Introduction: one-and-a-half cheers for the EU Global Strategy

ABSTRACT

EU High Representative Federica Mogherini presented her EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016. Encircled by security crises, it is difficult to think of something more important for Europe than collective action with the aim of weathering the storm. The EUGS, in this respect, seeks to define common ends and identify means. So what do we make of the EUGS? What does the EUGS tell us about the current role of the EU in global affairs? And how will the withdrawal of the UK from the EU affect foreign and security policy? As a way of introduction to the forum, this article notes that the EUGS focuses on the neighbourhood, puts the interests of European citizens first, identifies civilian means, and has created momentum on security policy. The key question, however, remains whether there is any interest in the EUGS beyond the foreign policy elites.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• foreign policy
• security policy
• strategy
• EU Global Strategy

Contemporary Security Policy seeks to publish research on issues of contemporary importance that have a security implication and are relevant in terms of policy. The recent European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), presented by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini to the European Council in June 2016, ticks all these boxes. For Europe—encircled by security crises—it is difficult to think of something more important than collective action with the aim of weathering the storm. This is precisely what the EUGS is supposed to be about: defining common ends and identifying means to achieve them.

The EUGS is the result of a two-year drafting process.¹ For two years, foreign policy elites across the continent have held debates, in Brussels, the national capitals, and beyond, on what the ends and means of EU foreign and security cooperation are and ought to be. For Mogherini, having such a debate on strategy was at least as important as the outcome itself.² And the debate is not over yet. At the time of writing, diplomats and officials across Europe are busy coming up with a range of detailed sectoral strategies and implementation documents.

So what do we make of the EUGS? What does the EUGS tell us about the current role of the European Union (EU) in global affairs? And how will the withdrawal of the UK from the EU affect foreign and security policy? The seven articles in this forum reflect on these questions from different perspectives. Rather than dissecting the EUGS paragraph by paragraph, the authors use the EUGS as an opportunity to reflect on EU foreign and security policy. Without giving any of their conclusions away, the authors are reasonably positive about the EUGS, but they worry whether the EU can deliver in an increasingly ‘connected, contested and complex world’.³

As a way of introduction, let me make a number of points. First, it is worth pointing out that despite the grandiose title, the EUGS actually presents a fairly realistic picture of what the EU does, and can do, in the field of international relations. For instance, rather than being a truly global strategy, the EUGS focuses mostly on the immediate neighbourhood. It is more concerned about the crisis in Ukraine, or the chaos in Syria and Libya, than the strategic implications of the rise of China. While one could argue that this is a lost opportunity for the EU to define its policy towards the emerging powers, it is probably not a bad thing that the EU realizes it cannot do very much in this area.⁴ The focus on the neighbourhood is nevertheless a clear departure from the global focus of the previous decade when the so-called ‘strategic partnerships’ with the key emerging powers were negotiated.

Second, the EUGS goes back to the basics. It puts the immediate interests of European citizens first. Whereas the EU previously sought to remake the world in its own post-modern image, the times of norms, values and democracy-promotion are over. The slogan ‘effective multilateralism’, which featured so prominently in the European Security Strategy of 2003, has been downgraded to a less-ambitious ‘rules-based global order’. It ranks last among the five priorities and is preceded by objectives such as the ‘Security of our Union’ and ‘State and Societal Resilience to our East and South’.⁵ Indeed, ‘[t]he EU Global Strategy starts at home.’⁶ While the EUGS may not be purely about national interest—and observers like to quote the ambiguous concept of ‘Principled pragmatism’⁷—it is clear that the EUGS is more restrictive in its foreign policy objectives than the EU treaties.⁸

Third, while normative power Europe is perhaps dead, civilian power Europe is very much alive. At the heart of the EU’s response to conflicts and crises is an integrated, comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach. In fact, the EUGS talks very little about the military and (territorial) defence, and all the more about everything from cyber to trade, health, migration and resilience. This is positive for three reasons. First, it is critical that we finally do away with the artificial divide between domestic and foreign policy. Terrorists, migrants, diseases and cyber attacks tend to cross borders. Second, it is important that the EU better uses its strengths (such as the internal market) for strategic purposes. Finally, the EUGS recognizes clearly that on defence, ‘NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States’.⁹

My fourth and last point concerns the role of the EU in security and defence policy. While the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ in the EUGS has been hyped—in particular by a British newspaper which used to be known for its quality reporting¹⁰—it is worth considering that at least since the end of the Cold War, people have debated European autonomy. The Anglo-French Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998 called for ‘capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces’¹¹ as well as ‘appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning’.¹² So strategic autonomy, as presented in the EUGS, is hardly innovative.

It is striking nonetheless that the EUGS has created some momentum on EU security and defence. Many ideas are currently floating around.¹³ While we need to see where it goes, the determinism of the French and German foreign and defence ministers is certainly noteworthy.¹⁴ The proposed Franco-German ‘European Security Compact’ goes in many ways beyond what was politically feasible in the EUGS.¹⁵ While a leap forward in EU security policy is not necessarily a bad thing, one does also wonder whether this is merely payback for the British withdrawal from the EU. If anything, the emphasis in terms of strategic autonomy should be on deployable capabilities, complementarities between the member states, and higher defence spending, rather than building planning headquarters for the types of military operations that the EU does not do anymore.

To conclude, the EUGS gets the diagnosis right. And it proposes, by and large, policy options which are modest and realistic. At least as positive has been the process. While the drafting process was led by various Italian nationals, they have done a good job at stimulating debate across Europe. Particularly at the level of the national foreign and defence ministries as well as the relevant think tanks, there has been much debate and there is a considerable awareness of the EUGS. Such buy-in by the member states is critically important, as the member states themselves remain largely responsible for foreign and security policy. Equally important is that, at the level of elites, there seems to be a growing consensus about the need for the EU and its member states to step up.

The key question, however, remains whether there is any interest beyond these foreign policy elites across Europe. It is far from clear that the EUGS is supported by European government leaders let alone finance ministers or the general public. Debate at the highest level has indeed been minimal, even on those limited occasions when EU foreign and security policy was formally a priority on the agenda of European Council. In a similar fashion, while European publics may support the idea of greater EU foreign and security cooperation, they are not necessarily willing to pay for it. And we currently live in a world where the priority is with Innenpolitik. The litmus test for the EUGS is whether it can have any relevance beyond the foreign policy elites.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Hylke Dijkstra is the Editor-in-Chief of Contemporary Security Policy. He is also an Assistant Professor (with tenure) at the Department of Political Science of Maastricht University, The Netherlands. He was previously a Marie Curie Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations of the University of Oxford, where he was also affiliated with Nuffield College. He has published widely on EU security, NATO and UN peacekeeping.

ORCID

Hylke Dijkstra http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3637-5296

Notes

1. Nathalie Tocci, ‘The Making of the EU Global Strategy’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2016), this issue.

2. Ibid.

3. European External Action Service, European Global Strategy: Shared Vision, Common Action, A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels: EEAS, June 2016), p. 7, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (accessed 10 September 2016).

4. Jolyon Howorth, ‘EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels' Approach to the Emerging Powers’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2016), this issue.

5. Resilience is a key phrase in the EUGS. It is more ambitious than ‘stabilization’, but a step down from the previous liberal peacebuilding ambitions. See Wolfgang Wagner and Rosanne Anholt, ‘Resilience as the EU Global Strategy’s new leitmotif: Pragmatic, problematic or promising?’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 37, No 3 (2016), this issue.

6. European External Action Service, European Global Strategy (note 3), p. 9.

7. Ibid., p. 8.

8. ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ Article 3(5) Treaty on European Union.

9. European External Action Service, European Global Strategy (note 3), p. 20.

10. Bruno Waterfield, ‘EU army plans kept secret from voters’, The Times, 27 May 2016, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eu-army-plans-kept-secret-from-voters-3j3kg3zwj; also Tocci, ‘The Making of the EU Global Strategy’ (note 1).

11. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, 3–4 December 1998, Article 2.

12. Ibid., Article 3.

13. Daniel Keohane, ‘EU Defense, Where Political Opportunity Meets Strategic Necessity’, Carnegie Europe, 15 September 2016, http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=64584 (accessed 21 September 2016).

14. ‘A strong Europe in a world of uncertainties’, Joint contribution by the French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and Federal Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Europa/Aktuell/160624-BM-AM-FRA_ST.html (accessed 21 September 2016).

15. Ibid.