Perceived grievance and individualising moralities: exploring the psychological structure of left-wing authoritarianism

ABSTRACT

Research shows a sharp increase in political polarization over the last two decades. While right-wing authoritarianism has received considerable academic attention, the psychological mechanisms of left-wing authoritarianism remain under-explored. This study used structural equation modeling to empirically test the factors that influence left-wing authoritarianism and its relationship with features of identity politics and psychological distress. Moral foundations theory was used to assess the moral concerns underlying left-wing authoritarianism. Participants from English-speaking countries (52.4% female, aged 18 to 85 years old) were recruited from various political groups on social media. The final sample (N = 299) voluntarily completed an online survey measuring left-wing authoritarianism, psychological distress, moral concerns, need for cognitive closure, and emotional reactivity. The final model explained 53% of the variance in left-wing authoritarianism and demonstrated that psychological distress indirectly affects left-wing authoritarianism through perceived grievance. However, perceived grievance had the strongest direct impact, providing support for the premise that perceived grievance, a feature of identity politics, constitutes a strong positive predictor of left-wing authoritarianism. Additionally, non-hypothesized mediating effects were observed from perceived grievance to the individualizing foundations and left-wing authoritarianism.

Recently, a visible rise in ideological polarization, and identity-based political movements can be observed through the emergence of ‘wokeness’ on the ‘regressive left’ and white-identitarianism on the ‘alt right’.¹ Since the 1990s, the ideological gap between partisan groups has increased and exacerbated the shrinking middle.² However, the fragmentation spreads beyond typical left-right divisions, with mainstream leftism increasingly influenced by identity politics, a prominent source of tension contributing to a right-wing populist blowback.³ This has manifested in divisive online dynamics, college campus protests,⁴ global protests and in some countries, violent riots.⁵ Previous research focusing on traditional left-right orientations may not be applicable to the contemporary ideologies inflaming western cultural wars and consequently, further investigation is required.

Authoritarianism

Researchers suggest that authoritarianism is progressively affecting civilian’s political behavior.⁶ At the psychological level, authoritarianism has been predominantly defined as adherence to conventionalism, submission to a recognized authority, and aggression toward perceived outgroups.⁷ Research has heavily focused on the right side of the political aisle, with authoritarianism largely considered a right-wing, conservative-related construct, characterized by cognitive rigidity, dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and threat sensitivity.⁸ However, in The Authoritarian Dynamic, Stenner re-conceptualized authoritarianism as an innate psychological predisposition toward intolerance that becomes activated under conditions of normative threat.⁹ Stenner argued that authoritarianism is distinct from conservatism and is better understood as an enduring psychological predisposition for demanding social uniformity over individualism.¹⁰ Along these lines, authoritarians cope with perceived external threats by expressing an intolerance for difference and invoking conformity. Growing expressions of political intolerance are observable through increased restrictions and censorship of diverse expressions of speech, where reciprocal dialogue is unwelcomed.¹¹ This coincides with an increasing enthusiasm for identity politics, which has brought forth moral claims about oppression and privilege on the basis of race, gender, and sexual orientation. Political commentators and social scientists use the term identity politics (IP) to refer to the politicization of identities where group attributes such as gender, race, sexuality, and disability are centered.¹² For radicals on the left, IP is central to social justice activism and theory, which is colloquially linked with being ‘woke’; meaning to have awakened to societal injustice.¹³

Theoretical framework

Moral foundations theory (MFT) argues that moral judgments are based on five psychological foundations: the ‘individualising’ cluster of care and fairness, and the ‘binding’ group-centered cluster of loyalty, authority, and sanctity.¹⁴ These evolved systems often underlie cross-cultural differences in moral judgments.¹⁵ Moreover, the five-factor structure has been supported across thirty Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) and non-WEIRD societies and cultures.¹⁶ Across multiple studies in various countries left-leaning individuals have been found to rely upon the individualizing foundations, while right-leaning individuals base their morality across all five foundations.¹⁷ Although conservatives have more evenly distributed moral concerns, they generally rate the binding foundations as more important to their understanding of morality.¹⁸ As leftists primarily depend on two foundations, they misinterpret the motivations of conservatives who hold moral concerns they do not recognize.¹⁹ Limited research has applied MFT to extreme political attitudes and authoritarianism; however, a recent Twitter content analysis,²⁰ found that the moral signatures of left-wing authoritarianism (LWA), centered harm avoidance (characteristic of leftists), but also centered the ingroup and authority foundations (characteristic of conservatives) more than fairness. This demonstrates that moralities in leftists can display a conservative signature when attitudes become authoritarian. The significant trend toward IP has seen group attributes become increasingly sacralized,²¹ with political discourse becoming personalized and absolutist.

Identity politics and social justice

Social justice movements have had an increasing influence on society, particularly in the form of IP.²² These movements seek to empower individuals by promoting a narrative of certain group identities as marginalized entities, which are polarized against other privileged group identities.²³ Social justice calls attention to forms of structural oppression that produce inequalities, including patriarchy, systemic racism, white privilege, and heteronormativity.²⁴ Moreover, it has been suggested that a key attribute of leftist IP and social justice ideology are perceptions of victimhood, with awareness of privilege and oppression referring to the capacity to recognize social injustices arising from systemic privilege and oppression.²⁵ Fasce and Avendaño recently found that IP was composed of three dimensions: perceived grievance, identity-based ideology and prejudice toward groups perceived as privileged, which was then related to extreme justice-seeking behavior.²⁶

Leftist authoritarian attempts to enforce ideological adherence have gradually emerged through censorship, disciplinary action, and other implicit forms of illiberalism.²⁷ Social penalties are most pervasive on social media, where individuals can face a torrent of shout-downs, demands for retractions, and deplatforming. It has been suggested that algorithmic ordering and engagement metrics on social media platforms incentivize hostility and moral outrage.²⁸ As ideas expressed in speech become increasingly regulated, studies show that political correctness has been steadily reemerging.²⁹ For example, the rise of safe spaces and trigger warnings on university campuses rationalize speech regulations on the grounds that certain language is emotionally dangerous and can be perceived as a form of violence.³⁰ Lukianoff and Haidt argue that cognitive distortions are driving political correctness norms and policies, with exaggerated patterns of thought mobilized in calls for speech protections.³¹ Cognitive distortions magnify threat perceptions and generate maladaptive behavioral consequences such as emotional reasoning, all-or-nothing thinking, and catastrophising.³² Thus, Lukianoff and Haidt argue that shielding individuals from ideas that might cause discomfort encourages unhealthy mental habits and psychological fragility.³³

An intolerance of diverse ideas is also seen with ‘cancel culture’, a form of reputation destruction where an individual may be maliciously bullied and socially ostracized for expressing allegedly problematic beliefs.³⁴ Kaufmann recently found high levels of authoritarianism and political discrimination in western universities, where one in ten academics endorsed extreme forms of cancellation.³⁵ Narrowing social norms of acceptable discourse has seemingly coincided with an increase in dogmatic political views and affective polarization.³⁶ While examining powerful discourses is a valid enterprise, these ideologies do not submit themselves to the marketplace of ideas, thereby inhibiting legitimate disagreement and productive dialogue.

Left-wing authoritarianism

Lately, research exploring the construct of left-wing authoritarianism has provided evidence of LWA.³⁷ Through adjusting Altemeyer’s classic right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale to focus on liberal leaders, Conway et al. found that LWA is a valid construct, that was significantly associated with dogmatism, prejudice, desire for strong authority figures and punitive attitudes toward dissidents.³⁸ Through testing the validity of LWA across 12 studies, Conway et al. found that LWA was related to threat sensitivity, dogmatism, belief in a dangerous world, ‘Trump threat’, and a need for group cohesion.³⁹ Authoritarians on both sides appear to demonstrate increased sensitivity to perceived threats,⁴⁰ which fits with Stenner’s proposition in that insecure conditions may contribute to authoritarianism as individuals attempt to neutralize potential threats.⁴¹

Recently, Costello et al. developed a domain-specific conceptualization of LWA, comprised of anti-hierarchical aggression (revolutionary aggression toward institutions), top-down censorship (support for speech restrictions), and anti-conventionalism (rejection of traditional values).⁴² In a nationally representative United States (U.S.) sample, Costello et al. found that LWA was positively correlated with acts of violence during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests.⁴³ Across six samples (N = 7, 258), LWA and RWA displayed uniform relations with over 60 criterion-related variables, including belief in a dangerous world, moral absolutism, aggression toward outgroups, preferences for social uniformity, cognitive rigidity, and prejudice toward different others.⁴⁴ Studies demonstrate that the markers of authoritarianism are relatively similar across both sides.⁴⁵ Compared to moderates, extremists are also more likely to experience negative emotions and higher levels of arousal.⁴⁶ However, Costello et al. noted that the motives and values driving authoritarians on both sides are likely to deviate.⁴⁷ Further research is needed to examine the usefulness of LWA as a psychological construct.

Authoritarianism, identity politics, and psychopathology

Researchers have examined whether authoritarianism is a risk factor for psychological distress in relation to conservatism and results are notable for their inconsistency.⁴⁸ Some studies indicate that RWA is related to lower levels of psychological well-being.⁴⁹ However, conservatives generally score higher on life satisfaction, happiness, and self-esteem, compared to liberals who display higher levels of neuroticism ⁵⁰ and higher negative emotionality than RWA.⁵¹ As predicted by MFT, justice-related concerns typically motivate left-wing political judgments, and injustice sensitivities are more prominent among emotionally vulnerable individuals.⁵²

Identity politics appears to propagate a set of non-negotiable axioms that may foster distorted perceptions, and a sense of outrage. Authoritarianism has been related to absolute thinking styles,⁵³ which can be facilitated by intense emotional arousal,⁵⁴ qualities observed in psychological conditions.⁵⁵Authoritarianism appears to embrace the pathological features of psychological distress, including high levels of cognitive rigidity and negative emotionality.⁵⁶ Mental illness has previously been associated with violent extremism, predominantly among radical terrorists.⁵⁷ New forms of LWA have been described as an aggrieved worldview that perceives public life as profoundly unfair, and unjust, which generates extreme justice-seeking behavior.⁵⁸ It is therefore reasonable, to predict that adopting such a worldview could not only be psychologically appealing for vulnerable individuals but may also have a detrimental mental health impact.

Perceived grievance

Left-wing IP and critical social justice activism emphasize identity-based struggles based on race, gender and sexuality. Narratives that essentialize perceptions of grievance and a sense of injustice have been linked to LWA motivations.⁵⁹ Grievance refers to the perceived injustice caused by others⁶⁰ and has been identified as a risk factor associated with political extremism and radicalization.⁶¹ Perceived unfairness and group deprivation have been previously identified as contributing to authoritarian forms of justice-seeking.⁶² Competitive victimhood has also been found to contribute to political protests and social media activism.⁶³ Additionally, exposure to narratives of inequality and oppression can induce perceptions of grievance rather than direct personal victimization.⁶⁴ With political intolerance escalating, aggrieved individuals may be more likely to self-select into ideologies that propose authoritarian solutions to social injustices. However, such politicized conflict may also generate a state of distress.

Study rationale and aims

Currently, polarizing ideologies are becoming more profound and leading to significant societal tensions. While authoritarianism in right-wing contexts has been long studied, very little is known about how authoritarianism manifests in left-wing groups. Exploring the mechanisms underlying LWA will allow researchers to better understand the psychological processes held by all types of authoritarianism. This study aimed to expand the scope of authoritarianism in relation to leftist instances of IP by assessing perceived grievance (PG), a suggested feature of IP and risk factor associated with extremism. The objective was to investigate the potential relationships between LWA, PG and psychological distress. These relationships were considered within the context of MFT, to examine if the moral concerns underlying LWA are underpinned by the same sensitivities as leftists. Essentially, certain aspects of IP, such as PG, may reinforce and encourage unhealthy mental habits in both healthy and unhealthy populations, which may then foster authoritarian impulses. It is therefore plausible that these relationships function in two directions, in that distress may lead to LWA through PG, and simultaneously PG and LWA may generate psychological distress. Consequently, three models with different directionalities were developed, displayed in Figures 1–3.

Figure 1. Model A.

Figure 2. Model B.

Figure 3. Model C.

As IP seeks to elevate marginalized groups; social grievance narratives may be more attractive to maladjusted individuals, who may consider authoritarianism as a legitimate means of achieving equality. Consequently, in Model A, it was hypothesized that the relationship between psychological distress and LWA will be partially mediated by PG, need for cognitive closure, and emotional reactivity. It is additionally hypothesized that the individualizing moral foundations typically endorsed by left-wing adherents will also be associated with higher levels of LWA.

Conversely, IP appears to encourage a worldview dependent on a distorted and emotionally reactive lens. Therefore, in model B, it was hypothesized that the relationship between PG and LWA will be partially mediated by psychological distress, emotional reactivity and need for cognitive closure.

Finally, in model C, it was hypothesized that PG and psychological distress are not distinct dimensions but are correlated and function together to indirectly impact LWA, through emotional reactivity and need for cognitive closure.

Method

Participants

460 English-speaking participants were recruited online. Cases with substantial missing data (i.e. only initial questions completed on the survey) were removed, leaving a final sample of N = 299, with a fairly balanced distribution of males, 42%, and females, 52.4%. The majority (19.4%) were aged between 25 and 34 years old, and the sample was predominantly Caucasian (74.2%). Participants demographic information is presented in Tables 1 and 2 outlines participants political orientations. The sample demonstrated a strong tilt toward the left end of the scale, with 39.8% of the sample reporting very left orientations.

Table 1. Participants demographic information.

		n	%
Gender	Male	126	42.1
	Female	157	52.5
	Non-Binary	8	2.7
	Prefer not to say	8	2.7
Age	18–24	53	17.7
	25–34	58	19.4
	35–44	42	14.0
	45–54	46	15.4
	55–64	52	17.4
	65–74	39	13.0
	75–84	8	2.7
	85+	1	.3
Ethnicity	Caucasian	222	74.2
	European	32	10.7
	African American	1	.3
	Hispanic/Latino	2	.7
	Asian	9	3
	Aboriginal Australian/Torres Strait Islander	8	2.7
	New Zealand	5	1.7
	African	2	.7
	Middle Eastern	1	.3
	Other	17	5.7
Employment	Full-time	88	29.4
	Part-time	62	20.7
	Unemployed looking for work	17	5.7
	Unemployed not looking for work	16	5.4
	Student	52	17.4
	Retired	51	17.1
	Other	13	4.3
Education	Some high school	13	4.3
	High school	70	23.4
	Trade school	16	5.4
	Associates degree	18	6.0
	Bachelor’s degree	109	36.5
	Master’s degree	64	21.4
	PhD or higher	7	2.3
	Prefer not to say	2	.7

Table 2. Participants political preferences.

		n	%
Political Orientation	Very Left	119	39.8
	Leaning Left	109	36.5
	Centre	44	14.7
	Leaning Right	23	7.7
	Very Right	4	1.3
Social Issues	Very Left	143	47.8
	Leaning Left	96	32.1
	Centre	34	11.4
	Leaning Right	18	6.0
	Very Right	8	2.7
Fiscal Issues	Very Left	124	41.5
	Leaning Left	109	36.5
	Centre	38	12.7
	Leaning Right	22	7.4
	Very Right	6	2.0
Political Interest	Very Interested	212	70.9
	Somewhat Interested	75	25.1
	Not Much Interested	12	4.0

Design

This study used a cross-sectional survey design. Predictor variables included perceived grievance, psychological distress, need for cognitive closure, emotional reactivity, and moral concerns. The outcome variable was left-wing authoritarianism.

Materials

Demographic questionnaire

Participants completed demographic items relating to age, gender, ethnicity, education, and employment.

Political orientation

Three measures of political orientation were used: (a) A single-item measure of self-identified left-right ideology, ranging from very left (1) to very right (5); (b) a 5-point Likert-scale assessing social and fiscal political orientations (1 = very left, 5 = very right); and (c) a 3-point index of political interest (1 = not much interested, 3 = very interested).

Left-wing authoritarianism

Left-wing authoritarianism was measured using the shortened 22-item LWA Scale.⁶⁵ The scale is divided into three factors: revolutionary aggression (e.g. ‘certain elements in our society must be made to pay for the violence of their ancestors’), top-down censorship (e.g. ‘political correctness does not hinder free speech – it expands it’), and anti-conventionalism (e.g. ‘I hate being around non-progressive people’). Participants indicated their response toward various statements on a 5-point Likert scale, (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. LWA scores were averaged, with higher scores representing greater levels of LWA. The scale has good reliability (⍺ = 0.94) and convergent validity with other measures of authoritarianism and discriminant validity with political ideology.⁶⁶ In this study, the scale demonstrated excellent reliability (⍺ = .93).

Perceived grievance

Perceived grievance (PG) was measured through an individual’s awareness of four forms of privilege and oppression including White Privilege, Heterosexism, Christian Privilege, and Sexism. These indicators are measured by the 39-item Privilege and Oppression Inventory (POI) ⁶⁷ which has been previously utilized to measure PG in relation to IP and social justice activism.⁶⁸ Strong content validity and acceptable internal consistency has been found for each subscale (ranging from .79 to .92).⁶⁹ Items are scaled a on 6-point Likert Scale, ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (6) strongly agree. Scores on each subscale were averaged, with higher scores indicating a greater awareness of privilege and oppression. For this study, Cronbach’s alphas were excellent (ranging from $\mathit{\alpha }$ = .90 to  = .95).

Psychological distress

The Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21)⁷⁰ measured participants depression, anxiety, and stress levels. The DASS contains three subscales asking respondents to rate how much particular statements applied to them over the past week on a 4-point Likert Scale, from (0) did not apply to me at all to (3) applied to me very much. Scores were computed by adding values for each subscale, with higher scores indicating greater depression, anxiety, and stress. Several studies indicate that the DASS-21 is a reliable and valid instrument for measuring psychological distress in clinical and non-clinical adult samples.⁷¹ Each of the constructs are interrelated and show satisfactory reliability (depression, = .90, anxiety  = .82, stress  = .87).⁷² In this study, each subscale demonstrated good internal consistency (depression = .91, anxiety  = .82, stress  = .86).

Moral foundations

The moral foundations of fairness, harm, loyalty, authority, and purity were assessed using the 30-item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ).⁷³ MFQ items are divided into two sections, the first asks respondents to rate the relevance of several issues when they are making a moral judgment. Sample item for the fairness foundation: ‘Whether or not someone was denied his or her rights’. Whilst the second section asks respondents to rate their level of agreement with a range of moral statements, for example ‘Justice is the most important requirement for society”. Responses are measured on a 5-point Likert scale, (0) not at all relevant to (5) extremely relevant, with the six items per subscale averaged to produce a score for each foundation. There is substantial evidence on the scale’s reliability and validity, with test-retest analysis exhibiting stability of the foundation subscale scores over time.⁷⁴ Cronbach’s alpha score show acceptable reliability (harm-care,  = .69, fairness-reciprocity, =.65, in-group-loyalty,  = .71, authority-respect, =.74, purity-sanctity, = .84).⁷⁵ For this study, alpha reliabilities for each MFQ domains were similar: harm-care,  = .66, fairness-reciprocity, =.64, in-group-loyalty,  = .69, authority-respect, =.75, purity-sanctity,  = .79, signifying acceptable reliability.

Emotional reactivity

Emotional reactivity was measured using the shortened 18-item Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale (PERS-S)⁷⁶ which measures both positive and negative reactivity. These dimensions are captured by six subscales that measure three interrelated facets of emotional responses including the ease of activation, intensity, and duration on a 5-point Likert scale, (1) very unlike me to (5) very like me. Scores are computed by summing the items matching each subscale. The PERS demonstrates good levels of internal reliability and good concurrent validity with other emotional measures including the DASS-21, and Nock et al.’s ⁷⁷ Emotion Reactivity Scale.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Preece et al. found the internal reliability of the negative (α = .94) and positive reactivity scale (α = .93) was excellent.⁷⁹ For this study, Cronbach’s alphas of the negative (α = .90) and positive reactivity scale (α = .87) were good.

Need for cognitive closure

The 42-item Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (NFCC)⁸⁰ measured participants’ motivation for certainty and aversion to ambiguity. The NFCC scale contains five subscales that assess preferences for order, predictability, decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity and close-mindedness. Items were scored on 6-point Likert-scale, (1) strongly agree to (6) strongly disagree, with higher scores indicating a stronger NFCC. Example of items include ‘I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view’. The scale contains high internal consistency (α = .84) and acceptable discriminant and convergent validity with other measures of related constructs including intolerance of ambiguity,⁸¹ and Dogmatism.⁸² For this study, the scale demonstrated good reliability (⍺ = .84) and Cronbach’s values for each subscale were acceptable to good (ranging from  = .75 to  = .88).

Procedure

Ethical approval was granted by the University of the Sunshine Coast Human Research Ethics Committee (approval number: S211569). Using snowball sampling, participants from the general population were recruited through social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, Instagram), forums (e.g. Reddit) and e-mail correspondence. Advertisements were posted in general news feeds, community groups, and in a variety of online political groups on left and right-wing politics. Advertisements contained a brief statement outlining inclusion criteria and invited participants to the questionnaire via an online link. Student participants were sought through university portal announcements online, which invited them to participate in the survey in exchange for a course credit. Prior to commencement, each participant was provided with an information sheet outlining a brief overview of the study. Participants were informed that their responses were anonymous, and they could withdraw at any time. With the exception of the student participants, no rewards were offered for participation and all participants provided consent prior to their inclusion in the study. Each student participant was briefed on the general aims of the research following survey completion.

Data analysis

To allow for a detailed exploration of the hypothesized relationships, structural equation modeling (SEM) was selected for statistical analysis. While there is no collectively accepted method for determining sample size for SEM, there is consensus among researchers that a ‘large’ sample size above 200 is sufficient, as is the case here.⁸³ Three a priori models informed by key literature findings were created prior to analysis. Model fit was assessed through the Normed Chi-Squared χ², the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Root Mean-Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Normed Fit Index (NFI), Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and the Tucker Lewis Index (TLI).⁸⁴ Maximum likelihood estimation was used, and model fit was considered acceptable if the Normed Chi-Squared (χ²/df) was ≤ 2,⁸⁵ RMSEA ≤ .08,⁸⁶ NFI ≥ .90, CFI ≥ .93 and the TLI ≥. 90.⁸⁷ Prior to running inferential analyzes, cases with missing data were removed. Next, the standardized values of all variables were observed and one univariate outlier exceeding cut off values was removed. Multivariate outliers were detected by comparing the calculated Mahalanobis distance against a chi-square distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of independent variables. Six multivariate outliers violating the critical χ2 value (α = .01) were removed.⁸⁸ All assumptions were met unless otherwise stated and considering the final sample size (N = 299) in relation to central limit theory, assumptions for SEM were met.⁸⁹ All analyses were conducted using The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS version 27.0; IBM Corp, 2017) Program and SEM was conducted via IBM Amos 27.0 in SPSS.

Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients among all variables.

Variable	M (SD)	α	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Left-wing Authoritarianism	2.68 (0.81)	.93
2 .Stress	5.39 (4.05)	.86	.11*
3. Anxiety	4.64 (4.75)	.81	.11*	.61**
4. Depression	2.66 (3.09)	.91	.12*	.70**	.63**
5. Sexism Awareness	4.91 (1.03)	.93	.48**	.22**	.06	.16**
6. White Privilege Awareness	4.05 (1.04)	.94	.62**	.10	.00	.03	.73**
7. Christian Privilege Awareness	4.48 (1.05)	.90	.50**	.10	.03	.09	.61**	.64**
8. Heterosexism Awareness	4.19 (1.07)	.95	.60**	21**	.12*	.15**	.71**	.76**	.68**
9. Care-Harm Foundation	4.80 (0.74)	.66	.45**	.16**	.16**	.14**	.47**	.44**	.33**	.41**
10. Fairness-Reciprocity Foundation	4.90 (0.65)	.64	.50**	.12*	.10	.10	.46**	.46**	.44**	.45**	.65**
11. Ingroup-Loyalty Foundation	2.86 (0.85)	.69	−.11	−.10	−.07	−.06	−.23**	−.29**	−.34**	−.28**	−.00	−.10
12. Authority-Respect Foundation	3.01 (0.92)	.75	−.26**	−.08	−.06	−.06	−.30**	−.36**	−.44*	−.34**	−.01	−.19**	.65**
13. Purity-Sanctity Foundation	2.72 (1.01)	.79	−.17**	−.08	−.05	−.03	−.15**	−.26**	−.39**	−.33**	.06	−.11	.59**	.60**
14. Positive Emotional Reactivity	33.04 (6.20)	.87	.09	−.19**	−.37**	−.17**	.18**	.19**	.10	.12*	.22**	.15**	.14*	15**	11*
15. Negative Emotional Reactivity	27.20 (7.90)	.90	.15**	.48**	.45**	.42**	−.12*	.08	.08	.11*	.15**	.10	−.05	.00	−.02	−.24**
16. Need for Cognitive Closure	146.25 (15.19)	.84	.41	.037	.00	−.01	.15**	−.14*	−.16**	−.08	.00	−.02	.23**	.28**	.20**	−.03	.22**

Note. N=299, ** p<.01; *p<.05

Results

Preliminary analysis

Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations between variables. As expected, LWA showed moderate to strong correlations with the PG dimensions (rs ranged from .48 for Sexism Awareness to .62 for White Privilege Awareness, ps < .001). LWA scores were significantly associated with the psychological distress indicators, although moderate in strength. Higher scores on the individualizing foundations were strongly correlated with higher levels of LWA, (Fairness r = .50, harm r = .45), while the binding foundations were negatively related to LWA. Negative emotional reactivity was positively correlated with LWA, and positive emotional reactivity demonstrated a negative association, although both showed modest relations. Notably, NFCC was insignificantly related to LWA, however the ambiguity subscale was positively correlated with LWA.

Model fit

Three structural models tested the directionality of the relationships between psychological distress, PG, NFCC, emotionality reactivity and LWA, although model fit was initially poor (Models A and C) or not achieved (Model B). Model A as depicted in Figure 1, was tested first and fit indices indicated that the model displayed poor fit (χ²/df = 4.80 [χ2(60) = CMIN: 287.679], CFI = .875; RMSEA = .11, NFI = .848; TLI = .837; AIC = 349.67 (90% CI = .100–.126). Model B, as shown in Figure 2, was not supported by the data (i.e. non-positive definite), and Model C as shown in Figure 3, also demonstrated poor fit (χ2/df = 6.163 [χ2 (60) = 369.800], CFI = .830, RMSEA = .13, NFI = .805, TLI = .779 (90% CI = .119–.145)). Although the fit of Model A was poor, however, this was better fitting than the other models. To improve the model fit, the modification indices for Model A indicated that a direct path from perceived grievance to the individualizing foundations was likely to improve fit. The final model, as shown in Model D (Figure 4) substantially improved the fit of the model (χ²/df = 3.060 [χ²(59) = 180.543], CFI = .933, RMSEA = .083, NFI = .90, TLI = .912 (90% CI = .069–.097). Along with the improvement in fit indices, the AIC decreased from Model A (AIC = 252.966) to the final model (AIC = 244.543), indicating the final model has a better fit and more parsimonious than the previous models. The final model (Model D) is shown in Figure 4 with standardized beta weights for the observed indicators and the latent factors of these relationships. All factor loadings were significant at p < .001. Overall, this model explained 53% of the variance in LWA. Strong direct effects were shown from PG to the individualizing foundations (β = .64, p < .001) and to LWA (β = .52, p < .001). However, a stronger indirect effect was shown (β = .68, p < .001) from PG to LWA via the individualizing foundations. This indicates that the individualizing foundations partially mediate the effects of PG on LWA. A moderately strong direct effect (β = .26, p < .001) was shown for the individualizing foundations to LWA, and mild indirect effects (β = .17, p < .001) were shown for psychological distress to LWA. The indirect effects of psychological distress on LWA were not mediated by emotional reactivity or NFCC, although NFCC independently demonstrated weak direct effects (β = .12, p < .001) on LWA, while psychological distress had strong direct effects (β = −.80, p < .001) on emotional reactivity.

Figure 4. Model D (Final model).

Discussion

The present study explored the factors that influence LWA and its relationship with PG and psychological distress. The final model (Model D) demonstrated an improved fit and explained 53% of the variance in LWA. Conceptually, the findings suggest that psychological distress mildly contributes to‬ LWA via PG, while PG, strongly contributes to LWA. Additionally, non-hypothesized mediating effects were observed from PG to the individualizing foundations and LWA. This demonstrates that individuals experiencing psychological distress are more likely to hold higher perceptions of grievance, which then contribute to authoritarian attitudes on the left. ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

Psychological distress and perceived grievance pathway

The final model supported the hypothesis that psychological distress has a positive relationship with LWA, which is mediated by PG. This is consistent with the claims that liberals and individuals high in LWA demonstrate increased levels of negative emotionality compared to individuals high in RWA.⁹⁰ Interestingly, however, only PG mediated the relationship between psychological distress and LWA. This demonstrates that individuals suffering from psychological distress are indeed drawn to narratives that essentialize oppression and social grievances which then contribute to LWA. Although the path from psychological distress to NFCC was non-significant, NFCC was significantly related to LWA, although this effect was mild in strength. Nevertheless, this is in line with emerging research on LWA⁹¹ and other findings which indicate that liberals can display decreased cognitive complexity and increased dogmatism.⁹² Recently, across five U.S. studies (total N = 1,049), Newman and Sargent revealed that liberalism was negatively associated with attitudinal ambivalence.⁹³ As demonstrated by previous work on both LWA and RWA, rigid thinking could simply be a feature of authoritarianism in its own right, that does not emerge from distress.

The strongest direct impact on LWA came from PG, providing support for the premise that PG, a feature of IP, constitutes a strong positive predictor of LWA. This is consistent with Fasce and Avendaño, who found that the promotion of grievance was inherent to left-wing IP.⁹⁴ The present findings are comparable to other research that has emphasized the role of perceived unfairness and injustice as key factors contributing to radicalization and extremism.⁹⁵ Essentially, individuals who perceive their group has been intentionally oppressed, and sense other groups enjoying greater degrees of justice, privilege, or status, may be motivated to redress these wrongdoings through extreme political action. To some extent, this ties into Merton’s ⁹⁶ concept of relative deprivation, and Durkheim’s notion of ‘anomie’ used to understand social deviance.⁹⁷ This model specifically demonstrated that a higher awareness of oppression and privilege in relation to race, gender, religion and sexual minorities is central to LWA. However, perceptions of grievance do not necessarily need to involve direct personal victimization or identification with an allegedly oppressed group. As seen in this study, the demographic characteristics (Table 1) indicate that the majority of the participants did not belong to any racial minorities. This suggests that group centered grievances that contribute to support for extreme behavior do not necessitate identification with group victimization, just a perception of social injustice.

These findings contradict the assumption that a leftist political orientation is antithetical to intolerance or authoritarianism, specifically.⁹⁸ Intriguingly, individuals high in LWA show prejudice toward historically targeted groups of oppression when these groups possess conservative or religious attitudes.⁹⁹ In three studies conducted among undergraduate and adult participants, Chambers et al. found that liberals exhibited negative attitudes toward African American groups when they expressed Conservative and Christian beliefs.¹⁰⁰Additionally, in another U.S. sample, Conway et al. found that LWA significantly predicted increased negative attitudes toward religious African Americans and Jews supportive of Israel.¹⁰¹ While left-wing individuals may like to consider themselves more open-minded, this research challenges that idea, showing that, like their conservative counterparts, left-wing authoritarians’ can express prejudice against the traditionally marginalized groups for whom they advocate.

Perceived grievance and the individualising pathway

In this study, an individual’s propensity for LWA was not only a direct function of their perceptions of grievance, but also impacted by their endorsement of the individualizing foundations, as depicted in Figure 4. Additionally, the impact of PG on LWA was partially mediated by the individualizing moral concerns. This demonstrates that the moralities held by left-wing authoritarians are consistent with left-wing partisans for whom the individual is the primary locus of moral value. This lends support to MFT and the moral foundations hypothesis, which suggests that left-wing individuals are more likely to prioritize the individualizing foundations over the binding foundations.¹⁰² The current findings broaden this premise to authoritarians on the left and demonstrate the mediating role individualistic moralities play in the relationship between PG and LWA. This is also compatible with the research findings in that a sense of grievance and injustice invoke moral emotions, particularly moral outrage.¹⁰³ Moreover, Lotz et al. suggests that, for some individuals, moral emotions and a sense of injustice drive the desire to punish or harm others.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, these findings are consistent with the mounting evidence demonstrating that morality is deeply implicated in political behavior.¹⁰⁵ In two studies comprising 24 739 U.S. participants, Koleva et al. found that the moral foundations explained more variance in political attitudes than age, gender, religious engagement, or interest in politics.¹⁰⁶ The intuitions based on MFT strongly predicted an individual’s stance on contentious issues including the death penalty, abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, immigration, and terrorism.¹⁰⁷

Tosi and Warmke proposed that moral grandstanding may be an important explanatory mechanism for understanding the increase in polarization and rise of cancel culture.¹⁰⁸ Through conducting six studies among undergraduate U.S samples, Grubbs et al. found initial support for the validity of moral grandstanding as a construct which was associated with greater daily political and moral conflict.¹⁰⁹ Moral grandstanding has been likened to ‘virtue signalling’, a term used to describe individuals who make publicized moral statements, often aired as condemnations of perceived offenses, to improve their reputation.¹¹⁰ Similarly, moral grandstanding involves a display of moral outrage used to either impress peer groups, dominate others, and seek social status. Grubbs et al. claim that when public discourse becomes dominated by status seeking goals, this can generate increased expressions of moral outrage, public shaming, and inflated moral claims.¹¹¹ Relatedly, studies on politicized social media activity have observed high levels of moralized emotional content and exaggerated expressions of outrage.¹¹² In a recent Twitter analysis on 12.7 million tweets from 7,331 users, Brady et al. found evidence to suggest that expressions of moral outrage on social media platforms, were being reinforced through social feedback and norm learning mechanisms.¹¹³ While extremists express more outrage than moderates, moderates are more susceptible to social reward and feedback that reinforces outrage expressions.¹¹⁴ Thus, moderates can be gradually radicalized through social media incentives which reward them for expressing more outrage over time. The impact of this increasingly dysfunctional social environment skews individuals toward an increasingly moralized, and rigid discourse. Attempting to achieve consensus and respect in spite of one’s differences looks far away.

This present study adds to the growing scholarship exploring LWA as a construct and extends it to IP. Political psychology research is typically conducted among North American samples and to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first model to utilize LWA in a sample outside the U.S. Collectively, the results appear to be consistent with the wider literature, and also lend support to MFT in relation to those on the extreme end. The findings from this study provide a unique contribution to understanding western political polarization and LWA in relation to IP.

Limitations and future directions

While the final model explained a substantial proportion of the variance in LWA, further work is necessary to understand LWA and IP. Although there is theoretical support for the hypothesized relationships, casual relations cannot be confirmed due to the cross-sectional nature of the study. As this study relied on survey data, these results do not extend beyond self-report measures which are susceptible to response biases. Despite a relatively balanced gender distribution, the sample was mostly Caucasian and highly skewed in terms of education, which reduces the samples representativeness and limits generalizability. No other political attitudes (e.g. social dominance orientation, RWA) were measured, which does not allow for a direct comparison between radical opponents. While perceptions of injustice could also be viewed as grievances, an awareness of oppression is not wholly equivalent with a perception of grievance. The POI is also limited by a lack of attention to social class, and as it becomes dated, it does not capture the more contemporary elements of activism implicated in the identity-based social justice left. Future studies should consider the influence of other related post-modern ideologies in relation to authoritarianism, including Critical Race Theory, and various feminisms and gender theories. Additionally, there are some conceptual concerns with the MFQ. Items on the Purity/Sanctity subscale may include content that could conflate the moral domain with other constructs such as religiosity. Left-leaning individuals have been found to use purity in their moral thinking for environmental issues,¹¹⁵ yet they generally score lower on these existing measures of purity which may overlook liberal or non-religious ideas of purity.

Studies examining the relationship between psychological wellbeing and authoritarianism are still limited. Future research should attempt to clarify the relation between psychological distress and authoritarianism and the emotional profiles of both LWA and RWA. Additionally, further work is needed to clarify whether IP attracts psychologically vulnerable individuals or whether adherence to IP reinforces psychological mechanisms that contribute to psychological distress. While researchers have explored the polarization between partisan groups, few studies have investigated the mechanisms which could help overcome this divisive moral warfare. Future research should examine the influence of educational programs on reducing authoritarian tendencies and promoting civil discourse. Given the influence of IP on university campuses, higher education institutions need to consider the potential negative consequences of having campus discourse and education curriculums guided by ideology. It is imperative that educational institutions foster inclusive environments that embrace viewpoint diversity, encourage respectful debate and constructive disagreement in the classroom. To promote healthier social environments, education leaders need to actively commit to promoting intellectual environments that make civil discourse a priority and a norm.

Conclusion

This study explored the factors that influence LWA and specifically, its relationship with perceived grievance and psychological distress. Three structural models were used to examine the potential emotional, cognitive, and moral factors that influence LWA. Results of the final model revealed that psychological distress does mildly contribute to‬ LWA through perceived grievance, but it is perceived grievance, a key element of IP, that strongly contributes to LWA. The present results highlight that perceptions of social grievance, and individualistic ideas of morality are central to LWA. For decades, scholars have argued that authoritarianism is antithetical to leftism. However, this study complements recent research findings which demonstrate how leftists are indeed vulnerable to authoritarianism, particularly within the identity-based social justice left. While this understanding may not be comprehensive, it allows for insight into the psychological profile of those holding extreme political attitudes on the often-overlooked left side of the spectrum.‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

Author contributions

Savannah Love contributed to the conceptualization, design and methodology of the study and collected the data.

Dr Rachael Sharman contributed to the conceptualization, design and methodology and recruitment for the study.

All authors had significant contributions in the writing and editing of the final paper and approved the final manuscript as submitted.

Availability of data and material

Stored on the University of the Sunshine Coast’s Research (R) network drive. Dataset unavailable as we do not have ethics permission to make public.

Compliance with ethical standards

Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study. All procedures involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Sunshine Coast (approval number: S211569) and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Acknowledgment

The authors would like to acknowledge Dr Prue Millear for supervision in the development of hypothesized path models and analysis of the data.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. J. T. Moss and P. J. O’Connor, ‘The Dark Triad traits predict authoritarian political correctness and alt-right attitudes’, Heliyon, 6(7) (2020), p. e04453. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e04453. J. T. Moss and P. J. O’Connor, ‘Political correctness and the alt-right: The development of extreme political attitudes’, PLOS ONE, 15(10) (2020), p. e0239259. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239259. J. Phillips and J. Yi, ‘Charlottesville paradox: The “liberalizing” alt-right, “authoritarian” left, and politics of dialogue’ Society (New Brunswick), 55(3) (2018), pp. 221–228. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-018-0243-0

2. Pew Research Center. (2014). Political polarization in the American public. https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/. Pew Research Center. (2017). The partisan divide on political values grows even wider. https://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/

3. S. Dulesh, ‘The regressive left and dialectics’, Humanist Perspectives, 202 (2017), https://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+Regressive+Left+and+Dialectics.-a0523137821. D. Haynes, ‘Sacrificing women and immigrants on the altar of regressive politics’, Human Rights Quarterly, 41(4) (2019), pp. 777–822. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2019.0062

4. G. P. Magarian, ‘When audiences object: Free speech and campus speaker protests’, University of Colorado Law Review, 90(2) (2019), pp. 551–592. J. Russomanno, ‘Tribalism on campus: Factions, iGen and the threat to free speech’, Communication Law and Policy, 24(4) (2019), pp. 539–586. https://doi.org/10.1080/10811680.2019.1660554

5. S. M. Harris, ‘Black Lives Matter to systemic family therapists,’ Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 46(3) (2020), pp. 383–384. https://doi.org/10.nn/jmft.12445. C. Rosen, ‘Mostly peaceful: The birth of an excuse’, Commentary, 150(3) (2020), pp. 11–12. https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.usc.edu.au/magazines/mostly-peaceful-birth-excuse/docview/2449674266/se-2?accountid=28745

6. M. Hetherington, and J. Weiler, Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009). J. Wronski, A. Bankert, K. Amira, A. Johnson, and L. Levitan, ‘A tale of two democrats: How authoritarianism divides the democratic party’, The Journal of Politics, 80(4) (2018), pp. 1384–1388. https://doi.org/10.1086/699338

7. T. Adorno, E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D. Levinson, and N. Sanford, The authoritarian personality. (Harper, 1950). B. Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Spectre (Harvard University Press, 1996).

8. B. Altemeyer, Right-wing authoritarianism (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1981). J. T. Crawford, and M. J. Brandt, ‘Ideological (A)symmetries in prejudice and intergroup bias’, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, 34 (2020), pp. 40–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/. H. M. Crowson, ‘Are all conservatives alike? A study of the psychological correlates of cultural and economic conservatism’, The Journal of Psychology, 143(5) (2009), pp. 449–463. https://doi.org/10.3200/JRL.143.5.449–463. J. Duckitt, B. Bizumic, S. W. Krauss, and E. Heled, ‘A tripartite approach to right-wing authoritarianism: The authoritarianism-conservatism-traditionalism model’, Political Psychology, 31(5) (2010), pp. 685–715. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467–9221.2010.00781.x. M. Rokeach, The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems. (Basic Books, 1960). A. Van Hiel, E. Onraet, and S. De Pauw, ‘The relationship between social-cultural attitudes and behavioral measures of cognitive style: A meta-analytic integration of studies: Social-cultural attitudes and cognitive style’, Journal of Personality, 78(6) (2010), pp. 1765–1800. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467–6494.2010.00669.x

9. K. Stenner, The authoritarian dynamic (Cambridge University Press, 2005).

10. Stenner, ibid., p. 269.

11. G. Bouvier, ‘Racist callouts and cancel culture on Twitter: The limitations of the platform’s ability to define issues of social justice’, Discourse, Context & Media, 38 (2020), pp. 100431. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcm.2020.100431. Moss, and O’Connor, ‘Political correctness and the alt-right’, op. cit., Ref. 2., p. 3. B. Wu, ‘Doxed: Impact of online threats on women including private details being exposed and “swatting”. Plus, Greg Lukianoff on balancing offence and free speech.’ Index on Censorship, 44(3) (2020), pp. 46–49. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306422015605714

12. M. Bernstein, ‘Identity politics’, Annual Review of Sociology, 31(1) (2005), pp. 47–74. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100054. E. Diamond, ‘Identity politics then and now’. Theatre Research International, 37(1) (2012), pp. 64–67. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0307883311000770. P. Klandermans, ‘Identity politics and politicized identities: Identity processes and the dynamics of protest’, Political Psychology, 35(1) (2013), pp. 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12167

13. C. Clark and B. Winegard, ‘Tribalism in war and peace: The nature and evolution of ideological epistemology and its significance for modern social science’, Psychological Inquiry, 31(1) (2020), pp. 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2020.1721233

14. J. Graham, J. Haidt, and B. A Nosek, ‘Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96 (2009), pp. 1029–1046. https://doi-org.ezproxy.usc.edu.au/10.1037/a0015141.

15. J. Haidt and C. Joseph, ‘Intuitive ethics: How innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues.’ Daedalus, 133(4) (2004), pp. 55–66. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027945.

16. B. Doğruyol, S. Alper and O. Yilmaz, ‘The five-factor model of the Moral Foundations Theory is stable across WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures’, Personality and Individual Differences, 151 (2019), p. 109547. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109547

17. M. V. Day, S. T. Fiske, E. L. Downing and Trail, T. E., ‘Shifting liberal and conservative attitudes using moral foundations theory’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12) (2014), pp. 1559–1573. https://doi.org//10.1177/0146167214551152. K. R. Kim, J-S. Kang and S. Yun, ‘Moral intuitions and political orientation: similarities and differences between South Korea and the United States’, Psychological Reports, 111(1) (2012), pp. 173–185. https://doi.org/10.2466/17.09.21.PR0.111.4.173–185. J. Kivikangas, J. Lönnqvist and N. Ravaja, ‘Relationship of moral foundations to political liberalism-conservatism and left-right orientation in a Finnish representative sample’, Social Psychology (Göttingen, Germany), 48(4) (2017), pp. 246–251. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864–9335/a000297. M. Kugler, J. Jost and S. Noorbaloochi, ‘Another look at moral foundations theory: Do authoritarianism and social dominance orientation explain liberal-conservative differences in ‘moral’ intuitions? Social Justice Research, 27(4) (2014), pp. 413–431. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-014-0223-5. D. P. McAdams, M. Albaugh, E. Farber, J. Daniels, R. L. Logan and B. Olson, ‘Family metaphors and moral intuitions: How conservatives and liberals narrate their lives’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(4) (2008), pp. 978–990. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012650. A. Nilsson and A. Erlandsson, ‘The moral foundations taxonomy: Structural validity and relation to political ideology in Sweden’, Personality and Individual Differences, 76 (2015), pp. 28–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.11.049

18. Graham, Haidt and Nosek, ‘Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations’, op. cit., Ref. 14, pp. 1032–1037. McAdams et al. ‘Family metaphors and moral intuitions’, op. cit., Ref. 17, pp. 987–988.

19. J. Haidt and J. Graham, ‘When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize’, Social Justice Research, 20 (2007), pp. 98–116. https://doi-org.ezproxy.usc.edu.au/10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z

20. J. Lane, K. McCaffree and F. L. Shults, ‘The moral foundations of left-wing authoritarianism: On the character, cohesion, and clout of tribal equalitarian discourse’, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 23(1–2) (2021), pp. 65–97.

21. J. Graham and J. Haidt, ‘Sacred values and evil adversaries: A moral foundations approach’. In Shaver P. & Mikulincer M. (Eds.), The social psychology of morality: Exploring the causes of good and evil (American Psychological Association, 2012).

22. A. Fasce and D. Avendaño, ‘Left-wing identity politics and authoritarian attitudes: a correlational study of social media users’, Journal of Political Ideologies. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2023.2246914. M. Moran, ‘(Un)troubling identity politics: A cultural materialist intervention’, European Journal of Social Theory, 23(2) (2020), pp. 258–277. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431018819722. H. Pluckrose and J. Lindsay, Cynical theories: How activist scholarship made everything about race, gender, and identity – and why this harms everybody (Durham: Pitchstone Publishing, 2020).

23. Pluckrose and Lindsay, ibid, p. 14. Diamond, ‘Identity politics’, op. cit., Ref. 29, pp. 64–66.

24. E. Bonilla-Silva, ‘Rethinking racism: Toward a structural interpretation’, American Sociological Review, 62(3) (1997), pp. 465–480. https://doi.org/10.2307/2657316. B. Campbell and J. Manning, The rise of victimhood culture: Microaggressions, safe spaces, and the new culture wars (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

25. M. J. McClellan, L. P. Montross-Thomas, P. Remer, Y. Nakai and A. D. Monroe, ‘Development and validation of the awareness of privilege and oppression scale–2. Sage Open, 9(2) (2019). https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019853906

26. Fasce and Avendaño, ‘Left-wing identity politics’, op. cit., Ref. 22, p. 12.

27. Magarian, ‘When audiences object’, op. cit., Ref. 4, pp. 551–554. E. Kaufmann, ‘Academic freedom in crisis: Punishment, political discrimination, and self-censorship’. Centre for the study of Partisanship and Ideology. (2021). https://cspicenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/AcademicFreedom.pdf

28. W. J. Brady, K. McLoughlin, T. N. Doan and M.J Crockett, ‘How social learning amplifies moral outrage expression in online social networks’, Science Advances, 7(33) (2021). https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abe5641

29. C. Andary-Brophy, Political correctness: Social-fiscal liberalism and left-wing authoritarianism [Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, 2015]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. Moss, and O’Connor, ‘The Dark Triad traits’, op. cit., Ref. 1., pp. 3–4. Moss, and O’Connor, ‘Political correctness’, op. cit., Ref. 1., pp. 14–18.

30. R. Shibley, ‘Vindictive protectiveness on campus’, Society, 53 (2016), pp. 375–382. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-016-0031-7

31. G. Lukianoff and J. Haidt, The coddling of the American mind: How good intentions and bad ideas are setting up a generation for failure (Penguin, 2018).

32. A. C. Puliafico and P. C. Kendall, ‘Threat-related attentional bias in anxious youth: a review’, Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review, 9(3–4) (2006), pp. 162–180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10567-006-0009-x

33. G. Lukianoff and J. Haidt, ‘The coddling of the American mind’, The Atlantic, 316(2) (2015), pp. 42–52.

34. Bouvier, ‘Racist callouts’, op. cit., Ref. 11., p. 1. R. Chiou, ‘We need deeper understanding about the neurocognitive mechanisms of moral righteousness in an era of online vigilantism and cancel culture’ AJOB Neuroscience, 11(4) (2020), pp. 297–299. https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2020.1830872

35. Kaufmann, ‘Academic freedom’, op. cit., Ref. 27., pp. 21–24.

36. S. Iyengar, G. Sood and Y. Lelkes, ‘Affect, not ideology: A social identity perspective on polarization’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 76(3) (2012), pp. 405–431. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs038

37. L. G. Conway, S. Houck, L. Gornick and M. Repke, ‘Finding the loch ness monster: Left‐wing authoritarianism in the United States’, Political Psychology, 39(5) (2018), pp. 1049–1067. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12470. L. G. Conway, A. Zubrod, L. Chan, J. McFarland and E. Van de Vliert, ‘Is the myth of left-wing authoritarianism itself a myth? Frontiers in Psychology, 13 (2023), pp. 1041391–1041391. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1041391. Fasce and Avendaño, ‘Left-wing identity politics’, op. cit., Ref. 22., pp. 12–13. J. Manson, ‘Right-wing authoritarianism, left-wing authoritarianism, and pandemic-mitigation authoritarianism’, Personality and Individual Differences, 167 (2020), pp. 110251–110251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110251

38. Conway et al. ‘Finding the loch ness monster’, op. cit., Ref. 37., pp. 1057–1058.

39. Conway et al. ‘Myth of left-wing authoritarianism’ op. cit., Ref. 37., pp. 7–12.

40. Conway et al. ibid., p. 7. A. Mirisola, M. Roccato, S. Russo, G. Spagna and A. Vieno, ‘Societal threat to safety, compensatory control, and right-wing authoritarianism’, Political Psychology, 35(6) (2014), pp. 795–812. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12048

41. Stenner, The authoritarian dynamic, op. cit., Ref. 9., pp. 269–270.

42. T.H. Costello, S. Bowes, S. T. Stevens, I. Waldman, A. Tasimi and S. O. Lilienfeld, S, ‘Clarifying the structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 122 (1) (2022), pp. 135–170. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000341

43. Costello et al. ‘Structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 42., p. 160.

44. Costello et al. ‘Structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 42., pp. 150–163.

45. J. Baron and J. T. Jost, ‘False equivalence: Are liberals and conservatives in the United States equally biased?’ Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14(2) (2019), pp. 292–303. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691618788876. Conway et al. ‘Finding the loch ness monster’, op. cit., Ref. 37., p. 1063. M. Rollwage, R. Dolan and S. Fleming, ‘Metacognitive failure as a feature of those holding radical beliefs’, Current Biology, 28(24) (2018), pp. 4014–4021.e8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.10.053. L. Zmigrod, P. Rentfrow and T. Robbins, ‘The partisan mind: Is extreme political partisanship related to cognitive inflexibility? Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 149(3) (2020), pp. 407–418. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge000

46. B. Bakker, G. Schumacher and M. Rooduijn, ‘Hot Politics? Affective responses to political rhetoric’, The American Political Science Review, 115(1) (2020), pp. 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000519. J. Frimer, L. Skitka and M. Motyl, ‘Liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid exposure to one another’s opinions’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 72 (2017), pp. 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2017.04.003.

47. Costello et al. ‘Structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 42., pp. 163–164.

48. B. Duriez, T. A. Klimstra, K. Luyckx, W. Beyers and B. Soenens, ‘Right‐wing authoritarianism: Protective factor against or risk factor for depression?’ European Journal of Personality, 26(5) (2012), pp. 536–549. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.853. E. Onraet, A. Van Hiel, K. Dhont, G. Hodson, M. Schittekatte and S. De Pauw,‘The association of cognitive ability with right‐wing ideological attitudes and prejudice: A meta‐analytic review’, European Journal of Personality, 29(6) (2015), pp. 599–621. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2027. A. Schlachter and J. Duckitt, ‘Psychopathology, authoritarian attitudes, and prejudice’, South African Journal of Psychology, 32(2) (2002), pp. 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1177/008124630203200201

49. Duriez et al. ‘Right-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 48., pp. 6. Schlachter and Duckitt, ‘Psychopathology, authoritarian attitudes, and prejudice’’, op. cit., Ref. 48., pp. 545.

50. E. Onraet, A. Van Hiel and K. Dhont, ‘The relationship between right-wing ideological attitudes and psychological well-being. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(4) (2013), pp. 509–522. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213478199. J. Hirsh, C. DeYoung, X. Xu and J. Peterson, ‘Compassionate liberals and polite conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology and moral values’, Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(5) (2010), pp. 655–664. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210366854. J. L. Napier and J. T. Jost, ‘Why are conservatives happier than liberals?’ Psychological Science, 19(6) (2008), pp. 565–572. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467–9280.2008.02124.x. B. R. Schlenker, J. R. Chambers and B.M. Lee, ‘Conservatives are happier than liberals, but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction’, Journal of Research in Personality, 46(2) (2012), pp. 127–146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2011.12.009. A. Van Hiel and L. Brebels, ‘Conservatism is good for you: Cultural conservatism protects self-esteem in older adults’, Personality and Individual Differences, 50(1) (2011), pp. 120–123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.09.002.

51. Costello et al. ‘Structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 42., p. 163.

52. M. Schmitt, M. Gollwitzer, J. Maes and D. Arbach, ‘Justice sensitivity’, European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 21(3) (2005), pp. 202–211. https://doi.org/10.1027/1015–5759.21.3.202

53. G. Hodson and M. A. Busseri, ‘Bright minds and dark attitudes: Lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice through right-wing ideology and low intergroup contact’, Psychological Science, 23(2) (2012), pp. 187–195. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611421206. J. Jost, J. Glaser, A. Kruglanski and F. Sulloway, ‘Political conservatism as motivated social cognition’, Psychological Bulletin, 129(3) (2003), pp. 339–375. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033–2909.129.3.339

54. J. Demanet, B. Liefooghe and F. Verbruggen, ‘Valence, arousal, and cognitive control: A voluntary task-switching study’, Frontiers in Psychology, 2 (2011), p. 336. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00336. U. Schimmack and D. Derryberry, ‘Attentional interference effects of emotional pictures: Threat, negativity, or arousal?’ Emotion, 5(1) (2005), pp. 55–66. https://doi.org/10.1037/1528–3542.5.1.55

55. F. Strack and R. Deutsch, ‘Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8(3) (2004), pp. 220–247. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1

56. R. Y. Hong and M. W. L. Cheung, ‘The structure of cognitive vulnerabilities to depression and anxiety: Evidence for a common core etiological process based on a meta-analytic review’, Clinical Psychological Science, 3(6) (2015), pp. 892–912. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702614553789. J. W. Van Prooijen, A. P. M. Krouwel, A. Boiten and L. Eendebak, ‘Fear among the extremes: How political ideology predicts negative emotions and outgroup derogation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(4) (2015), pp. 485–497. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215569706

57. K. Bhui, M. Otis, M. J. Silva, K. Halvorsrud, M. Freestone and E. Jones, ‘Extremism and common mental illness: Cross-sectional community survey of white British and Pakistani men and women living in England’, The British Journal of Psychiatry: The Journal of Mental Science, 217(4) (2020), pp. 547–554. https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.2019.14. P. Gill, J. Horgan and P. Deckert, P. ‘Bombing alone: Tracing the motivations and antecedent behaviors of lone-actor terrorists’, Journal of Forensic Sciences, 59(2) (2014), pp. 425–435. https://doi.org/10.1111/1556–4029.12312.

G. Lafree, M. Jensen, P. James and A. Safer-Lichtenstein, ‘Correlates of violent political extremism in the United States’, Criminology (Beverly Hills), 56(2) (2018), pp. 233–268. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745–9125.12169

58. Fasce and Avendaño, ‘Left-wing identity politics’, op. cit., Ref. 22, p. 3.

59. Fasce and Avendaño, ibid., p. 12.

60. B. Sizoo, D. Strijbos and G. Gerrit, ‘Grievance-fueled violence can be better understood using an enactive approach’, Frontiers in Psychology, 13 (2022), https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.997121

61. E. Corner, P. Gill, R. Schouten and F. Farnham, ‘Mental disorders, personality traits, and grievance-fueled targeted violence: the evidence base and implications for research and practice’, Journal of Personality Assessment, 100(5) (2018), pp. 459–470. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2018.1475392. K. Dyrstad and S. Hillesund, ‘Explaining support for political violence: Grievance and perceived opportunity’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(9) (2020), pp. 1724–1753. M. T. Pathé, D. J. Haworth, T. Goodwin, A. G. Holman, S. J. Amos, S. J. P. Winterbourne and L. Day, ‘Establishing a joint agency response to the threat of lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence’, Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 29(1) (2018), pp. 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2017.1335762

62. M. Bal and K. Van Den Bos, ‘From system acceptance to embracing alternative systems and system rejection: Tipping points in processes of radicalization’, Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 3(3) (2017), pp. 241–253. http://doi.org/10.1037/tps0000123. B. Doosje, A. Loseman and K. Van Den Bos, ‘Determinants of radicalization of Islamic youth in the Netherlands: Personal uncertainty, perceived injustice, and perceived group threat’, Journal of Social Issues, 69(3) (2013), pp. 586–604. https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12030. A. W. Kruglanski, M. J. Gelfand, J. J. Bélanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hetiarachchi and R. Gunaratna, ‘The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: how significance quest impacts violent extremism’, Political Psychology, 35 (2014), pp. 69–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12163

63. M. Noor, N. Shnabel, S. Halabi and A. Nadler, ‘When suffering begets suffering: The psychology of competitive victimhood between adversarial groups in violent conflicts’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 16(4) (2012), pp. 351–374. M. Noor, J. Vollhardt, S. Mari and A. Nadler, ‘The social psychology of collective victimhood’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 47(2) (2017), pp. 121–134. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2300

64. A. Speckhard and M.D. Ellenberg, ‘ISIS in their own words: recruitment history, motivations for joining, travel, experiences in ISIS, and disillusionment over time – analysis of 220 in-depth interviews of ISIS returnees, defectors and prisoners’, Journal of Strategic Security, 13(1) (2020), pp. 82–127. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944–0472.13.1.1791

65. Costello et al. ‘Structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 42. p. 147.

66. Costello et al. ibid., pp. 149–150.

67. D. G. Hays, Y. C. Chang and S. L. Decker, ‘Initial development and psychometric data for the Privilege and Oppression Inventory’, Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 40(2) (2007), pp. 66–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/07481756.2007.11909806

68. R. Byrd and D. Hays, ‘Evaluating a safe space training for school counsellors and trainees using a randomized control group design’, Professional School Counseling, 17(1) (2013), pp. 2156759. https://doi.org/10.1177/2156759X0001700103. J. Garrett-Walker, M. S. Poole, S. L. Williams, C. J. Banks, J. A. Stallings, K. Balgobin and D. P. Moore, ‘Racial colour-blindness and privilege awareness in relation to interest in social justice among college students’, Journal Committed to Social Change on Race and Ethnicity, 4(2) (2018), pp. 38–64. https://doi.org/10.15763/issn.2642–2387.2018.4.2.38–63. Fasce and Avendaño, ‘Left-wing identity politics’, op. cit., Ref. 22, p. 6.

69. Hays et al. ‘Initial development and psychometric data’, op. cit., Ref. 67, p. 75,

70. P. F. Lovibond and S. H. Lovibond, ‘The structure of negative emotional states: Comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the Beck Depression and Anxiety Inventories’, Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(3) (1995), pp. 335–343.

71. M. M. Antony, P. J. Bieling, B. J. Cox, M. W. Enns and R. P. Swinson, ‘Psychometric properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions DASS of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales in clinical groups and a community sample’, Psychological Assessment, 10(2) (1998), pp. 176–181. I. Clara, B. Cox and M. Enns, ‘Confirmatory factor analysis of the depression – anxiety – stress scales in depressed and anxious patients’, Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 23(1) (2001), pp. 61–67. J. Henry and J. Crawford, ‘The short‐form version of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS‐21): Construct validity and normative data in a large non‐clinical sample’, British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44(2) (2005), pp. 227–239. P. J. Norton, ‘Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS-21): Psychometric analysis across four racial groups’, Anxiety, Stress, & Coping: An International Journal, 20 (2007), pp. 253–265. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10615800701309279

72. D. Lee, ‘The convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21)’, Journal of Affective Disorders, 259 (2009), pp. 136–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2019.06.036

73. J. Graham, B. A. Nosek, J. Haidt, R. Iyer, S. Koleva and P. H. Ditto, ‘Mapping the moral domain’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2) (2011), pp. 366–385. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847

74. Graham et al. ‘Mapping the moral domain’, op. cit., Ref. 73, p. 371.

75. Graham et al. ibid. p. 372.

76. D. Preece, R. Becerra and G. Campitelli, ‘Assessing emotional reactivity: Psychometric properties of the Perth emotional reactivity scale and the development of a short form’, Journal of Personality Assessment, 101(6) (2019), pp. 589–597. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2018.1465430

77. M. K. Nock, M. M. Wedig, E. B. Holmberg and J. M. Hooley, ‘The emotion reactivity scale: Development, evaluation, and relation to self-injurious thoughts and behaviors’, Behavior Therapy, 39(2) (2008), pp. 107–116. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2007.05.005

78. Preece et al. ‘Assessing emotional reactivity’ op. cit., Ref. 76, p. 593.

79. Preece et al., ibid., p. 593.

80. A. W. Kruglanski, M. N. Atash, E. De Grada, L. Mannetti and A. Pierro, ‘Need for Closure Scale’. Measurement instrument database for the social science (2013). www.midss.ie

81. H. J. Eysenck, ‘The science of personality: Nomothetic’, Psychological Review, 61 (1954), pp. 339–342.

82. D. Webster and A. Kruglanski, ‘Individual differences in need for cognitive closure’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6) (1994), pp. 1049–1062. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022–3514.67.6.1049

83. P. Barrett, ‘Structural equation modelling: Adjudging model fit’, Personality and Individual Differences, 42(5) (2007), pp. 815–824. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.09.018. A. L. Comrey and H. B. Lee, A first course in factor analysis (Psychology Press, 2013). M. S. Garver and J. T. Mentzer, ‘Logistics research methods: Employing structural equation modelling to test for construct validity’, Journal of Business Logistics, 20(1) (1999), pp. 33–57. https://www-proquest-com.ezproxy.usc.edu.au/scholarly-journals/logistics-research-methods-employing-structural/docview/212605730/se-2?accountid=28745.

84. R. H. Hoyle, Structural equation modeling: Concepts, issues, and applications (Sage, 1995).

85. R. B. Kline, Principles And Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (3rd ed.). (Guilford Press, 2011).

86. M. W. Browne and R. Cudeck, ‘Alternative ways of assessing model fit’, Sociological Methods & Research, 21(2) (1992), pp. 230–258. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124192021002005

87. B. M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modelling with EQS and EQS/Windows: Basic Concepts, Applications, and Programming (Sage, 1994).

88. B. Tabachnick and L. Fidell, Using multivariate statistics (6th ed.). (Boston: Pearson Education, 2013).

89. A. P. Field, Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics (5th ed.). (Sage: Newbury Park, 2018).

90. C. Burton, J. Plaks and J. Peterson, ‘Why do conservatives report being happier than liberals? The contribution of neuroticism’, Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 3(1) (2015), pp. 89–102. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v3i1.117 Costello et al. ‘Structure and nature of left-wing authoritarianism’, op. cit., Ref. 42., p. 163.

91. Costello et al. ibid., p. 163. Conway et al. ‘Finding the loch ness monster’, op. cit., Ref. 37., p. 1058. Conway et al. ‘Myth of left-wing authoritarianism’ op. cit., Ref. 37., p. 7.

92. L. G. Conway, L. J. Gornick, S. C. Houck, C. Anderson, J. Stockert, D. Sessoms and K. McCue, ‘Are conservatives really more simple‐minded than liberals? The domain specificity of complex thinking’, Political Psychology, 37(6) (2016), pp. 777–798. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12304. S. C. Houck and L. G. Conway, ‘Strategic communication and the integrative complexity-ideology relationship: Meta-analytic findings reveal differences between public politicians and private citizens in their use of simple rhetoric’, Political Psychology, 40(5) (2019), pp. 1119–1141. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12583

93. L. S. Newman and R. H. Sargent, ‘Liberals report lower levels of attitudinal ambivalence than conservatives’, Social Psychological & Personality Science, 12(5) (2021), pp. 780–788. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620939798

94. Fasce and Avendaño, ‘Left-wing identity politics’, op. cit., Ref. 22, p. 12–13.

95. Bal and Van Den Bos, ‘From system acceptance’, op. cit., Ref. 62, p. 244–245. A. W. Kruglanski, M. J. Gelfand, J. J. Bélanger, A. Sheveland, M. Hetiarachchi and R. Gunaratna, ‘The psychology of radicalization and deradicalization: how significance quest impacts violent extremism’, Political Psychology, 35(S1) (2014), pp. 69–93. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12163. K. Van Den Bos, ‘Unfairness and radicalization’, Annual Review of Psychology, 71 (2020), pp. 563–588. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419–050953. Doosje et al. ‘Determinants of radicalization’ op. cit., Ref. 62, pp. 598–599.

96. R. Merton, ‘Social structure and anomie’, American Sociological Review, 3(5) (1938), pp. 672–682. https://doi.org/10.2307/2084686

97. E. Durkheim, Suicide, a study in sociology (2nd ed.). (Routledge, 1897)

98. W. F. Stone, ‘The myth of left-wing authoritarianism’, Political Psychology, 2(3/4) (1980), pp. 3–19. https://doi.org/10.2307/3790998. L. Weinrib, ‘Against intolerance: The red scare roots of legal liberalism’, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 18(1) (2019), pp. 7–31. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781418000580. B. Altemeyer, ‘The other “authoritarian personality”’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30 (1998), pp. 47–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065–2601(08)60382–2

99. J. R. Chambers, B. R. Schlenker and B. Collisson, ‘Ideology and prejudice: The role of value conflicts’, Psychological Science, 24(2) (2013), pp. 140–149. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612447820. Conway et al. ‘Myth of left-wing authoritarianism’ op. cit., Ref. 37, p. 13.

100. Chambers, ‘Ideology and prejudice’, op. cit., Ref. 99, p. 146–147.

101. Conway et al. ‘Myth of left-wing authoritarianism’ op. cit., Ref. 37, p. 13.

102. Graham et al. ‘Mapping the moral domain’, op. cit., Ref. 73, pp. 368–369.

103. N. T. Feather, ‘Deservingness and emotions: Applying the structural model of deservingness to the analysis of affective reactions to outcomes’, European Review of Social Psychology, 17(1) (2006), pp. 38–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280600662321. S. Lotz, A. Baumert, T. Schlösser, F. Gresser and D. Fetchenhauer, ‘Individual differences in third-party interventions: How justice sensitivity shapes altruistic punishment: individual differences in third-party interventions’, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 4(4) (2011), pp. 297–313. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750–4716.2011.00084.x

104. Lotz et al. ‘Individual differences in third-party interventions’, op. cit., Ref. 103, pp. 307–308.

105. Brady et al. ‘How social learning amplifies moral outrage’ op. cit., Ref. 28, p. 5. Kivikangas et al. ‘Relationship of moral foundations’, op. cit., Ref. 17, p. 250. Day et al. ‘Shifting liberal and conservative attitudes’, op. cit., Ref. 17, p. 1569. P. Milesi, ‘Moral foundations and political attitudes: The moderating role of political sophistication: Moral foundations and political sophistication’, International Journal of Psychology, 51(4) (2016), pp. 252–260. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12158

106. S. P. Koleva, J. Graham, R. Iyer, P. H. Ditto and J. Haidt, ‘Tracing the threads: How five moral concerns (especially purity) help explain culture war attitudes’, Journal of Research in Personality. 46(2) (2012), pp. 184–194. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.01.006.

107. Koleva, ibid., pp. 191–192.

108. J. Tosi, and B. Warmke, ‘Moral grandstanding’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 44(3) (2016), pp. 197–217, https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12075

109. J. B. Grubbs, B. Warmke, J. Tosi, A. S. James and W. K. Campbell, ‘Moral grandstanding in public discourse: Status-seeking motives as a potential explanatory mechanism in predicting conflict’, PLOS ONE, 14(10) (2019), p. e0223749. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223749

110. E. Westra, ‘Virtue signalling and moral progress’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 49(2) (2021), pp. 156–178. https://doi.org/10.1111/papa.12187

111. Grubbs et al. ‘Moral grandstanding’, op. cit., Ref. 109, pp. 3–4.

112. R. Karlsen, K. Steen-Johnsen, D. Wollebæk and B. Enjolras, ‘Echo chamber and trench warfare dynamics in online debates’, European Journal of Communication (London), 32(3) (2017), pp. 257–273. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323117695734. C. A. Bail, L. P. Argyle, T. W. Brown, J. P. Bumpus, H. Chen, M. B. F. Hunzaker, J. Lee, M. Mann, F. Merhout and A. Volfocsky, ‘Exposure to opposing views on social media can increase political polarization’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115(37) (2018), pp. 9216–9221. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1804840115. W. J. Brady, J. A. Wills, J. T. Jost, J. A. Tucker and J. J. Van Bavel, ‘Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 114(28) (2017), pp. 7313–7318. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1618923114

113. Brady et al. ‘How social learning amplifies moral outrage’ op. cit., Ref. 28, pp. 7–9.

114. Brady et al. ibid., p. 5.

115. J. A. Frimer, C. E. Tell and J. Haidt, ‘Liberals condemn sacrilege too: The harmless desecration of Cerro Torre’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(8) (2015), pp. 878–886. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550615597974. J. Rottman, ‘Breaking down biocentrism: two distinct forms of moral concern for nature’, Frontiers in Psychology, 5 (2014), p. 905. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00905