Abstract
Amman has been engaged in a diplomatic high-wire act, attempting to stabilise relations both with Israel – despite domestic protests and its intense opposition to the possible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza – and with Iran. It is also seeking to avert social and fiscal crises that would result from a collapse in funding for the United Nations relief mission supporting Palestinian refugees.
The crisis raging in Israel and Gaza since October 2023 has threatened Jordan’s interests in ways not seen since the country lost control of the West Bank in 1967. Public protests in response to the crisis have grown to sizes comparable to those that occurred during the Arab Spring. Jordan’s security has also been exposed to Iranian efforts to regionalise the conflict by encouraging militia activity in Iraq, which has fuelled the protests in Jordan, and by exploiting Jordanian airspace to strike Israel. Amman has responded by adopting an activist diplomatic approach to de-escalate the conflict.
The government views the ongoing war, the extreme right-wing government in Israel, the weakness of the Palestinian Authority and increasing settler violence in the West Bank as raising the risk of a doomsday scenario it has feared for many years: an influx of Palestinian refugees from the West Bank into Jordan, the end of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) – which provides services to 2.4 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan – the loss of Jordanian custodianship over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem, and interruptions in vital water and energy supplies from Israel due to heightened political tensions.
Palestinian displacement
Jordan adopted a sharp position against any possible displacement of Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan immediately after the outbreak of the Hamas–Israel war. The Jordanian monarch, King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein, declared that displacement was a ‘red line’. The prime minister, Bisher Al-Khasawneh, warned that any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians from Gaza or the West Bank would amount to a ‘declaration of war’ on his country. Jordan’s foreign minister, Ayman Safadi, also affirmed these positions on multiple occasions.
Jordan’s concerns about the displacement of Palestinians relate to the country’s demographic history. Since its independence in 1946, Jordan has been challenged by several refugee waves from the countries surrounding it – Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Syria – as well as countries in the broader Middle East, including Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Refugees now constitute around 33.1% of the country’s total population, and Palestinian refugees comprise 21.1%. The majority of these refugees hold both Jordanian citizenship and refugee status. In addition, there is a significant portion of non-refugee Jordanians who have Palestinian ancestors. This situation of dual identity complicates Jordan’s politics, making any new refugee influx a destabilising factor for its society and political system. Indeed, a general feeling of marginalisation among East Bank Jordanians has created an anti-immigration and anti-Palestinian sentiment in the country.
Jerusalem and the holy sites
The rightward drift in Israeli politics in recent years has amplified Jordanian officials’ concerns about the sustainability of the status quo in Jerusalem. The increasing number of invasions of the Al-Aqsa Mosque by Israeli right-wing extremists as well as the Israeli police’s discriminatory control of access to the mosque are considered clear violations of Jordan’s historical role in Jerusalem. In January 2023, for instance, Israeli police blocked the Jordanian ambassador’s entry to the Al-Aqsa Mosque. That same month, Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir declared that he would continue storming the Al-Aqsa Mosque, stating, ‘with all due respect to Jordan … I went up to the Temple Mount, I will continue to go up to the Temple Mount. … The State of Israel is a sovereign state, an independent state, not under the auspices of any other country’. Events such as these, alongside some Israeli cabinet members’ and officials’ opposition to Jordan’s role in the holy sites, have been interpreted in Amman as evidence that Israel is not interested in de-escalating tensions in Jerusalem.
The current situation concerns Amman for two related reasons. Firstly, it threatens the Hashemite role in Jerusalem and the kingdom’s historical legitimacy. Jerusalem has been a determining factor in Jordanian foreign policy since the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921. The four Hashemite monarchs who led the country in the decades that followed saw their role in Jerusalem as a source of legitimacy for their rule, not only in the eyes of their subjects but also in the broader Arabic and Islamic worlds. Attempts by these rulers to resolve tensions over Jerusalem resulted in the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace treaty. Article 9 of the treaty states:
In accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.
Secondly, Amman is concerned that controversy over Jerusalem could increase public support for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s main opposition movement. This group has traditionally exploited the public sentiment associated with Jerusalem to challenge and embarrass the government. The firm positions adopted by Abdullah and his ministers over Jerusalem have been in part an attempt to pre-empt such criticism.
The future of UNRWA
Amman is also concerned about the decline in international funding for UNRWA. More UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees reside in Jordan than anywhere else – 40.7%. This situation makes UNRWA operations in the country important from both an economic and a political perspective. UNRWA removes a burden from the Jordanian government’s shoulders in terms of health, education and social protection services provided to refugees. In 2022, for example, it ran 161 schools and 25 primary healthcare facilities across the country. Politically, the 2.4m refugees registered with UNRWA also hold Jordanian citizenship, therefore enjoying political and social privileges in Jordan while retaining an ability to claim a ‘right of return’ to Palestine, should a future Israeli–Palestinian settlement recognise this right.
UNRWA’s role in Jordan therefore makes the agency’s work vital to the stability of the Hashemite Kingdom. Conversely, defunding UNRWA as advocated by Israel would increase the government’s financial burden over the refugees. These Palestinians would lose refugee status, causing a major shift in Jordan’s political, demographic and security situation. Indeed, the dual identity of Palestinian refugees in Jordan is already creating some tensions in terms of political representation and economic rights, as well as raising a debate around who is Jordanian. If Palestinian refugees lose their refugee status, this will automatically increase fears among indigenous Jordanians about their claim to political power in the country.
Economic concerns
The regionalisation of the war in Gaza has negatively affected the Jordanian economy. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have blocked shipping to and from the Port of Aqaba, Jordan’s only port. In addition, rising tensions between Jordan and the Israeli government are generating concerns about the former’s dependence on Israeli energy and water imports. In 2022, Jordan’s natural-gas imports amounted to around 3.5 billion cubic meters, about 77.1% of which came from Israel. Israel provides a smaller share of water to Jordan – 50m cubic metres annually, or 3.6% of the total estimated 1.4bn cubic meters of water needed nationwide – but the amount is important nonetheless because Amman struggles with a persistent water deficit. Jordan is thus vulnerable to changes in Israeli policy. Indeed, the Israeli government has already threatened not to renew the water-supply agreement due to the country’s position on the war in Gaza. In 2018, the Israeli government made similar threats after Jordan reclaimed the areas of Baqoura and Ghumar from Israel.
Due to Jordan’s geographic proximity to Israel and the Palestinian territories, moreover, the country has witnessed a decline in inbound tourism. Hotel occupancy rates have not exceeded 15% since the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack, and tourist arrivals into the country have declined to the lowest level since 2022.
Security concerns
The regionalisation of the conflict in Gaza has also increased security pressure on Jordan. In the past few years, Jordan has engaged in a low-visibility confrontation with Iran’s allies and networks of influence in Syria and Iraq. This includes a high-intensity battle against drug cartels in Syria backed by Iran and President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. These cartels have increased their smuggling activities since October 2023. Iranian-backed militias operate across western Iraq and southern Syria, where they continuously attack US facilities. The drone strike on the Jordan-based Tower 22 American military base was conducted from Iraq by one of these groups.
The most pressing security issues for Amman are domestic protests and the security of borders shared with countries controlled by Iran’s allies and partners. Jordanians, including those of Palestinian origin, have taken to the streets to express peacefully their sympathy with Gaza and to advocate for the termination of relations with Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood has attempted to dominate the protest movement to gain popularity ahead of parliamentary elections expected to be held by the end of 2024. Iran and its partners in various Arab countries have also attempted to destabilise Jordan by spreading misinformation about Amman’s role in the crisis and by highlighting its relations with Western countries.
Jordan remains largely immune to Tehran’s influence. Amman’s security apparatus has proved effective in blocking Iranian efforts to penetrate its politics. Iran’s role in defeating ISIS in Iraq and in preserving the Assad regime in Syria gave it a permanent presence on Jordan’s borders, and the war in Gaza was another such opportunity for Tehran. It mobilised its media in support of the protests. Hamas also encouraged the protests in Jordan after its leader, Ismail Haniyeh, visited Tehran on 26 March. Simultaneously, the Iran-backed militia Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced its intention to mobilise 12,000 Jordanian fighters against Israel. Finally, Iran violated Jordanian airspace during its air attacks against Israel launched on 14 April. Amman responded by shooting down uninhabited aerial vehicles over its territory, both to defend its sovereignty and to protect Jordanians from any threat they might pose. The government then summoned Iran’s ambassador to Amman to protest Tehran’s behaviour. Iran and some in the Arab world criticised the monarchy for joining a Western coalition in protecting Israel from air attacks. The move, however, sent a clear message to both Israel and Iran that Jordan was not interested in taking part in a regional war, and the king said he would not allow his country to become a ‘theatre of war’. Jordan’s participation, meanwhile, strengthened its standing in western capitals.
An activist approach to foreign policy
Since the outbreak of the Hamas–Israel war, the Jordanian monarch and his government have advocated an immediate and permanent ceasefire alongside the resumption of diplomatic talks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, Abdullah made at least 16 foreign trips to mobilise Western and Arab support for Jordan’s position on the war. He was the first Arab head of state to meet US President Joe Biden at the White House after the 7 October attack on Israel and visited major capitals including London, Brussels and Berlin to push for a ceasefire in Gaza. Notably, neither he nor his foreign minister have visited Israel nor publicly hosted Israeli officials.
Abdullah has articulated a list of demands that includes: the rejection of the transfer of Palestinians to either Jordan or Egypt; the end of the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip; the continuation of the status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem; and the resumption of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians to achieve a two-state solution.
Abdullah was among the first international leaders to label Israel’s practices of cutting food, water and electricity supplies in the Gaza Strip as ‘war crimes’. During a Jordanian Armed Forces meeting attended by the chiefs of the army and security services, he asserted that his country would protect its borders and would ‘not allow new waves of refugees’.
To maintain global focus on Gaza, the Jordanian monarch visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial in Rwanda, focusing his remarks on the ongoing war. He wrote an opinion article in the Washington Post calling for a humanitarian intervention in Gaza and for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. In November 2023, Jordan was the first country to airdrop aid to Gaza, and Jordan became a major hub for joint air operations for the delivery of additional aid. The king was on one of the planes that delivered aid to Gaza.
Besides the diplomacy led by the Jordanian king and his government, members of the royal family have also been active. Queen Rania Al-Abdullah, who has Palestinian ancestry, has vocally criticised Israel and Western states over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. The king’s uncle, Prince Al-Hasan bin Talal, visited UNRWA to show support for the agency. These royal moves were designed to placate domestic and regional audiences and to demonstrate Jordanian dynamism despite the country’s difficult diplomatic position.
Outlook
Managing the conflict has been a high-wire act for Amman. It has preserved its peace treaty with Israel, despite domestic opposition and Israel’s uncompromising position on Jerusalem, and attempted to de-escalate tensions with Tehran even as it responded forcefully to Iranian violations of its airspace. It worries that intensification of the Iran–Israel clash will once again play out within its borders and airspace.
De-escalating the Hamas–Israel war and resolving the wider Israel–Palestine conflict will remain Jordan’s top priorities for the foreseeable future. Instability on its western border has immense implications for the country just as it faces severe political and economic challenges. Amman has therefore sought to form an Arab consensus with Cairo, Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi, lobby Western capitals and obtain political cover and economic support. Conscious of the limits of its influence, Amman is waiting for US diplomatic pressure and a possible change in leadership in Israel to put the latter on a different path. If this happens, the government’s good relations with Israeli centrist figures such as Benny Gantz, coupled with its ability to influence the Palestinian Authority, is likely to play an important role.