Heroes in search of homes: housing demobilized soldiers in early statehood Jerusalem

ABSTRACT

The housing shortage faced by demobilized soldiers after the 1948 War was especially grave in Jerusalem, where they had to compete with refugees, immigrants, and civil servants over abandoned properties. Public construction of new homes for them in the city was belated, limited, and slow when compared to other localities in Israel. Despite public sympathy and institutional aid, organizational circumstances and political considerations resulted in a solution for some, yet no affordable and timely solution for all. The prioritization of various groups of home seekers often sidelined demobilized soldiers, highlighting the erratic nature of Jerusalem’s postwar repopulation process and the spatial manifestations of social capital.

KEYWORDS:

• Demobilized soldiers
• Jerusalem
• social capital
• 1948 war

Introduction

The fighting in and around Jerusalem in Israel’s War of Independence (henceforth the 1948 War) ended in late November 1948 following the signing of a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Jordan. In its wake, Jerusalem was left divided between the two states. The abandonment of some of the city’s neighborhoods by their non-Jewish (mostly Arab) residents and, to a lesser extent, Jewish residents during the war initially resulted in a large inventory of available housing in the Israeli sector of the city. Private houses and flats, many of which were unscathed by the fighting and even left fully furnished, were placed under the custody of the state, while some were seized by the army or taken over by squatters.

Available housing in Jerusalem was desperately sought by various sectors of the city’s population, both longstanding and newly arrived: Jewish refugees who were forced to abandon their neighborhoods and nearby settlements in the course of the fighting, and could not, or would not, return to their original homes; new immigrants who chose to settle in Jerusalem or were directed to the city by the Jewish Agency (entrusted by the government with the housing of newly arrived immigrants); civil servants, some with family, who were gradually relocated to the city from Tel Aviv; and demobilized soldiers of the 1948 War, who are the concern of this paper.

By late 1949 the existing inventory of abandoned homes was largely depleted, and the city suffered an acute housing shortage. While this situation characterized other cities and towns in early statehood Israel, it was most apparent in postwar Jerusalem, the result of the rapid increase in the city’s population and the very slow increase in its housing stock. The fierce competition over housing in the city by various sectors makes it a unique test case and a platform through which questions regarding the fluid nature of social capital and its spatial manifestations can be addressed.

The theory of capital, as postulated by Bourdieu and elaborated by others,¹ has been very useful in explaining the phenomena of competition over resources within a given society. According to this theory, groups are locked in a constant struggle to improve or maintain their access to resources, tangible or otherwise. In doing so, they make use of three types of capital: economic (measured in finances and tangible assets), social (measured in social ties and connections), and cultural (measured in education and adopted lifestyle). A possible derivative of social and cultural capital is symbolic capital, which is measured in the respect and prestige awarded to a certain group by the rest of society.

Bourdieu defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.”² The particular issue of demobilized soldiers and their housing plight in early statehood Jerusalem is very much connected to the question of the brittleness of social capital, as it best exemplifies the gap between rhetoric and action and demonstrates the fast erosion of social capital when challenged by a host of different factors.

The erosion of the demobilized soldiers’ social capital has been addressed before on a countrywide scale,³ but to date has been hardly dealt with in depth in the specific context of Jerusalem.⁴ This article deals specifically with the issue of housing, as houses are not just a basic need but also a tangible asset with a discernable presence in, and an effect on, urban space. As such, their allocation or dedicated construction is a physical testament to the social capital of their occupants.

Housing demobilized soldiers in abandoned properties

The harsh experiences and sacrifices suffered by soldiers in the 1948 War instilled in Israeli civilians a sense of admiration and awe. Whether still in service or just released from active duty, soldiers enjoyed the gratitude of an indebted population. The war, wrote David Ben-Gurion (leader of the left-leaning, ruling party of Mapai), Israel’s first prime minister and defense minister, was not won by the army’s hardware but by the efforts exerted by its well-trained and committed soldiers.⁵ He, too, felt indebted to them: Some 200 letters from concerned or disgruntled citizens were received daily in his office; reportedly, those penned by demobilized and disabled soldiers were given “special attention.”⁶ As early as November 1948, acutely aware of the impending housing problem to be faced by demobilized soldiers at the end of the war, Ben-Gurion called for the immediate, countrywide preparation of temporary housing solutions for them.⁷

Working under Ben-Gurion was Yosef Gurion, who before independence dealt with the rehabilitation and housing of native, demobilized Jewish soldiers who fought in the ranks of the British army in World War II. Gurion was put in charge of the Ministry of Defense’s Department for the Settlement and Rehabilitation of Demobilized Soldiers (Ha-Agaf Le-Shikum Hayalim Meshuhrarim), established in early November 1948. Upon assuming his position, he issued a detailed memorandum regarding his department’s tasks. A dedicated section within addressed the demobilized soldiers’ housing needs. Until a permanent solution for them was found, Gurion recommended granting them preferential eligibility for temporary housing. “I am hopeful, and I believe,” wrote Gurion, “that the nation and its leaders […] will know how to find the means to rehabilitate and settle their soldiers-emissaries as they return to us victorious from the war.”⁸

Especially revered were the disabled veterans, who, according to one daily, “sacrificed part of their body […] on the altar of victory, which entitles them not only to the nation’s assistance but also to its appreciation.” But the sense of indebtedness applied to all demobilized soldiers, as articulated in a 1950 report issued by the Ministry of War Casualties, which was set up to address the pressing needs of civilians affected by the 1948 War: “understood […] is the attitude that soldiers […] deserve special treatment as compared to civilians.”⁹

The arrival of many new immigrants to the fledgling state led to the worsening of the housing shortage, however, and priority in housing gradually tilted toward them and away from the demobilized soldiers. When, in early 1949, Gurion asked Ben-Gurion to appoint assistants for the gargantuan task of arranging housing for demobilized soldiers, Ben-Gurion informed him that it was rather the housing of new immigrants which was the top priority. As can be discerned from entries in his diary, the Council of State (Mo’etzet Ha-Medina Ha-Zmanit, which governed the country before its first parliamentary elections) seconded this approach. According to Ben-Gurion, special assistance in housing was to be given to needy demobilized soldiers only, especially the disabled ones, and not to all demobilized soldiers indiscriminately.¹⁰

Needy demobilized soldiers included, among others, those who were themselves newly arrived immigrants, some with family. The preferential treatment given to them and to their families allowed Ben-Gurion to show his commitment to both servicemen and immigrants. In one case he ordered the immediate and “ruthless” evacuation by the army of hundreds of rooms it had occupied for various uses in the mostly deserted Arab town of Jaffa in favor of housing demobilized immigrant soldiers.¹¹

This favored treatment did not extend to all immigrant soldiers, many of whom had arrived in the state through the Overseas Recruitment Program (Gius Hootz La-Aretz, abbreviated to Gahal). These were mainly young Holocaust survivors who immigrated to the fledgling state during the 1948 War and were enlisted upon arrival. Although extolled by Ben-Gurion as “the most vivid and distinct manifestation of the People of Israel’s deep attachment to its land,”¹² Gahal recruits often fell between the cracks. Upon demobilization, they often ended up receiving no assistance whatsoever, as the Ministry of Defense classified them as new immigrants under the jurisdiction of the Jewish Agency, and the latter regarded them as regular demobilized soldiers who came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense.¹³

In early 1949 it had been estimated that housing demobilized soldiers would require some 18,500 housing units nationwide in addition to an unspecified number of temporary housing solutions in hotels, boarding houses, and the like.¹⁴ As an emergency measure, Ben-Gurion called for outfitting army barracks on the outskirts of towns as temporary dwellings. The rehabilitation of demobilized soldiers was one of the main objectives of the “four-year plan” undertaken by Israel’s first elected government in March 1949. The Custodian of Abandoned Property, (Ha-Apotropus Al Nikhsey Nifkadim) a by-unit in the Ministry of Finance that was set up to manage abandoned Arab property from the 1948 War, was instructed to prioritize demobilized soldiers over civilians in the allocation of housing.¹⁵ This reflected public sentiment, as revealed in the answers given by 70% of respondents in a 1949 poll.¹⁶

The first state-led countrywide and comprehensive attempt to address the needs of demobilized soldiers was made shortly thereafter through the proposed Demobilized Soldiers Law, suggested in March 1949. The law guaranteed demobilized soldiers of the 1948 War the right to gainful employment but interestingly said nothing about housing. In replying to a petition on this matter arranged by the National Committee of War Invalids (Ha-Va’ad Ha-Artzi Shel Nekhey Milhama), Ben-Gurion only said that all relevant ministries were instructed to give priority to disabled demobilized soldiers over new immigrants where housing was concerned.¹⁷

In mid-1949 there was a sharp increase in the number of demobilized soldiers as fighting in the 1948 War formally ended on all fronts. This aggravated the housing shortage and had the government fervently looking for solutions. Throughout the country, dedicated hostels offered demobilized soldiers a three-month stay for a nominal fee, allowing them time to find proper housing.¹⁸ More legislative measures were taken: the dedicated Soldier’s Protection Law (Housing), passed by the Knesset in June 1949, offered demobilized soldiers (as well as mobilized soldiers and the families of both) extended housing privileges. Thus, demobilized soldiers were granted the right to reclaim flats they had rented before mobilization, overriding the tenancy rights of those who had entered them since. In addition, demobilized soldiers who rented apartments and had existing rent dues were given a few months’ deferment and immunity from eviction. Existing eviction warrants were retroactively annulled.¹⁹

In early July 1949, the Knesset discussed a proposed bill that would have enabled the government to temporarily confiscate uninhabited properties for the temporary housing of those in need, including demobilized soldiers. While this may point to the severity of the housing shortage that necessitated the implementation of draconian measures, it also highlights the ideological differences in the young Israeli democracy. Unsurprisingly, the bill, put forward by Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen of the liberal Progressive Party to address a problem recognized universally across the political spectrum, was upheld by leftist, socialist-leaning parties and criticized by the capitalist-leaning political right.²⁰ In early September, Ben-Gurion, fully aware of rising tensions, also ordered the designation of a quarter of all new homes built by the state for new immigrants for the neediest among demobilized soldiers.²¹

In late 1949, in a meeting called by the Association of Demobilized Soldiers (Igud Ha-Hayalim Ha-Meshuhrarim), complaints were voiced against the alleged procrastination and underbudgeting regarding housing for demobilized soldiers. Their promised prioritization, it was claimed, was being ignored by several housing companies. In addition, the Jewish Agency was not giving any special priority in housing to demobilized immigrant soldiers over non-serving immigrants. A member of the association called on authorities to “do away with the disgraceful neglect of the demobilized soldier.” Quoting this association member, one newspaper used these words as a headline, omitting the quotation marks, thus giving them the semblance of an op-ed and disclosing its sympathy for the speaker, simultaneously reflecting and helping shape public opinion on the matter.²²

Shortly thereafter, in what seemed like a desperate attempt to assuage demobilized soldiers’ discontent and produce more housing solutions, an amended bill was discussed by the Knesset that allowed tenants in rented flats to sublet vacant rooms.²³ Meanwhile, in early 1950, the law that would have enabled the expropriation of vacant rooms for the sake of demobilized soldiers was yet to pass. Concerned citizens drew attention to the fact that homeless demobilized soldiers were living in the streets, “sleeping in bus stops and cold parking lots [having given] it all to make sure your house was safe,” as one citizen protested in a letter published in a daily newspaper.²⁴

One solution to the housing shortage was directing demobilized soldiers into agricultural settlements in the country’s geographical periphery. Demobilized soldiers were viewed as ideal candidates for this as their young age and army background were suitable to cope with the settlements’ remoteness, precarious proximity to the borders and rudimentary conditions.²⁵ This initiative was also meant to alleviate their housing plight and reflected the prominent pioneering ethos of the time. Gurion, who before independence had been involved in establishing agricultural settlements for Jewish World War II veterans, spearheaded this initiative, which achieved partial success.²⁶

By the mid-1950s only around 4,500 demobilized soldiers, some of them disabled, as well as members of bereaved families, received prioritized housing in abandoned properties nationwide, some of which were especially renovated and fitted at the state’s expense. Many others, incapable of waiting for the conclusion of lengthy legislative procedures and perhaps emboldened by public sentiment, kept invading empty properties.²⁷

Dedicated construction for demobilized soldiers

When the existing housing stock had been exhausted, dedicated construction of housing for demobilized soldiers had begun, a practice tracing itself back to the beginnings of the welfare state in post-World War I Europe. The slogan “homes fit for heroes” was coined to describe the housing campaign promised by British Prime Minister Lloyd George. His government legislated the 1919 Housing Act, leading to the eventual construction of some 175,000 homes for demobilized soldiers in England and Wales.²⁸ Inspired by the British government’s policy, similar provision of over 4,000 homes for World War I veterans was also undertaken in Ireland in the 1920s and 1930s, mostly in rural areas as a means to tackle problems of urban unemployment and congestion.²⁹

Preference in public housing for army veterans in the USA has its roots in mid-nineteenth century federal policy, when free land was offered to them for settlement on the frontier. A century later, and despite reservations expressed by free market adherents and a host of legal and political hurdles, housing had been provided for World War II veterans in some American cities. This was seen not only as befitting reward for them but also as a chance to offer employment to construction workers and improve urban living conditions. Spurring construction, the Veterans Administration, a federal agency, guaranteed comfortable loans to demobilized soldiers, making houses in developments such as Levittown, NY, wholly affordable to middle class veterans.³⁰

In the closing stage of World War II, the Jewish Agency, alongside the British Mandate Palestine government, initiated and funded the construction of housing estates for demobilized Jewish soldiers who had fought in the war in the ranks of the British army, and offered affordable loans for buyers. Construction was carried out by a dedicated firm, Diyur Ex-Servicemen Housing Co. Ltd.³¹ In early July 1948, Zalman Lavon, manager of Shikun, the housing company of the Histadrut (General Trade Union), proposed the countrywide construction of 3,000–4,000 apartments for demobilized soldiers, to be funded by taxing homeowners.³² However, it soon became obvious that large-scale construction for demobilized soldiers, especially on expensive urban land, would be difficult to realize. In January 1949 the Knesset’s Central Committee for the Sake of Soldiers (Ha-Ve’ada Ha-Merkazit Le-Ma’an Ha-Hayalim) decided on offering housing loans to demobilized soldiers rather than on actual construction for them.³³

The inundation of the young country by new immigrants further reshaped housing priorities. In a Knesset session in late 1949 it was decided that the dismantling of overcrowded immigrant transit camps, in which tens of thousands of immigrants languished in substandard conditions, would take precedence over construction for demobilized soldiers.³⁴ In Tel Aviv, a grand scheme to construct 1,000 houses for demobilized soldiers was eventually curtailed as the government decided to appropriate some of the houses for new immigrants.³⁵

A major obstacle to extensive construction was funding. The young state’s coffers were empty due to war expenses and the new immigrants’ absorption costs. In June 1949 Gurion admitted that fully-funded housing for demobilized soldiers was beyond the country’s financial capabilities. Those opting for new houses, he added, would have to incur a nominal participation in construction fees.³⁶

By September 1951 only some 500 houses for demobilized soldiers were completed, while some 2,500 more were in various stages of planning or construction. Special allowance was made in the case of disabled demobilized soldiers. More than 2,000 housing units designed for them, as well as for bereaved families, were constructed by the mid-1950s. Some five percent of housing units that were initially built for groups such as new immigrants and veteran civilians were set aside for them as well.³⁷

Competition over existing housing stock in Jerusalem

The fierce battles waged in and around Jerusalem during the 1948 War, which eventually guaranteed Israel’s hold over its western sector, exacted a heavy toll. The importance attached to Jerusalem as a major historical, cultural and political center for the Jewish people lent the military efforts and sacrifices connected with it a special place in public discourse and merited grandiloquent exaltations of those who fought for the city, soldiers and civilians alike. “In our struggle for homeland and independence,” wrote Ben-Gurion, ”[the war for Jerusalem demonstrated] the most tragic and most glorious display of bravery.”³⁸ The press, too, placed those who fought in for Jerusalem on a pedestal. Even three years after the fighting had ended, one daily still referred to demobilized soldiers in the city as “liberators of Jerusalem.”³⁹

The significant social capital enjoyed by soldiers for their efforts and sacrifices in the fighting for Jerusalem in the 1948 War might suggest that decision makers would have been particularly attentive to their housing plight in the city upon demobilization. However, the rhetoric and public sentiment surrounding soldiers of the 1948 War was not matched by swift and conclusive institutional efforts to address their situation.

According to Israel’s first population census, carried out in early November 1948, some 8,000 residents of Jerusalem were recruited soldiers.⁴⁰ Not all returned to Jerusalem as the war ended, but those that did were joined over time by demobilized soldiers from elsewhere who decided, for various reasons, to settle in the city. There they soon found themselves competing with home seekers from other sectors.

At the height of war many thousands of Jewish residents in Jerusalem were forced to abandon their frontline neighborhoods and seek shelter elsewhere. Many were assigned, or squatted in, abandoned Arab homes. At this stage there was little friction as most soldiers were still in active duty. But starting in September 1948, the influx of new immigrants to Jerusalem, coinciding with the ever increasing demobilization of soldiers as fighting subsided, ignited a ferocious competition over available houses in the city.

A sense of urgency prevailed; given no comprehensive housing solution, some demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem, either from its veteran or newly arrived residents, initially resorted to invading vacant rooms in abandoned properties, often with their families. There was no single policy regarding their eviction. Occasionally authorities turned a blind eye and eventually gave squatters retroactive permission to stay put, but not when trespassers lived in substandard conditions. One such case involved the forced eviction of demobilized soldiers and their families from a derelict building located dangerously close to the border, prompting public uproar.⁴¹

Some army officers allocated apartments for their soon to be demobilized subordinates without recourse to protocol or with the absence of one. Other soldiers, while still mobilized, acted on their own and invaded abandoned properties assigned to new immigrants. The army frowned upon this practice, at least publicly, and announced that squatters would be court martialed and deprived of assistance in housing.⁴² This had little effect as the liberty taken by the army to seize houses was understood by soldiers as de facto permission to do likewise. Many went unpunished, which encouraged others to follow suit. The leniency shown toward squatters was reproached by Giora Yoseftal, head of the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency, who threatened to resign if the practice were to continue.⁴³

As early as November 1948 the Herut movement in Jerusalem established an association to assist disabled veterans of the 1948 War in the city, including where housing was concerned. When it tried to register it in accordance with the Ottoman Law of Societies it was barred since, allegedly, its goals ran contrary to legal requirements.⁴⁴ The Jerusalem chapter of the Association of Demobilized Soldiers (Irgun Hayalim Meshuhrarim Be-Yerushalaim), initially numbering 200 veterans, was established in late February 1949 upon the dissolution of the six month military administration which was set up in the city during the latter stages of the 1948 War.⁴⁵ Its humble size deprived it of significant leverage, and left demobilized soldiers in the city to fend for themselves.

While competition between demobilized soldiers and civilians over available housing in abandoned properties existed in several towns and occasionally led to violent friction,⁴⁶ in Jerusalem this phenomenon was accentuated. The relatively large pool of abandoned homes in the city diminished rapidly, deepening the rift between demobilized soldiers and civilians who competed for it. In several cases the army was criticized for reserving houses it has seized in the war for demobilized soldiers at the expense of needy civilians.

One such case concerned a row of houses in the former Arab neighborhood of Musrara, which straddled the armistice line cutting through Jerusalem. When pressed to release them for civilian use, their precarious location led the army to state, in what appears to be a rather flimsy reasoning, that “the safety of the place necessitates that only the families of soldiers and demobilized soldiers will reside in them.”⁴⁷ Another such case involved a cluster of homes that the army had reserved for demobilized officers in the southern neighborhood of Qatamon, which was overburdened by refugees and immigrants.⁴⁸

In line with a nationwide policy, the Jewish Agency and the army soon worked in concert to guarantee precedence in the allocation of improved housing in Jerusalem for immigrant soldiers still in service, immigrant demobilized soldiers, and the families of both.⁴⁹ Among those demobilized immigrant-soldiers who were single and childless but were eligible for the institutional support offered to newcomers, some found shelter in one of several immigrant hostels located around Jerusalem. These offered a rather convenient alternative to the crude immigrants’ transit camps in the city, but were small and had demobilized soldiers occupying rooms which were desperately needed by other immigrants. The Jewish Agency frowned upon this practice but was reluctant to send them away.⁵⁰

The gradual deepening of the housing shortage eventually led to cutting back on aid in housing to immigrant demobilized soldiers. Eligibility was soon conditioned on having spent at least one year in Israel prior to enlisting in the army or having a family. Those who did not meet these criteria were usually denied special assistance.⁵¹ At the same time, none of the abovementioned hostels which offered demobilized soldiers affordable, temporary boarding elsewhere in the country were established in Jerusalem.

With the dwindling of available houses in urban neighborhoods, an ever increasing number of home seekers in Jerusalem were sent to settle several abandoned Arab villages on the city’s then distant outskirts. These were usually settled by new immigrants who had few ties to the rest of the city and almost no political clout with which to demand better housing. Most demobilized soldiers, at least those belonging to the veteran population of the country, did not wish to reside in them and would not cooperate with the initiative.⁵²

At the same time, no existing neighborhood in Jerusalem was wholly or partially earmarked for demobilized soldiers. They were given the opportunity of settling in Bak’a, an abandoned neighborhood in the southern reaches of the city, but had to scramble for available houses alongside refugees and new immigrants. The neighborhood was remote, disconnected from the core of the city and initially with no proper road or bus service connecting the two.

Starting in February 1949, hundreds of civil servants, some with family, were gradually relocated from the de facto capital of Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, as part of a decision to establish the latter as Israel’s official capital and seat of government. Having been sent by the government to reside in Jerusalem, they were unequivocally prioritized in the allocation of housing. This deepened the city’s grave housing shortage, especially for demobilized soldiers.

By now there was a growing understanding by Mapai officials of the electoral cost of neglecting the needs of demobilized soldiers and the benefits to be gained from catering to them. “The party didn’t reach them,” lamented a party member at Mapai’s national convention held in early 1950, “the local chapters never took care of the demobilized soldiers.”⁵³ The Jerusalem Workers’ Council (Mo’etzet Po’aley Yerushalaim), the local extension of the Histadrut, acted on that understanding even before the Mapai convention. In a meeting of top governmental and Jewish Agency officials in April 1949, it was decided to prioritize civil servants and new immigrants in the allocation of housing in Jerusalem; the council’s representatives intervened, leading to a decision to assign demobilized soldiers 30% of all vacant apartments that were initially allotted for civil servants. By mid-June, some 500 demobilized soldiers were set up in abandoned properties throughout Jerusalem.⁵⁴

As elsewhere in the country, the plight of the disabled among the demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem was especially grave. In November 1949 some 150 disabled demobilized soldiers jointly squatted in a cluster of apartments set aside for civil servants in the abandoned neighborhood of Abu Tor in south Jerusalem and held out against the police. They were initially offered housing in other buildings in the neighborhood, but these straddled the armistice line and were not accessible given the soldiers’ disabilities. The disabled veterans criticized the assignment of the better houses in the neighborhood to people who did not fight for the sake of the city in the 1948 War, nor partake in the suffering of the population. A violent clash ensued, and the incident ended with four dozen civil servants asked to allot a room in their designated apartments for the temporary housing of a disabled demobilized soldier.⁵⁵

The above incident focused attention on the grave housing shortage suffered by disabled demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem, refuting the Custodian of Abandoned Properties remark earlier in 1949, according to which the wealth of abandoned properties in Jerusalem could prove a solution for those among them who could not find housing in more desirable locations, such as Jaffa.⁵⁶ The Ministry of Defense now sought the help of the Public Works Department to arrange for suitable apartments for disabled demobilized soldiers in Abu Tor.⁵⁷ A couple of months later it also set up the Committee for the Allocation of Buildings Released by the Army (Ha-Va’ada Le-Halukat Mivnim Mitpanim Al Edey Ha-Tzava). Its stated purpose was to further the release of buildings seized by the army in, mainly, the three major cities of Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem for the use of the disabled among the demobilized soldiers as well as career officers and their families and was therefore of little help to regular demobilized soldiers.⁵⁸

Dedicated construction for demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem

Ridden with delays and setbacks, dedicated construction of housing for demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem was carried out considerably slower and on a limited scale as compared to both elsewhere in Israel and to the construction of homes for civil servants in the city. The aforementioned Diyur Ex-Servicemen Housing Co. Ltd construction firm, which by 1952 had built some 1,100 housing units in Tel Aviv and Haifa, did not operate in Jerusalem, and construction was undertaken through other arrangements.⁵⁹

In November 1948 the Jerusalem Municipality, despite the crippling political and financial weakness it suffered in early statehood,⁶⁰ attempted to relaunch construction of a housing complex in the Shmuel Ha-Navi quarter in the north of the city. It had originally intended to build it in 1945 for World War II veterans but its realization was stunted by the 1948 War and was now to be redesignated for its veterans.⁶¹ This never materialized.

When, in February 1949, the Jerusalem chapter of the Association of Demobilized Soldiers voiced its demands for sufficient and affordable housing to the Jerusalem Municipality, Mayor Daniel Auster (of the centrist Ha-Tzionim Ha-Klaliim party) sympathized but claimed that the municipality was insolvent and had no way to help.⁶² In early 1951 the issue was taken up by his successor, Shlomo Zalman Shragai (of the religious Ha-Po’el Ha-Mizrahi party), in a meeting with Ben-Gurion. Shragai wanted to know what became of the funds that the British Mandate authorities had allocated for the construction of homes for World War II demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem but did not receive a direct answer.⁶³

The problem was not monetary alone. It should be kept in mind that the 1948 War had been a total war, which, by definition,⁶⁴ involved combatants and noncombatants alike and targeted civilian infrastructure and settlements, blurring the distinction between frontline and hinterland. A saying attributed to Ben-Gurion, reflecting popular sentiment, espoused the notion that “the whole nation is an army, the whole land – a frontline.”⁶⁵ But while reflecting a strong sense of kinship between civilians and servicemen, this also meant that prioritizing soldiers in the allocation of housing, or in any other matter, was not necessarily justified. This insight was articulated in the abovementioned 1950 report by the Jerusalem office of the Ministry of War Casualties, in which it was stated that contrary to the rest of the country, “in Jerusalem there is certainly no moral justification to place a wedge between soldier and civilian. In this city all residents took part in the struggle, each one doing his utmost for its defense; there was no difference between frontline and hinterland.”⁶⁶

The acute housing shortage for demobilized soldiers, in Jerusalem as elsewhere, mainly concerned those who were not entitled to what became known as “sectoral housing” – a term that referred to housing projects built at the initiative of, or designated for, a group of people, usually from among the veteran population, who had a common affiliation to a certain political, ideological or professional organization. In early statehood Israel, these were often linked to the Histadrut and the Mapai-led Labor movement (although most major parties had public construction firms affiliated with them). Residents of sectoral housing projects, all members of ad hoc cooperative associations and comprising small purchasing groups, enjoyed the political, logistical or financial backing of their organization. Their homes were usually of relatively good quality and were acquired through convenient purchasing plans.⁶⁷

In late June 1949 deputy mayor Reuven Schreibman (Mapai) called for the generous designation of formerly Arab land on the southwestern outskirts of Jerusalem for the construction of houses for, among others, demobilized soldiers – without specifying their sectoral affiliation or lack thereof. The government’s de facto ownership of the land, he argued, would nullify its high cost as a hindrance to development. A concerted governmental effort, he maintained, could guarantee the speedy completion of construction.⁶⁸

A few objective factors caused the belated and limited scale of public residential construction in Jerusalem as compared to other places in Israel: Raw materials had to be brought to the city from afar, and its hilly topography and rocky terrain made construction costlier.⁶⁹ And while there was high demand for housing in the city, a critical mass of poor residents, either among its veteran or newly arrived population, deterred profit seeking construction firms.

In July 1949 Gurion tried to promote a plan to construct flats on Jerusalem’s western outskirts for demobilized soldiers who were not eligible for sectoral housing, estimating their number at five hundred. Interestingly, in trying to urge decision makers to allocate land for the undertaking, he pointed out the important contribution this would have, given the “defeatist atmosphere in Jerusalem in relation to housing.”⁷⁰ This is a remarkable comment. It might suggest that Gurion did not trust decision makers’ understanding of the urgency of supplying sufficient housing for demobilized soldiers, forcing him to persuade them by other arguments.

Taking up the matter again later that year, Gurion admitted that the government did not live up to its promise to prioritize the housing needs of demobilized soldiers. Asking the Custodian of Abandoned Property once more to allocate sufficient land for the matter, he insisted that for the sake of fairness toward demobilized soldiers, as well as to prevent future criticism, designated land should be as well connected to the rest of the city and suitable for construction as that allocated for other sectors of home seekers in Jerusalem.⁷¹ Meanwhile, the Central Housing Committee (Ve’adat Ha-Shikun Ha-Merkazit) in the Jewish Agency decided to tighten eligibility for permanent housing in Jerusalem for immigrants residing in the city’s largest transit camp, in a declared attempt to assist demobilized soldiers seeking homes in the city.⁷²

In late 1950 Ben-Gurion, having met with Gurion, ordered the allocation of available lots in Jerusalem and the allotment of building materials for the construction of houses for disabled demobilized soldiers. By September 1951, a handful of lots were purchased by the state in the city for this purpose. Eventually, of all flats designed and built for severely crippled demobilized soldiers and bereaved families nationwide, only some two hundred were built in Jerusalem by the mid-1950s.⁷³

Work on Qiryat Ha-Yovel, a large neighborhood on Jerusalem’s southwestern outskirts, commenced in 1950, with the stated intention of building the housing for around two hundred demobilized soldiers, among other groups of people. At first several government ministers were hesitant about the idea of constructing homes so far from the city center. This deterred many prospective buyers, including demobilized soldiers. It is worth noting that this spatial sidelining was not unique to Jerusalem: In Tel Aviv, a 1949 scheme to construct houses for demobilized soldiers was initially planned in an area which lay north of the Yarkon stream, then considered remote and hard to access, as the land prices in more central areas were significantly higher.⁷⁴

Elsewhere in Jerusalem, in the three separate and relatively central neighborhoods of Qiryat Moshe, Mekor Baruch and Talbiye, construction of housing complexes for demobilized soldiers was carried out considerably slower than expected due to significant delays in the appropriation of land and in the granting of promised governmental loans. In order to justify these delays, the Jewish National Fund, which was responsible for purchasing land from the government for the sake of construction, argued that demobilized soldiers rejected suggestions for construction in then remote neighborhoods, demanding to be housed closer to the city center.⁷⁵ All the while the costs of materials and labor kept rising, with the government unwilling to recalculate its initial funding and make up for the difference. The Jerusalem chapter of the Association of Demobilized Soldiers protested and held demonstrations and press conferences, claiming that the delays were expected to significantly raise the price of their promised flats.⁷⁶

Above all, demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem felt themselves let down by an ungrateful establishment. In mid-1952 four separate organizations – the Jerusalem chapter of the Association of Demobilized Soldiers, the Union of the War of Liberation Invalids in Jerusalem (Igud Ha-Nekhim Mi-Milhemet Ha-Shihrur Be-Yerushalaim), the Union of the Parents of the Fallen and Widows of the War of Liberation in Jerusalem (Igud Horey Halalim Ve-Almanot Mi-Milhemet Ha-Shihrur Be-Yerushalaim) and the Jewish Brigade and British Army Veterans in Jerusalem (Vatikey Ha-Brigada U-Meshuhrary Ha-Tzava Ha-Briti Be-Yerushalaim) – penned a joint memorandum to Minister of Labor Golda Meirson, who was in charge of governmental housing schemes. They condemned the foot dragging in the allocation of land for the construction of their promised homes and disclosed a clear sense of entitlement. “We regard the government’s breach of trust regarding our housing as an insult to us and to the country,” read the memorandum, “no sacrifice was too big for us, we conquered vast areas and now have to beg for small plots for the sake of our housing […] Is this the reward we receive as defenders of the country? Is it conceivable that after all we have done, we shall be so disgracefully neglected?” Jerusalem, pointed out the writers of the memorandum, was the only place in which construction was so delayed, and meantime the down payments they made on future flats were quickly devaluing.⁷⁷

Construction of the abovementioned complexes was finally completed as the municipality, which was involved in their construction, received government assistance. The Jerusalem chapter of the Association of Demobilized Soldiers blamed the municipality for initially spending the funds on unrelated matters. The delays indeed resulted in increased costs, and upon entering their new flats some buyers realized they had paid substantially above market value. Indeed, others who were not entitled to the grants and loans offered to demobilized soldiers paid less for similar sized apartments elsewhere.⁷⁸

Small scale, non-institutional initiatives for the construction of homes for demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem did not materialize. In one case from mid-1949, a demobilized soldier who wished to build a complex of flats in the city was referred by the Jerusalem office of the Department for the Settlement and Rehabilitation of Demobilized Soldiers to its Tel Aviv counterpart, attesting to the former’s unpreparedness to assist in the matter.⁷⁹ Later that year a group of demobilized soldiers tried finish building a housing complex in the neighborhood of Qiryat Moshe, the construction of which was stunted by the 1948 War. Even though these were the very same people who had initiated its construction before the war (when they belonged to a local transportation cooperative) and despite their pressing need for homes, they were met with refusal by relevant government ministries. The half-built buildings were torn down as part of a large-scale plan that designated the entire area for a government complex.⁸⁰

In the early 1950s, after a few years of subsidizing construction mainly for new immigrants and various sectoral projects, the government launched “Popular Housing” (shikun amami) – a countrywide plan for the public construction of tens of thousands of homes for all citizens, regardless of tenure in the country or political and organizational affiliation. Still, ten percent of all new homes were assigned for select segments of the population, including demobilized soldiers. In Jerusalem, these were mentioned specifically as intended residents in new neighborhoods on the city’s outskirts, such as Qiryat Ha-Yovel.⁸¹

Gradually, and in a piecemeal fashion, the acute housing shortage of 1948 War veterans in Jerusalem was alleviated, as little evidence of this housing shortage is found in public records from the mid-1950s onwards. This is probably due to accelerated public construction, in Jerusalem as elsewhere, made possible through German reparation monies and Israel’s general economic consolidation.

Discussion and conclusions

In the wake of the 1948 War a sense of indebtedness of a grateful population toward demobilized soldiers was reflected, among other things, in a clear institutional and public empathy toward their pressing housing needs. This was echoed in public polls, multiple articles in the press and in statements made by political figures and concerned citizens. Demobilized soldiers won the backing of powerful agents, namely the army and the Ministry of Defense. The latter set up a dedicated department to cater to their needs – including that of ample and affordable housing – while the Knesset passed tailored legislation to the same effect. Indeed, the rhetoric and actions toward demobilized soldiers in early statehood Israel are testament to their significant social capital at the time.

However, demobilized soldiers found themselves competing fiercely with other groups over existing and new houses, and they enjoyed no significant advantage in procuring housing for themselves. The near symbiosis between the military and civilian spheres during the 1948 War and the interchangeability of frontline and hinterland proved to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, soldiers were hailed as deserving heroes; on the other, it placed them and civilians on near equal footing. When all had suffered and sacrificed, there was little justification in prioritizing one over the other. The high demand for housing on behalf of new immigrants only served to further negate the perceived right of demobilized soldiers to receive housing. As time passed, the 1948 War and the sacrifices made by soldiers who fought in it were gradually relegated to memory, which possibly dimmed the original, acute sense of obligation toward them.

This countrywide housing shortage was especially acute in Jerusalem given its need to house thousands of families of refugees, new immigrants and civil servants in the first few years following the 1948 War. More than elsewhere, in Jerusalem, the social capital held by demobilized soldiers, including disabled ones, had limited currency from the very start. The admiration and gratitude felt toward them was no match for the urgent necessity to tend to competing sectors among home seekers in the city, some of whom enjoyed strong organizational backing, whether from the government or the Jewish Agency.

Demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem were initially assigned abandoned properties in poorly accessible neighborhoods, sometimes in houses straddling the volatile armistice line that sliced through the city. Little attention was given to the special needs of the disabled among them. Even the army reserved some of the properties it had seized in the war only for demobilized officers. A testament to their distress, many among the rank and file who would not, or could not, wait to be orderly assigned houses invaded abandoned properties. Some were forcefully evicted, and even court martialed.

Unlike other cities in Israel, no separate, large-scale neighborhood for demobilized soldiers was ever built in Jerusalem. The semi-governmental firm established for the construction of homes for demobilized soldiers did not operate in the city. A single governmental plan to aid in the construction of 500 flats for demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem proved to be a drawn out and costly affair, delayed – among other reasons – by the demobilized soldiers’ reluctance to being settled on the city’s then remote outskirts.

Left to their own devices, small groups of demobilized soldiers tried to undertake the construction of housing projects on their own. The level of their success depended on their tenacity and the institutional and financial backing they received. Their especially difficult situation in Jerusalem is symbolically exemplified in one case, in which half-built houses that they hoped could be completed for them were instead eventually torn down to make way for a governmental office complex. The overall result was that, unlike the cases of Tel Aviv and Haifa, clusters of housing for demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem were small and scattered in a fragmented and non-contiguous pattern.

The issue of housing for demobilized soldiers in Jerusalem during early statehood reflects the young country’s transition from the solidarity and national unity often characterizing societies at war to harsh postwar realities of sectoral competition over limited resources amid debilitating political and financial constraints. It also touches upon the sense of disillusionment with the state shared mostly by the sabra (locally born) among the demobilized soldiers, who had been led to believe that they belonged to an entitled elite.⁸² Their struggle to secure affordable, centrally located housing within a reasonable time frame was part and parcel of the overall scramble of competing groups for housing in early statehood Jerusalem, and one in which they enjoyed little advantage. In this respect the veterans’ housing struggle is a refined expression of the fluidity and brittle nature of social capital. Concomitantly it is an example of its effects on the spatial arrangement and the shaping of urban space.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Eldad Brin

Eldad Brin holds a PhD in geography from the University of Haifa (2020), is a post-doctoral candidate at the university’s Herzl Institute for the Study of Zionism, co-teaches at the Hebrew University and has taught at the Schechter Institute of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem. His recent publications include “Not in the City, nor in the Village: Lower Lifta, 1948-1967” with Arnon Golan (Cathedra, 177, 2021, in Hebrew) and “The Limits of Symbolic Capital: The Case of Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter Evacuees in Qatamon” (Israel Studies, 27 [1], 2022).

Notes

1. Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, 93–111; Dreher, The Social Construction of Power, 53–68.

2. Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, 101.

3. Naor, “The 1948 War,” 47–59; Kabalo, Israeli Community Action, 250–283.

4. Golan, Shinui merhavi, 57, 72.

5. Ben-Gurion, Be-hilachem Yisrael, 8.

6. “Milyon LI ta’aleh bniyat ha-kirya bi-Yerushalayim [The Construction of the New Jerusalem Neighborhood will Cost a Million Liras],” Al Ha-Mishmar, April 10, 1950, 1; Ben-Gurion, Be-hilahem Yisrael, 319–320.

7. Kabalo, Israeli Community Action, 3.

8. Koller, Yosef Gurion, 159–161, 164–165, 169–170; Daniel, Be-darkei shikum, 42.

9. “Bikur be-merkazei ha-shikum [A Visit to the Rehabilitation Centers],” Al Ha-Mishmar, December 24, 1948, 2; The Regional Office in Jerusalem of the Ministry of War Casualties, Nizkey milhama, 8.

10. David Ben-Gurion, diary entry, January 3 and 4, 1949, the Ben-Gurion Archive [hereinafter: BGA]; Daniel, Be-darkei shikum, 32; Eldar, Abraham Ziegel, 28.

11. David Ben-Gurion, diary entry, February 10, 1949 and May 20, 1949, BGA.

12. Rivlin and Prath, David Ben-Gurion, pages not numbered.

13. Jewish Agency Executive meeting, February 7, 1949], BGA, item 227639; Ma’ariv, April 17, 1949. For an overview of authorities’ suspicion toward an association set up by veteran overseas volunteers (Mahal), which among other things was to help veterans with housing, see Kabalo, Israeli Community Action, 278–280.

14. “Ha-tokhnit le-shikum ha-hayalim (skira),” 16–21.

15. Naor, “The 1948 War,” 50.

16. Segev, 1949, 152; Defense Committee meeting, January 14, 1949, Israel State Archive [hereinafter: ISA], ISA-Knesset-ForeigDefeCommittee-001f3sx.

17. “Hok ha-hayalim ha-meshuhrarim bifnei ha-knesset [The Knesset to Vote on the Veterans’ Law],” Ha-Tzofe, March 22, 1949, 1.

18. “Rak 1600 hayalim meshuhrarim nirshemu betor zkukim le-diyur [Only 1600 Soldiers have Registered as Elligible for Housing],” Haaretz, May 29, 1949, 4.

19. Reshumut [Official Gazette], no. 13, The Law for the Protection of the Soldier (Apartment), Chapter A, July 1, 1949, https://main.knesset.gov.il/activity/legislation/laws/pages/lawbill.aspx?t=lawreshumot&lawitemid=147323 (accessed October 11, 2020); Naor, “The 1948 War,” 50.

20. “Hok tfisat nehasim yakel al shikun olim ve-hayalim meshuhrarim [The Assets’ Seizure Law Will Help Immigrants and Veterans Get Housing],” Davar, July 6, 1949, 1.

21. Shilo to Ben-Gurion, April 4, 1950, ISA, G-5471/10 (in this document, Shilo refers to Ben-Gurion’s order of September 1948, but this is most probably a typing error).

22. “Tusar herpat ha-azuva me-ha-hayal ha-meshuhrar be-shetah ha-shikun [Let Us Remove the Shame of Squalor from Veterans in Housing],” Ha-Tzofe, November 8, 1949, 2.

23. Annals of the Ninety-First Session of the First Knesset Plenum, November 29, 1949, https://fs.knesset.gov.il/1/Plenum/1_ptm_250213.pdf (accessed October 11, 2020).

24. “Metzukat meshuhrarim hasrei gag [The Plight of Unhoused Veterans],” Haaretz, February 8, 1950, 2.

25. “Ha-hayal ha-meshuhrar ba-hityashvut [The Settlement of Veterans],” Ba-Mahane, June 8, 1950, 10; David Ben-Gurion, diary entry, May 31, 1949, and May 28, 1950, BGA; Naor, “The 1948 War,” 50–51.

26. Koller, Yosef Gurion, 162; Defense Committee meeting, January 14, 1949, ISA, ISA-Knesset-ForeigDefeCommittee-001f3s×; “Ha-memshala mesakemet pe’ulot ha-shikum, ko’ah adam, refu’a ve-yahalomim [A Summary of the Government’s Action in regard to Housing, Manpower, and Medicine and Diamonds],” Ha-Boker, September 11, 1951, 4.

27. Drin (Drabkin), Housing in Israel, 90.

28. Swenarton, Homes Fit for Heroes, 1, 112.

29. Aalen, Homes for Irish Heroes, 305–307.

30. Vale, From the Puritans, 15, 99, 241–243; von Hoffman, “Housing and Planning,” 235–236.

31. “Tohniot ha-memshala le-klitat hayalim meshuhrarim [The Government’s Plans for the Absorption of Veterans],” Ha-Mashkif, October 1, 1945, 4; “Ha-shikun ha-amami be-Eretz Yisrael – ba’ayotav ve-hesegav [Popular Housing in the Land of Israel – Its Problems and Achievements],” Yediot Iriyat Tel Aviv, February 15, 1948, 17; Defense Committee meeting, January 14, 1949, ISA, ISA-Knesset-ForeigDefeCommittee-001f3s×.

32. Zalman Lavon, “Shikun be-medinat yisrael [Housing in the State of Israel],” July 15, 1948, Labor Party Archive [hereinafter: LPA], 2-004-1948-204.

33. “Eegeret la-hayalim [Letter to Soldiers],” no. 3, January 10, 1949, LPA, 2-002-1949-55b.

34. Meeting of Mapai Members Presiding in the Knesset’s Economic Committees, December 7, 1949, LPA, 2 -01101949-4.

35. Golan, Shinui merhavi, 123.

36. ”1000 dirot le-hayalim meshuhrarim [1000 Apartments for Veterans],” Haaretz, June 28, 1949, 2.

37. “Ha-memshala mesakemet pe’ulot ha-shikum, ko’ah adam, refu’a ve-yahalomim,” Ha-Boker, September 11, 1951, 4; Drin (Drabkin), Housing in Israel, 90–91.

38. Ben-Gurion, Be-hilachem Yisrael, 339.

39. “Meshahrerei Yerushalaim tov’im karka le-shikunam [The Liberators of Jerusalem Demand Land for Housing],” Ha-Boker, November 21, 1951, 3.

40. Central Bureau of Statistics, Mirsham ha-toshavim; Schmelz, “Ha-uchlusia ha-Yehudit,” 135.

41. “Be-makot gersha ha-mishtara olim ve-hayalim me-binyan [The Police Used Violence to disperse Immigrants and Veterans],” Al Ha-Mishmar, September 1, 1950, 6.

42. Administration Officer of the Jerusalem District to commanders in the field, November 18, 1948, Archive of the Israel Defense Forces and the Security Establishment (hereinafter: AIDF), 111–959/1949, 19.

43. Eldar, Abraham Ziegel, 28.

44. Kabalo, Israeli Community Action, 275–276.

45. “Hukam irgun hayalim meshuhrarim be-Yerushalaim [A Veterans Organization has been Established in Jerusalem],” Kol Ha-Am, February 25, 1949, 7.

46. Naor, “The 1948 War,” 50.

47. Teperberg to the Jerusalem District Commander, the District Officer, the Jerusalem Office of the Absorption Department and the Custodian of Abandoned Property, November 4, 1949, Central Zionist Archive [hereinafter: CZA], S84/297.

48. “Ha-ir ha-atika be-katamon [The Old City in Qatamon],” Haaretz, February 28, 1953, 3.

49. “Zichron dvarim me-siha she-hitkaima ben anshey mahleket ha-klita be-mehoz Yerushalaim le-ktzinei sa’ad be-nos’ei shikun, December 15, 1948 [Memorandum of a Conversation between Personnel of the Jewish Agency’s Absorption Department in the Jerusalem District and Army Welfare Officers Regarding Housing, December 15, 1948],” CZA, S84/70/1, 80; Eliner to the Absorption Department of the Jewish Agency, January 6, 1949, CZA, S84/70/1, 34; Lufven, Ish yotze, 127–130; Yisraeli to the welfare squad by the Jerusalem City Officer, January 17, 1949, CZA, S84/311, 55.

50. Goldstein to Eliner, September 2, 1951, CZA, S84/73, 61; “Doh yeshiva im ovdey Givat Sha’ul Bet [Report on Metting with Staff at Givat Shaul B],” October 17, 1949, CZA, S84/28, 121.

51. Shilo to Friedman, February 27, 1950, ISA, GL-3061/2; Shilo to Sapir, February 23, 1950 and Shilo to Avitzur, March 22, 1950, IDFA, 7–1291/1951, 76 and 87; “Doh al ha-tipul be-hayalim meshuhrarim be-mehoz Yerushalim, March-April 1953 [Report on Treatment of Demobilized Soldiers in the Jerusalem District, March-April 1953],” CZA, S84/311, 13.

52. Custodian of Abandoned Property to the District Officer, May 8 1951, CZA, S84/147; Golan, Shinui merhavi, 43–44.

53. “Pgisha artzit shel ba’ei koah ha-snifim ba-moshavot, be-yeshuvey ha-olim ve ha-yeshuvim ha-ironi’im likrat ha-ve’ida ha-shvi’it, February 12, 1950 [Protocol of the Nationwide Meeting of Mapai Representatives in the Moshavot, Immigrant Settlements and Urban Settlements in Lieu of the Seventh Mapai Convention, February 12, 1950],” LPA, 2-021-1949-31.

54. Golan, Shinui merhavi, 66.

55. “Gilui da’at shel ha-va’ad le-nehei milhemet ha-shihrur, November 14, 1949 [Opinion Statement, Committee for Invalides of the War of Liberation, November 14, 1949],” CZA, S84/246; “150 hayalim meshuhrarim ve-nehim palshu le-dirot be-shehunat Der Abu-Tor bi-Yerushalaim [150 Veterans and Disabled Persons are Squatting in Apartments in the Abu Tor Neighborhood in Jerusalem],” Kol Ha-Am, November 15, 1949, 4; “Al ma ragshu nehei Yerushalaim? [What Has Made Disabled Persons in Jerusalem so Worked Up?],” Yedioth Aharonoth, December 16, 1949, 6.

56. “Piku’ah al rehush natush [Overseeing Abandoned Property],” Davar, January 7, 1949, 4.

57. Shilo to Friedman, February 27, 1950, ISA, GL-3061/2.

58. Shilo to Sapir, February 23, 1950, AIDF, 7–1291/1951.

59. “Din ve-heshbon al ha-bikoret ba-hevra diur le-meshuhrarei ha-milhama be’am, January 1, 1959 [Report on an Inspection of the Diyur Ex-Servicemen Housing Co. Ltd, January 1, 1959],” ISA, G-2375/34.

60. For a detailed description of the ailments of the Jerusalem Municipality in early statehood, see Brin and Charney, “Planning as Political Declaration.”

61. Hoffman to the Jerusalem City Engineer, November 26 and December 15, 1948, Jerusalem City Archive (hereinafter: JCA), 1697/4.

62. “Hukam irgun hayalim meshuhrarim be-Yerushalaim”, Kol Ha-Am, February 25, 1949, 7.

63. David Ben-Gurion, diary entry, January 28, 1951, BGA.

64. Naor, “Hazit ha-oref,” 38; Naor, “Israel’s 1948 War,” 241–243; Strachan, “Essay and Reflection,” 341–345.

65. Naor, “Hazit ha-oref,” 47.

66. The Regional Office in Jerusalem of the Ministry of War Casualties, Nizkey milhama, 8.

67. Rabinowitz, “Ha-optzia she-nishkeha,” 125–32.

68. “Ha-medina ve-Yerushalaim [The State and Jerusalem],” Davar, June 24, 1949, 2.

69. Givon to Meirson, June 26, 1950, ISA, G-6164/29.

70. Gurion to Shafrir and others, July 11, 1949, ISA, G-2375/22.

71. Gurion to Shafrir and others, October 19, 1949, ISA, G-2375/22.

72. Goldstein to Eliner, September 2, 1951, CZA, S84/73.

73. Drin (Drabkin), Housing in Israel, 91.

74. Daniel, Be-darkei shikum, 44; “Ha-memshala mesakemet pe’ulot ha-shikum, ko’ah adam, refu’a ve-yahalomim”, Ha-Boker, September 11, 1951, 4; Golan, Shinui merhavi, 123–124.

75. “Hafgana so’eret shel hayalim meshuhrarim ha-dorshim shikun be-Yerushalaim [A Turbulent Protest of Veterans Who Demand Housing in Jerusalem],” Ha-Tzofe, November 22, 1951, 4.

76. “Hayalim meshuhrarim kovlim neged ikuv haspakat homarim le-shikunam [Veterans are Protesting the Delay in Providing Material for Housing],” Herut, May 21, 1952, 2; Cohen, Yerushalayim asher katavti, 53.

77. “Tazkir shel mishtaknei shlav bet be-Yerushalaim, ‘Me’onot David’ May 11, 1952 [Memorandum of the ‘David Housing’ Phase Two Tenants, May 11, 1952],” ISA, G-2375/22.

78. “Mafginim hishbito ha-avoda be-iriat Yerushalaim [Protester have Stopped the Work in Jerusalem’s City Hall],” Ma’ariv, December 28, 1952, 3; “Nehim ve-hayalim meshuhrarim nidreshu le-ha-hpil ha-tashlum al shikunehem [Disabled Persons and Veterans were Asked to Pay Twice as Much for Their Housing],” Herut, November 5, 1957, 4.

79. “Ha-hayal ha-meshuhrar mehapes ktovet … [The Veteran Looking for an Address],” Ma’ariv, April 17, 1949, 3.

80. (Unidentified name) to the Ministry of Finance’s representative office in Jerusalem, October 5, 1949, Labor Movement Archive, 192-3-333-IV; Levine to Guttman, June 29, 1953, ISA, G-5441/24.

81. Golan, Shinui merhavi, 68–71; Krystal, “Salmat beton va-melet”, 66–67.

82. Durkheim, Suicide; Simmel, Conflict; Malešević, Nationalism; Horowitz, Tkhelet ve-avak, 46–47.