includes only new construction projects by American and Russian firms outside of their home market, although including domestic starts does not significantly change the patterns observed in this chart. Thus, there are 14 new Russian foreign reactor starts and seven new US foreign reactor starts included in Figure 5.

25 Pomper, “US-Vietnam Nuclear Pact.”

26 Government of the Russian Federation, “О Государственной корпорации по атомной энергии ‘Росатом’ (с изменениями на 2 июля 2021 года)” [About the State Atomic Energy Corporation ‘Rosatom’ (with changes as of July 2, 2021)], Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, No. 49, 03.12.2007, Art.6078, <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/902074550?section=text>.

27 Elmas Hasanovic, “The Politics of Egypt’s Nuclear Energy Program,” International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 2018), pp. 1–2, <http://internationaljournalcorner.com/index.php/theijhss/article/view/130014>.

28 Nikita Minin and Tomáš Vlček, “Determinants and considerations of Rosatom’s external strategy,” Energy Strategy Reviews, Vol. 17 (2017), pp. 37–44, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2017.07.001>. In contrast, the US government is not involved directly in negotiations on specific deals between American nuclear companies and the partner state.

29 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Economic Competition and Nuclear Cooperation: The ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ Revisited,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2014), pp. 21–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2014.880277>.

30 Schepers, “Russia’s Nuclear Energy Exports,” p. 7.

31 The Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Security Index (NSI) is a biennial measure of the country-specific risk of theft and of sabotage to nuclear facilities, material, and technology. The scoring system incorporates analysis of each country’s laws and regulations for nuclear material, various measures of country and government capacity and corruption, and actual incidences of theft and/or sabotage that have occurred in the state. For our analysis, we incorporated data from the 2020, 2018, and 2016 NSIs, <https://www.nti.org/about/programs-projects/project/nti-index>.

32 David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker, The Peddling Peril Index 2019/2020: The First Ranking of National Strategic Trade Control Systems (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, May 2019), <https://isis-online.org/ppi>.

33 Across all 104 agreements that we scored, the average 2019 PPI score for states that have nuclear-cooperation agreements with both Russia and the United States is 713, while the score for states with only US agreements is 730 and for countries with only Russia agreements is 514.

34 Our analysis identified at least 14 bilateral nuclear-cooperation agreements announced on the Chinese Atomic Energy Authority’s website (<www.caea.gov.cn>) since 2010. China’s nuclear partners include Cambodia, Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Tunisia, and Uganda. Unlike Russia and the United States, China does not provide ready public access to the texts of these agreements, nor does it provide substantive details on their terms in its press announcements.

35 Several news outlets have reported that Saudi Arabia has received Chinese assistance in constructing a facility to create concentrated uranium, also known as yellowcake, from uranium ore. The Saudi Energy Ministry is reported to have “categorically denied” the existence of such a facility, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry has reportedly avoided answering questions about the facility and possible Chinese assistance. See Julie Masterson and Shannon Bugos, “Saudi Arabia May Be Building Uranium Facility,” Arms Control Today, September 2020, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-09/news/saudi-arabia-may-building-uranium-facility>.

36 US Department of State, “A New Approach to Civil Nuclear Cooperation Policy.”

37 Jonathon Baron and Stephen Herzog, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons: The Attitudinal Nexus in the United States,” Energy Research & Social Science, Vol. 68, No. 101567 (October 2020), pp. 1­–11, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101567>.

Additional information

Funding

Research for this article was supported by the Sarah Scaife Foundation and the Office of Naval Research of the US Department of Defense under Minerva Program grant N00014-19-1-2474. The views and recommendations expressed are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the Office of Naval Research or the Department of Defense.

Notes on contributors

Adam N. Stulberg

Adam N. Stulberg is Sam Nunn Professor and chair of the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. His current research focuses on strategic dimensions of nuclear and energy networks, Russia’s conflict behavior in the gray zone, and comparative approaches to strategic stability. He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles; an MA in international affairs from Columbia University; and a BA in History from the University of Michigan. He served as a political consultant at the RAND Corporation from 1987 to 1997. His publications include Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft (1999), The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security (2013, co-edited with Matthew Fuhrmann), and The End of Strategic Stability? Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries (2018, co-edited with Lawrence Rubin).

Jonathan P. Darsey

Jonathan P. Darsey is a PhD candidate in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. His research examines how economic statecraft is affected by the structure, power, and interests of corporations in specific industries such as nuclear power, utilizing a combination of data science and traditional international-relations methods. Prior to the Nunn School, he was a partner in Accenture’s business consulting group, where he worked with Fortune 500 corporations on global innovation and growth strategies. He earned an MS from the School of International Service at American University, an MBA in global strategy from Cornell University, and a BA in economics and Latin American studies from Davidson College.